the finance keeper as to the statement of Mrs. Edgerly of her intention to withdraw was inadmissible and incompetent under the statute (Act No. 30, Pub. Acts 1903). See authorities cited in Rousseau v. Brotherhood of Yeomen, 177 Mich. 568 (143 N. W. 626). But, with this testimony eliminated, the record still shows that Mrs. Edgerly dropped out voluntarily. The error in permitting the testimony to stand was harmless. Although she lived in the same city with the finance keeper, no attempt was made in her behalf to become reinstated until on her deathbed, and that attempt was by the daughter-in-law.

The dispensation merely permitted the great record keeper to accept applications for reinstatement of members suspended more than 30 days without furnishing a certificate of good health. It was but an indulgence or gratuity to members who took advantage of it while in force. Those who took advantage of it while it was in force would be protected, because an actual reinstatement would have taken place on the books of the order, and the transaction would have become a closed one. Those suspended members who did not take advantage of it while in force could not claim any right had been taken away from them, because none was covered by it unless an application for reinstatement was made. On November 1, 1910, the great commander rescinded the prior dispensation, and required all members under suspension more than 30 days to furnish a certificate of good health in order to become reinstated. There was no dealing in either dispensation with any member directly.

Counsel for plaintiff seem to contend that personal notice should have been given to Julia E. Edgerly of the November 1st dispensation, rescinding the prior one. We are unable to find any provision of the laws of the order or authority sustaining the proposition

185 Mich.-11.

that when a member voluntarily drops out of the order, and thereby her certificate becomes forfeited by the express terms of her contract with the order, she has still a vested right to have notice of subsequent action of the order. When she actually dropped out, the order had the right to treat her as suspended. There is no evidence to justify the claim of plaintiff that Julia E. Edgerly was misled or deceived by the action of the order, or that she placed any reliance upon the July dispensation, or knew of it. She knew that, if she did not pay her assessments, she would stand suspended, and with that knowledge she voluntarily and deliberately became suspended and dropped out of the order.

A member who has become suspended can only be reinstated in strict conformity with the laws, and has no rights until an actual reinstatement has taken place. 29 Cyc. p. 38, and cases cited. This doctrine seems to be sustained by Hay v. Benefit Ass'n, 143 N. C. 256 (55 S. E. 623).

It is worthy of passing note that the dispensation did not attempt to do away with application to the local hive. We quote from section 141: "She may be reinstated upon application being made at a regular meeting of her hive." We have looked in vain in this record for any such application, or any action of the local hive. The local finance keeper undertook to restore Mrs. Edgerly, without any action of the hive or any consultation with that body, so far as this record shows.

We are unable to agree with plaintiff's contention that section 93 of the by-laws of 1910, which is the reinstating section, confers some rights upon suspended members to become reinstated. That section deals with "members," not suspended members.

It will be noted that the paper signed "Julia E. Edgerly," on December 6, 1910, does not purport to

be an application for reinstatement, but is, on the contrary, an application for transfer from one class to another. It seems to have been assumed that the reinstatement had already taken place, and that the applicant was a member in good standing. We do not understand that such was the fact. We agree with the contention of defendant that, when a member suspends herself, which, by the provisions of the contract, suspends her relations with the order, she only has such right of reinstatement as exists at the time she applies for reinstatement. What may have happened during the period of her suspension she cannot complain about; and her beneficiary is in no better position than she would be.

At the time the application was made for Julia E. Edgerly to be reinstated, if any was made at all, a certificate showing her good health was necessary. This was not, and could not be, furnished. The trouble with the plaintiff's case is that at the time of the death of his mother her beneficiary certificate had been suspended, and there had been no reinstatement thereof. That was the status at the time of her death. For the reasons already stated by us, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

BROOKE, C. J., and MCALVAY, KUHN, OSTRANDER, BIRD, MOORE, and STEERE, JJ., concurred.

PEOPLE v. WHEELER.

1. CRIMINAL LAW-TRIAL-JURY-VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION. On the trial of a criminal prosecution for the violation of the local option law, where respondent's counsel inquired of one of the members of the panel if the evidence was equally balanced in his mind which way he would be inclined to lean, for the people or for the respondent, and the court suggested that the question should contain the modification or contingency, "If either way," and counsel declined to incorporate the suggested amendment in his question, there was no reversible error in ruling out the question unless some sufficient reason was shown why counsel refused to adopt the suggestion of the court. 2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REGULATION - INTOXICATING LIQUORS PROHIBITION-DIFFERENT OBJECTS. The title of Act No. 381, Pub. Acts 1913, relating to the regulation of the sale, consignment, shipment, transportation, etc., of intoxicating liquors and to the prohibition of the same in certain cases is sufficient; regulation and prohibition not being such distinct objects as to violate the constitutional limitation whereby statutes are required to contain but one object: the act in question effects but one purpose, namely, the regulation of the traffic and prohibition under certain circumstances in counties which have adopted local option.

3. SAME TITLE OF ACT-DOUBLE OBJECT.

Compliance with the constitutional provisions limiting the number of objects to which an act may apply is sufficiently accomplished when the statute has but one gen. eral object which is fairly indicated by the title. It is not essential that every end and means necessary to an accomplishment of the general purpose should be effected by a separate act of the legislature. Section 21, Art. 5, Constitution. Under section 16, Art. 2, of the State Constitution and the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution prohibiting the State from depriving any person of life, liberty or property without due process of

law, the State is not prohibited from regulating and prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors in the ordinary exercise of its police power.1

Said Act No. 381 applying to the entire State is not local legislation within the meaning of Art. 5, section 30, of the State Constitution requiring acts which have a local effect to be submitted to and approved by the electors of the district which is affected.

5. INTOXICATING LIQUORS — CRIMINAL LAW - PRIVATE RESIDENCESTATUTES-KEEPING INTOXICATING LIQUORS-PUBLIC HOUSE. Where respondent was charged with keeping a quantity of whisky in a room which was not part of his private residence and in a place of public resort, and where the evidence tended to show that the room in which the liquor was discovered was on the first floor of a hotel, that the entire first floor was used as a place of public resort, that the room was locked but was surrounded by others which were open to the public and that it was in use as a servant's room, being precisely the kind of place which the provisions of the statute were designed to relate to, the conviction of the respondent for violation of the act was justified.

Exceptions before sentence from Hillsdale; Chester, J. Submitted January 21, 1915. (Docket No. 127.) Decided March 18, 1915.

Carl Wheeler was convicted of violation of the liquor law. Affirmed.

Orville J. Cornell, for the people.

Munro & Powell and Paul W. Chase, for respondent.

KUHN, J. The respondent was convicted under Act No. 381 of the Public Acts of 1913. It was charged in the information that he "did keep, store, and

'On the question of the constitutional right to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor, see note in 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 908.