by the plaintiff's bank in Illinois, and that it then became a valid contract of that State, and under its laws the wife was not disqualified from becoming surety for her husband. The question thus presented is as to whether this was an Alabama or an Illinois contract.

As we have seen, the note was drawn, signed and delivered to the payee at Tuscumbia, Ala., and that Mrs. Chapman signed as surety for her husband. She did not authorize it to be discounted in Illinois, or know that the members of the firm intended to have it negotiated there. She only knew that it was payable at the plaintiff's bank in that State. It is true the note did not have a valid inception in such a sense as to create a liability on the part of the makers until it was discounted and passed over to the bank, but this does not necessarily make it an Illinois contract, as far as the surety is concerned. Mrs. Chapman's contract to become surety was complete when the instrument was signed and delivered to the payee. It was then a contract beyond her recall, upon which she in the future might become liable when negotiated by the payee, if otherwise valid, and the place of the negotiation could not, under the circumstances, in any manner change the force or effect of her contract. One of the essential elements in a contract is the meeting of the minds of the contracting parties upon the matter which is the subject of the contract. In this contract Mrs. Chapman agreed with the payee of the note that she would become surety for her husband to the amount thereof, and this agreement was made in the State of Alabama. She did not agree that it should be negotiated in Illinois and made an Illinois contract. Her mind did not meet the intention of the payee upon that subject, and she cannot, therefore, be held to have agreed that it should become a contract of that State. She knew, by the terms of the instrument, that it was payable at the plaintiff's bank, but this did not advise her that it was intended to discount it there or to constitute it a contract of that State. It appears from the evidence that the firm kept its accounts with and made its deposits in the plaintiff's bank, and she might well have assumed that it was made payable there for the convenience of the firm. We have had occasion to examine many cases bearing upon the question under consideration. It may not be profitable to here indulge in an extended discussion of the authorities, for we have found none that are exactly in point. We shall, therefore, extract from them some general principles, which appear to be settled beyond controversy, and apply them to the question under consideration.

1. All matters bearing upon the execution, the interpretation and the validity of contracts, in

cluding the capacity of the parties to contract thereto, are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made.

2. All matters connected with its performance, including presentation, notice, demand, etc., are regulated by the law of the place where the contract by its terms is to be performed.

3. All matters respecting the remedy to be pursued, including the bringing of suits and the service of process, depend upon the law of the place where the action is brought.

In the case of Scudder v. Union Nat. Bank (91 U. S., 406), a bill of exchange was drawn by a party in Chicago upon a firm in St. Louis, and verbally accepted by a member of the St. Louis firm, then present in Chicago. Under the law of Missouri acceptances were required to be in writing, but under the law of Illinois a parol acceptance was valid. The bill of exchange, as we have seen, was drawn in Chicago, Ill., and, therefore, all matters pertaining to its execution, interpretation and validity had to be determined by the laws of that State. It was made payable in St. Louis, Mo., and, ordinarily, the laws of that State would control with reference to acceptance and performance, but a member of the firm in that State was present in Chicago, and he there accepted the bill of exchange without waiting for it to be sent on to St. Louis to his firm in that city. It was, therefore, held to be an Illinois acceptance.

In the case of Voight v. Brown (42 Hun, 394), the husband and wife resided in the State of New York; the wife here authorized her husband to sign her name to an accommodation note. He then went into Connecticut and there executed a note payable to the order of the firm of which he was a partner and signed her name thereto. He then took the note to New York and had it discounted by the plaintiffs and received the money. Under the laws of Connecticut a married woman could not contract except for the benefit of herself, her family or her separate or joint estate. Under the laws of New York her contract was valid. It was held to be a New York contract. The learned Appellate Division cites this case as supporting their contention, but to our minds it widely differs from that which we have under consideration. In that case the wife, as we have seen, resided in this State and remained in this State. The authority of her husband to sign her name to the note was given here. When he, therefore, as her agent, drew the note and signed her name thereto, he acted upon authority derived in this State, and the paper became of the same force and effect as if the wife had actually signed it here. It was taken to the city of New York and there negotiated. We thus have it drawn as a New York contract and negotiated as a

In the case of Milliken v. Pratt (125 Mass., 374), a wife guaranteed the payment by her husband of $500 to one Pratt of Portland, Me. The guaranty was in writing and was dated at Portland, January 29, 1870. She, however, actually signed the paper .in Massachusetts, but she sent it to Pratt at Portland and caused it to be delivered to him there. Acting upon it he delivered goods to her husband which he then purchased. The guaranty was valid under the laws of Main but void under the laws of Massachusetts. It was held that the contract was governed by the laws of Maine. In this case it will be observed that the guaranty not only purports to have been executed in Maine, but that the wife caused the instrument to be sent to Maine and there delivered to the plaintiff. She, therefore, knew and understood that the contract was to have its inception there, and consequently, must have intended it to be controlled by the laws of that State.

In line with this is the recent case of Grand v. National Express Co. (4 App. Div., 589, aff'd in this court, 158 N. Y., 688), in which it was expressly held that the contract must be construed and determined under the law of the State where it was executed unless it could fairly be said that the parties at the time of its execution clearly manifested an intention that it should be governed by the laws of another State.

Applying these principles to the question under consideration, it seems clear that the capacity of Mrs. Chapman to contract must be determined by the law of the State where the contract was executed unless it can fairly be said that she at the time of the execution of the instrument clearly understood and intended that it should be governed by the laws of another State. Such an intention or understanding is not manifest in this case; instead thereof it is found that she did not know where the paper was to be discounted.

After

when she signed the note. She also knew that it was an accommodation note, made to raise money for the use of the firm and that until negotiated it was without binding force upon anyone. signing it she intrusted it to the payee, knowing that, in behalf of the firm, he intended to negotiate it somewhere and that he was at liberty to negotiate it anywhere. When the payee thus received the note signed by her she had made no contract, for the paper had no inception as yet. The contract of a surety rests upon the contract of the principal, and until the latter becomes operative the former is not binding. The promise of the surety has nothing to act upon until the promise of the principal is in force as an effective contract. When the firm negotiated the paper in Illinois, as they had a right to do, by selling it to a bona fide purchaser for value, that which theretofore had been merely a note in form first became a note in fact. It then became a contract, and for the first time acquired the quality of commercial paper. Until then the law did not recognize Mrs. Chapman as a surety. She had made no enforcible contract, but merely an inchoate promise, which was without legal life, until what was done in Alabama with implied authority to complete it elsewhere ripened into a lawful obligation by what was done in Illinois. All that was done in Alabama did not make a contract, and, therefore, the contract was not made in that State. It was made in Illinois, because there was no contract, either of principal or surety, until the paper was used in that State. That use of the note was necessarily within the contemplation of Mrs. Chapman when she signed it and gave it to Mr. Reynolds, the payee, with her implied consent that he or his firm might negotiate it anywhere, and hence within a State where the law permits a wife to become surety for her husband. As the law presumes a lawful and not an unlawful intent, when possible, the presumption arises, in the absence of evidence upon the subject, that she intended the

VANN, J. (dissenting).— While Mrs. Chapman signed her name in Alabama, she promised to pay in Illinois. If there is doubt as to the State where the contract was made, there is none as to the State where it was to be performed. Although in fact a surety for her husband's firm, there is nothing on the face of the note to show it, for she contracted as a maker and her promise is absolute in form. Uniting with that firm and others as joint makers, she promised to pay the sum in question to the order of E. P. Reynolds, Jr., at the "Union National Bank, Chicago, Ill." The payee was

dence only, and where she knew it could not be enforced, and hence could not be honestly used, did not make it a contract of that State nor prevent it from becoming a contract of the State within which she promised to pay it. I think it was an Illinois contract, and should be governed by the laws of that State. For these reasons I dissent from the conclusion reached by the majority of the court, and record my vote in favor of affirming the judgment appealed from.

PARKER, Ch. J.; GRAY, O'BRIEN and MARTIN, JJ.. concur with HAIGHT, J.; BARTLETT, J., concurs with VANN, J.

Judgment reversed, etc.

SHAKESPEARE'S LAW.

The correctness of Shakespeare's law has been a subject of endless discussion since the day when Lord Campbell's essay was given to the world. Nor does the question seem to have lost interest at the present time, if we may judge from the fact that three able volumes which were reviewed in the columns of Law Notes, have lately appeared treating this matter. Yet apparently all has not been said. In a recent Chicago case, counsel directed the court's attention to Portia's famous judgment that made waste paper of Shylock's bond," and declared that Shakespeare had in mind, when he wrote it, the principle that a guarantor's liability cannot be extended by implication. Judge Waterman, in deciding the case, declared that Portia's judgment "did anything but make waste paper of Shylock's bond. On the contrary, it converted it into an instrument by which the hapless Jew was robbed; nor have we understood that Portia's judgment was or is law in this or any other country." It does not seem that the accuracy of the great dramatist's law is a matter of much importance to any but benighted advocates of the Baconian authorship of Shakespeare, yet on the facts of the case, after looking over two or three articles on this very point, we are inclined to agree with Judge Waterman. Portia's law must, if accurate at any time, have been accurate at some uncertain time in the history of Venice or in the England of Queen Elizabeth. Now, as we understand the decision, the gist of the judgment in Shylock v. Antonio was that the bond for a pound of flesh was a valid instrument and gave the plaintiff a right to exact the forfeiture; yet, if he exacted the forfeiture, he was guilty of murder. Assuredly this was not the English law, for by that law the condition was void, whether it exacted a penalty or commanded an act, involving a crime. Whether it was law at some indefinite time in Venice we boldly confess our ignorance — an ignorance which we

venture to assert was shared by Shakespeare, who was probably satisfied with its accuracy on the coasts of Bohemia and the stage of the theatre frequented by the lord chamberlain, his servants. We have no desire to impose on our readers, however, and lay before them the statement of "the distinguished German jurist Pietscher,"― stat nominis doctissimi umbra to us who says: "I believe that I dare assert that at that time in Venice the consideration that a contract against morals was void was not yet recognized or regarded as a valid plea." Peace to the shade of the learned Pietscher! He probably had, or has such is our ignorance his share of Teutonic humor. But did any of the learned critics ever pause from investigating the law of Venice "at that time" to think how much more dramatic the scene is as Shakespeare has given it to us? How the interest is maintained and the characters of the actors developed, as Portia's eloquence proceeds now in favor of one party, now in favor of the other, and ends with the Jew completely entagled in the snare of his own devising? - Law Notes.

DOG vs. CAT.

At Bridgeport, Conn., a case involving the right of a dog to chase a cat without being shot by the owner of the cat is now in progress, and it looks now as if it might equal the record of the famous Missouri calf case in which the litigation over a $7.00 calf extended over many years until it had worn a very smooth path between the home of the litigants and the Supreme Court and then back again, the costs and attorney's fees amounting to something over $10,000, to say nothing of the losses of the two farmers in wasted time and energy.

The Bridgeport Post reports the last phase of this now famous dog and cat case as follows: Judge Howard B. Scott decides that a man must not shoot a dog when it is after a cat unless the dog is in some act of grabbing the feline.

The decision was handed down to-day in the Civil Common Pleas Court and it is rendered in the now famous case of Ford against Glennon.

Having reached this conclusion Judge Scott finds that Policeman Glennon is liable for value of the dog, and after considering the evidence on this point the court assesses this value at $100. Judgment is accordingly rendered for that amount with costs.

In all probability the Supreme Court will have another interview with the case, as the defendant will hardly be satisfied with the ruling of the lower court.

The action originally was brought by Thomas J. Ford against Policeman Bernard H. Glennon to

The dog was out one day with Mr. Ford's sixyear-old daughter. As it passed Officer Glennon's door the animal saw the pet cat of the Glennon family basking in the sun. With a fierce dash it made for the cat and rudely disturbed its repose, which was just what a dog would do, as Kipling would say.

The cat beat a retreat to the window sill. Mrs. Glennon came out and screamed. Thinking its position not quite safe pussy made for a big tree in front of the house, the dog after it. It was a great race and the cat reached a place of safety by about the hair on its tail.

Just then Officer Glennon came along and saw the dog standing with its feet up against the tree and pussy's tail a few inches from the terrible jaws. He banged away and the dog fell dead.

The case went to court and Judge Howard J. Curtis decided that pussy had rights which Towser was bound to respect and that pussy's owner had the right to kill and slay when he thought pussy in danger.

The plaintiff, a great dog man, was not satisfied, and he took the case to the Supreme Court. That august tribunal decided that the lower court erred in interpreting the law. There must be no killing of the dog unless the situation is so dangerous that no other resource is left. The dog might have actually mangled the cat, but even then the cat's owner has no right to shoot. The cat's owner must seek redress in a civil action.

With the Supreme Court ruling before him Judge Scott heard the case last week and he promptly hands down the finding as above.

The case aroused great interest all over the country. It was the subject of much editorial comment and it was being posted in the law journals; old ladies with cat leanings thought Judge Curtis just right, young ladies with pug proclivities wrote letters denouncing it. And now it will no doubt make the rounds again, this time to the satisfaction of the people with pet puppies, to the disgruntlement of friends of the back fence musicians.-Law Students' Helper.

Louis; George J. Tansey, president of the St. Louis Merchants' Exchange; and will be made up of Exposition directors and members of auxiliary committees as follows: Corwin H. Spencer, William H. Thompson, D. M. Houser, C. H. Huttig, Adolphus Busch, Seth W. Cobb, George W. Parker, Charles W. Knapp, Nathan Frank, ex-Governor N. J. Colman, E. C. Simmons, Ray Davis, Fred W. Lehman, George M. Wright, chairman New York committee; O. L. Whitelaw, chairman Vermont committee; Clark H. Sampson, chairman Massachusetts committee; L. B. Tebbitts, chairman New Hampshire committee; Hobart Brinsmade, chairman Connecticut committee; J. J. Wertheimer; Charles S. Brown, chairman New Jersey committee; George O. Carpenter.

The party first vsiited Albany, N. Y., and appeared before the New York legislature on Febru|ary 24. From Albany they went to Trenton, N. J., to meet the legislature on the following day, thence to Providence, R. I., to appear before the legislature on the twenty-sixth, and from there to Boston. The delegation met the Massachusetts legislature on the afternoon of February twenty-seventh and attended a dinner at the Algonquin club the same evening, under the auspices of the Boston Commercial club. The governors of the New England States were invited, together with the members of the World's Fair commissions in each of these States, and other prominent citizens named by the governors.

The immense magnitude upon which the World's Fair, to celebrate the centennial of the Louisiana Purchase, has been planned is not believed to be fully understood in the east, and it was the mission of this representative delegation to answer questions and correct any false impressions that may exist. The Louisiana Purchase Exposition will be twice as large as the Columbian Exposition at Chicago, not only in extent of buildings and grounds, but in its exhibits and other features. Provision has been made in the 1,200 acres comprised in the Exposition area for more than 200 acres of floor space. Nearly $1,000,000 worth of buildings, the Washington University group, are in process of construction, some of them about fin