failure, as the receiver takes the choses in action be. longing to the bank subject to all claims and defenses which might have been interposed as against the bank before the liens of the United States and general creditors attached.-ADAMS V. SPOKANE DRUG CO., U. S. C. C. (Wash.), 57 Fed. Rep. 888.

82. NEGLIGENCE-Dangerous Premises.-A teamster, after delivering merchandise at the back door of a store, started towards the desk for a receipt, and fell through an open trap door: Held, that the proprietor was not liable for the injuries, it not appearing that there had been any express or implied invitation to the teamster to pass to the desk, but that it was the custom of truckmen to make their presence known by calling, when no one was at the door. -PELTON V. SCHMIDT, Mich., 56 N. W. Rep. 689.

83. NEGLIGENCE Personal Injuries —.—In in action for personal injuries, an averment that "the injury is permanent, and will render plaintiff a cripple for life," without any allegation as to damage from loss of time occasioned thereby, does not justify the introduction of evidence as to loss of time and earnings.-SLAUGHTER V. METROPOLITAN ST. RY. Co., Mo., 23 S. W. Rep. 760. 84. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-Res Judicata.-Where a note is given for the price of a chattel sold with warranty, a recovery for a breach of the warranty does not affect the right to recover on the note.-TRAUTWEIN V. TWIN CITY IRON WORKS, Minn., 56 N. W. Rep. 750.

85. NUISANCE- Pleading-Limitation of Actions.-In an action at law in a Federal Court in New Jersey for the maintenance of a nuisance, a plea of the State statute limiting actions for nuisance to a period of six years is good, it being necessary to plead the statute in order to limit the recovery to that time.-WHIT. TENACK V. PHILADELPHIA & R. R. Co., U. S. C. C. (N. J.), 57 Fed. Rep. 901.

86. PARTNERSHIP-Dissolution.-On the dissolution of the partnership composed of plaintiff and defendant, the latter assumed payment of the firm debts. Plaintiff alleged that a debtor had obtained a judgment against the firm, which he (plaintiff) was obliged to pay, and sought to recover the amount thereof from defendant. The evidence showed that, if plaintiff paid the judgment at all, he did so by satisfying a claim which he held against the debtor, but the amount of such clain was not shown: Held, that plaintiff could not recover.-O'FIEL V. KING, Tex., 23 S. W. Rep.

696.

87. PAROL EVIDENCE.-The rule that prevents any written contract from being altered or varied by parol proof of another or materially variant verbal contract or agreement, made at the same time, does not prohibit the establishment by parol of a subsequent contract that alters, modifies, or changes the former existing written agreement between the parties.-WILSON V. MCCLENNY, Fla., 13 South. Rep. 873.

88. PARTIES Misjoinder-Venue.-Debtors by open account are not subject to suit jointly with one who has guarantied, in writing, payment of the account. Residence of the latter in the county in which the suit is located gives the court no jurisdiction over the former.--SIMS V. CLARK, Ga., 18 S. E. Rep. 158.

89. PATENT-Proceeding to Enjoin Sale.-Where on a preliminary hearing of an application to enjoin defendant from selling or incumbering a patent assigned to him, and claimed by plaintiff under a prior unrecorded assignment, it appears that complainant is en titled to equitable relief as against his assignor, that defendant acknowledged to a person other than com plainant that he had notice of complainant's claim, and that defendant, unless enjoined, can sell the patent to as many individuals as he can find as purchasers, which, if done, would work irreparable damage to complainant, a temporary injunction should be granted, though defendant makes affidavit resisting the application, denying that he ever had such notice. -STANTON MANUF'G CO. V. MCFARLAND, N. J., 27 Atl. Rep. 828.

on the case for damages, if the declaration makes a case entitling the plaintiff to any recovery whatever, even though it be only nominal damages, a demurrer will not lie thereto because it claims other or greater damages than the case made legally entitles the plaintiff to recover; demurrer not being the proper way to test the extent of the recovery to be had. Such questions are properly raised and settled by objections to testimony at the trial, or in the shape of instructions to the jury as to the law applicable to the points raised. -BORDEN V. WESTERN UNION TEL. Co., Fla., 13 South. Rep. 876.

91. PRACTICE-Stipulation of Attorneys.-Oral agree ments of attorneys, entered into out of court, to sub mit matters in suit to arbitration, will not be enforced when objection is made thereto. The only competent proof to establish an agreement made by an attorney in regard to the disposition of a cause is the evidence of the attorney himself, his written agree. ment signed and filed with the clerk, or an entry thereof upon the records of the court.-GERMAN-AMERICAN INS. Co. v. BUCKSTAFF, Neb., 56 N. W. Rep. 692.

92. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Estoppel.-A bond purporting to be the joint and several obligation of one who is about to be commissioned as a notary public, as principal, and of others as sureties, but which has been executed by the sureties only, does not, upon its face, show any contract obligation on the part of such sureties.-MARTIN V. HORNSBY, Minn., 56 N. W. Rep.

751.

93. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Judgment.-A judgment against the principal and sureties on a note should protect the sureties by directing that the execution be first levied on the principal's property, as required by Rev. St. art. 3663.-MONTROSE V. FANNIN COUNTY BANK, Tex., 23 S. W. Rep. 709.

-

94. PUBLIC LANDS Homestead Entries.-A single man, with his brother, resided upon a 160-acre tract of land for more than three years, under the pre-emption laws, the land having been surveyed, and the survey, returned to the general land office. He then divided with his brother, continuing to reside on the 80-acre tract, and, a year afterwards, married: Held, that the division did not affect his right to the 80 acres as his separate property, and his wife acquired no community interest therein.-GARDNER V. BURKHART, Tex., 23 S. W. Rep. 709.

95. PUBLIC LANDS-Railroad Grant.-Act of July 2, 1864 (13 Stat. 365), which authorized the construction of the Northern Pacific Railroad from Lake Superior westerly to some part on Puget sound, with a branch via the valley of the Columbia river to a point at or near Portland, Or., granted lands in aid of the construction on each side of "said railroad line:" Held, that the grant extended to the road with its branch, and not merely to the main trunk line.-UNITED STATES V. OREGON & C. R. Co., U. S. C. C. (Oreg.), 57 Fed. Rep. 890.

96. QUIETING TITLE Federal Courts.-In Federal Courts, sitting in States where the local statutes have dispensed with possession by complainant as a prerequisite to maintaining the suit, a bill in equity to quiet title to land is demurrable, which fails to allege affirmatively either that plaintiff is in possession, or that both complainant and defendant are out of possession.-SOUTHERN PAC. R. Co. v. GOODRICH, U. S. C. C. (Cal.), 57 Fed. Rep. 879.

97. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Child Killed-Contributory Negligence.-A railroad company is bound to exercise reasonable care to discover persons on its track, and, in the case of a child under two years of age, the fact that it was on the track is not contributory negligence on its part; and, the negligence of defendant being conceded, the question is whether plaintiff was guilty or contributory negligence in allowing it to wander alone on the track.-SAN ANTONIO & A. P. Rr. Co. v. VAUGHN, Tex., 23 S. W. Rep. 745.

98. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Trespasser - Neligence.On trial of an action against a railway company for personal injuries it appeared that plaintiff, an adult, while walking, for his own convenience, in defendant's private railroad yard, to avoid an approaching train, stepped between the rails of an adjoining track, whence any object approaching from the rear could be seen for at least 1,000 feet; that he failed to look behind him, and, after proceeding about 300 feet, was struck by an engine, the bell of which was not ringing, as required by a city ordinance. It further appeared that walking upon the tracks in the yard by strangers was forbidden by statute, but that persons did walk on the tracks daily without interference: Held, that plaintiff's in jury resulted from his failure to exercise ordinary care, and that defendant was not liable.-MISSOURI PAC. RY. V. MOSELEY, U. S. C. C. of App., 57 Fed. Rep. 921. 99. REMOVAL OF CAUSES-Remand. Where in an action for wrongful death the complaint lays the damages "in the sum of-thousand dollars; wherefore plaintiff demands judgment for- thousand dollars," this must be construed as a suit for $1,000 damages, and defendant cannot secure a removal of the cause to a Federal Court on the ground of diverse citizenship, by alleging in the petition for removal that the matter in dispute exceeds $2,000.-YARDE V. BALTIMORE, & O. R. Co., U. S. C. C. (Ind.), 57 Fed. Rep. 913. 100. SALE Contract. - Under a contract by which plaintiff agreed for a price named to furnish defendant "free on board cars" at place of delivery a quantity of coal, it was incumbent on defendant to furnish the cars.-HOCKING V. HAMILTON, Penn., 27 Atl. Rep. 836.

101. SALE - Rescission for Purchaser's Fraud. An election to rescind a sale of goods for the purchaser's fraudulent representation as to financial standing is clearly manifested by the seller when he institutes the statutory proceeding of claim and delivery, by filing the claimant's oath and bond, and retaking the goods, as provided by Sayles' Civil St. arts. 4822 4847; and the fact that the nature of the seller's claim or title is not disclosed until the issues are tendered as immaterial.HEINZE V. MARX, Tex., 23 S. W. Rep. 704.

102. SALE-Warranty.-Certain notes secured by chattel mortgages were given for a cornsheller, which was warranted to shell 6,000 bushels per day with eight horses to furnish power. On a trial the machine could not be made to work, and the expert sent by the company was unable to put it in running order: Held, that the purchaser was justified in returning it promptly after the discovery of the defects. —— DAVIS V. HARTLERODE, Neb., 56 N. W. Rep. 731.

103. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-Description of Land.Where, in a suit for the specific performance of an agreement to purchase a "lot adjoining Pavonia Yacht Club, on Bay View avenue," etc., it appears that the defendant is the owner of only one lot which can be embraced within the description, it will be presumed that such lot was intended, and the description will be deemed sufficiently definite; but such description will be considered indefinite, and the agreement inca. pable of enforcement, if the defendant be the owner of more than one lot which will answer the description.CHAMPION V. GENIN, N. J., 27 Atl. Rep. 817.

104. STATE BOARDS-Electrical Subways.-The act of March 10, 1892 (P. L. 1892, p. 78), creating the board of commissioners of electrical subways, does not em power the board to grant to a street railway company the franchise of erecting poles and wires in the street to furnish power to propel cars by electricity. The functions of the board are simply supervision over the exercise of franchises derived from other legislative authority.-TRUSTEES PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF TRENTON V. STATE BOARD OF COM'RS OF ELECTRICAL SUBWAYS, N. J., 27 Atl. Rep. 809.

105. STATUTE-Construction.-In the construction of statutes, the intent of the legislature, gathered from what is embodied and expressed in the entire statutes, is the vital part.-KOHN v. COLLISON, Del., 27 Atl. Rep. 834.

106. TAXATION-Improvements by Pre-emptioner.— Improvements on land held under pre-emption, homestead, and timber culture laws of the United States, on which final proof has not been made, are subject to taxation against the persons owning such improve. ments.-STATE V. TUCKER, Neb., 56 N. W. Rep. 718.

107. TENANCY IN COMMON-Sale of Timber.-A tenant in common has the right to sell marketable timber growing on the land, so long as he does not commit waste; and the purchaser takes a good title as against the other cotenants, their remedy being to compel the seller to account for the proceeds.- GILLUM V. ST. LOUIS, A. & T. Rr. Co., Tex., 23 S. W. Rep. 717.

108. TRESPASS-Adverse Possession.-When plaintiff, holding under color of title, fails to prove adverse possession for the statutory period either before or after an interval during which the land was entirely unoccupied, though his possession was adverse both before and after said interval, his title to maintain trespass fails.-ZEITINGER V. HACKWORTH, Mo., 23 S. W. Rep.

763.

109. TRESPASS QUARE CLAUSUM FREGIT.-A complaint averred that defendants broke and entered the plaintiffs' close, and their shops, warerooms, yard, and premises, and took and carried away and converted to their own use certain articles named, belonging to plaintiffs, whereby the latter suffered great damages in the loss of such property, in the interruption to their business carried on in said shops, warerooms. and yard, and in their business standing and credit, and were damaged in all the foregoing in the sum of $2,000: Held, that the complaint set out but one cause of action, which was properly stated in one count.MERRIMAN V. MCCORMICK HARVESTING MACH. Co., Wis., 56 N. W. Rep. 743.

110. TRIAL- Misconduct of Jury-"Quotient" Verdict.-A verdict obtained by taking one twelfth of the aggregate amount of the several estimates of the jurors is not objectionable when there was no antecedent agreement to be bound by the result, and when each juror deliberately assented to and accepted the amount thus ascertained.- CONSOLIDATED ICE-MACH. Co. V. TRENTON HYGEIAN ICE CO., U. S. C. C. (N. J.), 57 Fed. Rep. 898.

111. TRUST AND TRUSTEE Power of Trustee to sell Land.-Unless expressly authorized by the instrument creating the trust, or by judgment of a court of compe tent jurisdiction, a trustee of a married woman and minor children has no power to sell land, except by virtue of an order of a judge of the superior court.HUFBAUER V. JACKSON, Ga., 18 S. E. Rep. 159.

112. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT-Jurisdiction.In determining whether federal jurisdiction depends entirely upon diverse citizenship, so as to make the case "final" in the Circuit Court of Appeals, under the sixth section of the act of March 3, 1891 (13 Sup. Ct. Rep. xv.), the inquiry is limited to the face of the record in the Circuit Court at the institution of the suit; and, if at that time jurisdiction was sustainable only on that ground, the fact that a federal question was subsequently raised by the defenses set up will not warrant an appeal from the Circuit Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.-COLORADO CENT. CONSOLIDATED MIN. Co. v. TURCK, U. S. S. C., 14 S. C. Rep. 35.

113. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.- JurisdictionState Decisions.-Where a State receiving railway aid lands from congress under certain restrictions as to time and mode of sale grants them to a railroad com pany with power to sell "in accordance with the acts of congress granting the same," and thereafter takes back a mortgage embodying the same provision as security for a loan of State bonds, a question whether a subsequent sale of lands by the company is null under the mortgage and State statute, as being in violation of the restrictions imposed by congress, is not a federal question, and a decision thereof by the State Supreme Court is not reviewable in the United States Supreme Court.-MILLER V. ANDERSON, U. S. S. C., 14 S. C. Rep.

52.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

HUSBAND AND WIFE-ESTATES-ENTIRETIES -JOINT TENANCY.-In Thornburg v. Wiggins, 34 N. E. Rep. 999, the Supreme Court of Indiana, decide that though where a conveyance is made to husband and wife jointly, without limiting words, they take an estate by entireties, yet if the conveyance is to them expressly "in joint tenancy" they take as joint tenants. Dailey, J., says:

A joint tenancy is an estate held by two or more persons jointly, so that during the lives of all they are equally entitled to the enjoyment of the land, or its equivalent, in rents and profits; but upon the death of one his share vests in the survivor or survivors until there be but one survivor, when the estate becomes one in severalty in him, and descends to his heirs upon his death. It must always arise by purchase, and cannot be created by descent. Such estates may be created in fee, for life, or years, or even in remainder. But the estate held by each tenant must be alike. Joint tenancy may be destroyed by anything which destroys the unity of title. Our law aims to prevent their creation, and they cannot arise except by the instrument providing for such tenaney. Griffin v. Lynch, 16 Ind. 398. 9 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 850, says: "Husband and wife are, at common law, one person, so that when realty vests in them both equally, they take as one person; they take but one estate, as a corporation would take. In the case of realty, they are seised, not per my et per tout, as joint tenants are, but simply per tout; both are seised of the whole, and, each being seised of the entirety, they are called 'tenants by the entirety,' and the estate is an estate by entireties. Estates by entireties may be created by will, by instrument of gift or purchase and even by inheritance. Each tenant is seised of the whole; the estate is inseverable, cannot be partitioned; neither husband nor wife can alone affect the inheritance; the survivor takes the whole." This tenancy has been spoken of as "that peculiar estate which arises upon the conveyance of lands to two persons who are at the time husband and wife, commonly called 'estates by entirety.' As to the general features of estates by entire ties there is little room for controversy, and there is none between counsel. Our statutes re-enacts the common law. Arnold v. Arnold, 30 Ind. 305; Davis v. Clark, 26 Ind. 424. Strictly speaking, estates by entireties are not joint tenancies (Chandler v. Cheney, 37 Ind. 391; Hulett v. Inlow, 57 Ind. 412); the husband and wife being seised, not of moieties, but both seised of the entirety per tout, and not per my (Jones v. Chandler, 40 Ind. 589; Davis v. Clark, supra; Arnold v. Arnold, supra). It has been said by this court in some of the earlier decisions that no particular words are necessary. A conveyance which would make two persons joint tenants will make a husband and wife tenants of the entirety. It is not even necessary that they be described as such, or their marital relation referred to. Morrison v. Seybold, 92 Ind. 302; Hadlock v. Gray, 104 Ind. 596, 4 N. E. Rep. 167; Dodge v. Kinzy, 101 Ind. 102; Hulett v. Inlow, 57 Ind. 414; Chandler v. Cheney, 37 Ind. 395. But the court has said that the general rule may be defeated by the expression of conditions, limitations, and stipulations in the conveyance which clearly indicate the creation of a different estate. Hadlock v.

Gray, supra; Edwards v. Beall, 75 Ind. 401. Having its origin in the fiction or common-law unity of husband and wife, the courts of some States have held that married women's acts extending their rights destroyed estates by entirety, but this court holds otherwise (Carver v. Smith, 90 Ind. 226); and the greater weight of authority is in its favor. Our decisions hold that neither alone can alienate such estate. Jones v. Chandler, supra; Morrison v. Seybold, supra. There can be no partition. Chandler v. Cheney, 37 Ind. 391. A mortgage executed by the husband alone is void (Jones v. Chandler, 40 Ind. 391); and the same is true of a mortgage executed by both to secure a debt of the husband (Dodge v. Kinzy, 101 Ind. 105); and the wife cannot validate it by agreement with the purchaser to indemnify in case of loss arising on account of it. State v. Kennett, 114 Ind. 160, 16 N. E. Rep. 173. A judgment against one of them is no lien upon it. Ditching Co. v. Beck, 99 Ind. 250; McDonnell v. Martin, 52 Ind. 434; Othwein v. Thomas (Ill. Sup.) 13 N. E. Rep. 564. Upon the death of one, the survivor takes the whole in fee. Arnold v. Arnold, supra. The deceased leaves no estate to pay debts (Simpson v. Pearson, 31 Ind. 1); and during their joint lives there can be no sale of any part on execution against either (Carver v. Smith, supra; Dodge v. Kinzy, 101 Ind. 105; Hulett v. Inlow, 57 Ind. 412; Chandler v. Cheney, supra; Davis v. Clark, supra; McConnell v. Martin, supra; Cox's Adm'r v. Wood, 20 Ind. 54). The statutes extending the rights of married women have no effect whatever upon estates by entirety. Carver v. Smith, 90 Ind. 223. Such estate is in no sense either the husband's or the wife's separate property. The husband may make a valid conveyance of his interest to his wife, because it is with her consent. Enyeart v. Kepler, 118 Ind. 34, 20 N. E. Rep. 539. The rule that husband and wife take by entireties was enacted in this territory in 1807, nine years before Indiana was vested with statehood, and has been repeated in each succeeding revision of our statutes. It has thus been the law of real property with us for 86 years. Section 2922, Rev. St. 1881, provides that "all conveyances and devises of lands, or of any interest therein, made to two or more persons, except as provided in the next following section, shall be construed to create estates in common, and not in joint tenancy, unless it be expressed therein that the grantees or devisees shall hold the same in joint tenancy and to the survivor of them, or it shall manifestly appear from the tenor of the instrument that it was intended to create an estate in joint tenancy." Section 2923 provides that the preceding section shall not apply to conveyances made to husband and wife. Under a statute of the State of Michigan, similar in all its essential qualities to our own, the court held that, "where lands are conveyed in fee to husband and wife, they do not take as tenants in common" (Fisher v. Provin, 25 Mich. 347); they take by entireties. Whatever would defeat the title of one, would defeat the title of the other. Manwaring v. Powell, 40 Mich. 371. They hold neither as tenants in common nor as ordinary joint tenants. The survivor takes the whole. During the lives of both, neither has an absolute inheritable interest; neither can be said to own an undivided half. Insurance Co. v. Resh, Id. 241; Allen v. Allen, 47 Mich. 74, 10 N. W. Rep. 113.

While the rule of entireties was predicated upon a fiction, the legislative intent in this State has always been to preserve this estate, and has continued the peculiar statute for this purpose. Estates by entireties have been preserved as between husband and wife, although joint tenancies between unmarried

persons have been abolished, so as to provide a mode by which a safe and suitable provision could be made for married women. Carver v. Smith, 90 Ind. 227. "Where a rule of property has existed for seventy years, and is sustained by a strong and uniform line of decisions, there is but little room for the court to exercise its judgment on the reasons on which the rule is founded. Such a rule of property will be overruled only for the most cogent reasons, and upon the strongest convictions of its incorrectness. It is evident that the legislature of 1881 did not intend to repeal the statutes establishing tenancies by entireties. They simply intended to enlarge in some particulars the power of the wife, which existed already under the Acts of 1852 and the years following.

It

did not abolish estates by entireties as between husband and wife, but provided that when a joint deed was made to husband and wife they should hold by entireties, and not as joint tenants or tenants in common." Carver v. Smith, supra. In Chandler v. Cheney, 37 Ind., on page 396, the court says: "It was a well-settled rule at common law that the same form of words which, if the grantees were unmarried, would have constituted them joint tenants, will, they being husband and wife, make them tenants by entirety. The rule has been changed by our statute above quoted." The whole trend of authorities, however, is in the direction of preserving such tenancies, where the grantees sustain the relation of husband and wife, unless from the lauguage employed in the deed it is manifest that a different purpose was intended. Where a contrary intention is clearly expressed in the deed, a different rule obtains. "A husband and wife may take real estate as joint tenants or tenants in common, if the instrument creating the title use apt words for the purpose." 1 Prest. Est. 132; 3 Bl. Comm., Sharswood's note; 4 Kent. Comm., side p. 363; 1 Bish. Mar. Wom. § 616 et seq.; Freem. Coten. § 72; Fladung v. Rose, 58 Md. 13-24. "And in case of devise and conveyances to husband and wife together, though it had been said that they can take only as tenants by entire ties, the prevailing rule is that, if the instrument expressly so provides, they may take as joint tenants or tenants in common." Stew. Husb. & Wife, §§ 307, 310; Tied. Real Prop. § 244. "And as by common law it was competent to make husband and wife tenants in common by proper words in the deed or devise," etc. (Hoffman v. Stigers, 28 Iowa, 310; Brown v. Brown (Ind. Sup.), 32 N. E. Rep. 1128.) "so it seems that husband and wife may by express words be made tenants in common by gift to them during coverture" McDermott v. French, 15 N. J. Eq. 80. In Hadlock v. Gray, 104 Ind. 599, 4 N. E. Rep. 167, a conveyance had been made to Isaac Cannon and Mary Cannon, who were husband and wife, during there natural lives, and the court say: "The language employed in the deed plainly declares that Isaac Cannon and Mary Cannon are not to take as tenants by entirety. The result would follow from the provision destroying the survivorship, for this is the grand and essential characteristic of such a tenancy. . . . The whole force of the language employed is opposed to the theory that the deed creates an estate in fee in the husband and wife." The court further say: "It is true that where real property is conveyed to husband and wife jointly, and there are no limiting words in the deed, they will take the estate as tenants in entirety. .. But, while the general rule is as we have stated it, there may be conditions, limitations, and stipulations in the deed conveying the property which will defeat the operation of the rule. The denial of this proposition involves

the affirmation, of the proposition that a grantor is powerless to limit or define the estate which he grants, and this would conflict with the fundamental principle that a grantor may for himself determine what estate he will grant. To deny this right would be to deny to parties the right to make their own contracts. It seems quiet clear upon principle that a grantor and his grantees may limit and define the estate granted by the one and accepted by the other, although the grantees be husband and wife." The court then adopts the language of Washburn (1 Washb. Real Prop. 674), and Tiedeman, supra. In Edwards v. Beall, supra, the court hold that when lands are granted husband and wife as tenants in common they will hold by moieties, as other distinct and individual persons would do. If, as eontended by appellees, the rule prevail that the same words which, if the grantees were unmarried, would have constituted them joint tenants, will, they being husband and wife, make them tenants by entireties, then it would result as a logical conclusion that husband and wife cannot be joint tenants, because by this rule, words, however apt or appropriate to create a joint tenancy, would, in a conveyance to husband and wife, result in an estate by entireties; joint tenancy would be superseded or put in abeyance by the estate created by law,-tenancy by entirety. The result of such reasoning would be to destroy the contractual power of the parties where this relationship between the grantees is shown to exist. Any other process of reasoning would carry the rule too far, and we must hold it modified to the extent here indicated. Husband and wife, notwithstanding tenancies by entirety exist as they did under the common law, may take and hold lands for life, in joint tenancy or in common, if appropriate language be expressed in the deed or will creating it; and we know of no more apt term to create a joint tenancy in the grantees in this estate than the expression "convey and warrant to Daniel S. Wiggins and Laura Belle Wiggins in joint tenancy."

CARRIERS OF GOODS INTERSTATE SHIPMENTS. The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas in Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Clark, decided that a shipment of freight over connecting lines from Missouri to a point in Texas by a bill of lading which provides that the receiving carrier shall only be liable for damage occurring on its own line, and which guaranties a through rate of freight to such point, is an interstate shipment, within the interstate commerce act; and, though the entire haul of the last connecting line is within the State of Texas, an overcharge by it on such shipment is a matter to be adjusted under the interstate commerce act, and not under the laws of Texas. Ramey, J., says:

The plaintiff's petition distinctly alleged, and the proof so shows, that the penalty claimed for the overcharge and discrimination was based on a through bill of lading executed by the Missouri,Kansas & Texas Railway Company to transport the freight therein mentioned from St. Louis, Mo., to Will's Point, in Van Zandt county, Tex. By the provisions of said bill of lading the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company was to deliver to connecting lines, and only be