"Q. But he never brought in the $250,000, did he? "A. No, sir.

"Q. And it dragged along for months in that stage, that he was coming to you and talking to you about something that they were going to get; showed you a telegram?

"A. I won't say months, Mr. Groesbeck. I couldn't say exactly the time.

"Q. Well, Mr. Mason, you said here it was some time in the spring. Fix it by Decoration Day, say. "A. Somewhere in that neighborhood I guess.

"Q. It was before Decoration Day, wasn't it? "A. Well, I could not state. It was around that neighborhood some time, along in the spring.

"Q. You don't know of any other concern that the People's State Bank was loaning a hundred or one hundred sixty-two thousand dollars to upon a statement that somebody was going to put a couple of hundred thousand dollars in their business, do you? "A. I don't recall any."

It thus conclusively appears: That Mr. Mason had knowledge of the kiting operations of Cameron Currie & Co. with the bank as early as Decoration Day of 1908, and that these operations were allowed to be continued by him as an officer of the bank because he had been told by Mr. Case that Hayden, Stone & Co. were auditing the books of Cameron Currie & Co. and expected to put $250,000 of additional capital into that business. That the bank, through Mr. Mason, well knew and understood that Cameron Currie & Co. were agents buying and selling for customers and owners generally on commission, there can be no question, and also that he had knowledge of the fraudulent credits extended to them, and the fact of their insolvency. The defendant put on as witnesses, with reference to the bank's transactions with Cameron Currie & Co., certain of its clerks and tellers, but no officer of the bank took the stand who testified authoritatively to the real relations existing between the bank and Cameron Currie & Co.

After a careful examination of the record with reference to these various transactions, we are unable to say, from the proofs, what the real condition of this checking account was at the time of the deposit of the check, and are satisfied that a great amount of the transactions that entered into this checking account were not legitimate banking transactions, and were not carried on in the ordinary course of banking business; and that these transactions were consented to by the officer of the bank in charge of this account. We do not believe that, under these circumstances, it should be said, or that it can be said, that the bank (it having consented and permitted Cameron Currie & Co. to do business in this illegal way) was a bona fide holder of this check for value, and therefore agree with the trial judge in holding that the plaintiff had not met the burden placed upon it to show this, and its case against the defendant must therefore fail.

Neither are we of the opinion that the defendant has by his conduct in the case of Austin v. Hayden, supra, in which he appeared as an intervener, estopped himself from setting up fraud as a defense in this case. To so hold was not the purpose of this court in the opinion written by Mr. Justice BROOKE in the case of Austin v. Hayden, 176 Mich. 331 (142 N. W. 563). While, under this opinion, Hayden, Stone & Co. might have defended this action, nevertheless it appears that they did not so defend and the defendant did.

We find no error, and the judgment is therefore affirmed.

BROOKE, C. J., and MCALVAY, STONE, OSTRANDER, BIRD, MOORE, and STEERE, JJ., concurred.

To a servant in the employ of a tenant of real estate, no duty was owing by an adjoining proprietor in tearing down a building standing on the boundary line of the premises, not to take away the supports of a shed or lean-to that fell a number of hours afterwards while plaintiff was within the structure, where all the parties in interest must have contemplated that the shed would fall, and plaintiff was not in the employ of the defendant who had control of the operation of pulling down the building, with license from both parties in interest.

Nor was defendant chargeable with failure to warn plaintiff of the progress of the work which must have been observed by the injured servant.

Error to Wayne; Hally, J. Submitted January 11, 1915. (Docket No. 59.) Decided April 19, 1915.

Case by Louis Groesbeck against Henry D. Shelden and others for personal injuries. Judgment for defendant on a directed verdict. Plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Alex. J. Groesbeck and Guy A. Miller, for appellant. Geer, Williams, Martin & Butler, for appellee Shelden.

The relations of the parties are as follows: Defendant Shelden and Joseph L. Hudson, deceased, were proprietors whose lands adjoined-Hudson's estate being east of the estate of Shelden. Defendant Girardin was tenant of Hudson, under what terms does not appear, and plaintiff, Groesbeck, was employed by Girardin upon and about the estate as man

of all work. By an interchange of conveyances, the boundary line dividing the estates was changed, and as a consequence a large barn, which had been before a part of the Hudson estate, standing entirely upon Hudson's land, thereafter stood partly upon the land of each proprietor. Ascertaining from Girardin that the building was not useful to him and that he had no desire to have it remain, Mr. Hudson proposed to Mr. Shelden that it be taken down and removed, and that he (Shelden) should demolish it. To this Mr. Shelden consented, and by his direction, and by men under his authority and control, but not under his personal supervison and oversight, the barn was taken down. The work of demolition began at the top of the building. Upon the easterly side of the barn were buildings, one of which projected beyond the north line of the barn; its roof, alongside of the barn, being supported, in part, by the barn—that is to say, it was a lean-to, and the side of the barn was, so far as they were connected, its westerly side. The shed in question had been used as a stable for horses, and contained four box stalls, divided by three partitions running east and west. The large structure, which was demolished, was 40x80 feet in size; the boundary line of the estates passing through its longer axis. Its easterly side was 28 or 30 feet in height. The adjoining and connected shed, or horse barn, was 50x14 feet in size; its easterly side being 8 feet high, and its westerly side, next the large barn, 14 feet high. The easterly side of the barn, below the roof of the lean-to, was of planks. Horses were kept in the shed until Sunday morning preceding the occurrence out of which this suit arises. Plaintiff was absent from the place from Sunday morning (when the siding between the two structures had not been removed) until Tuesday night. He was not near the structure on Wednesday. On Thursday the large

barn was demolished, practically down to its floor and sills. The siding and studding between it and the lean-to had been removed. No new or other supports for the roof of the shed had been introduced, and it stood with some 40 feet in length of the roof supported by a single post or standard about midway of the 40-foot section. The roof found some support north of the large barn in its side wall, and to the south end it was attached to another shed. Thursday afternoon, December 22, 1910, plaintiff went to the large barn. Two men were at work taking up the floor. He discovered, he says, a number of toe weights in the rubbish and began picking them up. There is a dispute of testimony as to what he was doing; but a portion of the roof of the shed fell, pinning him under it and injuring him.

The duty which it is alleged was owed to plaintiff and was breached was

"to exercise ordinary care and prudence to render said premises, and especially the said farm building above described, reasonably safe for the purposes for which it was being used, and to maintain good and sufficient braces, joints, scantlings, partitions, and supports in the said building, so as not to render it unsafe, dangerous, or insecure in any particular, so that plaintiff as aforesaid, with due care and caution upon his part, might not be subjected to unreasonable or unnecessary hazard or danger; and, further, it became the duty of said defendants, and each and all of them, to notify and warn the plaintiff of any defects in the said building, and of any danger to which he might be subjected while in the use of the premises, and especially the building aforementioned, and that it was the duty of the said defendants to guard and protect the plaintiff while within the said building and in and about the premises from any hazard or danger made possible or caused by the taking away of the joists, scantlings, partitions, or other braces supporting the roof of said building, or in any manner rendering the premises unsafe, dangerous, or hazardous, so