the county of Yorkshire, without searching in the Common Pleas for at least such periods as by the local acts are allowed to elapse between the entering up of the judgments and the local registration; i. e. as to lands in the north riding for twenty days, and, in the west and east ridings, and the town and county of the town of Kingston upon Hull, for thirty days; 8 Geo. 2. c. 6. s. 1., 5 Ann. c. 18. ss. 4. 11., 6 Ann. c. 35. ss. 19. 28. with notice. Lands situated within a register district will not, Purchasers it seems, now be affected by a judgment not registered in the Common Pleas Office as to purchasers, mortgagees and creditors, although it may be registered in the local office, and the purchaser may have notice. If, however, the judgment has been registered in the Common Pleas, but has not been registered in the local office, then it seems that a purchaser who buys with notice of such judgment would be affected by it, as there is no express enactment altering the rule of law by which purchasers, &c. have always been affected by unregistered judgments and other incumbrances affecting lands in a register county, of which they had notice. (Le Neve v. Le Neve, 3 Atk. 646, 655; Tunstall v. Trappes, 3 Sim. 307; Johnson v. Holdsworth, 1 Sim. N. C. 106; Westbrook v. Bligh, 2 W. R. 490). judgment. As between the debtor and creditor, a judgment Operation of is a general lien upon, and enables the sheriff to At law. take in execution, all the freehold, copyhold and leasehold hereditaments and premises of which the debtor, or any person in trust for him, may be No charge on benefices. Provisions for registra tion. seised or possessed at the date of the judgment or at any time afterwards, or over which he may have any disposing power which he might, without the assent of any other person, exercise for his own benefit. A judgment is also a specific charge on all such property as is before mentioned, and every other kind of disposable estate of the debtor which could not be taken in execution, such as estates in reversion, remainder or expectancy, advowsons, equities of redemption, &c. &c.; and the clause which makes the judgment an equitable charge expressly declares that it shall be binding on the issue of the body of the debtor, and all other persons whom he might alone debar from any remainder, reversion or other interest. Charges on ecclesiastical livings being prohibited by previous statutes, a judgment has been held not to be a charge on this species of property. (Hawkins v. Gathercole, 3 W. R. 194; 13 Eliz. c. 20.; 57 Geo. 3. c. 99.). The 19th section of the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. provides "that no judgment, decree, order or rule shall, by virtue of the act, affect any lands, tenements or hereditaments, as to purchasers, mortgagees or creditors, unless and until a memorandum or minute containing the name and the usual or last known place of abode, and the title, trade or profession of the person whose estate is intended to be affected thereby, and the Court and the title of the cause or matter in which such judgment, decree, order or rule shall have been obtained or made, and the date of such judgment, decree, order or rule, and the account of the debt, damages, costs or monies thereby recovered or ordered to be paid, shall be left with the senior Master of the Court of Common Pleas at Westminster." A question has arisen on the above section, whether it was intended to exclude the doctrine of notice, so as to make registry essential to bind a purchaser with notice, and the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 82. succeeded in making notice immaterial to a purchaser, so far as the remedies given to the judgment creditor have been extended by the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. By that act it is provided, "that no such judgment, decree, order or rule as aforesaid, shall, by virtue of the said act, affect any lands, tenements or hereditaments, at law or in equity, as to purchasers, mortgagees or creditors, unless and until such a memorandum or minute as in the said act in that behalf mentioned, shall have been left with the senior Master of the said Court of Common Pleas at Westminster, any notice of any such judgment, decree, order or rule to any such purchaser, mortgagee or creditor in anywise notwithstanding." It still, however, remained doubtful whether a purchaser, with notice of a judgment not registered, could be bound to the extent of the remedies under the Statute of Westminster. To remedy this defect in the previous statutes it has been enacted, by the 4th section of the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 15., that no judgment, decree, order or rule, which might be Provisions for re-regis tration. registered under the said act of the 1 & 2 Vict., any The 4th section of the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11. enacts, "that all judgments of the superior Courts, decrees or orders in any Court of equity, rules of a Court of common law, and orders in bankruptcy or lunacy, which, since the passing of the said act of the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110., have been registered under the provisions therein contained, or which shall hereafter be so registered, shall, after the expiration of five years from the date of the entry thereof, be null and void against lands, tenements and other hereditaments, as to purchasers, mortgagees or creditors, unless a like memorandum or minute as was required in the first instance is again left with the senior Master of the said Court of Common Pleas within five years before the execution of the conveyance, settlement, mortgage, lease or other deed or instrument vesting or transferring the legal or equitable right, title, estate or interest in or to any such purchaser or mortgagee for valuable consideration, or, as to creditors within five years, before the right of such creditors accrued, and so, toties quoties, at the expiration of every succeeding five years; and the senior Master shall forthwith reenter the same in like manner as the same was originally entered, and such officer shall be entitled for any such re-entry to the sum of one shilling." In order to remove the doubts which have arisen upon this provision, it is provided, by the 5th section of the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 15., that the provision contained in the section numbered 2 of the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 82. shall extend not only to the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110., but also to the 4th section of the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11. as explained by this act (i. e. the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 15.), so that notice of any judgment &c. not duly re-registered, shall not avail against purchasers, mortgagees or creditors, as to lands, tenements or hereditaments. &c., not affected by notice if judgments not entered for five years. If the judgment has not been registered within Purchasers, five years before the execution of the conveyance, it may be assumed that it is not binding on the purchaser or mortgagee, whether he can be attached with notice or not. In the case of Kolls Shaw v. Neale (3 W. Rep. 350), the Vice Chancellor said, with regard to a purchase made subsequently to the date and registry of a judgment which was duly registered within five years after the date of the purchase, but not re-registered within five years from the date of the original registry, "It is true that the order was first a valid subsisting charge, but it ceased to be so when five years had elapsed from the date of the original registry, and the subsequent registration operated just as if the debt had been paid off and a new judgment had then been obtained and registered for the first time." The 6th section of the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 15., by Provisions |