By paying one forged acceptance a man is not estopped from setting up that defence in the case of another similar bill.(q) [*204] When goods or bills of lading are sent to the consignee accompanied by a bill of exchange for his acceptance, he *must accept the bill before he can acquire or transfer any property in the goods or bills of lading.(r) So when a check was sent in respect of a promised renewal, the acceptor cannot take the check without renewing the acceptance.(8) (q) Morris v. Bethell, L. R., 5 C. P. 47. (r) Shepherd v. Harrison, L. R., 5 H. L. 116; 40 L. J., Q. B. 149. A PERSONAL demand on the drawee or acceptor is not neces[*206] sary. (a) It is sufficient if the bill be exhibited and *payment be demanded at his usual residence or place of business of his wife or other agent; for it is the duty of the acceptor, if he is not himself present, to leave provision for the payment.(b)1 (a) And it has been held in America that if made by a notary on the drawee in the street, away from his place of business, it is insufficient: Byles on Bills, 6th American edition, p. 316. (b) Matthews v. Haydon, 2 Esp. 509; Brown v. M'Dermot, 5 Esp. 265. If the bill be payable at a particular place, see post, p. 215. 1 A demand by a notary in the street upon the acceptor of a bill payable generally is not a sufficient demand. It should be made at his place of busi And it is sufficient if payment be demanded of an agent who has been authorized to pay, or has usually paid bills for the drawee. ness: King v. Holmes, 11 Penna. State Rep. 465. The general rule is that where a bill is accepted by partners the presentment for payment should be at their place of business or at the dwelling house of either of them. And if a draft is addressed to the acceptors at a particular place, that will be presumed to be their place of business: The Otsego County Bank v. Weaver, 18 Barbour, S. C. Rep. 290. Demand must be made on all the makers of a joint note: Arnold v. Dresser, 8 Allen 435; Blake v. McMillen, 22 Iowa 358. Refusal by a clerk at the counting house of drawee is sufficient without evidence of his authority: Stainback v. The Bank of Virginia, 11 Grattan 260. When demand is made the bill itself must be exhibited : Freeman v. Boynton, 7 Mass. 483; Masson v. Lake, 4 Howard, U. S. Rep. 262: Draper v. Clemens, 4 Missouri 52. See Posey v. Decatur Bank, 12 Alabama 802; Bank of Vergennes v. Cameron, 7 Barbour, Sup. Ct. 143; Whitwell v. Johnson, 17 Mass. 499; Smith v. Gibbs, 2 Smedes & Marshall 479; Nailor v. Bowie, 3 Maryland 251. A demand of payment of a lost note or presentment of a copy is sufficient, and satisfies the usual averment of due presentment: Hinsdale v. Miles, 5 Conn. 331. It is sufficient to constitute a demand and refusal to pay a note that the maker, on the day that it becomes due, calls on the holder at his store where the note is, and informs him that he cannot and shall not pay it, and desires him to give notice to the indorser, though the note is not produced: Gilbert v. Dennis, 3 Metc. 495. A notice sent the maker of a note through the post-office, where his residence is known, that his note is overdue and unpaid, is not sufficient demand to charge the indorser: Stuckert v. Anderson, 3 Wharton 116; Barnes v. Vaughan, 6 Rhode Island 259; Hartford Bank v. Green, 11 Iowa 476. On the day a bill was due a notary went with it several times to the office of the acceptor, but found the doors closed and no person there to answer his demand. This was held a good demand although one of the firm resided in the place: Wiseman v. Chiapella, 23 Howard (S. C.) 368; Bank of Louisiana v. Satterfield, 14 Louisiana Annual 80. Where inquiry was made both at the maker's last place of business and his last place of residence, from which he had recently removed, and he could not be found, it is sufficient, and the complaint in a suit against the indorser properly avers presentment: Paton v. Lent, 4 Duer 231. As to what diligence in seeking the maker or acceptor will excuse demand, see Gage v. Dubuque Railroad Co., 11 Iowa 310; Grafton Bank v. Cox, 13 Gray 503; Baumgardner v. Reeves, 11 Casey 250; Laughlin v. Marshall, 19 Illinois 390; Sasser v. Whitley, 10 Maryland 98; Plakto v. Patchin, 26 Missouri 389; Packard v. Lyon, 5 Duer 82; Benedict v. Caffe, Ibid. 226. Although a bill payable at a particular bank is in point of fact in the bank, but the bank is wholly ignorant of the fact; as where a bill was sent in a letter, and the postman laid the letter on the cashier's desk, but it slipped through a crack and was not seen; the fact that the bill was thus really in the bank does not constitute a presentment: Chicopee Bank v. Philadelphia Bank, 8 Wallace 641. Where a promissory note is payable at either of two places, presentment at either of them will suffice. Thus, where a country bank note was made payable both at Tunbridge and in London, presentment in London was held sufficient, though it was proved that, had it been presented at Tunbridge, the nearest place, it would have been paid. (e) But it is conceived that presentment of a check to the London bankers of the drawee, though described on the check as agents, is sufficient, for the obligation to pay a check must in general depend on the state of the drawer's account, which the London agents may not know. (d) The bill or note ought to be exhibited, (e) for it should be then and there delivered up. The party presenting should also be ready and authorized to receive the money, and has no right (at least, unless usage requires it) to impose on the drawee any trouble or risk in remitting the money elsewhere.(f) The bankruptcy or insolvency of the drawee is no excuse for a neglect to present for payment; for many means may remain of obtaining payment by the assistance of friends or otherwise.(g) It has been held in the King's Bench that the shutting up of a bank, when any demand there made would have been inaudible, is substantially a refusal by the bankers to pay their notes to all the world.(h) But it was decided in the same case, on error in the Exchequer Chamber, that an allegation in the declaration that the makers became insolvent and ceased, and wholly declined and refused then and thenceforth to pay at the place specified, any of their notes, is insufficient, not being *equivalent to an alle[*207] gation of presentment.(?) But it is conceived, notwithstanding the observations of the court in the last case, that it cannot be (c) Beeching v. Gower, Holt, N. P. C. 313. (d) Bailey v. Bodenham, 33 L. J., C. P. 252. (e) See the American authorities, Byles on Bills, 6th American edition, p. 316. (f) See Bailey v. Bodenham, 33 L. J., C. P. 255. (g) Russell v. Langstaffe, Doug. 496; Warrington v. Furbor, 8 East 245; Nicholson v. Gouthit, 2 H. Bl. 609; Ex parte Johnstone, 1 Mont. & Ayr. 622; 3 Deac. & Chitty 433, s. c.; Esdaile v. Sowerby, 11 East 114; Lafitte v. Slatter, 6 Bing. 623 (19 E. C. L. R.); 4 M. & P. 457, s. c.; Camidge v. Allenby, 6 B. & C. 373 (13 E. C. L. R.); 9 D. & R. 391. (h) Howe v. Bowes, 16 East 112. (i) 5 Taunt. 30 (1 E. C. L. R.); s. c. in error. necessary for the holders of the notes of a bank which has notoriously stopped payment, and is shut up, to go through the empty form of carrying their notes up to the bank doors, and then carrying them home again.(k) A presentment for payment is now decided not to be necessary in order to charge a man who guarantees the due payment of a bill or note.() And it had before been held that where a party was a guarantee for the vendee of goods, who had accepted a bill for the amount and then became bankrupt, the notorious insolvency of the vendee was sufficient so far to excuse the drawer as to enable him to charge the guarantee, unless it could have been shown that the bill would have been paid if duly presented, though it would have been otherwise in an action on the bill.(m) If the drawee has shut up his house, the holder must inquire after him and attempt to find him out.' (k) Since the above observations were written I observe that the point has been so ruled at Nisi Prius and afterwards at Chambers. See Henderson v. Appleton, Chitty, 9th ed. 356, and Rogers v. Langford, 1 C. & M. 637, where Lord Lyndhurst says, "It is possible, if you had returned the notes in due time, that might have done instead of presentment." See also Turner v. Stones, 1 Dow. & L. 122; Sands v. Clarke, 19 L. J., C. P. 84; Main's case, 5 Rep. 21 a; Robson v. Oliver, 10 Q. B. 704 (59 E. C. L. R.). (7) Hitchcock v. Humfrey, 5 M. & G. 559 (44 E. C. L. R.); Walton v. Mascall, 13 M. & W. 453. (m) Warrington v. Furbor, 8 East 242; 6 Esp. 89, s. c.; Smith v. Bank of New South Wales, L. R., 4 Priv. Coun. 194. 1 Want of demand is excused when the drawee cannot be found: Stewart v. Eden, 2 Caines 121; Galpin v. Hard, 3 McCord 394; Porter v. Judson, 1 Gray 175; McKee v. Boswell, 33 Missouri 567. Where the dwelling-house or place of business of the drawee of the bill is shut up, inquiry should be made in the neighborhood in order to excuse presentment: Ellis v. Commercial Bank, 7 Howard (Miss.) 294. Where the maker of a promissory note has absconded from his usual place of residence before the time of payment, it is not necessary to prove an inquiry for him there, and an effort to obtain payment, in order to charge the indorser: Lehman v. Jones, 1 Watts & Serg. 126. Contra, Wyman v. Adams, 12 Cushing 210. If the drawee of a bill remove from his usual place of residence to another in the same state or kingdom, the holder is bound, in order to charge the indorser, to use reasonable diligence in finding the latter, and, if he succeed, present the bill for payment: Reid v. Morrison, 2 Watts & Serg. 401; see Gilmore v. Spies, 1 Barb. 158. Where the maker of a promissory note abandons his business |