ministration having been at first tory, and afterwards of a motley complexion, though depending for existence on the great whig interest, which it in some degree proscribed. Every one knows that this ministry was precipitated from power through the favourite's abuse of her ascendancy, become at length intolerable to the most forbearing of queens and mistresses, conspiring with another intrigue of the bed-chamber, and the popular clamour against Sacheverell's impeachment. It seems rather an humiliating proof of the sway which the feeblest prince enjoys even in a limited monarchy, that the fortunes of Europe should have been changed by nothing more noble than the insolence of one waiting-woman and the cunning of another. It is true that this was effected by throwing the weight of the crown into the scale of a powerful faction; yet the house of Bourbon would probably not have reigned beyond the Pyrenees, but for Sarah and Abigail at queen Anne's toilet.

The object of the war, as it is commonly called, of the Grand Alliance, commenced in 1702, was, as expressed in an address of the house of commons, for preserving the liberties of Europe, and reducing the exorbitant power of France'. The occupation of the Spanish dominions by the duke of Anjou, on the authority of the late king's will, was assigned as its justification, together with the acknowledgment of the pretended prince of

phin and the whig junto; and Tindal, his mere copyist, is not worth mentioning. But Cunningham's History, and still more the letters published in Coxe's Life of Marlborough, show better the state of party-intrigues, which the Parliamentary History also illustrates, as well as many pamphlets of the time. Somerville has carefully compiled as much as was known when he wrote.

Parl. Hist. vi. 4.

IV.

CANDON DEV

LIBERTE
ET
PATRIE

BIBLIOTHEOL

2

Wales, as successor to his father James. Charles, archduke of Austria, was recognized as king of Spain, and as early as 1705, the restoration of that monarchy to his house is declared in a speech from the throne to be not only safe and advantageous, but glorious to England'. Louis XIV had perhaps at no time much hope of retaining for his grandson the whole inheritance he claimed; and on several occasions made overtures for negotiation, but such as indicated his design of rather sacrificing the detached possessions of Italy and the Netherlands, than Spain itself and the Indies". After the battle of Oudenarde, however, and the loss of Lille in the campaign of 1708, the exhausted state of France and discouragement of his court induced him to acquiesce in the cession of the Spanish monarchy, as a basis of treaty. In the conferences of the Hague in 1709, he struggled for a time to preserve Naples and Sicily; but ultimately admitted the terms imposed by the allies, with the exception of the famous thirty-seventh article of the preliminaries, binding him to procure, by force or persuasion, the resignation of the Spanish crown by his grandson within two months. This proposition he declared to be both dishonourable and impracticable; and the allies refusing to give way, the negotiation was broken off. It was renewed the next year at Gertruydenburg, but the same obstacle still proved insurmountable. 3

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It has been the prevailing opinion in modern times, that the English ministry, rather against the judgment

' Nov. 27. Parl. Hist. 477.

* Coxe's Marlborough, i. 453. ii. 110. Cunningham, ii. 52. 83. 3 Mémoires de Torcy, vol. ii. passim. Coxe's Marlborough, vol. iii. Bolingbroke's Letters on History, and Lord Walpole's Answer to them. Cunningham. Somerville, 340.

of their allies of Holland, insisted upon a condition not indispensable to their security, and too ignominious for their fallen enemy to accept. Some may perhaps incline to think, that even had Philip of Anjou been suffered to reign in Naples, a possession rather honourable than important, the balance of power would not have been serriously affected, and the probability of durable peace been increased. This, however, it was not necessary to discuss. The main question is as to the power which the allies possessed of securing the Spanish monarchy for the archduke, if they had consented to waive the thirtyseventh article of the preliminaries. If indeed they could have been considered as a single potentate, it was doubtless possible, by means of keeping up great armies on the frontier, and by the delivery of cautionary towns, to have prevented the king of France from lending assistance to his grandson. But self-interested and disunited as confederacies generally are, and as the grand alliance had long since become, this appeared a very dangerous course of policy, if Louis should be playing an underhand game against his engagements. And this it was not then unreasonable to suspect, even we should believe, in despite of some plausible authorities, that he was really sincere in abandoning so favourite an interest. The obstinate adherence of Godolphin and Somers to the preliminaries may possibly have been erroneous; but it by no means deserves the reproach that has been unfairly bestowed on it; nor can the whigs be justly charged with protracting the war to enrich Marlborough, or to secure themselves in power. '

The late biographer of Marlborough asserts that he was against breaking off the conferences in 1709, though clearly for insisting on the cession of Spain. (iii. 40. ) Godolphin, Somers, and the whigs in

The conferences at Gertruydenburg were broken off in July, 1710, because an absolute security for the evacuation of Spain by Philip appeared to be wanting, and within six months a fresh negotiation was secretly on foot, the basis of which was his retention of that king

general, expected Louis XIV to yield the thirty-seventh article. Cowper, however, was always doubtful of this. Id. 176.

It is very hard to pronounce, as it appears to me, on the great problem of Louis's sincerity in this negotiation. No decisive evidence seems to have been brought on the contrary side. The most remarkable authority that way is a passage in the Memoirs of St. Phelipe, iii. 263. who certainly asserts that the king of France had, without the knowledge of any of his ministers, assured his grandson of a continued support. But the question returns as to St. Phelipe's means of knowing so important a secret. On the other hand, I cannot discover in the long correspondence between madame de Maintenon and the princess des Ursins the least corroboration of these suspicions, but much to the contrary effet. Nor does Torcy drop a word, though writing when all was over, by which we should infer that the court of Versailles had any other hopes left in 1709, than what still lingered in their hearts from the determined spirit of the Castilians themselves.

It appears by the Mémoires de Noailles, iii. 10. (edit. 1777) that Louis wrote to Philip, 26 Nov. 1708, hinting that he must reluctantly give him up, in answer to one wherein the latter had declared that he would not quit Spain while he had a drop of blood in his veins. And on the French ambassador at Madrid, Amelot, remonstrating against the abandonment of Spain, with an evident intimation that Philip could not support himself alone, the king of France answered that he must end the war at any price. 15 Apr. 1709. Id. 34. In the next year, after the battle of Saragosa, which seemed to turn the scale wholly against Philip, Noailles was sent to Madrid in order to persuade that prince to abandon the contest. Id. 107. There were some in France who would even have accepted the thirtyseventh article, of whom madame de Maintenon seems to have been. P. 119. We may perhaps think that an explicit offer of Naples, on the part of the allies, would have changed the scene; nay, it seems as if Louis would have been content at this time with Sardinia and Sicily. P. 108.

dom. For the administration presided by Godolphin had fallen meanwhile; new counsellors, a new parliament, new principles of government. The tories had from the beginning come very reluctantly into the schemes of the grand alliance; though no opposition to the war had ever been shown in parliament, it was very soon perceived that the majority of that denomination had their hearts bent on peace. But instead of renewing the negotiation in concert with the allies, which indeed might have been impracticable, the new ministers fell upon the course of a clandestine arrangement, in exclusion of all the other powers, which led to the signature of preliminaries in September, 1711, and afterwards to the public congress of Utrecht, and the celebrated treaty named from that town. Its chief provisions are too well known to be repeated.

The arguments in favour of a treaty of pacification, which should abandon the great point of contest, and leave Philip in possession of Spain and America, were neither few nor inconsiderable. 1. The kingdom had been impoverished by twenty years of uninterruptedly augmented taxation; the annual burthens being triple in amount of those paid before the revolution. Yet amidst these sacrifices we had the mortification of finding a debt

A contemporary historian of remarkable gravity observes: "It was strange to see how much the desire of French wine, and the dearness of it, alienated many men from the duke of Marlborough's friendship." Cunningham, ii. 220. The hard drinkers complained that they were poisoned by port; these formed almost a party; Dr. Aldrich, dean of Christ Church, surnamed the priest of Bacchus, Dr. Ratcliffe, general Churchill, etc. "And all the bottle companions, many physicians, and great numbers of the lawyers and inferior clergy, and, in fine, the loose women too, were united together in the faction against the duke of Marlborough."