1844. REGINA v. ANDREWS. party to bail, who was charged on a coroner's inquest with murder, and against whom a bill of indictment for that crime had also been found by the grand jury. No instance of a similar application was mentioned, but the case of Reg. v. Scaife and Wife (a), was relied on in support of the present motion, and also the practice which prevails of admitting parties to bail who are charged merely on a coroner's inquest. The case cited, however, is clearly distinguishable; as there the offence charged against the prisoners, who were husband and wife, was having coining materials in their possession: and the wife, against whom there did not appear to be any strong evidence, was admitted to bail; but with respect to the husband, the application was refused. The case of persons charged on coroner's inquests, is also distinguishable; for there the Court can see the whole evidence on the depositions before them, and so can judge of the probable guilt or innocence of the prisoner. This distinction is very clearly taken in Lord Mohun's case (b), which is a case exactly in point. There it is said, "If a man be found guilty of murder by the coroner's inquest, we sometimes bail him, because the coroner proceeds upon depositions taken in writing which we may look into. Otherwise, if a man be found guilty of murder by a grand jury; because the Court cannot take notice of their evidence, which they, by their oath, are bound to conceal." That is not the only case on this subject, for I find a uniform current of authorities against this application. Thus, in Bac. Abr., tit. "Bail in Criminal Cases," there is a case reported where the Court held they would not bail after a bill for murder found, although the act were plainly only manslaughter. In Reg. v. Chapman (c) and Reg. v. Guttridge (d), the one a case of murder, and the other of rape, after true bills found, the Court refused to bail the parties. I may advert to the fact, that application was made in the present case to Mr. Baron Gurney, and that learned Judge thought he could not with propriety grant the application; which is another authority against the present motion. The application must, therefore, be refused, 1844. REGINA v. ANDREWS. Rule refused. JACKSON v. SEAGER. a ant's attorney cause had been tecum, at served by the before 10 ster next 9 produce certain documents his office in Symond's Inn. which were at BALL had obtained a rule, calling upon one Thomas The defendMyddleton Loveland, the attorney for the defendant in the interne above cause, to shew cause why a writ of attachment should not issue against him for his contempt in not attending as witness in this cause, pursuant to a writ of subpoena. It appeared, from the affidavits in support of the motion, that notice that the cause, which was a feigned issue between the parties, would be tried at the sittings after Michaelmas Term, had been given to Messrs. Loveland and Beckitt, who acted as attorneys for the defendant; that a subpoena duces tecum was sued out on the 1st of February, in the present year, directed to Mr. Loveland, to appear on the 3rd, at Westminster; that on the 2nd of February, about three o'clock in the afternoon, a call was made at the office of Messrs. Loveland and Beckitt, in Symond's Inn, for the purpose of serving the former with a copy of the subpoena; that the deponent then saw the partner of Mr. Loveland, whom he informed of his business, and who said, "that if the deponent left the subpoena and conduct money with him, Mr. Loveland would attend;" that deponent having business elsewhere, and not being able to wait, left a person to watch for Mr. Loveland's return, who waited a considerable time, and called again at the office without success, and was told that Mr. Loveland would not return He was clerk to the board of guardians, and vestry clerk, and in his duty as such, attended that morning a meeting had been pre viously fixed, he would still believing that be in time to attend the trial: but a special jury nee, which case, it was expected would have lasted the whole day, suddenly terminating, the above cause was called on about 10 o'clock in the morning, and the record, in consequence of his absence, withdrawn. The Court made a rule absolute for an attachment against him. 1844. JACKSON v. SEAGER. that night. That the same evening, about half past eight, service was effected on Mr. Loveland at his residence at Chelsea, and payment of a shilling made. That on the 3rd of February, the cause was called on at about ten o'clock in the morning; but that in consequence of the absence of Mr. Loveland, who, it was sworn, was a necessary and material witness for the plaintiff, the plaintiff was obliged to withdraw the record. From the affidavits in opposition to the motion, it appeared that Mr. Loveland was served with the copy of the subpoena a few minutes before ten o'clock, just as he was going to bed, and that the subpoena was to appear the next morning at Westminster at nine o'clock; that he told the party serving him that he ought to receive a guinea with such copy subpoena, but the party serving refused to pay more than a shilling; that being clerk to the guardians, and vestry clerk to the parish of Chelsea, before knowing that the above cause would be in the paper for the 3rd of February, deponent made arrangements to attend the Board of Guardians in his official capacity; that he believed he would be able to discharge his duties as such clerk, &c., and afterwards reach Westminster Hall in time to be examined as a witness in the cause, which stood in the paper after a special jury, which his clerk had been informed, on inquiry at the Marshal's office, would most probably last the whole day; that he shortened his duties as such clerk, &c., as much as possible, and made every exertion to reach Westminster Hall early in the day, and accordingly did reach Westminster Hall by twelve o'clock, when he found the Court had risen; that he was not aware, till served with the subpoena, that his attendance would be required at the trial; and that the papers which he was required to produce, were at his office in Symond's Inn. The affidavits also disclosed circumstances tending to shew the record was not withdrawn in consequence solely of Mr. Loveland's absence; but on account of the absence of several other witnesses. It was also positively denied by Mr. Loveland that he had any intention to treat the Court with disrespect, or to avoid attending and being examined as a witness at the trial. M. Chambers shewed cause. The witness in this case has not been served with the subpoena a reasonable time before the trial. The service is at half past nine o'clock at night at Chelsea, to produce documents in Court at Westminster at nine o'clock the next morning, which the witness kept at his office in Symond's Inn. None of the cases have gone so far as to hold that an attachment would lie against a witness under similar circumstances. [Wightman, J.-It does not appear that he objected to the lateness of the summons. According to his own account, there was nothing to prevent him from coming, except his attendance on the Board of Guardians.] This witness had certain duties to perform of a public character. He was clerk to the Board of Guardians, and vestry clerk to the parish, and in that capacity was bound to attend at a meeting of the Guardians, which had been previously fixed for the next morning. He, besides, had every reasonable anticipation that he could perform both duties, which he would have done, if the special jury cause had not unexpectedly gone off. Under these circumstances, the Court would, perhaps, consider the present not a case for so summary a proceeding; particularly as the affidavits expressly negative any intention on the part of Mr. Loveland to treat the Court with disrespect. Ball, in support of the rule. It is not asserted that Mr. Loveland could not attend by reason of the shortness of time between the service of the subpoena and the trial; but only that he was prevented by his engagements as vestry clerk, and clerk to the Board of Guardians. That is no sufficient excuse. He was bound to obey this Court, and had no right to speculate as to when this cause would be 1844. JACKSON v. SEAGER. 1844. JACKSON v. SEAGER. called on. WIGHTMAN, J.-I think this rule must be made absolute. As an attorney of this Court, Mr. Loveland must have been aware that it was his paramount duty to have attended here. He thought, however, he could first attend the Board of Guardians, and still be in time for the trial. In that expectation he was mistaken; but he ought to have known that he had no right to speculate on such a chance. The rule will, therefore, be absolute. (a) 8 Dowl. 869. Rule absolute. On inquiry at the town resi dence of the defendant, who was a peer of Ireland, it appeared that the defendant was staying in Ire land, at his usual place of residence there. Calls were made, and a copy of the writ of summons left at his town resi dence; and HAY v. EARL OF CHARLEVILLE. W. H. WATSON moved for a distringas to compel an Ireland, and that it was uncertain when he would return another copy, enclosed to his address in Ireland. The defendant had taken no notice of these proceedings. The Court refused to grant a distringas. |