The Future of Nuclear Deterrence: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Fifth Congress, First Session, February 12, 1997 |
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Common terms and phrases
ABM Treaty abolition admirals agree agreement alert status allies Answer argument believe BRARY Chairman clear Cold Cold War Committee CONG CONGRES CONGRESS THE LIBRARY continue conventional dangerous deployed deployment disarmament Duma effective effort eliminating all nuclear elimination of nuclear further reductions goal GRES GRESS ICBM important issue joint statement LIBR LIBRARY OF CONGRESS maintain mass destruction ment military missile defense system national missile defense national security negotiations nonproliferation nuclear arsenal nuclear capability nuclear deterrent nuclear forces nuclear powers nuclear weapons Pakistan political President question RARY RESS Richard Perle risk rogue role Russia Russian nuclear safe and reliable safety Secretary Slocombe security interests Senator COCHRAN Senator LEVIN Senator STEVENS SLOCOMBE Soviet Staff START II Stockpile Stewardship strategic nuclear forces Subcommittee Test Ban Treaty THAD COCHRAN Thank tion U.S. and Russian U.S. security United verification weap weapons of mass
Popular passages
Page 18 - Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
Page 18 - the United States must and will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. In this regard, I consider the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile to be a supreme national interest of the United States.
Page 2 - we will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. Therefore, we will continue to maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size and capability to hold at risk a broad range of assets valued by such political and military leaders.
Page 15 - US Strategic Command — that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type which the two Secretaries consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, the President, in consultation with Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT under the standard "supreme national interests" clause in order to conduct whatever testing might be required.
Page 18 - ... foreign leadership with access to nuclear weapons from acting against our vital interests and to convince such a leadership that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. Thus, for the foreseeable future, the United States will continue to need a reliable and flexible nuclear deterrent — survivable against the most aggressive attack, under highly confident, constitutional command and control, and safeguarded against both accidental and unauthorized use. We believe these goals can be achieved...
Page 3 - Stabilising agreed reductions in nuclear forces have been, and continue to be, a primary objective of the United States. The US and Russia have taken great strides in this regard in recent years. START I will reduce each side's deployed strategic weapons from well over 10,000 to 6,000 accountable weapons. Russia, like the US, is actually somewhat ahead of schedule in meeting the START I reduction requirements. START II, when it is ratified by the Russian Duma and enters into force, will further reduce...
Page 19 - ... the end of their service lives over the next decade; or that would be eliminated under START II. Stabilizing agreed reductions in nuclear forces have been, and continue to be, a primary objective of the United States. The US and Russia have taken great strides in this regard in recent years. START I will reduce each side's deployed strategic weapons from well over 10,000 to 6,000 accountable weapons. Russia, like the US, is actually somewhat ahead of schedule in meeting the START I reduction...
Page 4 - NATO's Strategic Concept, adopted in 1991 after the end of the Cold War, which states that "The fundamental purpose of NATO's nuclear force is to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war and that nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression incalculable and unacceptable." Why did we and why did NATO reach these conclusions? Most importantly, because the positive changes in the international environment are far from irreversible, and we can foresee...
Page 52 - But to use this as a reason to disengage from the region, or to avoid deepening our security ties with these nations, could undermine efforts to cap their destructive capability. It could even help push them into an unfettered arms race. That would be disastrous. I believe that we can best help to avoid the disastrous by building bridges of trust between the United States and India and between the United States and Pakistan.
Page 1 - September, said he looks forward to a new century "in which the roles and risks of nuclear weapons can be further reduced, and ultimately eliminated." The United States has made remarkable progress in fulfilling our NPT Article VI commitment.