operative after the demurrer was sustained, the position of the solicitors for appellant is that, as the statute affects purely the method of applying the remedy to the rights of the parties, and not the rights themselves, and, even though passed subsequent to the commencement of the suit, and subsequent to the order sustaining the demurrer, it is fully applicable to all pending cases, including the case at bar, and this court is bound by it in passing upon the question, citing First National Bank of Ovid v. Steel, 136 Mich. 588 (99 N. W. 786); Daniels v. Railway, 163 Mich. 468 (128 N. W. 797); Judd v. Judd, 125 Mich. 228 (84 N. W. 134); State Savings Bank v. Matthews, 123 Mich. 56 (81 N. W. 918); Hufford v. Railroad Co., 64 Mich. 631 (31 N. W. 544, 8 Am. St. Rep. 859); Hanes v. Wadey, 73 Mich. 178 (41 N. W. 222, 2 L. R. A. 498); Beebe v. Birkett, 108 Mich. 234 (65 N. W. 970).

The solicitors for the appellee cite in opposition to this contention 2 Sutherland on Statutory Construction (2d Ed.), § 674, and Bedier v. Fuller, 116 Mich. 126 (74 N. W. 506).

A reading of the averments of the cross-bill and of the provisions of the bond shows that, if the averments of the cross-bill are true, the bonding company is liable to the lienors. The one side claims this liability may be established in the present proceeding. The other claims it must be established in the law side of the court. This indicates a question of remedy, rather than one of liability, and, according to the great weight of the authorities cited, brings the case within the statute as amended.

Counsel, however, insist that the amendment of section 10 contained in Act No. 394, Pub. Acts 1913, is void because unconstitutional, in that its object is not expressed in its title, and because its object is twofold.

185 Mich.-21.

Article 5, § 21, of the Michigan Constitution reads: "No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title."

It is also claimed the amendment violates section 13 of article 2 of the Constitution, which reads:

"The right of trial by jury shall remain, but shall be deemed to be waived in all civil cases unless demanded by one of the parties in such manner as shall be prescribed by law."

The contention of counsel is that:

"The original act and the amendatory act merely provided for the establishing, protecting, and enforcing by lien the rights of mechanics and materialmen. The admendatory act does not give any hint in the title that it provides a new remedy for the owner of property who is possessed of a surety bond. The title to the original act and the amendatory act gives no hint that from henceforth mechanics are to enforce their claims through bonds, rather than by lien on the property" — counsel citing People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 494; Brooks v. Hydorn, 76 Mich. 273 (42 N. W. 1122); Vernor v. Secretary of State, 179 Mich. 157 (146 N. W. 338), and other cases.

The title of Act No. 179 of the Public Acts of 1891 is as follows:

"An act to establish, protect and enforce by lien the rights of mechanics and other persons furnishing labor or materials for the building, altering, improving, repairing, erecting or ornamenting of buildings, machinery, wharves and all other structures; and to repeal all acts contravening the provisions of this act."

The title of Act No. 394, Public Acts of 1913, reads:

"An act to amend section ten of Act No. 179 of the Public Acts of 1891, approved July 1, 1891, being compiler's section 10719 of the Compiled Laws of 1897, entitled 'An act to establish, protect and enforce by lien the rights of mechanics and other persons furnishing labor or materials for the building, altering,

improving, repairing, erecting or ornamenting of buildings, machinery, wharves and all other structures; and to repeal all acts contravening the provisions of this act.'"

We think, when the opinion of Justice COOLEY in People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, is read in its entirety, it tends to show the sufficiency of the title to the amended act. We quote from the opinion:

*

"There was no design by this clause to embarrass legislation by making laws unnecessarily restrictive. in their scope and operation, and thus multiplying their number; but the framers of the Constitution meant to put an end to legislation of the vicious character referred to, which was little less than a fraud upon the public, and to require that in every case the proposed measure should stand upon its own merits, and that the legislature should be fairly satisfied of its design when required to pass upon it. * * But this purpose is fully accomplished when the law has but one general object, which is fairly indicated by its title. To require that every end and means necessary to the accomplishment of this general object should be provided for by a separate act relating to that alone would not only be senseless, but would actually render legislation impossible. The police government of a city could not be organized without a distinct act for each specific duty to be devolved upon it, and these could not be passed until a multitude of other statutes had taken the same duties from other officers before performing them. And these several statutes, fragmentary as they must necessarily be, would often fail of the intended effect, from the inherent difficulty of expressing the legislative will when restricted to such narrow bounds."

In this connection we call attention to the opinion in Barnard v. McLeod, 114 Mich. 73 (72 N. W. 24), because it construes the mechanic's lien law and deals with the contention that the amendment then before the court took away from the contractor a commonlaw right, of which purpose the title gave no notice. In Pratt Food Co. v. Bird, 148 Mich. 631, 634 (112

N. W. 701, 118 Am. St. Rep. 601), Justice MONTGOMERY, speaking for the court, said:

"Is the law constitutional? It is claimed that the law is unconstitutional, in that it violates section 20 of article 4 of the Constitution, which provides that no law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title. It is established by our decisions that, if what is introduced by way of an amendment to an act might have been incorporated in the act under its original title, there is no violation of this section. * * * The question is, therefore, whether, under the original title, a provision fixing a standard of pure food, and providing means to prevent deception in the sale of such food, is within the title of an act to provide for the appointment of a dairy and food commissioner, and to define his powers and duties and fix his compensation. We think the title is within our previous decisions sufficient. It is obvious to one reading this title that there must have been imposed upon the commissioner certain powers and duties to make his department of any value to the State, and, furthermore, that these powers and duties must have relation to something. It is equally obvious that the relation of these powers and duties must be to the subject which is brought within the department that is created, viz., the dairy and food department. The title is very similar to that which esablished the insurance bureau. In Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. State Treasurer, 31 Mich. 6, it was held that a title which read 'An act to establish an insurance bureau' was sufficiently broad to cover any pertinent regulations respecting the bureau's course of action towards those engaged in insurance, and any appropriate provisions for prescribing the duty due from the insurance companies to the State in the matter of taxation, without violating the constitutional provision.'

See, also, Westgate v. Adrian Township, 161 Mich. 333 (126 N. W. 422).

We think the amendment was germane to the subject which was receiving the attention of the legislators.

Another position of counsel is stated as follows:

*

"We submit that, whenever an equity court is operating under a special power given to it, it does not then have the additional power to draw into the case remaining portions of the controversy, not within the confines of that special grant of power. * * The lien law is in derogation of the common law, and all rights under it are statutory, and cannot be extended beyond the provisions of the statute. It is to be seen from these considerations that the right of lien is purely statutory, and we urge that as a necessary consequence the jurisdiction of chancery in matters of lien is necessarily limited by the provisions of the statute. This court has so held"-citing Sterner v. Haas, 108 Mich. 488 (66 N. W. 348).

In Koch v. Sumner, 145 Mich. 358 (108 N. W. 725, 116 Am. St. Rep. 302, 9 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 225), a construction of the mechanic's lien law was involved. The owner of the property not only disputed the right of the contractor to a lien, but sought to recover damages for failure to perform the contract. The same claim was made there as here, and Sterner v. Haas, supra, was cited. It was held the owner might recover damages; the opinion reading as follows:

"A reading of the opinion will show, however, that it did not go off upon that point, but upon the general proposition that it is the duty of a court of equity which has properly acquired jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties to do final and complete justice in relation thereto. This is no new doctrine in this State. It was announced as long ago as Whipple v. Farrar, 3 Mich. 436 [64 Am. Dec. 99]. See, also, Miller v. Stepper, 32 Mich. 194; Wallace v. Wallace, 63 Mich. 326 [29 N. W. 841]; Drayton v. Chandler, 93 Mich. 383 [53 N. W. 558]; In re Axtell's Petition, 95 Mich. 244 [54 N. W. 889]; George v. Light Co., 105 Mich. 1 [62 N. W. 985]; McLean v. McLean, 109 Mich. 258 [67 N. W. 118]. In Convis v. Insurance Co., 127 Mich. 616 [86 N. W. 994], the doctrine was restated by Justice GRANT as follows: