That, before the making of the first order, no barristerat-law had ever attended or practised at any court of quarter sessions in the said county, nor at any court of sessions in the principality of Wales, except on a special retainer, and that the attornies and solicitors of her Majesty's superior courts at Westminster, or, until the abolition of the special judicature of Wales, of the court of great sessions for the county of Denbigh, practising in the said court of quarter sessions, had at all times audience in the said court, and derived therefrom certain gains and emoluments.

That, in virtue of the said order and confirmation thereof, certain members of the bar have since attended the quarter sessions, and have claimed and been permitted to have exclusive audience as advocates; and audience has been refused by the said court to deponent and several other attornies of the superior courts at Westminster, practising in the courts of Denbigh, to whom the making of the order has caused considerable pecuniary loss.

He contended that, though it might be right for the justices to regulate their own proceedings, such a rule as this would cause great hardship, to the poor particularly, who would be obliged to incur the greater expense of employing counsel instead of attornies, as the ancient usage of the court had been. He cited Collier v. Hicks (a), where Lord Tenterden, C. J., refers to the inconvenience felt from the want of regular attendance of barristers at remote places, and the heavy and ruinous expense likely to ensue; and Parke, J., says, "No person has a right to act as an advocate without the leave of the Court, which must of necessity have the power of regulating its own proceedings, in all cases where they are not already regulated by ancient usage.”

Lord DENMAN, C. J.-I think the rule is most important, that all courts of justice should regulate their (a) 2 B. & Ad. 663.

1846.

The QUEEN

v.

The Justices of
DENBIGH-

SHIRE.

own proceedings. The exception to the rule, arising
from occasions of ancient usage, as stated by my Brother
Parke, does not appear to me to apply to such a case as
the present, of different classes of the profession claiming
to be heard. I think the rule in this case is a very

beneficial one.
The argument in favour of admitting
attornies to be heard, on account of the less expense as
to costs, would apply equally to persons who would work
for less charges than attornies. It would apply to this
Court as well as to others; in fact, it would be equally
just in all cases whatsoever. We sit here to try causes
which are often of small amount, but that of itself is no
reason why attornies, or persons who would accept even
smaller remuneration, should be entitled to audience as
the higher branch of the profession are. I think it is
quite necessary for the interest of all that there should
be an order a privileged order-in courts of justice, and
that we should not interfere with the discretion of the
sessions in laying down this rule in the exercise of its
undoubted power of regulating its own practice. If no
barristers attended the sessions, it would be another
thing; but here they do. The discretion has been ex-
ercised here under some limitation, that is, that unless
there shall be a sufficient number of barristers present,
attornies shall be heard. If, instead of the limit being
four, the sessions had said sixty, the reason now relied
on, of expense, would have been equally valid, for a poor
man would find equal difficulty in employing a barrister
out of the greater number as out of the lesser. The
reason is not sufficient to satisfy me that this order
should be quashed, and therefore I am of opinion that
this rule must be refused.

PATTESON, J.-I entirely agree with what has been said by his Lordship. I have nothing to add to his ob

servations.

Rule refused.

1846.

TENNANT v. CRESTON.

DEBT for penalties.—The declaration was framed un

April 25th.

The 17 Geo. 2,

c. 3, is not repealed by the

6

& 7 Will. 4, an overseer,

c. 96; therefore,

who refuses upon demand forthwith" to

give copies of the poor-rate

to an inhabit

ant of the parish, is still

der the 17 Geo. 2, c. 3, s. 3, against the defendant, the
overseer of the poor of a parish, for refusing to give
the plaintiff, an inhabitant of the parish, a copy of the
poor-rate forthwith upon demand. Plea-Not guilty."
At the trial, before Patteson, J., at the last Spring
assizes for Westmoreland, it appeared that the rate in
question had been made on the 18th of October, 1845;
that the plaintiff had, on the 30th of October, demanded
a copy of it, when the defendant declined to furnish one;
but that he subsequently, November 6th, tendered a
copy to the plaintiff. The learned Judge was of opinion,
that the 17 Geo. 2, c. 3, s. 2, had not been complied
with, and the plaintiff had a verdict for 201., the amount
of the penalty.

In Easter Term (a) Greig moved for a rule nisi for a nonsuit, or for arresting the judgment. The 17 Geo. 2, c. 3, s. 2, required that the overseer "shall, upon demand, forthwith" give copies of the rate. That act, however, has been virtually repealed by the 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 96, (Parochial Assessment Act); and the declaration, which is framed under the earlier act, is therefore bad. The object of the 17 Geo. 2, c. 3, was the publication of the poor rate, and must refer to the form of rate as made under the 43 Eliz. c. 2. The subject matter of the penal clauses in the 17 Geo. 2, c. 3, has passed away. The form is now altered, and by sect. 5

(a) April 17, before Lord Denman, C. J., Patteson, Williams, and Wightman, Js.

VOL. II.

G G

N. 8. C.

liable to the penalty imposed by sect. of the former

2

act.

1846.

TENNANT

v.

CRESTON.

of the 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 96, persons rated are themselves
to take copies if they desire to have them. [Williams,
J.--Suppose a rate payer cannot write.] He might
employ some one who could. [Wightman, J.-The
provisions in the two statutes have quite a different as-
pect: one requires the overseers, under a penalty, to give
a copy, the other enables a rate payer to take one-Why
may they not be read together? It would have been
very easy to repeal the former act, if it had been intended
that the latter should supersede it.] At any rate, the
object of the former act is secured by the latter, as the
parishioners have as free access to the rate, and as good
means of information as they had before.
Regina v. The Justices of Devon (a).

He cited

Cur. adv. vult.

Lord DENMAN, C. J.-The question in this case was, whether the 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 96, does in effect repeal the 17 Geo. 2, c. 3, and we have no reason for thinking that it does.

(a) 1 B. & A. 588.

Rule refused.

1846.

In the Matter of RAMSDEN.

poor

THIS
was a rule calling upon the overseers of the
and surveyors of the highways for the townships of
Armley and Wortly in the West Riding of Yorkshire,
to shew cause why a habeas corpus should not issue to
discharge James Ramsden out of the custody of the
keeper of the Castle at York, where he was detained under
four warrants of commitment under the hands and seals
of two of the justices of that riding, for non-payment of
certain poor rates and highway rates.

The two warrants for poor rates were in the following form:-After setting out the making, allowing, and publishing of the rate, that J. Ramsden was an occupier and duly rated, they proceeded:-" And whereas it duly appeared unto us, R. M. and J. R. A., two &c., as well on the oath &c., as otherwise, that the sum hath been lawfully demanded, but that the said J. R. hath refused to pay the same: And whereas the said J. R., having been duly summoned to appear before two of her Majesty's justices of the peace [not naming them] for the said borough, to shew cause why the same should not be paid, did appear accordingly, but hath not shewn any sufficient cause why the same should not be paid: And whereas we, R. M. and J. R. A., issued a warrant of distress &c.; and whereas it appears to us,

R. M. and J. R. A., that no sufficient distress can be had &c. These are, therefore, to command you &c.

:

The two warrants on account of highway rates, so far as is material to the present case, were in the same form.

May 8th.

The 3 Geo. 4, c. 23, s. 2,

enacts, that, tion and adjudication of a complaint by any two jusquent

after examina

tices, all subsequent proceedings to enforce

obedience

thereto may be

enforced by either of the said justices, or any other jus

tice for the

same county,

in like manner as if done by

the same two

heard and adjudged the complaint: —Held, that a commitment, which recited

justices who

warrant of

that a party

had been sum

moned before

two justices, to shew cause why

he should not pay rates, (not stating that they were the who granted same justices the warrant), was bad for not shewing that the same justices who issued the summons also adjudicated upon the case.