WHEREAS it is provided by the Act of the 1st and 2nd of her present Majesty, ch. 45, s. 3, that after the 1st day of November, 1838, any person entitled to be admitted an attorney of any of the superior Courts of Common Law at Westminster, shall, after being sworn in and admitted as an attorney of any one of the said Courts, be entitled to practise in any other of the said Courts, upon signing the roll of such Court, and not otherwise, in like manner as if he had been sworn in and admitted an attorney of such Court; provided that no additional fee, besides those payable under the Act of the first year of the reign of her present Majesty, c. 56, shall be demanded or paid; and that the fees payable for such admission shall be apportioned in such manner as the Judges of the said Courts, or any eight of them, shall by any rule or order made in term or vacation, direct and appoint :

VOL. I.

1838.

RULE OF
COURT.

We, therefore, direct and appoint, that the fees payable by virtue of the said last-mentioned Act for the Judge's fiat, be received in the first instance by the clerk of the judge granting the fiat, and paid over by him to the clerk of the Chief Justice or Chief Baron of the Court, as the case may be, and the day after each term all the fees so received shall be divided into fifteen portions, one of which shall be paid to the clerk or clerks of each Judge; and further, that the fees payable by virtue of the said Act to the ushers, shall be received in the first instance by one of the ushers of the Court in which the admission shall take place, and shall on the day after each term be divided into three equal portions, one of which shall be paid to the ushers of each Court.

(Signed)

DENMAN,
N. C. TINDAL,
ABINGER,

J. A. PARK,

J. LITTLEDALE,
J. VAUGHAN,

J. B. BOSANQuet,

E. H. ALDERSON,

J. PATTESON,

J. GURNEY,

J. WILLIAMS,

J. T. COLERIDGE,

J. PARKE,

T. COLTMAN.

Friday, November 2nd.

Assumpsit.

Declaration,

that in consi

deration that the plaintiff,

at the request of the defend

ant, had consented to allow the defendant to

weigh divers

BAINBRIDGE v. FIRMSTON.

ASSUMPSIT. The declaration stated that, in consideration that the plaintiff, at the request of the defendant, had consented to allow the defendant to weigh divers boilers of the plaintiff of great value, to wit &c., the defendant promised the plaintiff that he the defendant would, within a reasonable time after the said weighing was effected, leave and give up the said boilers in as perfect and complete a condition, and as fit for use by the plaintiff, as the same were in at the time of the consent so given &c. Averment,

boilers of the plaintiff, the defendant promised to give them up to the plaintiff in the same condition as at the time of such consent. Averment, that by such consent the defendant weighed them, and breach :Held, on motion to arrest judgment, that the declaration contained a good consideration for the promise.

that in pursuance of such consent the defendant weighed the boilers; yet that he, not regarding his promise, did not, within a reasonable time &c., return the said boilers in as perfect and complete condition &c., but on the contrary, that he took the same to pieces and left them in a detached condition, whereby the plaintiff had been put to great trouble and inconvenience, and been deprived of the use of the said boilers, and was compelled to expend divers sums in putting the said pieces together. To the damage &c.

Plea: Non assumpsit.

The plaintiff having obtained a verdict at the trial before Lord Denman C. J. at the London sittings after last Trinity term,

J. Bayley now moved for a rule nisi to arrest the judgment. There was no sufficient consideration to support the promise. "Every promise, for the non-performance of which an action of assumpsit may be maintained, must be founded on a sufficient consideration, that is, a consideration, either of benefit to the defendant, or of benefit to a stranger, of damage, or of loss, sustained by the plaintiff at the request of the defendant.”—1 Selw. N. P. (a). No action will lie for a mere nonfeasance, unless the promise is founded on a consideration; Elsee v. Gutward (b), and Bates v. Cort (c).

Lord DENMAN C. J.-I think the declaration good. The defendant requests to be allowed to weigh certain boilers belonging to the plaintiff; he can only do so by the plaintiff's permission, in consideration of which he makes the promise alleged; the promise follows as of course. We need not inquire into the nature of the benefit derived to the defendant. The plaintiff may have sustained some damage by complying with the defendant's request, and that is enough after verdict.

(a) P. 45, 9th ed.

(b) 5 T. R. 143.

(c) 2 B. & C. 474; S.C. 3 D. & R. 676.

1838.

BAINBRIDGE

v.

FIRMSTON.