1846. The QUEEN v. The Justices of the WEST RIDING. porate into that act not only the enactments of other apply only to appeals between two parishes, otherwise this absurdity would follow: according to section 79 of that act, the respondents must send copies of the examinations. Here the respondent is the clerk of the peace, who knows nothing of the removal till he receives notice of appeal. Besides, that section would make it necessary to keep dangerous lunatics for twenty-one days, and even more, if there were then not time for the appellants to give the ten days' notice of appeal required by the rule of the sessions; Regina v. The Justices of Lancashire (a); whereas the evident policy of the 9 Geo. 4, c. 40, was to prevent overseers from confining a lunatic in their own establishments, and contemplated their immediate removal to the county asylum. Besides, an appeal is never given but by express terms: Rex v. Hanson (b), Regina v. Stock (c), Regina v. The Justices of the West Riding (d). Overend and Pickering, contrà.-It is admitted, that, if the appeal is under the 60th section of the act, the appellants have not complied with its provisions, by entering into the requisite recognisances. It is true that it is so treated in Regina v. Pixley (e), but that was not the point under consideration in that case, and Regina v. The Justices of Kent (f) was not then cited; there the Court held that section 54 applies both to criminal and pauper lunatics, whereas section 60 only applies to the former. Wherever the county is to be affected, the clerk of the peace is respondent, Regina v. Skipton (g), and is therefore interested in giving notice of appeal. It is clear, that, if the appellants are not in time to try the appeal (a) 4 Q. B. R. 910. (b) 4 B. & A. 519. (c) 8 A. & E. 405. (d) 1 Q. B. R. 624. (e) 4 Q. B. R. 711. (f) 2 Q. B. R. 686. 1846. The QUEEN v. The Justices of the WEST RIDING. 1846. The QUEEN v. The Justices of the WEST RIDING. at the April sessions, they are not bound to enter and respite the appeal at those sessions, but otherwise they must do so: Rex v. The Justices of Devon (a), Regina v. The Justices of Herefordshire (b), Regina v. Sevenoaks (c), Regina v. The Justices of Surrey (d); and therefore the appellants here were in time, if the subsequent statutes are incorporated in the 9 Geo. 4, c. 40; if not, no doubt they were too late. But no principle is more thoroughly understood than that all statutes in pari materiâ are to be read as one law: Bac. Abr. "Statute," (I. 3). It is clear that the intention of section 54 was to put these appeals on the same footing as those against orders of removal, and subject to any alterations which they from time to time might undergo. The words "are now heard and determined" apply only to the mode in which the justices are to exercise their powers. This is clear from subsequent statutes relating to lunatics, in which it cannot be doubted that the provisions of the 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, are incorporated. The 1 Vict. c. 14, s. 2, contains an appeal clause in precisely the same terms as the 9 Geo. 4, c. 40, except that it adds a condition, by providing for notice to be given to the town-clerk of a borough affected by the order. So, in the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 54, s. 5, which extends the power of appealing to guardians of an union or parish. It will, therefore, be extremely inconsistent if all these statutes are not construed together. In principle they are one law: Stradling v. Morgan (e). Even in the 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, the time of appealing is only extended by implication; it is still determined by the 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 12, and it cannot be disputed that that statute is incorporated in the 9 Geo. 4, c. 40. Regina v. The Justices of Lancashire (a), where it was held that the additional time of appealing was extended to the case of suspended orders, notwithstanding the express words of the 49 Geo. 3, c. 124, is a strong authority in favour of this construction, and is confirmed by Regina v. Sevenoaks (b), which was also a case of a suspended order. Regina v. The Leeds and Liverpool Canal Company (c) shews that the word "now," in a statute, may be extended to a subsequent change of circumstances, and is not restricted to the state of things existing at the time the act passed. The reason that parties should have twenty-one days to consider whether they will appeal or not applies as strongly to the cases of lunatics as of other paupers. The order in each case is equally conclusive. Cur. adv. vult. WILLIAMS, J., now delivered judgment.-This was an application for a mandamus to the justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire, to direct them to enter continuances and hear an appeal against a certain order made by two justices of the West Riding, directing the overseers of a certain township to remove a lunatic pauper to the asylum for that riding; the same justices proceeded to inquire into the settlement of the pauper, and determined it to be in the parish of Liverpool. And the order then proceeded to direct a certain sum of money to be paid weekly for the maintenance and expenses of that pauper in the lunatic asylum. Against this order there was an appeal, and the question is, whether or not that appeal was in time. The order was made on the 8th of March, the service (b) Antè, Vol. 1, p. 595. (a) 4 Q. B. R. 910. (c) 7 A. & E. 671, 1846. The QUEEN v. The Justices of the WEST RIDING. 1846. The QUEEN v. The Justices of the was on the 13th of March, and the next sessions for the West Riding were held upon the 7th of April. In consequence, if the appeal be entirely under the act authorising the removal of paupers to lunatic asylums, (9 Geo. WEST RIDING. 4, c. 40),-there being an express provision in the 54th section of that act that appeals under it "shall be heard and determined in the same manner as appeals against orders of removal are now heard and determined," -if upon that statute alone, I say, the appeal depends, upon the present occasion the appellants were too late, within the 9 Geo. 1, c. 7, and the justices were right in refusing to hear the appeal. But a question arises which has not arisen before, or at least has not been decided by the Court, how far the 54th section of the 9 Geo. 4, c. 40, directing the appeal to be heard and determined in the same manner as in cases of orders of removal, is affected by the Poor Law Amendment Act, 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, and especially by the 79th section of that act; because, if there was a virtual extension of the time for appealing by that 79th section, the appellants would have been in time by appealing to the July sessions; though they were not in time if the appeal was regulated and directed by the 9 Geo. 1, c. 7, s. 8. The meaning of the case of Regina v. The Justices of Lancashire (a) is this; that, whereas in the case of orders of removal under the 4 & 5 Will. 4, parties cannot be removed (unless in certain cases, to which I shall immediately advert) until twenty-one days after notice in writing has been given to the parish to which the removal is to be made, that is virtually an extension of the time of appealing, seeing, that, if the appellant township take nineteen or twenty days to consider of it, they then have the ordinary time to give their notice of appeal, (a) 4 Q. B. R. 910. |