on the assumption that a protest is necessary for this purpose, and that the statutes of Will. 3 and Anne do not authorize or direct a protest, except the bill be expressed to be made for value received. But it has been decided that the 8th section of 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9, makes a protest unnecessary for this purpose ;(x) and, even if it were necessary under those statutes, in bills where those words are expressed, it would not be necessary where they are not; for, upon a careful perusal of both statutes, it will appear *that they [*88] only apply to bills expressed to be for value received; and the 6th section of the 3 & 4 Anne distinctly declares that a protest shall not be necessary, unless the words "value received" appear on the face of the bill; thus leaving bills where these words are not as at common law; and at common law no inland bill need be protested, in order to charge the drawer with interest and damages.(y) For this purpose, therefore (if the statutes made any difference), a bill would be more readily effectual without these words than with them.

It was once doubted whether an action of debt would lie on a bill, unless the consideration were expressed ;(2) but it has been decided that debt would lie although the consideration were not expressed. (a)

The words "value received" are ambiguous, where the bill is drawn payable to a third person; for they may mean either value received by the drawer of the payee, or by the acceptor of the drawer. But the first is the more probable interpretation; for it is more natural" that the party who draws the bill should inform the drawee of a fact which he does not know, than of one of which he must be well aware."(b)

If, however, the bill is drawn payable to the drawer's own order, the words "value received" must mean received by the acceptor of the drawer; and on such a bill, if the declaration state that it was for value received by the drawer it will be a variance.(c) "Value

(x) Windle v. Andrews, 2 B. & Al. 696; 2 Stark. 425 (3 E. C. L. R.), s. c. (y) Per Bayley, J., 2 B. & A. 701.

(z) Bishop v. Young, 2 B. & P. 78; Priddy v. Henbry, 3 D. & R. 165; 1 B. & C. 674, s. c. (8 E. C. L. R.).

(a) Hatch v. Trays; Watson v. Kightly, 11 Ad. & E. 702 (39 E. C. L. R.) ; 3 Per. & Dav. 408, s. c.

(b) Per Lord Ellenborough, in Grant v. Da Costa, 3 M. & Sel. 351. (c) Highmore v. Primrose, 5 M. & S. 65.

received," in a note, means received by the maker of the payee.(d)

Though the nature of particulars of the consideration appear on the bill or note, it was not necessary to state it in the declaration, or it might be stated generally as value received. (e) "The defendant," says Maule, J., "may prove that the note was given for a different consideration, or without any consideration at all."(ƒ)

*But it has been held that the defendant will not be allowed to contradict his written admission on the note, of the nature [*89] of the consideration. Where a note was given by an administratrix, and expressed to be "for value received by my late husband," she was not allowed to show that the note was given only as an indemnity, and that the payee had not been damnified (g)

Without the drawer's signature, a bill payable "to my order," though accepted, is of no force(h), either as a bill of exchange or as a promissory note.(i)1

The signature of the drawer or maker of a bill or note is usually subscribed in the right-hand corner; but it is sufficient if written in any other part. Thus "I, J. S., promise to pay," has been held a sufficient signature of a promissory note.(j) A man who cannot write may sign a bill by his mark.(k)2

(d) Clayton v. Gosling, 5 B. & C. 361 (11 E. C. L. R.); 8 D. & R. 110. (e) Coombs v. Ingram, 4 D. & R. 211; Bond v. Stockdale, 7 D. & R. 140. (ƒ) Abbott v. Hendrich, 1 M. & G. 796 (39 E. C. L. R.); 2 Scott, N. R. 183, s. c. Where the note on the face of it purported to be given for "value received in Pennance shares, pursuant to annexed contract," it was held unnecessary to put in any contract: Fox v. Frith, Car. & M. 502 (41 E. C. L. R.). (g) Ridout v. Bristow, 1 C. & J. 231; 1 Tyr. 84, s. c.; and see Edwards v. Jones, 2 M. & W. 414; 5 Dowl. 585; 7 C. & P. 633, s. c. (32 E. C. L. R.). (h) Stoessiger v. South E. Railway Company, 3 E. & B. 553 (77 E. C. L. R.); Goldsmid v. Hampton, 27 L. J., C. P. 286; 5 C. B., N. S. 94, s. c. (94 E. C. L. R.).

(i) M'Call v. Taylor, 34 L. J., C. P. 365.

(j) Taylor v. Dobbins, 1 Stra. 399; Saunderson v. Jackson, 2 B. & P. 238. (k) George v. Surry, 1 M. & M. 516.

1 May v. Miller, 27 Alabama 515; Tevis v. Young, 1 Metcalfe (Ky.) 197. 2 One signed a bill, and opposite his name at the other corner where witnesses usually sign, but without the word witness above, another signed, held not sufficient primâ facie that he signed as maker: Steininger v. Hoch, 3

An allegation in pleading that a party made his bill or note was sufficient, without alleging that he signed it, for making implies signing.(1)

If a deed be first executed, and then written or filled up, the deed is void;(m) but it is otherwise with a bill of exchange. For, if a stamped paper be signed, leaving blanks for the date, sum, time when payable, and name of the drawee, the drawer will be chargeable for any sum afterwards inserted within the amount warranted by the stamp. It is a letter of credit for an indefinite but not unlimited sum.(n)1

A bill of exchange, being in its original a letter, should be properly addressed to the drawee. (o) But where a bill *was made [*90] payable "at No. 1 Wilmot Street, opposite the Lamb, Bethnal Green, London," without mentioning the drawee's name, and the defendant accepted it, he was not allowed to make the objection.(p)2 But a bill cannot be addressed to one man and accepted

(1) Elliott v. Cowper, 1 Stra. 609; 2 Ld. Raym. 1376, s. c.; 8 Mod. 307; Ereskine v. Murray, 2 Ld. Raym. 1542; 1 Barn. 88, s. c.

(m) Com. Dig. Fait. (A.) 1.

(n) Collis v. Emett, 1 H. Bl. 313; Russell v. Langstaffe, 2 Doug. 496; Snaith v. Mingay, 1 M. & S. 87 ; Leslie v. Hastings, 1 M. & R. 119 ; Molloy v. Delves, 7 Bing. 428 (20 E. C. L. R.); 5 M. & P. 275; 4 C. & P. 492 (19 E. C. L. R.), s. c.; Barker v. Sterne, 9 Exch. 684; but see Hogarth v. Latham, L. R., 3 Q. B. D. 643.

(0) Peto v. Reynolds, 9 Exch. 410; 11 Exch. 418 in error, s. c.

(p) Gray v. Milner, 8 Taunt. 739 (4 E. C. L. R.); 3 Moore 90, s. c.

Wright 263. It is immaterial on what part of a note the maker's signature is placed, so that he signs it as original maker: Schmidt v. Schmaelter, 45 Missouri 502.

1 Between the original parties the consideration of a bill or note can always be inquired into; and it would practically abolish this rule, and lead to great oppression and injustice, if the maker or drawer were held to be estopped by any mere statement on the face of the paper as to the character of the consideration: Ryberg v. Snell, 2 Wash. C. C. Rep. 294; Lawrence v. The Stonington Bank, 6 Conn. 464; Parish v. Stone, 14 Pick. 198; Slade v. Halsted, 7 Cowen 322; Pearson v. Pearson, 7 Johns. 26; Barnet v. Offerman, 7 Watts 130.

2 The omission of the name of the drawee at the foot of a bill does not vitiate it. The acceptance supplies the defect, and is an admission by the acceptor that he is the person intended: Wheeler v. Webster, 1 E. D. Smith 1. Where a note is signed and delivered with a blank left for the sum payable, though the first holder is restricted as to the amount to be inserted, yet, if the note comes into the hands of another, who, without notice of the restric

by another.(9) A bill directed to A., or in his absence to B., being accepted by A., may be declared on without taking notice of B.(r) If the word at precede the drawee's name, whether inserted ignorantly or fraudulently, the instrument is still a bill of exchange.(8) A bill may be directed to the drawer himself, though it is, in that case, rather a note than a bill.(t)1

(9) Davis v. Clarke, 13 L. J., Q. B. 305; 6 Q. B. 16 (51 E. C. L. R.), s. c. (r) Anon., 12 Mod. 447.

(s) Shuttleworth v. Stephens, 1 Camp. 407; Rex v. Hunter, R. & R. C. C. Allan v. Mawson, 4 Camp. 115.

511;

(t) Block v. Bell, 1 M. & Rob. 149; Starke v. Cheesman, Carth. 509; Dehers v. Harriott, 1 Show. 163; Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077; Jocelyn v. Laserre, Fort. 282; see Davis v. Clarke, 6 Q. B. 16 (51 E. C. L. R.); Byles on Bills, 6th American edition, p. 139.

tion, fills the blank with a larger sum, the obligor will be bound by it: Bank of Commonwealth v. Curry, 2 Dana 142. A person signing his name on a blank paper and delivering it to another authorizes him to fill up the blank with any sum: Bank of Limestone v. Penick, 5 Monroe 25; M'Arthur v. M'Leod, 6 Jones (Law) 475; Jones v. Shelbyville Ins. Co., 1 Metcalf 58. If a person signs a note with a blank date for another's accommodation, he authorizes the other to fill up the date as he may see fit: Androscoggin Bank v. Kimball, 10 Cushing 373. The signer of a blank note as surety is responsible for any sum for which it may be filled up by the principal, though for a sum exceeding that which he authorized, if the holder took it without notice: Fullerton v. Sturges, 4 Ohio (N. S.) 529. Where a blank was left for the name of an acceptor, and the bill in this state, and with an indorser on it, was handed to a third person, who indorsed it for the accommodation of the drawer and indorser, it was held that the legal intendment of such a transaction was that the blank was to be filled by the name of another person as acceptor, and that the erasure of the name of the prior indorser and its insertion as acceptor was in fraud of the rights of the last indorser: Mahone v. The Central Bank, 17 Georgia 111. An indorsement on a note or bill, without sum, date or time of payment, will bind the indorser to pay any sum at any time which the person to whom the indorser intrusts it chooses to insert: Michigan Ins. Co. v. Leavenworth, 30 Vermont 11.

1 It is not necessary to constitute a bill of exchange that there should be three distinct parties to it. A bill drawn by a party upon himself is a bill of exchange in the hands of an indorsee: Randolph v. Parish, 9 Porter 76. A general request in writing to pay money to the drawer's own order is a bill of exchange, which the drawer may make payable to himself by an indorsement and notice to the acceptor before it is due: Rice v. Hogan, 8 Dana 133. It is not necessary that the various parties to a negotiable instrument should be different persons in order to render it a bill of exchange: Wildes v. Savage, 1 Story 22. An order drawn by the president of a corporation on the treasurer, payable on demand, may be declared on when dishonored as a bill of

If the drawer intends that the bill should be payable at a particular place, he may insert such a direction. Without the words only and not elsewhere," appended to such direction, the acceptance will be general, within 1 & 2 Geo. 4, c. 78, (u) so as to charge the acceptor. The drawer himself cannot be charged, unless the bill have been presented at the place where the drawer himself made it payable.(x) This statute does not apply to promissory notes; and therefore, if any place of payment be mentioned in the body of a note, it is part of the contract. The place of payment must be described in the declaration, and a presentment there is essential in order to charge the maker or any other party (y) But, where the place of payment is merely stated in a memorandum at the foot or in the margin of the note, by way of direction, it need not be noticed in pleading, and presentment there, though it is sufficient,(z) is not essential. (a)

(u) Selby v. Eden, 3 Bing. 611; 11 Moore 511, s. c.; Fayle v. Bird, 6 B. & C. 531; 9 Dowl. & R. 639.

(x) Gibbs v. Mather, in error, 8 Bing. 214; 1 M. & Scott 387, s. c. ; 2 C. & J. 254, s. c.; Hodge v. Fillis, 3 Camp. 463.

(y) Sanderson v. Bowes, 14 East 500; Roche v. Campbell, 3 Camp. 247. (z) Fife v. Round, 1861 (qu. reported).

(a) Price v. Mitchell, 4 Camp. 200; Exon v. Russell, 4 M. & S. 506; Wil

exchange: Wetumpka & Coosa Railroad v. Bingham, 5 Alabama 657; Hasey v. White Pigeon Beet Sugar Co., 1 Douglas 193. Such a bill is the same, in legal effect, as a promissory note; it imports a promise to pay on demand, and an action may be maintained upon it without proof of a demand of payment from the treasurer of the corporation: Ibid.; Fairchild v. Ogdensburg Railroad Co., 15 New York 337; Lyell v. Supervisors, 6 M'Lean 446; Dennis v. Table Co., 10 California 369. A draft by an agent of a corporation on the corporation is not a bill of exchange: Mobley v. Clark, 28 Barbour 390. An order drawn by a corporation on its own treasurer is an acknowledgment of debt by the corporation, but it must be presented for payment before suit: Marion Railroad Co. v. Hodge, 9 Indiana 163. A county auditor's order is the promissory note of the county, and negotiable: Commissioners v. Day, 19 Indiana 450. An order on a town treasurer to pay F. or bearer on demand has all the elements of negotiable paper: Dalrymple v. Whitingham, 26 Vermont 345; Bull v. Sims, 23 New York 570. The general current of the cases, however, is that county and township warrants or orders are not negotiable, or entitled to the privileges or subject to the rules of commercial paper. They are in fact only payable out of a particular fund: Dyer v. Covington, 7 Harris 200; Allison v. Juniata County, 14 Wright 351; Bayergue v. San Francisco, 1 McAlister, C. C. 175; Dana v. San Francisco, 19 California 486; Sturtevant v. Liberty, 46 Maine 457.