Patterson proposes that grantees of premises under deeds providing for their assumption of mortgages on the premises shall not be bound thereby unless they subscribe the deeds.- Everybody proposes to amend the Code of Procedure passim. THE NOTES OF CASES. THE case of Jordan v. Hovey, Missouri Supreme Court, February 7, 1881, 12 Cent. L. J. 215, seems quite novel. The plaintiff alleged that she was a servant in the hotel of defendant, and that while such servant, she and H., a minor son of defendant, mutually promised each other marriage; that during the existence of said contract the defendant unlawfully, wrongfully, and negligently, advised and encouraged plaintiff to have sexual intercourse with H., assuring her that it would be neither criminal nor improper; that relying upon said advice, and upon the promise of marriage, she permitted H. to have sexual intercourse with her twice on or near July 4, 1875; and on July 15 following, said H. repudiated his contract of marriage, and refused to marry plaintiff. The petition concluded that on account of the advice and negligent conduct of defendant, and the violation of the marriage contract by H., the plaintiff was thrown out of employment for six months or more, and otherwise damaged in the sum of $4,000, for which judgment was asked. Plaintiff recovered judgment below. Held, that as the plaintiff could not maintain an action against her seducer (Roper v. Clay, 18 Mo. 383; Paul v. Frazier, 3 Mass. 71), she could not maintain it against one who, by immoral and impure advice, assisted in her seduction. Plaintiff could have maintained an action against H. for breach of promise of marriage, provided he did not plead infancy, and the seduction might have been given in evidence in aggravation of damages. Nilbin v. Johnson, 58 Mo. 600. Defendant was likewise not responsible for the breach of promise of his son. In Paul v. Frazier, supra, Parsons, C. J., said: "The declaration amounts to a charge against the defendant for deceiving the plaintiff and persuading her to commit a crime, in consequence of which she has suffered damage. She is a partaker of the crime, and cannot come into court to obtain satisfaction for a supposed injury to which she was consenting." On the other point, the doctrine of the principal case is supported by Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 400; Kelly v. Riley, 106 id. 339; S. C., 8 Am. Rep. 336; Burks v. Shain, 3 Bibb, 341; Whalen V. Layman, 2 Blackf. 194; Wells v. Padgett, 8 Barb. 323; Sauer v. Schulenberg, 33 Md. 288; S. C., 3 Am. Rep. 174; but denied in Weaver v. Bachert, 2 Barr. 82. Another apparently novel case is Eaton v. Gay, Michigan Supreme Court, October, 1880, 11 Rep. 267. A. contracted with B. to furnish a supper for a society known as the Ancient Order of Foresters, at so much for each person partaking. Cigars and wine were furnished the guests by B., who testified that these were extras, while A. testified that they were explicitly included in the contract. Held, that it was error to instruct the jury that if the contract was silent as to wines and cigars, and if A. saw the guests being supplied at the supper with such articles, and made no objection thereto, an implied contract arose on his part to pay for the same. Cooley, J., said: "If Eaton agreed with Gay and Van Norlimited what could be furnished on his account, and man upon the bill of fare and the price, he thereby he had a right to expect that any printed bill which should be placed before the guests would be limited accordingly. No guest would then feel at liberty to call for any thing not there appearing, and if he did, and it was furnished to him, it would be a matter between himself and the proprietors with which Eaton could have no right to concern himself. It would be an extraordinary rule of law that would compel Eaton, under such circumstances, when he saw the guests partaking of wine, to give formal notice to the proprietors that he should pay no debts of their contracting. He had made his contract in advance and stipulated what his liability should be, and the guests were not his agents for the purpose of increasing this liability. If they ordered what he had not bargained for, he not only had a right to assume that they did this on some understanding, express or implied, with the proprietors, but common courtesy required him to refrain from interfering. This supper as agreed upon was his affair; the furnishing of extras was inter alios, and the proprietors could no more call upon him to pay for them, on the basis of implied contract, than upon any stranger.” De minimis non curat lex is illustrated in Roth v. State of Texas, 4 Tex. L. J. 393, where it was held that under a charge of theft of a bank bill a conviction may be had upon proof of theft of a National bank note. It is also there held that the bill being described as issued by the "Chatam National Bank," and the proof showing that it was issued by the "Chatham National Bank," there was no variance. The court said: "The rule adopted generally seems to be according to the distinction stated by Lord Mansfield, 'that where the omission or addition of a letter does not change the word so as to make it another word the variance is not material." 1 Whart. Crim. L. (7th ed.) 309; 1 Bish. Crim. Pro. (3d ed.) 562. Here the word is not changed and is strictly idem sonans. We are aware that in some courts a distinction is sought to be drawn between omissions or changes in the spelling of ordinary words and proper names (Brown v. People, 66 Ill. 344), but there can be no reason for the rule where the variance is so slight and does not affect the word or name more than in the case before us." For examples of idem sonans, see note, 28 Am. Rep. 439. In Brown v. People, supra, the indictment set out a copy of an alleged forged note, as signed "Otha Carr," while the note offered in evidence was signed "Oatha Carr." Held, a fatal variance. In Page v. State, 61 Ala. 16, the indictment charged the murder of "Preyer," and the proof was of "Pryor." Held, no variance. "Chin Chan" and "Chin Chang" are sufficiently alike for a Chinaman; Wells v. State, 4 Tex. Ct. App. 20. "Janury," in an indictment, will answer for "January." Hatto V. State, 7 id. 44; so of "Whiteman" for "Whitman. Henry v. State, id. 388. "Shiped" and "saide," in a forged instrument, may be properly spelled "shipped" and "said," in the indictment, without variance. LEGAL DEFINITIONS OF COMMON WORDS. X. 'N State v. Mullen, 35 Iowa, 199, it was held that it, with men and women eating, sleeping, and living on it, may be a "house of ill-fame;" adopting Webster's definition, "a building or edifice for the habitation of man; a dwelling place, mansion, or abode for any of the human species. It may be any size, and composed of any materials whatever." In Kitson v. Mayor, 26 Mich. 325, "saloon" was held to mean a place of refreshment, and not necessarily a place where intoxicating liquor is sold. The court said: "This is certainly the popular understanding of the term, and it is applied in all orderly communities to all places where persons resort to obtain food or drink, which are not also devoted to some other business. Undoubtedly a narrower meaning is sometimes applied, as it is to 'grocery,' and as it once was to 'tavern.' But saloons, and groceries, and taverns, are mainly designed for innocent purposes." So, in State v. Mansker, 36 Tex. 364, where it is said: "That might be the name of a private parlor or residence, a room for the reception of company, or for works of art, or a place for refreshments alone. It is true that a house or room used for retailing spirituous liquors is sometimes improperly called a saloon, but this improper use of the word cannot impart to it any such improper legal signification." But a "saloon-keeper" means a retailer of cigars, liquors, etc. Cahill v. Campbell, 105 Mass. 40. Two is not an "unusual number," when applied to persons violently entering disputed premises. Pike v. Witt, 104 Mass. 595. "In common parlance, a ‘dram' means something that has alcohol in it something that can intoxicate." Lacy v. State, 32 Tex. 227. A watch is not a “jewel or ornament." Ramaley v. Leland, 43 N. Y. 539. The court said: "It is not carried or used as a jewel or ornament, but as a time-piece or chronometer, an article of ordinary wear by most travellers of every class, and of daily and hourly use by all. It is as useful and necessary to the guest in his room as out of it, in the night as the day-time. It is carried for use and convenience, and not for ornament." A cook in a hotel is not a "laborer" within a lien act. Sullivan's Appeal, 77 Penn. St. 107. A dangerous place fifty feet from a street is not "contiguous" to the street. Chapman v. Cook, 10 R. I. 304; S. C., 14 Am. Rep. 686 "Militia " are not "troops." Dunne v. People, 94 Ill. 120. The court said: "Lexicographers and others define militia, and so the common understanding is, to be 'a body of armed citizens trained to military duty, who may be called out in certain cases, but may not be kept on service like standing armies, in time of peace.' That is the case as to the active militia of this State. The men comprising it come from the body of the militia, and when not engaged at stated periods in drilling and other exercises, they return to their usual avocations, as is usual with militia, and are subject to call when the public exigencies demand it. Such an organization, no matter by what name it may be designated, comes within no definition of 'troops,' as that word is used in the Constitution. The word 'troops,' conveys to the mind the idea of an armed body of soldiers, whose sole occupation is war or service, answering to the regular army. The organization of the active militia of the State bears no likeness to such a body of men. It is simply a domestic force as distinguished from regular 'troops,' and is only liable to be called into service when the exigencies of the State make it necessary." Singular as it may appear, the loaning of money on Sunday is "business." Proewert v. Decker, Wisconsin Supreme Court. A telephone is a "telegraph," and a telephonic conversation is a “telegram.’ Attorney-General v. Edison Telephone Company, 43 L. T. (N. S.) 697. This was under a statute defining a "telegram" as any message or communication transmitted by telegraph, and a "telegraph" as "a wire or wires used for the purpose of telegraphic communication, with any casing, coating, tube, or pipe inclosing the same, and any apparatus connected therewith for the purpose of telegraphic communication." Stephen, J., in the course of a very long and scientific opinion, observed: "The conversation must be a communication, even if the word 'message' is less appropriate. It is transmitted' or sent through a wire used for the purpose of communication, and that communication is telegraphic according to the common use of language, though it involves no writing. The various affidavits filed give a complete history of the word 'telegraph,' and show that from the first invention of semaphores till within the last few years no contrivance of the sort did literally write at a distance, but that the word was applied to a variety of contrivances which, by signals perceptible sometimes by the sense of sight, and sometimes by the sense of hearing, conveyed intelligence to great distances in a much shorter time than a letter could be carried." "No one supposes that the Legislature intended to refer specifically to telephones many years before they were invented, but it is highly probable that they would, and it seems to us clear that they eventually did, use language embracing future discoveries as to the use of electricity for the purpose of conveying intelligence." "We hold that a conversation held through a telephone is either a message, or at all events, a communication transmitted by a telegraph, which is the definition of a telegram. A small question was raised on the word 'transmitted.' When one person speaks to another it was said he 'makes,' but does not 'transmit,' a communication. The answer is that when he speaks through a wire some miles long he sends what he says through the wire or transmits it. As the defendants contended that the very voice itself was so sent, this seems specially clear as against them." A single act of personal violence by husband to wife does not constitute "cruelty of treatment" within the statute of divorce. Hoshall v. Hoshall, 51 Md. 72; S. C., 34 Am. Rep. 298. Here the parties had peaceably lived together for thirty years, when, as the court observed, a “quarrel grew out of the employment in the family of a young woman servant, and probably from some feeling of jealousy on the part of the wife. But there is no evidence of any improper conduct on the part of the husband, or any sufficient cause for the old lady's feeling of jealousy and dissatisfaction. Moreover, the woman servant had been sent away some time before, by the wife, which shows that her legitimate authority in the family was not destroyed or interfered with by her husband." In Rex v. Beardmore, 1 Burr. 792, it was held that "upon" does not mean "in." This was a motion for an attachment against an under-sheriff for re miracle of burning a man "with a cold iron." We think Mr. Reporter Burrow must have come from the west side of the channel. Lord Mansfield found fault with the defensive affidavits, and remarked: "So many affidavits, so studiously and artfully penned, to be safely sworn in one sense and read in another, are an aggravation." Justice Dennison concurred, and said: "It cannot be pretended that standing erect upon the pillory, is being set in it." Now, if we had been of counsel for the defendant, we should have cited an ancient and conclusive authority, to wit, The Two Gentlemen of Verona, where Launce, describing what he has undergone for his ungrateful cur, says: "I have stood on the pillory for geese he hath killed." The court, however, went against the defendant, saying the criminal was "a gross offender, an infamous libeller of the king and government," and fined the defendant £50, and ordered him to be imprisoned for two months and until the fine should be paid. The court seemed to lay stress on the umbrella, and we ourselves think that was a refinement of mercy, to say nothing of the servant in livery. mitting part of a sentence. One John Shebbeare I had been condemned to "be set in and upon the pillory," but it appeared that the defendant only stood upon the platform of the pillory, unconfined and at his ease, attended by a servant in livery, both servant and livery being hired for the occasion, holding an umbrella over his head all the time; that his head, hands, neck, or arms, were not at all confined or put into the holes of the pillory, but he sometimes put his hands in the holes in order to rest himself. It appeared, too, that the defendant attended as under-sheriff, "with his wand,” and that "he treated the criminal with great complaisance in taking him to and from the pillory." Many affidavits were produced to show that the defendant stood in the manner which had prevailed for thirty or forty years in Middlesex, and that ever since one or two persons who had been locked down in the pillory were killed, it had been customary not to fasten their heads in the middle hole, but only to compel them to stand with the head and face showing through that hole, and their hands in the other holes. Defendant's counsel contended that the sentence of quartering traitors and burning their bowels is never strictly executed, "nor the punishment of burning in the hand, which is constantly and notoriously done in the face, and with the knowledge of the judges themselves, with a cold iron." This last quoted sentence is as pure a specimen of a bull as ever was seen. If, for face, we read presence, which is evidently what was meant, we get rid of the idea that it could have been imagined more lenient to brand a man in the face than on the hand, and of the still more terrific idea that the punishment was transferred, for the sake of mercy, from the hand of the offender to the face of his judges; but we do not get rid of the implied CODIFICATION OF THE COMMON LAW AS AM sure that the acute minds of many of our most distinguished lawyers have not failed to perceive the incongruities and deficiencies of the present law, and yet there are many who seem adverse to any attempt to make the law of insanity more conformable than it is with medical science. Lord Justice Bramwell told the select committee on the homicide bill: "I think that although the present law lays down such a definition of madness * that nobody is hardly ever really mad enough to be within it, yet it is a logical and a good definition." He further stated that in his opinion the law was right, because it might deter many insane persons from crime by the threat of punishment. Lord Justice Blackburn, in his testimony before the select committee on the homicide bill, said: "On the question of what amounts to insanity that would prevent a person being punishable or not, I have read every definition which I ever could meet with, and never was satisfied with one of them, and have endeavored in vain to make one satisfactory to myself. I verily believe that it is not in human power to do it. You must take it that in every individual case you must look at the circumstances and do the best you can to say whether it was the disease of the mind which was the cause of the crime, or the party's criminal will." He also said: "But we cannot fail to see that there are cases where the person is clearly not responsible, and yet knew right from wrong." He then goes on to give the case of a woman he tried who had killed one child and was going to kill another, but who fortunately dropped the second child and went to a neighbor, telling her what she had done. This woman clearly knew the difference between right and wrong and knew the character of her act, and on the definition in the McNaughton case in 1843, was guilty. Lord Justice Blackburn however, as the woman was a raving maniac, so charged the jury on the ground of exceptional cases that the jury found her "not guilty, on the ground of insanity," and rightly. The Lord Chief Justice of England, in his criticism of Sir Fitzjames Stephens' plan of codifying the law of insanity, said: "As the law as expounded by the judges in the House of Lords now stands, it is only when mental disease produces incapacity to distinguish be *Italics are mine. tween right and wrong that immunity from the penal consequences of crime is admitted. The present bill introduces a new element, the absense of the power of self-control. I concur most heartily in the proposed alteration of the law, having been always strongly of opinion that, as the pathology of insanity abundantly establishes, there are forms of mental disease in which, though the patient is quite aware he is about to do wrong, the will becomes overpowered by the force of irresistible impulse; the power of self-control when destroyed or suspended by mental disease becomes, I think, an essential element of responsibility." The Lord Chief Justice of England in his weighty and truly scientific opinion, the intrinsic weight of which is immense, deserves the admiration of both the legal and medical profession all over the world. Lord Moncrief, the Lord Justice Clerk of Scotland, has said from the bench that “in point of fact there are very few lunatics who do not know right from wrong,” an opinion which I have myself insisted on before the New York Medico-Legal Society in two different papers read there. If we have the absence of self-control produced by disease of the body affecting the mind, in any given case of homicide on trial, it seems to me that every fair-minded lawyer in America will concur in acknowledging that we have here a philosophic or scientific principle on which to found the plea of "not guilty, on the ground of insanity," and one which includes the cases of all insane criminals. It does not seem to me that in the question of what constitutes insanity the members of the two great professions of law and medicine should, or at all need to, entertain essentially different and irreconcilable views, or that on the question of the irrespousibility of criminals who are supposed to be insane there should be such a diversity of opinion as exists to-day. The physician naturally studies the whole history of his patient and his ancestry, and searches for the causes of any bodily and mental changes that he finds, and thus arrives at the true pathology of the disease; while the lawyer and jurist is mainly interested in the existence of mental disease, its degree and its influence on conduct. We know far more about insanity than they did the last generation, and it is obviously unfair that laws pertaining to insanity when the knowledge of that disease was comparatively in its infancy, should not be amended to keep pace with our increased knowledge of the pathology of mental disease. that form of homicidal monomania where the patient is possessed of a sudden, blind, motiveless, unreasoning impulse to kill, I do not think that there is any desire, motive or reasoning intention to commit such a deed, the true pathology of this form of insanity consisting, it seems to me, in a vis a tergo received from the diseased action of the brain. We have here a diseased state of mind with absence of self-control. We have in suicidal monomania also a vis a tergo received from the diseased action of the brain, in which while perhaps our patient exhibits no other mental derangement, with no delusion or other intellectual disorder, the blind, motiveless, unreasoning impulse to suicide which, alike with the homicidal impulse, is the joint result of undoubted insanity. In both these cases the impulse is long enduring and gives rise to actions of patient deliberation and of cunning contrivance. The lawyer and physician are willing alike to recognize disease in the suicidal act; why then, the apparent unwillingness to recognize disease in the homicidal act? We must not look at these questions socially and ethically, but by the aid of the light of modern pathology, as the Lord Chief Justice of England has done already. There are many persons born with a predisposition to madness, and symptoms indicating that disease display themselves at frequent intervals through the whole course of life, but for many years may never reach such a pitch as to induce those in contact with such persons to treat them as insane. When an overt act In 66 is committed by such persons, can any one question the value of a careful study of the past life and acts of the accused? His life has exhibited the natural history of insanity, and with our present accurate and trustworthy method of investigation a careful and experienced physician in nervous diseases can clearly point out to the lawyer and jurist the unmistakable evidences of mental disease which the latter, necessarily, alone and unaided could not discover. The lawyer and physician should naturally aid each other in such investigations impartially and by the light of science. I have elsewhere pointed out that epileptics are to be classed in the most homicidal group of all, also that puerperal women and women at the climacteric period are subject at times to dangerous delusions, and also that kleptomania is a peculiarity of a certain number of cases of general paralysis. These facts are classical, and should be so accepted by the judiciary and by the legal profession generally. In a paper on Mental Responsibility and the Diagnosis of Insanity in Criminal Cases," read before the New York Medico-Legal Society and subsequently published in the English Journal of Psychological Medicine and Mental Pathology, I suggested a series of eight questions which, it seemed to me, if adopted by jurists in criminal cases would form a most efficient and just test in any given case. Perhaps the legal profession may prefer the simpler proposition which, as the result of Sir Fitzjames Stephen's attempt to codify the common law of England on insanity may be briefly summed up as follows, viz: Homicide is not criminal if the person by whom it is committed is, at the time when he commits it, prevented by any disease affecting his mind from controlling his own conduct. This is very simple and very comprehensive, and therefore the legal profession may very properly prefer it to my own. The eight questions which I proposed in my paper are as follows, viz: 1. Have the prisoner's volitions, impulses or acts been determined or influenced at all by insanity, and are his mental functions thought, feeling and action so deranged, either together or separately, as to incapacitate him for the relations of life? 2. Does the prisoner come of a stock whose nervous constitution has been vitiated by some defect or ailment calculated to impair its efficiency or damage its operations? 3. Has the prisoner been noticed to display mental infirmities or peculiarities which were due either to hereditary transmission or present mental derangement? 4. Has the prisoner the ability to control mental action, or has he not sufficient mental power to control the sudden impulses of his disordered mind, and does he act under the blind influence of evil impulses which he can neither regulate nor control? 5. Has the act been influenced at all by hereditary taint which has become intensified so that the morbid element has become quickened into overpowering activity, and so that the moral senses have been overborne by the superior force derived from disease? 6. Was the act effected by, or the product of, insane delusion? 7. Was the act performed without adequate incentive or motive? 8. Does the prisoner manifest excitement or depression, moody, difficult temper, extraordinary proneness to jealousy and suspicion, a habitual extravagance of thought and feeling, an inability to appreciate nice moral distinctions, and finally does he give way to gusts of passion and reckless indulgence of appetite? Some or all of these characteristics in number eight are found generally in connection with transmitted mental infirmity. In closing this perhaps too lengthy paper, I desire to speak briefly upon the subject of testamentary capacity. In my opinion the mental unsoundness of a man if unconnected with the testamentary disposition, ought not to destroy testamentary capacity. If the will of a person is not affected by, or is not the product of, an insane delusion, it should be regarded as valid. Delusions per se should not, I think, void a will. A person may be a monomaniac and yet have sufficient mental capacity to make a valid will. In such a case the mental faculties are often unimpaired and undisturbed. The most important point to be looked into is whether the testator has ignored natural affection and the claims of near relationship in the making of the will in question. The testator's mental faculties must be so far normal that he shall understand the nature of the act and also the consequences of it, and he must also have a clear idea as to the amount of property which he is disposing of. There must be a clear, sound moral sense, and the human instincts and affections must be intact. There must be no insane suspicion or aversion and no loss or impairment of reason and judgment. A person should not be considered capable of making a valid will if the act in question has been the product of, or has been actuated or influenced at all by 1st, hereditary taint which has influenced his volitions, impulses or acts; or 2d, by mental disease or insanity which has weakened, perverted or destroyed the mental functions. E. C. M. AUTHORITY OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTA- SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, FEB. 28, 1881. KILBOURN, Plaintiff in Error, v. THOMPSON ET AL. No person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either house of Congress unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that house has the jurisdiction to inquire. And neither of these bodies possesses the general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen. The constitutional provision as to the privilege of members of Congress for any speech or debate in either house is not limited to words spoken in debate, but applies to written reports, resolutions offered in writing, and to the act of voting whether orally or otherwise in short, to things generally done in a session of the house by one of its members in relation to the business before it. The House of Representatives, upon the proposed ground that the United States was a creditor of a bankrupt firm by reason of the improvident deposit of public moneys with such firm by the Secretary of the Treasury; that the firm had a valuable interest in a matter known as the real estate pool; that the assignee in bankruptcy of the firm had made a settlement with the other members of the pool to the loss of the creditors of the firm including the United States, and that the courts were powerless to afford adequate redress to the creditors, appointed a committee from its own members to inquire into the nature and history of the pool, the character of the settlement, etc., with powers to send for persons and papers. In the progress of the investigation by this committee plaintiff, a witness subpoenaed before them, refused to state the names of the members of the pool and also to produce records relating to the matters required of him, and repeated his refusal before the House, whereupon, at the instance of the committee and upon their report, the House by resolution ordered the imprisonment of the plaintiff for contempt. In pursuance of this resolution the Speaker of the House issued a warrant to the sergeant-at-arms directing such imprisonment, which was duly executed. In an action for false imprisonment against the sergeant-at-arms and members of the committee, Held, (1) that the resolution authorizing the investigation was in excess of the constitutional powers of the House; the committee were without lawful authority to compel the plaintiff to testify; the warrant of the speaker was void for want of jurisdiction, and the imprisonment of plaintiff was without lawful authority; and (2) that the provision of the Federal Constitution that "senators and representatives, for any speech or debate in either house, shall not be questioned in any other place," relieved the committee from liability for resolutions and votes in favor of plaintiff's imprisonment. IN error the Supreme Cates the case. error to the Supreme Court of the District of Co MILLER, J. The plaintiff in error sued the defendant in that court in an action of trespass for false imprisonment, charging them with taking him from his house with force and arms and detaining him as a prisoner in the common jail of the District for fortyfive days without any reasonable or probable cause, contrary to law and against his will. Michael C. Kerr, who was also sued as one of the defendants, died before service of process, and the suit abated as to him. John G. Thompson pleaded separately; first, the general issue; and secondly, a special plea of justification, which will be more fully considered, founded on the fact that in what he did he acted as sergeant-atarms of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States, and under its orders. The other defendants pleaded jointly the general issue, and a plea of justification similar to Thompson's, except that they alleged themselves to have been members of the House of Representatives, and members of a committee of that house, and that what they did was in that capacity and was warranted by the circumstances, which they fully set out in the plea. To both these special pleas the plaintiff demurred, and his demurrer being overruled, a judgment was rendered for the defendants. The case therefore stands before us as it did in the Supreme Court of the District, on the sufficiency of these special pleas. They are somewhat long, are very full in their statement of the facts which are supposed to justify the imprisonment of the plaintiff, and relying as they do on the privileges of the House of Representatives, they present a question, or rather questions, of serious importance for our consideration. As the plea of Mr. Thompson sets out the facts on which all the defendants rely, with such slight exceptions as will be noticed specifically in regard to the other defendauts, we will here give the substance of it. He alleges that the Congress of the United States was in session at Washington during the time of the trespasses with which defendants are charged. That Michael C. Kerr was speaker of the House of Representatives, George M. Adams was clerk, and he, the defendant, was sergeant-at-arms of that body, duly authorized and required to execute the commands of said house, together with all such process issued by authority thereof as should be directed to him by the speaker. The plea then states that the house being in session on the 24th day of January, A. D. 1876, adopted the following preamble and resolution: "WHEREAS, The government of the United States is a creditor of the firm of Jay Cooke & Co., now in bankruptcy by order and decree of the District Court of the United States in and for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, resulting from the improvident deposits made by the Secretary of the Navy of the United States with the London branch of the said house of Jay Cook & Co. of the public moneys; and whereas the matter known as the real-estate pool was only partially inquired into by the late joint select committee to inquire into the affairs of the District of Columbia, in which Jay Cooke & Co. had a large and valuable interest; and whereas Edwin M. Lewis, trustee of the estate and effects of said firm of Jay Cooke & Co., has recently made a settlement of the interest of the estate of Jay Cooke & Co. with the associates of said firm of Jay Cooke & Co., to the disadvantage and loss, as it is alleged, of the numerous creditors of said estate, in |