power to prevent it; that we resisted it by all means short of war. I have just now stated some of the reasons why we did not think the entry of that army into Spain a sufficient ground for war; but there was, in addition to those which I have stated, this peculiar reason, that whatever effect a war, commenced upon the mere ground of the entry of a French army into Spain, might have, it probably would not have had the effect of getting that army out of Spain. In a war against France at that time, as at any other, you might, perhaps, have acquired military glory; you might, perhaps, have extended your colonial possessions ; you might even have achieved, at great cost of blood and treasure, an honorable peace; but, as to getting the French out of Spain, that would have been the one object which you almost certainly would not have accomplished. How seldom, in the whole history of the wars of Europe, has any war between two great powers ended in the obtaining of the exact, the identical object for which the war was begun! Besides, sir, I confess I think that the effects of the French occupation of Spain have been infinitely exaggerated. I do not blame those exaggerations, because I am aware that they are to be attributed to the recollections of some of the best times of our history; that they are the echoes of sentiments which, in the days of William and of Anne, animated the debates, and dictated the votes of the British Parliament. No peace was in those days thought safe for this country while the crown of Spain continued on the head of a Bourbon. But were not the apprehensions of those days greatly overstated? Has the power of Spain swallowed up the power of maritime England? Or does England still remain, after the lapse of more than a century, during which the crown of Spain has been worn by a Bourbon, niched in a nook of that same Spain Gibraltar?

Again, sir, is the Spain of the present day the Spain whose puissance was expected to shake England from her sphere? No, sir; it was quite another Spain; it was the Spain within the limits of whose empire the sun never set; it was Spain with the Indies' that excited the jealousies, and alarmed the imaginations of our ancestors. But then, sir, the balance of power! The entry of the French army into Spain disturbed that balance, and we ought to have gone to war to restore it! I have already said that when the French army entered Spain, we might, if we chose, have resisted or resented that measure by But were there no other means than war for restoring the balance of power? Is the balance of power a fixed and unalterable standard? or is it not a standard perpetually varying, as civilization advances, and as new nations spring up, and take their place among established political communities? The balance of power, a century and a half ago, was to be adjusted

war.

CHAP. V.] CANNING'S ACCOUNT OF HIS POLICY.

341

between France and Spain, the Netherlands, Austria, and England. Some years afterwards, Russia assumed her high station in European politics. Some years after that again, Prussia became, not only a substantive, but a preponderating monarchy. Thus, while the balance of power continued in principle the same, the means of adjusting it became more varied and enlarged. They became enlarged in proportion to the increased number of considerable states in proportion, I may say, to the number of weights which might be shifted into the one or the other scale. To look to the policy of Europe, in the times of William and Anne, for the purpose of regulating the balance of power in Europe at the present day, is to disregard the progress of events, and to confuse dates and facts which throw a reciprocal light upon each other. It would be disingenuous, indeed, not to admit that the entry of the French army into Spain was, in a certain sense, a disparagement an affront to the pride a blow to the feelings of England; and it can hardly be supposed that the government did not sympathize, on that occasion, with the feelings of the people. But I deny that, questionable or censurable as the act might be, it was one which necessarily called for our direct and hostile opposition. Was nothing then to be done? Was there no other mode of resistance than by a direct attack upon France ; or by a war to be undertaken on the soil of Spain? What if the possession of Spain might be rendered harmless in rival hands harmless as regarded us - and valueless to the possessors? Might not compensation for disparagement be obtained, and the policy of our ancestors vindicated, by means better adapted to the present time? If France occupied Spain, was it necessary, in order to avoid the consequences of that occupation, that we should blockade Cadiz? No. I looked another way. I sought materials of compensation in another hemisphere. Contemplating Spain, such as our ancestors had known her, I resolved that if France had Spain, it should not be Spain with the Indies.' I called the New World into existence, to redress the balance of the Old."

6

In this celebrated speech, Mr. Canning appears to take his stand where he avowed his wish that his country should stand "not only between contending nations, but between conflicting principles." If we find in it a spirit higher than that of the allied potentates who would have ruled both hemispheres after the pattern of their antiquated ideas, we find in it also a tone lower than that of sympathy with the struggles for freedom which yet it was his policy to aid. When, as a listener tells us,1 "his chest heaved and expanded, his nostril dilated, a noble pride slightly curled his lip, and age and sickness were forgotten in the ardor of youthful genius," it must have been the conscious1 Diary of an M. P.

ness of power and of the soundness of his policy which inspired him; for he was certainly not, by his own profession, under the sway of emotions so lofty as the occasion created in others. It may be, however, that his sentiments were loftier than his professions. “All the while," says the observer, "a serenity sat upon his brow that pointed to deeds of glory." The deeds were glorious, however the doer may have assigned reasons of mere policy for them in an assembly which he could so sway as that they would have borne from him expressions of a higher political generosity. Perhaps he remembered how many were watching afar to catch up his words the Holy Allies for their purposes, and many an eager malcontent for his; and this may have made him careful, in the midst of his emotions, to preserve his central stand between the imperial policies and the popular enthusiasms of the time. If so, he spoke wisely and well for such listeners, not only in his expositions of his principles and methods of peace, of non-interference, and of recognition of de facto powers, whatever their origin and date, but he offered them, in the course of the same chapter of events, a warning and a prophecy which has never been forgotten since, and is little likely to be forgotten now.

The occasion was the arrival of intelligence that Spain was Appeal from interfering with Portugal, whose free constitution Portugal. was hated and feared by the restored despot Ferdinand. Mr. Canning had formerly declared what our relations with Portugal were. If she chose to undertake any war on her own account, for the defence of freedom or any other cause, Great Britain had nothing to do with that; but, if she were attacked on account of her constitutional freedom, or for any other cause, Great Britain was bound by treaties, and by every obligation of good faith, to repair to her assistance. Such a case had arisen now -in December, 1826. Some Portuguese regiments had deserted to the royalist cause in Spain. The Spanish government had repeatedly pledged itself to disarm and disperse these regiments; but it failed to do so, and permitted these regiments to make hostile inroads into Portugal, under the eyes of the Spanish authorities, and with every tacit assistance from them. On the night of Friday, the 8th of December, the British government received from the Princess Regent of Portugal an earnest application 1 for "aid against a hostile aggression from Spain"; and the minister, whose first principle of administration had been the preservation of peace, was as prompt in action as if he had been eager for war. His own account of the affair is the shortest, plainest, and clearest. Short and plain as it is, it moved the heart of his immediate hearers first, and then of the nation, to an enthusiasm which will never be forgotten by those who lived at the time. "On Sunday, the third of this month,2 1 Hansard, xvi. p. 334. 2 Ibid. p. 357.

1

CHAP. V.]

PROTECTION OF PORTUGAL.

343

we received from the Portuguese ambassador a direct and formal demand of assistance against a hostile aggression from Spain. Our answer was, that, although rumors had reached us, through France, his Majesty's government had not that accurate information that official and precise intelligence of facts on which they could properly found an application to Parliament. It was only on last Friday night that this precise information arrived. On Saturday, his Majesty's confidential servants came to a decision. On Sunday, that decision received the sanction of His Majesty. On Monday, it was communicated to both Houses of Parliament; and this day, sir, at the hour in which I have the honor of addressing you, the troops are on their march for embarkation." There may be some wonder in Englishmen's minds at this day, as there certainly is in the minds of some foreigners, that this procedure and its explanation should have excited the enthusiasm that it did in the House and the nation. It may be said, truly enough, that the Portuguese are but two or three millions of priests and slaves, who have thus far incessantly shown themselves incapable of freedom; and that their alliance can never be of material advantage to England, for purposes of commerce or any other fellowship. All this may be true; and yet there may be still feelings in the national heart regarding Portugal which might account for the enthusiasm of the time. The very discussion of our alliance with Portugal carries back the imagination to the time of Charles II., when we became possessed of Bombay, and when our government declared, in the affectionate style of ancient treaties: "The King of Great Britain does profess and declare, with the consent and advice of his council, that he will take the interest of Portugal and all its dominions to heart, defending the same with his utmost power, by sea and land, even as England itself." There were remembrances of the treaties of Queen Anne's time, and the watch then to be kept against Spain and France, as now. The very words, our ancient and faithful ally," always used when our relations with Portugal are spoken of, stir a sentiment in her favor. Again, there was the generous complacency felt by the strong when appealed to by the weak the obligation being, in this case, not to disappoint the generous sentiment, because our good faith was engaged on the side of the appeal. Again, though the rational and firm desire of the British government and the majority of the people had been to preserve peace during the last anxious and troubled years, when despotism and revolution were everywhere in conflict, it had cost not a little to generous hearts, and also to minds not yet disenchanted from the spells of war, to refrain from rushing into conflict, and bringing the opposition of principles and 1 Hansard, xvi. p. 355.

prejudices to the arbitrament of battle. Mr. Brougham had said that "Great Britain was bound over in recognizances of 800,000,000l. to keep the peace"; and this consideration of debt and exhaustion availed while there was no strong impulse in a contrary direction. But the moment that the movement of troops became a movement of good faith and generosity, the spirit of the nation broke through its restraints of prudence, and its silence of neutrality; and the minister's announcement of the transmission of troops to Portugal was received with acclamations which shook the world. The troops anchored in the Tagus on the 25th of the same month; 1 but they were not wanted. The winged darts of the minister, his burning words, had done the necessary work with the speed of the winds. The revolted regiments slunk away from the frontier, and were dissolved. The French agent at Madrid stole away home; and King Ferdinand was profuse in his assurances of hatred of any power which would molest Portugal. More than that: this speech was one which no censorship could exclude, or delay on its passage to those whom it concerned. The newspapers passed from hand to hand under the Spanish cloak; recitations of the Englishman's words went on in whispers under the bright Italian moon; and at Vienna and Warsaw, men's hearts swelled and their eyes shone as phrases from this speech were detected in common intercourse, and forthwith formed a sort New era of of freemasonry among those who understood. The

conflict.

power lay in the warning and the prophecy which we mentioned above, and which we here present · the warning and prophecy of a war of opinion in Europe. After referring to his desire and maintenance of peace, when the French entered Spain four years before, Mr. Canning proceeded: "I then said that I feared that the next war which should be kindled in Europe would be a war, not so much of armies as of opinions. Not four years have elapsed, and behold my apprehensions realized! It is, to be sure, within narrow limits that this war of opinion is at present confined; but it is a war of opinion that Spain, whether as government or as nation, is now waging against Portugal; it is a war which has commenced in hatred of the new institutions of Portugal. How long is it reasonable to expect that Portugal will abstain from retaliation? If into that war this country shall be compelled to enter, we shall enter into it with a sincere and anxious desire to mitigate rather than exasperate; and to mingle only in the conflict of arms not in the more fatal conflict of opinions. But I much fear that this country, however earnestly she may endeavor to avoid it, could not, in such a case, avoid seeing ranked under her banners all the restless and dissatisfied 1 Annual Register, 1826, p. 342. 2 Hansard, xvi. p. 368.