where the drawer, without the consent of the acceptor, added to the acceptance the words, "Payable at Mr. B.'s, Chiswell Street," it was held that this was a material alteration, discharging the acceptor. (d) And the same point has been repeatedly decided since the 1 & 2 Geo. 4, c. 78. "Suppose," says Abbott, C. J., “a bill so altered to be indorsed to a person ignorant of the alteration; his right to sue his indorser would, as the bill appears, be complete upon default made where the bill is payable; whereas, in truth, the acceptor, not having in reality undertaken to pay there, would have committed no default by such non-payment. I am of opinion, therefore, that the alteration is in a material part of the bill, and the acceptor is, in consequence, discharged."(e)

But it has been held by the same learned judge,(f) and *by the Court of Exchequer, that a similar addition with [*325] the consent of the acceptor would not invalidate the instrument, either at common law or under the Stamp Act. Where a bill was addressed to A. B. & Co., and the acceptance was by A. and B., and the address was afterwards altered to correspond with the acceptance, as the acceptors would be liable either way, the alteration was held to be immaterial.(g) An alteration of a foreign bill, by adding either on the face of the bill or to the indorsements the rate of exchange, according to which the bill is to be paid, is fatal.(h)

Budd, L. R., 8 Ex. 171; Vance v. Lowther, L. R., 1 Ex. Div. 126. The defence was capable of being raised by a plea traversing the acceptance; but see now Ord. XIX. r. 23.

(d) Cowie v. IIalsall, 4 B. & Al. 197 (6 E. C. L. R.); 3 Stark. 36 (3 E. C. L. R.), s. c.

(e) M'Intosh v. Haydon, R. & M. 362; Desbrowe v. Weatherby, 1 M. & Rob. 438; 6 C. & P. 758 (25 E. C. L. R.), s. c.; Taylor v. Moseley, 1 M. & Rob. 439, n.; Semple v. Cole, 8 L. J., Exch. 155. These decisions have been recently under review and confirmed by the Court of Queen's Bench in Burchfield v. Moore, 23 L. J., Q. B. 261; 3 E. & B. 683 (77 E. C. L. R.), s. c. ; Gardner v. Walsh, 5 E. & B. 83 (85 E. C. L. R.).

(f) Stevens v. Lloyd, M. & M. 292; and see Jacobs v. Hart, 6 M. & S. 142; Walter v. Cubley, 2 C. & M. 151; but in Walter v. Cubley the attention of the court was not drawn to Gibb v. Mather, 8 Bing. 221 (21 E. C. L. R.); 1 Moore & S. 387; 2 C. & J. 254, s. c. Would not the alteration have been material in an action against the drawer? Stevens v. Lloyd, M. & M. 292; and if so, was not the legal effect of the instrument altered?

(g) Farquhar v. Southey, M. & M. 17; 2 C. & P. 497 (12 E. C. L. R.), s. c.; Hamelin v. Bruck, 15 L. J., Q. B. 343; 9 Q. B. 306 (43 E. C. L. R.), s. c. (h) Hirshfield v. Smith, 35 L. J., C. P. 177; L. R., 1 C. P. 340, s. c., though the additions were in red ink.

The addition of the words "interest to be paid at six per cent. per annum," written at the corner of the note and not in the body, is a material alteration avoiding the note.(i)

But secondly, even if the consent of all parties have been obtained to an alteration in a material part, such alteration, nevertheless, avoids the bill under the stamp laws; for it is become a new and different instrument, and therefore requires a new stamp; which stamp cannot, as we have seen, then be affixed.(j) Any alteration in the date, sum(k) or time of payment, the insertion of words rendering negotiable an instrument which before was not so, altering the words "value received" into an expression of the particular consideration which passed, are respectively material alterations, avoiding the bill under the Stamp Acts. (1) But the addition of another name to a joint and several note on a different part of the face of the note, with the assent of all parties, has been held, ut res magis valeat, to operate as an indorsement. (m)

There are, however, two cases in which an alteration, though in a material part, will not vacate the instrument; first, where such an alteration is made before the bill is *issued or become

[*326] an available instrument; and secondly, where the bill is

altered to correct a mistake or supply an omission, and in furtherance of the original intention of the parties.(n)1

(i) Warrington v. Early, 23 L. J., Q. B. 47.

(j) Wilson v. Justice, Bayley, 6th ed. 118; Bowman v. Nichol, 5 T. R. 537; 1 Esp. 81, s. c.

(k) Hamelin v. Bruck, 15 L. J., Q. B. 343; 9 Q. B. 306 (38 E. C. L. R.),

S. C.

(1) Bathe v. Taylor, 15 East 412; Walton v. Hastings, 4 Camp. 223; 1 Stark. 214 (2 E. C. L. R.), s. c.; Guthwaite v. Luntley, 4 Camp. 179; Knill v. Williams, 10 East 431. The words "not negotiable" may be added at any time to a crossed check: see p. 28.

(m) Ex parte Yates, 27 L. J., Bank. 9; 2 De G. & J. 191, s. c. But see Gardner v. Walsh, 5 E. & B. 83 (85 E. C. L. R.).

(n) Catton v. Simpson, 8 Ad. & E. 136 (35 E. C. L. R.); overruled by Gardner v. Walsh, 5 E. & B. 83 (85 E. C. L. R.); but see Ex parte Yates, supra, and Dodge v. Pringle, 29 L. J., Exch. 115; Aldous v. Cornwall, L. R., 3 Q. B. 573; 37 L. T. 201; 9 B. & S. 607.

1 Retracing the name of obligor which has faded or been blotted with ink and obscured does not avoid the obligation: Dunn v. Clements, 7 Jones (Law)

Thus where the drawer of a bill payable to his own order sent it to the drawee for acceptance, and the drawee requested that a longer time might be allowed for payment, and an alteration to that effect was accordingly made with the consent of the drawer, and the bill was afterwards accepted, it was held that the alteration being made before the bill was an available instrument against any party, a new stamp was unnecessary.(o) Upon the same principle, where three persons joined as drawer, acceptor and indorser, in the fabrication of an accommodation bill, and the date was altered before it came into the hands of a holder for value, it was held that as the accommodation parties could not sue upon it inter se, it was not, till it came into the hands of a holder for value, an available instrument, and therefore that an alteration before that time did not vitiate it. "The question," says Abbott, C. J., "is whether this alteration made it a new bill? Now, undoubtedly, when an

(0) Kennerley v. Nash, 1 Stark. 452 (2 E. C. L. R.).

58. To write over with ink words written in pencil is no material alteration Reed v. Roark, 14 Texas 329. When a third person who had written the note, and with whom it was left, in good faith changed the date, but on its being disapproved by the maker restored the original date, it was held that he was liable on the note: Collins v. Makepeace, 13 Indiana 448. Noting the residences of indorsers after their names does not affect its identity, nor avoid it as to any of the parties to it: Struthers v. Kendall, 5 Wright 214. The holder of a bill indorsed "A. B., Cashier," may add the name of the bank: Bank of Genesee v. Patchin Bank, 3 Kernan 309. The introduction of a dollar mark, followed by numerals, which may be omitted without affecting its sense, does not impair the validity of a note: Houghton v. Francis, 29 Illinois 244. The alteration of a note in a material respect by one of several makers, assuming to have authority so to do, and for the honest purpose of making it conform to the original intention of the parties, without the express though with the implied assent of the holder, will not prevent a recovery by the latter against all the makers declaring upon the note, as though in the form originally delivered: Murray v. Graham, 29 Iowa 520. In the absence of evidence of fraudulent intent, a note is not void which has been altered after indorsement without the knowledge of the indorser, if again restored to its original condition: Kountz v. Kennedy, 13 P. F. Smith 187.

An error in dating a note may be corrected by the holder, so as to make the note mature at the time in fact intended by the parties: Jessup v. Dennison, 2 Disney 150; Dreker v. Franz, 7 Bush 273. Both parties intended to make a note payable to B. C., but accidentally it was written B. R. C.; held that the erasure of the R. by the payee after delivery was immaterial: Cole v. Hills, 44 New Hamp. 227; Ames v. Colburn, 11 Gray 390; Shepherd v. Whetstone, 51 Iowa 457; Warpol v. Ellison, 4 Houst. 322.

accommodation bill has the different parties written upon it, it is, in some sense of the word, a bill of exchange; but it is utterly unavailable as a security for money until it is issued to some real holder for a valuable consideration. It first became a bill of exchange when it was issued to the indorsee for a valuable consideration." "Here," adds Best, J., "at the time when the alteration was made, the bill was a perfect bill in form, but it did not constitute a valid contract between the parties. A bond is a perfect instrument before delivery; but still an alteration made before delivery will not vitiate it."(p) But if either payee or indorsee have given value for it, so that the drawer is liable, an alteration, though

before acceptance, vacates the bill. "In such a case," says Lord Ellenborough," it does not remain in fieri till acceptance.

As to

the drawer, it was before then a *perfect instrument.(q) [*327] When the date was altered, a new bill was drawn, and that could not be done without a new stamp."(r) So if a promissory note be signed by A., and subsequently by B. as surety for A., whilst the note is in the hands of the payee, it will be void, unless the signature of B. is in pursuance of a previous agreement at the time of making the note.(s) And an altered bill will be void in the hands, of an innocent indorsee, as well as in the hands of parties cognizant of the alteration.(t)

If again the alterations were merely to correct a mistake, or to make a bill what it was originally intended to be, it will not avoid it under the Stamp Act. Thus where the drawee intended to make the bill negotiable, and indorsed it over, but had omitted the words "or order," their subsequent insertion in pursuance of the original intention was held not to vacate the bill. (u) So where a bill having

(p) Downs v. Richardson, 5 B. & Ald. 674 (7 E. C. L. R.) ; 1 D. & R. 332, s. c.; Tarleton v. Shingler, 7 C. B. 812 (62 E. C. L. R.). As to the alteration of a deed after execution by one party, see Jones v. Jones, 1 C. & M. 721 ; before complete delivery: Spicer v. Burgess, 1 C., M. & R. 129; 4 Tyr. 598,

S. C.

(q) Walton v. Hastings, 4 Camp. 223; 1 Stark. 215 (2 E. C. L. R.), s. c. (r) Outhwaite v. Luntley, 4 Camp. 179.

(s) Clerk v. Blackstock, Holt, N. P. C. 474. See Ex parte White, 2 Deac. & Chit. 334.

(t) Outhwaite v. Luntley, 4 Camp. 179.

(u) Kershaw v. Cox, 3 Esp. 246; 10 East 437; Jacobs v. Hart, 2 Stark. 45

(3 E. C. L. R.); 6 M. & Sel. 142, s. c.; Byron v. Thompson, 11 Ad. & Ell. 31 (39 E. C. L. R.) ; 3 P. & D. 71, s. c.

or order

been dated by mistake 1822, instead of 1823, the agent of the drawer and acceptor to whom it had been given to be delivered to the indorsee without their knowledge or consent corrected the mistake, it was held that such alteration did not vacate the bill.(x) So again, a man who has agreed beforehand to be a surety may, after the advance to another maker, sign the note.(y) A bona fide holder of a bill of exchange accepted payable to may insert his own name as payee, and indorse it, and the bill may be declared on as payable to the party who has inserted his name. "One," says Best, C. J., "who accepts a bill in this form, undertakes to be answerable for it in the shape of a bill. That being so, he undertakes to be answerable for it in the form which a bona fide holder has a right to give it, and the description in the declaration is made out against him. No new stamp is necessary; the first stamp gives authority for the insertion."(z) Whether the intent of the alteration were to vary the original contract, or merely to correct a mistake, is a question of fact for the jury.(a)1

(x) Brutt v. Picard, R. & M. 37.

(y) Dodge v. Pringle, 29 L. J., Exch. 115.

(z) Attwood v. Griffin, R. & M. 425; 2 C. & P. 368 (12 E. C. L. R.), s. c. (a) Ibid.

1 The acceptor of a bill may alter the date before he accepts, and if this be concurred in by the other parties, it will bind them: Ratcliff v. Planters' Bank, 2 Sneed. 425. Where a party to a negotiable bill or note containing blanks, whether in the date or amount, intrusts it to another, especially if indorsed in blank or payable to bearer, such a transaction carries on its face an implied authority in the person to whom the bill or note is intrusted to fill up the blanks at his discretion: Michigan Bank v. Eldred, 9 Wallace (S. C.) 544; Smith v. Lockridge, 8 Bush 423. The innocent holder of a note forged over an autograph, given in bank for mere purposes of identification, held not entitled to recover: Caulkin v. Whisler, 29 Iowa 495. Where a person signed an instrument to be filled up as an order for a certain article, and intrusted it to another for such purpose, who filled it up as a promissory note, the maker is liable to a bonâ fide holder, who had paid value before maturity: McDonald v. Muscatine National Bank, 27 Iowa 319. One who signs a note written partly in ink, but containing a material condition in pencil, is liable to a holder in good faith, who takes it after the pencil marks have been erased: Harvey v. Smith, 55 Illinois 224. Where the form of a bill of exchange is signed in blank, and the holder, without the knowledge or consent of the signer, has filled the blanks in such a manner as to make a promissory note, and thus change its legal tenor and effect, the signer will be released from responsibility upon such note while in the hands of the person who has made the alteration: Luellen v. Hare, 32 Ind. 211. Garrard