fucceffion refting on the true and only true foundations of all national and all regal greatnefs; affection at home, reputation abroad, truft in allies, terror in rival nations. The most ardent lover of his country cannot wish for Great Britain an happier fate than to continue as he was then left. A people emulous as we are in affection to our present Sovereign, know not how to form a prayer to Heaven for a greater bleffing upon his virtues, or an higher ftate of felicity and glory, than that he fhould live, and fhould reign, and, when Providence ordains it, should die, exactly like his illuftrious Predeceffor.

A great Prince may be obliged (though fuch a thing cannot happen very often) to facrifice his private inclination to his public interest. A wife Prince will not think that fuch a restraint implies a condition of fervility; and truly, if fuch was the condition of the last reign, and the effects were alfo fuch as we have defcribed, we ought, no lefs for the fake of the Sovereign whom we love, than for our own, to hear arguments convincing indeed, before we depart from the maxims of that reign, or fly in the face of this great body of ftrong and recent experience.

One of the principal topicks which was then, and has been fince, much employed by that political school, is an affected terror of the growth of an aristocratic power, prejudicial to * See the Political Writings of the late Dr. Brown, and many others.

the

the rights of the Crown, and the balance of the conftitution. Any new powers exercised in the Houfe of Lords, or in the Houfe of Commons, or by the Crown, ought certainly to excite the vigilant and anxious jealousy of a free people. Even a new and unprecedented course of action in the whole Legislature, without great and evident reafon, may be a fubject of juft uneafinefs. I will not affirm, that there may not have lately appeared in the House of Lords a difpofition to fome attempts derogatory to the legal rights of the subject. If any fuch have really appeared, they have arifen, not from a power properly ariftocratic, but from the fame influence which is charged with having excited attempts of a fimilar nature in the Houfe of Commons; which Houfe, if it should have been betrayed into an unfortunate quarrel with its constituents, and involved in a charge of the very fame nature, could have neither power nor inclination to repell fuch attempts in others. Those attempts in the Houfe of Lords can no more be called ariftòcratic proceedings, than the proceedings with regard to the county of Middlefex in the Houfe of Commons can with any fense be called democratical.

It is true, that the Peers have a great influence in the kingdom, and in every part of the public concerns. While they are men of property, it is impoffible to prevent it, except by fuch means as must prevent all property from its natural operation; an event not eafily to be compaffed, while property is power; nor by any means to be

wished,

1

wifhed, while the leaft notion exifts of the method by which the fpirit of liberty acts, and of the means by which it is preferved. If any particular Peers, by their uniform, upright, conftitutional conduct, by their public and their private virtues, have acquired an influence in the country; the people, on whofe favour that influence depends, and from whom it arofe, will never be duped into an opinion, that such greatnefs in a Peer is the defpotifm of an aristocracy, when they know and feel it to be the effect and pledge of their own importance.

I am no friend to aristocracy, in the sense at leaft in which that word is ufually understood. If it were not a bad habit to moot cafes on the fuppofed ruin of the conftitution, I should be free to declare, that if it muft perish, I would rather by far fee it refolved into any other form, than loft in that auftere and infolent domination. But, whatever my diflikes may. may be, my fears are not upon that quarter. The queftion, on the influence of a Court, and of a Peerage, is not, which of the two dangers is the most eligible, but which is the most imminent. He is but a poor obferver, who has not feen, that the generality of Peers, far from fupporting themfelves in a ftate of independent greatnefs, are but too apt to fall into an oblivion of their proper dignity, and to run headlong into an abject fervitude. Would to God it were true, that the fault of our Peers were too much spirit! It is worthy of some observation, that thefe gentlemen, fo jealous of ariftocracy, make no

complaints

complaints of the power of thofe Peers (neither few nor inconfiderable) who are always in the train of a Court, and whofe whole weight must be confidered as a portion of the fettled influence of the Crown. This is all safe and right: but if fome Peers (I am very forry they are not as many as they ought to be) fet themselves, in the great concern of Peers and Commons, against a back-ftairs influence. and clandeftine government, then the alarm begins; then the conftitution is in danger of being forced into an aristocracy.

I rest a little the longer on this Court topick, because it was much infifted upon at the time of the great change, and has been fince frequently revived by many of the agents of that party: for, whilst they are terrifying the great and opulent with the horrors of mob-government, they are by other managers attempting (though hitherto with little fuccefs) to alarm the people with aphantom of tyranny in the Nobles. this is done upon their favourite principle of difunion, of fowing jealoufies amongst the different orders of the State, and of disjointing the natural firength of the kingdom; that it may be rendered incapable of refifting the finifter defigns of wicked men, who have engroffed the Royal power.

All

Thus much of the topicks chofen by the Courtiers to recommend their fyftem; it will be neceffary to open a little more at large the nature of that party which was formed for its fupport. Without this, the whole would have

5

been

been no better than a visionary amusement, like the scheme of Harrington's political club, and not a business in which the nation had a real concern. As a powerful party, and a party constructed on a new principle, it is a very inviting object of curiofity.

It must be remembered, that fince the Revolution, until the period we are speaking of, the influence of the Crown had been always employed in fupporting the Minifters of State, and in carrying on the public bufinefs according to their opinions. But the party now in queftion is formed upon a very different idea. It is to intercept the favour, protection and confidence of the Crown in the paffage to its Ministers; it is to come between them and their importance in Parliament; it is to feparate them from all their natural and acquired dependencies; it is intended as the controul, not the fupport, of Adminiftration. The machinery of this system is perplexed in its movements, and falfe in its principle. It is formed on a fuppofition that the King is fomething external to his government; and that he may be honoured and aggrandized, even by its debility and difgrace. The plan proceeds exprefsly on the idea of enfeebling the regular executory power. proceeds on the idea of weakening the State in order to ftrengthen the Court. The fcheme depending intirely on diftruft, on disconnexion, on mutability by principle, on fyftematic weakness in every particular member; it is impoflible

It

that