rance against injury or death, through external, violent and accidental means, should be liberally construed in favor of the insured, so as to carry out the intention of both par ties to it; and when the language of the policy is susceptible of two interpretations, that which will sustain and cover the loss must be adopted. Where the policy provides that the liability shall arise when the death or injury "is external, violent and accidental means," it was not intended to cover only injuries resulting from external force or violence. The language requires that the means through which the accident occurred should be external. Therefore the liability arises when the death of the insured resulted from the accidental lodgment of a piece of beefsteak in his, windpipe when he was attempting to swallow it. Such accident is the result of violent means when it results from unnatural as distinguished from natural Pryor, J., says:

causes.

The appellee, Julia J. Reigart, the widow of Thomas I. Reigart, instituted this action in the Mason Circuit Court to recover $5,000 upon an accident pol icy issued by the American Accident Co., of Louisville, Ky., to said Reigart, and made payable to his wife if she survived him. Her husband lost his life by eating a piece of beefsteak, that, in the attempt to swallow it, accidentally passed into his windpipe, choking him to death in a few moments. By the terms of the policy the insurance was made payable for injury or death received through external, violent and accidental means. That the death of the insured was accidental is conceded, but it is contended that the contract of insurance only embraces accidental injury, caused by external violence or accidents, brought about by means externally violent. It is argued that the act of chewing or eating food is natural and harmless, and if in eating, a part of the food passes into the windpipe, causing death, it cannot be said that death was produced by means of external violence or force. In other words, that the plain meaning of the language of the policy, "through external, violent and accidental means," is that the accident causing death must have been caused by an external force. The court below said, in effect, to the jury, placing a different construction on the contract, if the death was accidental, and caused by the passing of the steak into the windpipe, they should find for the plaintiff. The rule laid down by Mr. May, in his work on Insurance (3d ed.), section 175, is as follows: "No rule in the interpretation of a policy is more fully established or more imperative and controlling than that which declares, in all cases, it must be liberally construed in favor of the insured, so as not to defeat, without a plain necessity, his claim to indemnity which, in making the insurance, it was his object to secure. When the words are, without violence, susceptible of two interpretations, that which will sustain and cover the loss must in preference be adopted;" and we might add that no construction should be placed upon such contracts as would defest the intention of both parties, as it is manifest, if

the interpretation given the language of this policy by counsel for the defense is adopted, it would defeat the intention of both the contracting parties. The doctrine of this court, as announced in Hutchcraft's Ex'r v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 87 Ky. 300, where the authorities were reviewed on the question there presented, recognizes fully this rule of construction, and that regard must be had to the purpose sought to be accomplished by both the parties. This appellant is an accident insurance company, and its policies are termed accidental policies, and the very object of in. suring in such companies is to obtain indemnity where an injury or death results from accident. While the policy provides that the liability arises where the injury "is through external, violent and accidental means, independent of all other causes," it was not designed that there should be such exter nal violence as a fall, a kick or a blow on the flesh as would cause death or an injury before the liability of the company could arise. This language was inserted in the contract to protect the company against hidden or secret diseases, resulting in injury, where there was no manifestation of harm to the external body. They were not attempting to restrict their liability to a particular kind of accidents, but were guarding the contract by the use of such terms as would prevent liability for injuries not originating from accidental causes, and that were liable to occur at any time from natural causes. If the steak had been putrid, causing the stomach to revolt at it, or so tough as to interfere with digestion, or to completely stay the operations of nature in such a manner as to produce disease, no one would contend that the pain or the disease was the result of accident, or that the terms of this policy embraced such a case; but where the substance causing the death is visible, and placed in the mouth of the assured, lodging by accident in the windpipe instead of the stomach, producing injury or death, it is as much an accident as if the assured had taken arsenic under the belief that it was some harmless medicine. There is no external force or violence from the poison, and the injury internal in its character, and yet the authorities hold that the insurance company is liable in such a case. Healy v. Mutual Accident Co., 133 Ill. 556. It is plain, we think, that the means, or that which caused the injury, should be external, and not that the injury should have been external. It is said, however, that if the injury is not to be external, that the death must have resulted from "violent and accidental means." It is universally understood, when it is said "that one died a violent death," that it was unnatural-a death not occurring in the ordinary way-and in fact the definition of the word "violent" is unnatural, and in using this word the insu rance company was attempting to prevent the insured from asserting a claim where the injury or death was the result of some natural cause. In the case of Paul v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 112 N. Y. 472, on a similar pol icy, it was held "that a death unnatural, the result of accident, imports an external and violent agency as the cause." This same view was taken by the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of Healy v. Mutual Accident Association, already cited. A similar construction to the verbiage of like policies has been heretofore given by courts of last resort, and if companies organized as this is intended that actual external force, causing the accident, must be shown before recovery could be had, it would be easy to so frame the language of the policy as to leave no doubt as to its meaning. The instructions below were proper, and in our opinion the widow is entitled to recover.

BANKS AND BANKING-CHECK AS AN EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENT.-The question when and under what circumstances, the death or insolvency of the drawer of a check has the legal effect to countermand its payment when the check is to be regarded as an equitable assignment of the fund-has given rise to a great deal of discussion and to some differences of opinion. The question has been recently considered by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in Hulings v. Hulings Lumber Co., it being there decided that a check operates as an equitable assignment pro tanto from the time it is drawn and delivered, as between the drawer and the payee or holder, and that a general assignment for the benefit of creditors does not defeat the check holder, although the check be not presented to the bank for payment until after such assignment. Holt, J., says:

It was in this case, an order to the cashier of the bank to transfer the deposit pro tanto of the lumber company to the account of Kenneweg & Co., in discharge of the note of the drawer, then there for collection. If the cashier or bank was the agent of the lumber company to pay, it was also the agent of Kenneweg to collect; and although the letter containing the check and instructions also contained, perhaps, the information as to the making of the trust deed, the check having come into the hands of Kenneweg's agent to collect, it may be regarded as issued, and, as between the lumber company and Kenneweg, operated as an equitable assignment of that amount. The bank did not and does not itself claim it, and no one impeaches it as fraudulent and voidable. The bank continued to hold the check, money and note, until the controversy as to the money virtually in court between Kenneweg and the trustee should be settled; so that it is a question of ownership, depending on equities, and not what the stakeholder could do. The let. ter is not produced. Mr. Shriver, the cashier, testifies, but is not examined on this point. It is probable that the letter spoke of the general assignment for payment of debt, and of the preference given the bank for its debt of $20,000 and the fact of insolvency, if it then existed, was not a fact communicated, but only inferred, for the officer who sent the check says in his testimony that the lumber company was not then insolvent. Although the trust deed was afterwards acknowledged, and delivered on the same day, no express mention is made of this deposit, and it did not operate proprio vigore as a revocation of the check. As a matter of honesty and fair dealing under the common usage in such matters, it is generally regarded as a fraud on the part of the drawer of the check, in payment of his debt, to countermand it without some good cause, and such fraud should not be encouraged by the law's approval. (2) As a matter of public policy and general convenience, the law's approval of the unlimited right of revocation would tend to weaken confidence in checks as money, and impair the usefulness of banks as places of deposit for convenient paying, as well as for safekeeping. (3) Regarded as an equitable assignment, it has all the elements of a contract of sale or transfer of negotiable

paper, without inconvenience to the bank, or undue restraint upon the proper power of revocation. (4) So much for principle pointing to the proper rule. And, as matter of authority, so long ago as 1835, in the case of Brooks v. Hatch (6 Leigh, 584), such check or order was held to be an equitable assignment pro tanto of the fund thereafter to come into the hands of the drawee; citing Row v. Dawson (1 Ves. Sr. 331); Peyton v. Hallett (1 Caines, 363); and Cutts v. Perkins (12 Mass. 206). In the case of Clayton v. Fawcett (2 Leigh, 19), the letter of Fawcett would have been adjudged an equitable assignment but for the condition contained in it that the payment was to depend on the drawer's being absent; citing on the subject of equitable assignment Duke of Chandos v. Talbot (2 P. Wms. 608); Theobalds v. Duffoy (9 Mod. 102), and Bates v. Dandy (2 Atk. 207). In Anderson v. De Soer (6 Grat. 363), the same doctrine is laid down; and in Bank v. Kimberlands (16 W. Va. 555, 558), and Bell v. Alexander (21 Grat. 1, 6). Upon the subject of a check duly issued operating as equitable asignment, see 2 Daniel, Neg. Inst. (4th Ed.), § 1618b, note; Id. § 1635, et seq.; Pease v. Landauer, 63 Wis. 20: Stoller v. Coates, 88 Mo. 514; Roberts v. Corbin, 26 Iowa, 327; Union Nat. Bank v. Oceana Co. Bank, 80 Ill. 212, and see cases cited; Sav. Inst. v. Adae, 8 Fed. Rep. 106; Bank v. Coates, Id. 540; Row v. Dawson and Ryall v. Rowles, 2 White & T. Lead. Cas. (4th Amer. from 4th Eng. Ed.), 1531, 1533; Grant Banks, side pp. 50, 51, citing Tate v. Hilbert (1793), 2 Ves. Jr. 111; Rev. Rep. 175, referring to Rolls v. Pearce (5 Ch. Div. 730), a case of donatio mortis causa. On same subject, see Austin v. Mead (Brett. Lead. Cas. Eq. 122, 15 Ch. Div. 651), and Burke v. Bishop (27 La. Ann. 465), treating the check as a mandate. On nature of a check, see 2 Daniel Neg. Inst., ch 49, § 1566; et. seq.; Bolles, Banks, § 58, et. seq.; Bullard v. Randall (1 Gray, 606). On nature of bank contracts and duty to pay checks, see Bolles, Banks, §§ 32, 80, et seq.; 2 Morse, Banks (3d Ed., by Parsons), ch. 36, § 565, et seq. On revocation of checks, see 1 Morse, Banks, ch. 28, § 397, et seq.; revocation by death, section 480; by insolvency, section 400a. On assignment in Equity, see 1 Beach, Mod. Eq. Jur. 326; 2 Story (13th Ed.), § 1044. On the French law on the general subject, see note 2 to section 1040a. On the subject of handing a key, etc., so as to enable buyer or donee to take possession, see 2 Schouler, Pers. Prop. § 67. On equitable assignment, see Id. §§ 76, 75; Elam v. Keen (4 Leigh, 333); 1 Schouler, §§ 74, 77, et seq. This is not a case of a suit at law against the bank, but in equity, where the court has the fund under its control and all the parties before it, including the stakeholder; and I do not understand any decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States as not treating it as a good, equitable assignment, as between the payee and trustee. Certainly such is the settled rule of law in this case.

der the statute (Rev. St. 1889, § 2615), without proof of negligence. Where the connection between the fire and the engine is denied, and is only provable by circumstantial evidence, and it is not pretended that the particular engine was better made or manned than other of defendant's, evidence of fires set by engines, before and after the fire in question, at different places along the line, is competent to show possibility and probability of plaintiff's theory. Rev. St. 1889, § 2615, making the company responsible to every person whose property may be injured or destroyed, and giving it an insurable interest in property along its route, does not exempt it from liability for personalty, and shrubs, trees and flowers, on which it cannot get insurance. Sherwood, J., dissented. The court says:

1. The first proposition insisted upon as ground for reversal of the judgment is that said section 2615, which makes every person and corporation responsible in damages for property injured or damaged by fire communicated, directly or indirectly, by locomotive engines in use upon their railroads, without proof of negligence, is unconstitutional. This objection has received the careful consideration of this court in banc at this term in the case of Mathews v. Railway Co., 24 S. W. Rep. 591, in which the statute in question was held valid. The objection under the authority of that case must therefore be overruled. It may not be out of place here to take the occasion of stating that, in my opinion, the statute can be sustained on the broad ground that it is merely remedial in its character, and is authorized under, the general powers of the legislature to provide appropriate remedies for the redress of such wrongs as are contemplated. "The remedy does not alter the contract or the tort. It takes away no vested right, for the defaulter can have no vested right in a state of the law which left the injured party without, or with only a defective, remedy." End. Interp. St. § 285. It is unquestioned that the utmost diligence and care cannot prevent the escape of fire from locomotive engines. We have, then, this condition of things: The corporation is given the right, by the statute, to run its engines by steam power, necessitating the use of fire. Fire necessarily escapes, and is scattered along the route. The citizen owns property on the line of the road, which is exposed to fire from those engines, regardless of the care and vigilance he may exercise. Both parties are faultless, but nevertheless the property of the owner is consumed by fire from an engine. The property owner has the right to own the property, and to claim protection under the law, equal, at least, to the right of the corporation to use fire on its engines. The loss must necessarily fall upon one or the other of these parties. Which one of them shall suffer the loss,the one through whose agency the damage was caused, though in the lawful use of its own property, or the one equally innocent of wrong, and who had no agency in causing the damage? Tested by the rule of natural right and equity, there could be but one answer to the inquiry. This answer is formulated into the maxim that "every one should so use his own

property as not to injure that of his neighbor." Prior to the statute under consideration, the loss was made to fall upon the owner who was innocent of fault in the use and care of his own property, and had no part in setting at liberty the destructive agency. The rule was manifestly unjust. To change this rule, and place the liability where it should rest, is the purpose of the statute. In the language of Dewey, J., in Lyman v. Railway Co., 4 Cush. 290, we consider the statute "as one of those general remedial acts passed for the more effectual protection of property against the hazards to which it has become subject by the locomotive engine. The right to use the parcel of land appropriated to the railroad does not deprive the legislature of the power to enact such regulations, and impose such liabilities for injuries suffered from the mode of using the road, as the occasion and circumstances may justify." The statute considered in that case imposed on the railroad company absolute liability for damages caused by fires escaping from engines. So, in a recent case in Connecticut, the court, in discussing a similar statute says: "In this view of the case, the statute rests upon broad grounds of justice and equity. It is designed to do justice where before there was a partial failure of justice. It is therefore a 'remedial statute,' in the best sense, and we must so construe it as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy." Martin v. Railroad Co., 62 Conn. 340, 25 Atl. Rep. 239. The contract between the State and the corporation is that the latter may propel its trains by the use of steam generated by fire. There was no agreement that it should be exempt from liability for the consequences resulting to others from its use of fire. In respect to such consequences it is subject to control by remedial laws to the same extent as natural persons. Fire, when uncontrolled, is necessarily destructive of property. As shown in the opinion of Gantt, J., in the Mathews case, supra, damage caused by fire was recoverable at common law without proof of negligence. There is no reason why the common law could not, or indeed should not, be restored in cases in which the lawful use of property by one necessarily exposes the property of others to damage by fire. A statute of this State declared that "if any person shall willfully set on fire any woods, marshes or prairies, so as thereby to occasion any damage to any other person, such person shall make satisfaction for such damage to the party injured, to be recovered in an action on the case." Rev. St. 1845, p. 1091, § 3. This act came before this court in 1848, and its validity was not questioned, though that distinguished jurist, Leonard, afterwards judge of this court, represented the party charged with the damage, and a recovery without proof of negligence was affirmed. In that case the court held that the fact that the fire was set on defendant's land constituted no defense under the statute. Finley v. Langston, 12 Mo. 123. A similar statute was held valid by the Supreme Court of Iowa. Conn v. May, 36 Iowa, 241. We think there can be no doubt that the State has the power to impose absolute liability upon one causing loss of property to another by the use of agencies necessarily destructive, and in the use of which absolute control is impossible, whether the one using the agency be a private person or a corporation.

2. The petition charged that the fire causing the injury was permitted to escape through the negligence of the defendant, and the court permitted a recovery under the statute without proof of negligence. Defendant assigns this action of the court as error, in that it permitted a recovery upon a cause of action

different from that charged in the petition. The peti tion states all the facts necessary to authorize a judgment under the provisions of the statute, and, in addition thereto, the allegation of negligence. By the statement of more than was required, plaintiff did not forfeit his right to recover upon proof of the facts he was required to state, and did state, in his petition. Radcliffe v. Railway Co., 90 Mo. 131, 2 S. W. Rep 277; Morrow v. Surber, 97 Mo. 155, 11 S. W. Rep. 48.

3. During the trial, witnesses were permitted to testify, over the objection of defendant, that other fires, both before and subsequent to the one in question, at different places on the line of defendant's road, had been started by sparks from some of defendant's engines. The admission of this evidence is assigned as error. In Coale v. Railway Co., 60 Mo. 227, this court held that, in order to prove that one engine was insufficient, or that the employees of the company in charge of such engine were careless or incompetent, evidence was not admissible to prove that other engines were defective, and other employees were incompetent or negligent. The ruling in that case is not controlling on the question of the admissibility of the evidence complained of here, for the rea son that the statute creates an absolute liability, without respect to the character of the machinery or the competency of the employees. The admission of the evidence was clearly harmless if it only tended to prove want of care on the part of defendant. The only issue involving the liability of defendant was whether the fire was communicated to plaintiff's property, directly or indirectly, by a locomotive engine in use upon its road. Was this evidence admissible as tending to prove that issue? The question. was sharply contested on the trial whether the fire causing the damage did, in fact, originate from one of defendant's engines. The evidence was all circumstantial. It was important, then, to show that there was a possibility that sparks may have been thrown a distance sufficient to reach the building in which the fire originated, and that they contained heat enough to set it on fire. The facts that live sparks were thrown from engines, and did ignite grass and other combustible materials, would tend to prove the prob. ability that the fire was communicated from an engine. It was not shown that the engine from which alone the fire could have been communicated was con. structed or manned with more care than all others in use on the road. The admissibility of such evidence was affirmed in Sheldon v. Railroad Co., 14 N. Y. 223, by a divided court. The court in that case says: "The competency of this evidence has been directly decided in the English Court of Common Pleas. Piggot v. Railway Co., 10 Jur. 571; Aldridge v. Railway Co., 3 Man. & G. 515. These cases upon this point are well decided. The principle is essential in the administration of justice, inasmuch as circumstantial proof must, in the nature of things, be resorted to, and inasmuch as the jury cannot take judicial cognizance of the fact that locomotive engines do emit sparks and cinders, which may be borne a given distance by the wind. The evidence was competent to establish certain facts which were necessary to be established in order to show a possible cause of the accident, and to prevent vague and unsatisfactory surmises on the part of the jury." This ruling was followed without division in Field v. Railway Co., 32 N. Y. 339, and Webb v. Railway Co., 49 N. Y. 421. A similar ruling was made by the Supreme Court of the United States in Railroad Co. v. Richardson, 91 U. S. 470. Mr. Justice Strong, who wrote the obinion of he court, says: "The question has often been con

sidered by the courts of this country and in England; and such evidence has, we think, been generally held admissible, as tending to prove the possibility, and consequent probability, that some locomotive caused the fire." He follows this statement of the law by a number of citations, both English and American, including the case of Sheldon v. Railroad Co., supra. Further on in the same opinion the judge says: "The particular engines were not identified, but their crossing raised at least some probability, in the absence of proof of any other known cause, that they caused the fire; and it seems to us that, under the circumstances, this probability was strengthened by the fact that somes engines of the same defendant, at other times during the same season, had scattered fire along their passage." To the same effect are the following cases: Smith v. Railroad Co., 63 N. H. 25; Railroad Co. v. Gilbert, 3 C. C. A. 264, 52 Fed. Rep. 711; Thatcher v. Railroad Co., 85 Me. 509, 27 Atl. Rep. 519. We think the evidence tended to prove the possibility, and consequent probability that the fire was communicated to plaintiff's property from one of defendant's engines, and that the evidence was admissible, and its probative force was for the determination of the jury. If the issue had been of negligence in the construction or management of the engine only, and the engine which could only have caused the damage had been clearly identified, evidence that other engines emitted sparks and set fires would have been inadmissible under the decisions of this court. Coale v. Railway Co., supra; Patton v. Railway Co., 87 Mo. 117. But, in case the fact whether the fire originated from the engine was alone in issue, and there was no direct proof of the fact, it seems very clear that such evidence would have some tendency to prove that issue. The evidence was all circumstantial, and the facts testified to were circumstances, though slight they may have been, bearing upon the issue.

4. Defendant insists, further, that plaintiff was not entitled to recover under the statute for personal property burned, nor for shrubs, trees, and flowers, upon which defendant could not obtain insurance. For support of this contention, counsel cite Chapman v. Railroad Co., 37 Me. 92. The loss considered in that case was of a lot of cedar posts temporarily deposited near the road. The statute made the railroad responsible "when a building or other property is injured by the fire communicated by a locomotive engine," and gave to the corporation "an insurable interest in the property along the route for which it is responsible." After discussing the statute, the court says: "The conclusion to which we have arrived is that the liability of railroad corporations under this statute extends only to property permanently existing along the route, and capable of being insured, and that as to movable property, having no permanent location, the liability of such corporatian is to be determined by principles of the common law." In Pratt v. Railroad Co., 42 Me. 479, the same court held that the fiability of the company under this statute was not confined to real estate, but extended to personal property as well. Exemption from responsi bility under the statute of that State has never extended beyond injury to movable property temporarily placed near the track. In the recent case of Thatcher v. Railroad Co., supra, the Supreme Court of that State very evidently disapproves the decision in the Chapman Case, though it expressly states that it had no intention of overruling it. The court agreed that a different construction of the statute had been given by the courts of Massachusetts, Vermont, and

New Hampshire from the one declared in the Chap man Case. We do not think so narrow a construction should be given our statute. It is remedial, and such construction should be given it as will advance the remedy. Indeed, the language of the statute is so plain and unambiguous as to admit of but one construction. The corporation shall be responsible "to every person or corporation whose property may be injured or destroyed."

ONE INSTANCE WHERE THE PLEA OF RES ADJUDICATA IS INOPERATIVE AS A TECHNICAL ESTOPPEL.

Is an individual who is interested in the subject-matter of a suit in more than one capacity, as in an official or representative capacity and also in his own personal capacity, and who is made a party defendant and summoned in one capacity only, estopped to deny the conclusiveness of the judgment upon him in his other capacities? We take the ground that he is not, whether he is summoned generally, without any particular mention of the interest he claims in the subjectmatter of the suit, except in the allegations of the bill or declaration, or whether he is summoned in his ollicial or representative capacity only. The position is not undisputed, especially where the party is summoned generally, but a careful review of the many authorities shows, we think, the weight of authority to support our contention, whether this question comes up on a general summons or a summons in a particular capacity only.

The most recent decision that has come under the writer's observation, in conflict with the proposition laid down, is that handed down July 14, 1890, by Judge Blodgett in the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in the case of John E. Cornell v. Mrs. Hetty H. R. Green, reported in 43 Fed. Rep. 105. This decision was of more than usual local interest on account of the value of the property involved, a tract of land in the fashionable residence district of Chicago, said to be worth some three millions of dollars, and it is of interest from a legal point of view because, so far as the writer can find, it stands alone in holding that a person shown by the record to have been summoned in his representative capacity only, can be affected in his rights individually by a mere recital in the bill that he has or claims indi

vidual interests. The case arose out of a mortgage foreclosure suit entitled Green v. Gage, instituted in 1875 by Mrs. Green against the widow, six children and three guardians of the two minor children of one George W. Gage, the original owner of the property, who had, in his life time, in 1871 and 1873, executed trust deeds on the property to secure the payment of certain notes. In 1874, Gage deeded these lands in feesimple to Wm. F. Tucker. In 1875 Gage died, and later in the same year Mrs. Green, having become the owner and holder of the notes secured by the trust deeds, instituted foreclosure proceedings. Her bill recited, among other things, the conveyance by Gage to Tucker of the property in litigation, in 1874, the record of the deed and the consideration for the conveyance, $24,000. In naming the parties defendant, Tucker was designated in the bill only as one of the guardians of the minor children of Gage and also as one of the executors of the last will and testament of

Gage. Process was prayed upon the defendants in a certain order, naming Wm. F. Tucker in his representative capacities, but . The marshal's return not individually. showed regular service in exact accordance with that prayer. Tucker made no appearance in the case and a default was entered against him. The decree did not show that a subpoena issued against him personally but merely recited that personal service was had upon him as defendant. In 1877 Tucker died, and in 1890 his heirs conveyed all their interest in the property to Cornell, who thereupon filed his bill to redeem in the United States Circuit Court at Chicago. The decision of Judge Blodgett was upon a general demurrer to this bill by the defendant, Mrs. Green, and was to the effect that the bill contained sufficient averments to put Tucker upon answer as to his individual interest in the subject-matter of the controversy, and that, having been served with process in his representative capacities of guardian and executor, Tucker was chargeable with notice of the entire contents of the bill so far as it affected him in his representative or individual capacity, and was sufficiently made a party before the court to bind him in his individual capacity. The only cases cited by the court in support of this decision were those of Walton's Executor v. Herbert, 4 N.