1842. JONES v. GOODAY. fendant to pay it into court. There is a case referred to Exch. of Pleas, in Bacon's Abridgment, tit. "Tender," pl. 6, of Lawrence v. Cox, where it was held that it was not necessary for a party who pleads a tender of amends, to pay the money into court. That is a precedent for pursuing the course the defendant has taken here; indeed, it goes beyond the present case, because it is an authority that even on a plea of tender it was unnecessary to pay the money into court. The sum tendered is not a debt, but the tender is a matter collateral to the defence, and I think it imposed no obligation on the defendant to pay the money into court. It seems to me, therefore, that there is a good bar to the action, and that the verdict must be entered for the defendant. ALDERSON, B.-I am of the same opinion. It seems to me that if a party is acting bonâ fide in what he considers to be the execution of the authority vested in him, he is entitled to notice of action, and to tender amends, and then the only question is, has he tendered sufficient amends? If the law, as laid down in the case cited by Mr. Kelly, were to be strictly acted upon, I concur entirely with my brother Parke in thinking it would take away the protection the legislature intended to give to officers acting in the execution of their duty, because it would impose on third persons the task of deciding, in every case, whether they had acted reasonably or not. If the act done was such doing it, be supposed to that no reasonble man could, in have acted bonâ fide, that would be another question. In the case of Cook v. Leonard, the Court must have considered that no reasonable man could have acted as the defendant did; that it was not merely gross ignorance on his part, but amounted to mala fides. The law on this subject is well laid down by Lord Ellenborough, and Bayley, J., in Theobald v. Crichmore (a). There it appeared the defendant acted in ignorance; but what does Lord Ellenborough say? that the (a) 1 B. & Ald. 227. 1842. JONES v. GOODAY. Exch. of Pleas, sole question was, not whether he acted illegally, but whether, in so acting, he did it with a bonâ fide intention of carrying out the act of Parliament: and Bayley, J., at the conclusion of his judgment, says, "It appears to me that the officer acted illegally, but in the supposed bonâ fide execution of his duty, and that he is therefore entitled to the protection of the statute." So here, I should say this defendant acted illegally, but in the supposed bonâ fide execution of his duty, as one of the commissioners, carrying into effect the act of all the commissioners, under the authority of this act of Parliament, and he is therefore within the protection of the statute. Then has he tendered sufficient amends for what he has done? The jury have found that he has. But then it is said, that he ought to have brought the money into court; I do not think so. Suppose this case, that before the act was done, it had been required that he should make an offer to pay so much to the other party; he does make the offer, and does the act. In that case he is authorized, and it could not be necessary to bring the money into court here he has done the act without authority, but he tenders the amount before the action is brought. It is said that inflicts great hardship, and that if a party were to tender £10,000 for amends, the plaintiff may lose it all, because a jury might happen to say that £9,999 was sufficient. I do not think that follows at all: a party to whom amends are tendered may take it, and yet say, "This is not sufficient," and may go on notwithstanding. I am putting the case where one party thinks the sum tendered is sufficient, and the other party alleges that it is not enough; but if the latter chooses to go on, according to the words in the clause, " after sufficient satisfaction made or tendered," there is no hardship in his being deprived of it altogether. ROLFE, B.-I entirely concur, and the only observation I shall make is this, that this statute is merely a local one, and there is no reason for supposing there ever will be a 1842. JONES case like the extreme one that has been put; it is not like Exch. of Pleas, a provision applying generally to all times and all places; and the only injury a party can sustain in trifling matters of this sort will be, that if sufficient amends have been tendered, then he cannot maintain his action. Judgment for the defendant. v. GOODAY. HUTCHINGS v. REEVES and BOXALL. May 3. weights and measures, appointed by the sessions under the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 63, s. 17, and having a general warrant from a magis trate, under s. 28, to act as such within his jurisdiction, may, by virtue of such appointment and war rant, enter any in his district, TRESPASS for breaking and entering the plaintiff's An inspector of shop, and taking and carrying away three pewter pots. Plea, not guilty (by statute). At the trial before Gurney, B., at the Middlesex Sittings after Hilary Term, it appeared that the defendant Reeves, in his capacity of inspector of weights and measures for the county of Middlesex, appointed by the justices in sessions, under the stat. 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 63, s. 17, on the 30th August, 1841, entered the premises of the plaintiff, who kept a beershop, and proceeded to try by the imperial standard the beer measures he found there; and the three pots in question being in his judgment deficient in measure, he seized them, and gave them to the other defendant, who accompanied him with a basket for that purpose, and carried them away. The warrant under which the defendant Reeves acted, dated 2nd December, 1840, was put in and read. It recited that it had been granted in pursuance of an application made by him for that purpose to the magistrate by whom it was signed, and empowered him, at all seasonable times, to enter all shops, houses, &c., whatsoever "within his jurisdiction," wherein goods should be exposed or kept for sale, &c., and to require the production of all weights, measures, steelyards, &c., and to compare and try the same with at all seasonable times, to exa mine and seize false weights and measures, and need not have a special warrant from a justice in each individual case. 1842. HUTCHINGS REEVES. Exch. of Pleas, the imperial standard weights and measures, &c. Upon this evidence, it was objected for the plaintiff, first, that this warrant, being in general terms, and not containing any authority to enter and search the premises of the plaintiff by name, was insufficient, and afforded no justification to the defendants: and secondly, that the defendant Boxall, who had no warrant or appointment under the statute, but merely accompanied Reeves as his servant, was not entitled to plead the general issue and give the special matter in evidence, under the 39th section of the act, which enacts that "in all actions brought against any person for any thing done in pursuance of the act, or in the execution of the powers or authorities thereof, the defendant or defendants may plead the general issue, and give this act and the special matter in evidence, at any trial to be had thereon, and that the acts were done in pursuance or by the authority of the act(a)." The learned Judge reserved the points for the opinion of the Court, and the plaintiff had a verdict, damages 21. 6s., leave being reserved to the defendants to move to enter a verdict for them or either of them. In this Term, R. V. Richards obtained a rule accordingly, against which Platt and Bovill now shewed cause.--It is clear that the inspector of weights and measures has not the power contended for in this case,-to enter any shop and seize the measures which he may deem deficient in weight, under a general warrant such as this,-unless it be given him by the 28th section of the stat. 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 63. The 17th section, which relates to the original appointment of inspectors by the justices in sessions, certainly gives no such authority. It merely enacts, that in England, at the general or quarter sessions of the peace, the justices shall (a) The latter objection was abandoned on the argument of the rule. 1842. v. REEVES. determine the number of copies of the imperial standard Exch. of Pleas, weights and measures, which they shall deem requisite for the comparison of all weights and measures in use within HUTCHINGS their respective jurisdictions, and shall direct that such copies, verified and stamped at the Exchequer, shall be provided for the use of the same, and shall fix the places at which such copies shall be deposited, and shall appoint a sufficient number of inspectors of weights and measures for the safe custody of such copies, and for the discharge of the other duties thereinafter mentioned; and shall allot to each inspector a separate district. The question, therefore, turns altogether upon the 28th section, by which it is enacted, "that in England and Ireland it shall be lawful for every justice of the peace of any county, &c., and in Scotland for every sheriff, &c., or for any inspector authorized in writing under the hand of any justice of the peace &c., at all seasonable times, to enter any shop &c. whatever 'within his jurisdiction,' wherein goods shall be exposed or kept for sale,&c., and there to examine all weights, measures, steelyards, or other weighing machines, and to compare and try the same with the copies of the imperial standard weights and measures required or authorized to be provided under this act; and if upon such examination it shall appear that the said weights or measures are light or otherwise unjust, the same shall be liable to be seized and forfeited, &c. &c." And if the defendant did not well justify his entry under this section, he did not bring himself within the protection of the 39th section. Now the warrant put in evidence gave the defendant no specific authority to enter the plaintiff's shop. The statute requires that the inspector shall be armed with the warrant of a magistrate, authorizing the act which would otherwise be a trespass. The appointment and the warrant are two entirely different things; the former is a general nomination of the party to the office, to be made by the sessions; the latter is a particular authority, to be given by |