3. Appellant complains of certain rulings of the court in regard to the admission of evidence. In several cases of which complaint is made objections were interposed by defendant, but no grounds therefor were stated. In one case the question objected to was not answered, and in but a single instance did the objection of defendant raise any question for the determination of the court. We think the rulings on that objection, and on all others in question, were correct.

4. It is claimed that the verdict was not supported by the evidence. The evidence was conflicting, and we are not prepared to say that it does not sustain the verdict. Affirmed.

GRIFFIN v. TUTTLE et al.

(Supreme Court of Iowa. March 12, 1888.)

1. TAXATION-ASSESSMENT-DESCRIPTION OF LAND.

An assessor's book, at the top of a page in the proper spaces, contained the description of certain parts of sections of land, the number of the section, township, and range, the number of acres, and the valuation, prefixed in the space for the owner's name by the word "unknown." The description of the parts of sections, all being 40-acre tracts, together with the numbers of the sections, was continued in the successive lines to the bottom of the page, but the other spaces were left blank. The footing at the bottom of the page showed the total number of acres and valuation. The land in controversy was assessed in the intermediate lines. Held, a valid assessment.

2. SAME-SALE FOR TAXES -NOTICE OF EXPIRATION OF REDEMPTION-WHEN NECESSARY.

In Iowa the purchaser of land at a tax sale is required to give the former owner notice of the expiration of his right to redeem, unless it is taxed as unknown at the time such notice is required to be given. Defendant's ancestor bought at tax sale, in October, 1876. By the assessor's list of 1879, the land was assessed as unknown, and no one was in possession of it. The deeds were made without a notice of expiration. Held, that the purchaser was not bound to look back of the assessment of 1879, that being, for the purposes of this case, a taxation within the meaning of the law, and that the deeds so made are valid without reference to expiration notice. 3. SAME-VALIDITY OF SALE-AMOUNT OF BID.

Code Iowa, § 876, contemplates that land sold at a tax sale shall bring the whole amount of the taxes due. Acts 16th Gen. Assem. c. 79, (Miller's Code, 215,) provides that in certain cases lands at such sales may be sold for less than the amount of taxes due. A tax deed recited that the land therein conveyed was struck off to the grantee, as the highest bidder, for an amount less than the taxes. Held that, there being no evidence to the contrary, the sale will be presumed lawfully made under the latter statute.

Appeal from district court, Clay county; G. H. CARR, Judge.

Action by M. E. Griffin against Caroline Tuttle et al., to set aside certain tax deeds, and determine the ownership of real estate. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

Harrison & Jenswold and Powers & Lacey, for appellant. Glass & Hughes, for appellee.

SEEVERS, C. J. It is conceded G. H. Randall owned the real estate in controversy, unless the tax deeds under which the defendant claims are valid. Randall conveyed the premises to Paterson, and he to the plaintiff, in 1885. The real estate was sold for delinquent taxes on the 2d day of October, 1876, and the treasurer, on the 15th day of January, 1881, executed a conveyance to M. Tuttle, and the defendants are his heirs and legal representatives. In 1878 the real estate was taxed to G. H. Randall. In 1880 it was taxed to the unknown owner, and the tax-list of 1874 was not introduced in evidence. A new assessment of real estate must be presumed to have been made in 1879, because there is a statute which so provides. The defendants claim that such an assessment was in fact made, and the books of the assessor were introduced in evidence so showing, as they claim; but the plaintiff claims such assessment is void. An expiration notice was published, which is conceded to

be insufficient, and the claim of the defendants is that no such notice was required, because the land was taxed to an unknown owner at the time the plaintiff, under the statute, was required to give such notice, if such time was two years and nine months after the sale, or when the tax deed was obtained. The assessment made in 1879 is as follows:

66 'ASSESSOR'S BOOK, SUMMIT TOWNSHIP, 1879.

The land in controversy is the E. of the S. E. of section 35, in township 97, range 37.

2. It is insisted there was no assessment because as to the land in controversy the township and range or the number of acres, valuation, and name of the owner, is not stated, but that in all of said matters the assessment is a mere blank. The assessment is substantially like it, if it is not identically the same, as the assessment in Burdick v. Connell, 69 Iowa, 458, 29 N. W. Rep. 416. Following that case, the assessment in question must be held to be sufficient.

3. There was no person in possession of the land, and if it was taxed to an unknown person, then the tax purchaser was entitled to a deed without giving any expiration notice. It was so held in Meredith v. Phelps, 65 Iowa, 118, 21 N. W. Rep. 156, and cases cited; and in Heaton v. Knight, 63 Iowa, 686, 16 N. W. Rep. 582, it is held that the assessments in a certain class of cases must be regarded as a taxation of the land. The only essential difference between the case last cited and this is that in the former the assessment was to a known owner, and in the latter to an unknown person. Notwithstanding this difference, the assessment under the cited case must be regarded as a taxation of the real estate. The tax purchaser was bound to examine this assessment in order to determine whether he was required to give an expiration notice, and if he did so, he then found the land was taxed to an unknown owner, and therefore he was not required to give such notice. He was not bound to look back of the assessment. The tax-list for 1879 was not then made out. If it be conceded he was bound to look at the tax-list when

he obtained his deed, this in no respect affected his duty, for the reason that such list showed the land was taxed to an unknown owner.

4. The tax deeds recite that the purchaser offered to pay a named sum for the land, being less than the whole amount of taxes due thereon, and as the same was the highest amount bid, the land was struck off to him. It is urged because of this recital the deed is void on its face for the reason that section 876 and other sections of the Code contemplate the land shall be sold for the whole amount of the taxes due on each separate parcel of the real estate. Chapter 79, Acts 16th Gen. Assem., (Miller's Code, 215,) provides that in certain cases lands may be sold for less than the amount of taxes due thereon. The deed is presumptive evidence that the sale was lawfully made, and therefore it follows, there being no evidence to the contrary, the sale was made in conformity to the statute last referred to. Affirmed.

PETERSON v. LITTLE et al.

(Supreme Court of Iowa. March 12, 1888.)

1. HOMESTEAD-EXEMPTION-Judgment Rendered before Purchase.

A judgment debtor's homestead is not exempt from the payment of a judgment recovered before the purchase of the homestead.

2. WRITS-SERVICE OF PROCESS-MARRIED WOMAN.

The return on an original notice, that due service was made "by reading the within notice to the within defendant, G. B. L., and Mrs. G. B. L., his wife, *** and delivering to her a true copy of the same, "shows a valid service as against the wife, and a judgment by default against her, as "O. M. L." would be valid in the absence of evidence that she was not known by one name as well as the other. 3. EXECUTION-SALE-VALIDITY—INADEQUATE PRICE.

Where real property is bid in at execution sale by the judgment creditor for the amount of his claim, and there is no proof of oppression on his part in not making the levy on other property, or proof that the sale was not properly and fairly conducted, and it appears that the debtor knew the property was advertised for sale, and the year of redemption was allowed to pass without an effort to redeem, the sale will not be set aside even though the price paid was grossly inadequate.

Appeal from district court, Polk county; W. F. CONRAD, Judge.

Action in equity by John F. Peterson against Ora M. Little and G. B. Little, to quiet title to certain real estate. There was a decree for the defendants, and plaintiff appeals.

O. C. Peterson, for appellant. Cole, McVey & Clark, for appellee.

ROTHROCK, J. 1. The real estate in controversy consists of a lot in the city of Des Moines, upon which there is a dwelling-house in which the defendants, who are husband and wife, reside. The defendant Ora M. Little, the wife of the defendant G. B. Little, became the owner of the property by warranty deed from one Talbot on the 2d day of April, 1885. In February, 1885, A. T. McCargar recovered a judgment before a justice of the peace against both the defendants for $29.85, and on the 23d day of June, 1885, a transcript of said judgment was filed in the office of the district court, and on the same day an execution was issued on the judgment and levied on the property in controversy, and on August 3, 1885, the property was sold at sheriff's sale to said McCargar to satisfy said execution, the amount of the bid being $54.25. McCargar assigned the sheriff-sale certificate to O. C. Peterson, and on August 5, 1886, the sheriff executed and delivered to Peterson a deed for the premises. In a few days thereafter Peterson made a quitclaim deed of the property to the plaintiff. The defendants were at the time of the trial in the court below still in possession of the property. They claim that the judgment against them is void, and demand that the sheriff's sale and deed be set aside upon several grounds, which we will proceed to consider:

First. They assert that the property is their homestead, and not liable to execution. But the record shows that the judgment was rendered against

them before they acquired the property. It is therefore not exempt from the payment of this debt.

Second. It is further claimed that there was no original notice served upon them in the action before the justice of the peace, and that he had therefore no jurisdiction nor authority to render a judgment. The facts in relation to this claim are as follows. An original notice was issued by the justice of the peace, of which the following is a copy: "A. T. McCargar, Plaintiff, v. G. B. Little, and Mrs. G. B. Little, his Wife, Defendants.

"STATE OF IOWA, POLK COUNTY,-SS. IN JUSTICE'S COURT, BEFORE F. R. МССАВЕ.

"To said Defendants: You are hereby notified that A. T. McCargar, the plaintiff above named, claims of you the sum of twenty-nine and 85-100 dollars, ($29.85) justly due from you, with six per cent. interest thereon from this date, on account for board and lodging furnished you and your family, at your request, and that unless you appear before the said F. R. MCCABE, a justice of the peace, at his office in Lee township, in said county, on the 7th day of February, 1885, at nine o'clock A. M. of that day, and make defense to said claim, judgment will be rendered against you for that amount and costs. "Dated at Des Moines, Iowa, the 2d day of February, 1885.

"F. R. MCCABE, Justice of the Peace."

Upon this notice a return was indorsed, which is as follows: "The within notice came into my hands on the 2d day of February, 1885, and I duly served the same on the 2d day of February, 1885, by reading the within notice to the within-named defendant G. B. Little, and Mrs. G. B. Little, his wife, a member of the family over fourteen years old, and delivering her a true copy of the same. Done in Lee township, Polk county, Iowa, this 2d day of February, 1885."

It is urged that the return did not show a service on either of the parties. The plaintiff appears to concede that the return does not show service as to G. B. Little, but claims that the service was full and complete as to Mrs. G. B. Little. We think his position must be sustained. It appears from the return that the notice was read to her, and a true copy deliyered to her, and the notice apprised her that a judgment was demanded against her. It is true, she is described in the notice and in the return of service as "Mrs. G. B." Little, and the judgment is rendered against "Ora M." Little, but there is no showing that she was not known by the one name as well as by the other. It is true, the judgment was by default; but her answer is in the nature of a crosspetition, and she seeks to attack the judgment not in a direct, but in a collateral, proceeding. It appears to us that the judgment is valid as against her, and, the title to the property being held by her, the judgment became a valid lien thereon when the transcript was filed in the office of the district court.

Third. The evidence shows that the property is of the value of about $1,500. There was a mortgage upon the premises, which was a lien prior to the judgment in question. The mortgage has been foreclosed, and the property was sold at a foreclosure sale in January, 1887, for $824; that being the amount of the mortgage, interest, and costs of foreclosure. The period of redemption expired in January of the present year. We are not advised as to whether redemption has been made by either of the parties to this suit, and that is not a material question in this case. The defendants claim that the sheriff's sale on the McCargar judgment should be set aside because the property was sold at a grossly inadequate price. The difference between the amount necessary to redeem from the mortgage sale and the value of the property would be about $700. The bid at the sheriff's sale was $55.25. We have found that the judgment was a lien upon the lot. It was the right of McCargar to collect the judgment by the levy and sale of any property of the defendants liable to execution. There is no showing that he was guilty of op

pression in refusing to levy on other property, Indeed, it does not appear that defendants owned any other property. So far as appears, the levy and sale were in all respects regular. There is neither averment nor proof that the sale was improperly conducted, or that McCargar did anything to prevent bidders from attending the sale and purchasing the property. It was his right to collect the judgment, and we know of no rule requiring him to bid more than his judgment, interest, and costs. In addition to this the evidence shows that the defendant G. B. Little knew before the sale that there was a judgment, and that the property was advertised for sale. The year of redemption was allowed to expire without any effort to redeem. Indeed, there is no fact in the case from which it can be inferred that McCargar acted fraudulently in anything he did in the premises. Gross inadequacy of price is not sufficient to avoid à judicial sale. Cavender v. Heirs of Smith, 1 Iowa, 306; Wallace v. Berger, 25 Iowa, 456; Sigerson v. Sigerson, 32 N. W. Rep. 462. If we should hold this sale voidable on this ground, every creditor holding a small claim against the owner of an indivisible tract of real estate would be precluded from enforcing collection of his claim in any other way than by a bid so large that it could not be said to be grossly inadequate. We think it is his right in good faith to bid and buy at the amount of his claim. In such case the period of redemption fixed by statute is ample protection for the debtor. Reversed.

FIRST NAT. BANK OF STORM LAKE v. HARWICK.

(Supreme Court of Iowa. March 12, 1888.)

1. NEW TRIAL-SURPRISE AND ACCIDENT-UNAVOIDABLE ABSENCE OF ATTORNEY. Where judgment was rendered against a party in the absence of his attorney, and it appeared that the attorney, being engaged in an important trial in another county, employed another attorney to attend to the cause for him, giving him all the necessary instructions; that the attorney employed, used ordinary diligence, in proceeding by the usual all-rail route to the county seat; that he did not reach the place of trial until a few hours after judgment had been entered, and there were other cases on the docket for trial ahead of this one unexpectedly disposed of,-a new trial was properly granted under Code Iowa, § 2837, which provides for a new trial in case "of accident or surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against."

2. SAME-VALID DEFENSE EVIDENCE.

Where a cause is adjourned after taking the testimony of a garnishee therein, and, at a subsequent term, a judgment is entered against the garnishee, in his absence, and there is no defense shown by the garnishee in a motion for a new trial or by the evidence introduced in support of the motion, the court may consider his testimony of record in the trial, in determining the nature of his defense and claim. Appeal from circuit court, Sac county; J. H. MACOMBER, Judge.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff from an order setting aside a judgment against the garnishee, T. F. Harwick, and granting a new trial.

Robinson & Milchrist, for appellant. A. E. Clark and Theo. Hawley, for appellee.

REED, J. The garnishee was garnished on execution as a supposed debtor of T. J. Harwick. He appeared at the next term of the court, and his answers were taken in open court, in which he denied that he was in any manner indebted to the defendant, or that he had any property in his possession belonging to him. Plaintiff filed a pleading controverting the answers, and the cause was continued. The issue was as to whether a certain draft belonging to the defendant, but which was payable to the order of the garnishee, and which in his answer he admitted was at one time in his possession, was in his hands after the notice of garnishment was served upon him. At the next term of the court, which was in April, 1886, plaintiff filed a motion for a continuance on the ground of the absence of A. E. Clark, who, he alleged, was a material witness in his behalf. Mr. Clark resided at Fort Dodge, and