(19 Idaho, 458) it was made without notice to any one representing the estate of Daniel F. Eddy. MINEAU v. IMPÉRIAL DREDGE & EX If His former attorney could not give a notice of motion for a new trial or of appeal that would be effectual, for he had ceased to have any authority in the matter. he has no authority to give such notice, he has none to receive one, or act upon it, in the further stages of the proceedings, when it is received. He has become a stranger to the proceedings." See, also, Spelling on New Trial & Appellate Practice, § 705. PLORATION CO. (Supreme Court of Idaho. March 3, 1911.) (Syllabus by the Court.) 1. TRIAL (8 165*)-NONSUIT-ADMISSIONS. The rule with reference to granting of nonsuits as announced by this court in Later v. Haywood, 12 Idaho, 78, 85 Pac. 494, and Idaho, 202, 85 Pac. 497, and Stricker v. Hillis, followed in Bank of Commerce v. Baldwin, 12 17 Idaho, 646, 106 Pac. 1128, followed and approved. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 373, 374; Dec. Dig. § 165.*] 2. BROKERS (§ 88*)-ACTION FOR COMMISSION -SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. Evidence in this case examined and considered, and held, that it was sufficient to make out a prima facie case, and that it was error to take the case from the jury and dismiss the action. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Brokers, corporation has purchased all the property and Where the evidence tends to show that one In the case at bar, the attorneys for Shaughnessy had notice of the death of their client. If they did not know it from other sources, they received the notice upon the filing of the findings and judgment, because the court had recited the fact of the death of their client in his findings of fact. This was notice to the attorneys and to every one else that the authority of the attorneys to represent Shaughnessy had ended, and that if they appeared further in the case they must do so under other employment. After taking this appeal, it seems that the attorneys who had given the notice of appeal and who had tried the case took no further part in the proceedings and apparently retired from the case. The case is prosecuted in this court by an attorney who did not appear in the trial court and had no connection with the case prior to the death of Shaughnessy. The attorney is the agent of his client for a special purpose. When he is employed to represent the client in the prosecution or defense of an action, he has the implied authority necessary to enable him to do all things which may be requisite to the protection of the interests of his client. When the client dies, the agency of the attorney ceases. Pedlar v. Stroud, 116 Cal. 462, 48 Pac. 371. For the purposes of that particular case, he is an attorney without a client, and, if he would appeal in the case, he must call the matter to the attention of the court and have a substitution of the name of some one who may have the power and authority to represent a judgment and an order denying a motion for a new trial. After the plaintiff had submitted his evidence and rested his case, the estate of the deceased litigant. This is necessary and essential in order to protect the interests both of the estate of the deceased party and of the adversary parties. The adverse party has a right to know that any action he may take will be binding and conclusive against the estate of the deceased. In this case no appeal could be prosecuted in the name of Shaughnessy, neither could notice of appeal be served on Shaughnessy. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Frauds, Statute of, Cent. Dig. §§ 27-31; Dec. Dig. § 18.*] Appeal from District Court, Elmore County; Edward A. Walters, Judge. Action by J. A. Mineau against the Imperial Dredge & Exploration Company. From a judgment of nonsuit and an order denying a new trial, plaintiff appeals. Reversed, and new trial granted. K. I. Perky and L. B. Green, for appellant. E. M. Wolfe, for respondent. AILSHIE, P. J. This is an appeal from the defendant moved for a nonsuit, which motion was allowed, and the case was withdrawn from the jury and dismissed. to recover a commission for the sale of waThe action was instituted by the plaintiff ter rights for certain arid lands and securing settlers for such lands. The plaintiff claimed that he had a contract with the defendant the Utility Power Company, Limited, whereby he was to procure settlers for certain arid lands situated in Ada county, and sell them water rights for such lands, and that for, his service in doing so he was to realize the sum of $5 per acre as commission; that in pursuance of the terms of that contract he SULLIVAN, J., and BUDGE, District procured settlers and sold water rights for Judge, concur. a large tract of land; and that the defend For these reasons, this appeal must be dismissed. This court has not acquired jurisdiction to further consider the case. The appeal is dismissed. Costs awarded to respondent. *For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep'r Indexes 22d or 23d of the same year, during which time I took up with him the question of the indebtedness of the Utility Power Company to me for work performed between January 1, 1907, to July 1, 1907. That indebtedness was assumed by the Imperial Dredge & Ex ant was indebted to him accordingly. He further alleged that the Utility Power Company, Limited, sold and transferred all of its property to the defendant, the Imperial Dredge & Exploration Company, and that as a consideration therefore the latter company promised and agreed to pay all the out-ploration Company by certificate handed to standing debts and obligations of the former company which included the indebtedness of the Utility Power Company to this plaintiff. The action was dismissed as to the Utility Power Company and proceeded thereafter against the Imperial Dredge & Exploration Company alone, which company is the only respondent in this court. me by the manager, Dare." Another witness, speaking of a conversation with Mr. Dare with reference to the liability and indebtedness of the Dredge & Exploration Company to pay the debts and obligations of the Utility Power Company, says: "With reference to the liability of the Imperial Dredge & Exploration Company to pay these notes The respondent contended in the lower and take them up, he stated to me that they court, and contends here, that the evidence were going to take up this note because they was not sufficient to establish any liability had assumed the obligations-words to that on the part of the respondent, or that re-effect-the obligations of the old company, spondent ever assumed the indebtedness to the Utility Power Company. The note was the appellant, either by direct promise or made payable to them." It also appears contract or by implication of law. The ap- that they paid off numerous other claims pellant, on the other hand, contends that held against the old company, and that the he made a prima facie case sufficient to go agent of the new company had repeatedly to the jury, and that the court erred in told creditors of the old company that they taking the case from the jury. would pay off such obligations. It is true that the evidence is meager and rather indefinite; but, under the rule that has been adopted and uniformly followed by this court, it is quite clear to us that the evidence made a prima facie case and was sufficient to go to the jury, and that it was error to grant a nonsuit. The evidence in the record is quite clear that the plaintiff had a contract with the Utility Company as alleged in his complaint, and that he procured certain settlers and sold a number of water rights in accordance with the terms of his contract. The evidence is not so strong, however, on the question as to the liability of the Imperial Dredge & Exploration Company. There is evidence which tends to show that the Dredge Company purchased all the property and rights of the Utility Power Company and succeeded to all of its properties, rights, and franchises, and there is likewise some evidence tending to show that, in consideration of the sale and delivery to it of such property and rights, it agreed to assume the debts and liabilities of the old company. In Later v. Haywood, 12 Idaho, 78, 85 Pac. 494, this court said: "On a motion by the defendant for nonsuit, after the plaintiff has introduced his evidence and rested his case, the defendant must be deemed to have admitted all the facts of which there is any evidence and all the facts which the evidence tends to prove." The same rule has been subsequently approved, reaffirmed, and followed in Bank of Commerce v. Baldwin, 12 Idaho, 202, 85 Pac. 497, and Stricker v. Hillis, 17 Idaho, 646, 106 Pac. 1128. Since this case must again be tried, we will refrain from making further comment on the evidence. We are satisfied that there was sufficient evidence produced at the trial to entitle the plaintiff to have the case submitted to the jury. It appears that Mr. Benjamin A. Dare was the agent and representative in Idaho of the Utility Power Company until it went out of business, and that, after the sale and transfer of its property and rights to the Dredge & Exploration Company, Mr. Dare was the agent and representative in Idaho of the latter company. This fact is quite The respondent relies on the case of Anclearly established. One witness testifies derson v. War Eagle Consolidated Mining that Mr. Dare assured him over and over Co., 8 Idaho, 789, 72 Pac. 671, in support of again that the Dredge & Exploration Com- its contention that the evidence failed to pany would settle certain claims he had establish any liability on the part of the against the old company, and that, "some- Dredge & Exploration Company to pay this thing was said at that time by Mr. Dare debt. We have no inclination to depart from about the Imperial Dredge & Exploration the rule announced in that case. In that Company assuming the indebtedness of the case, however, it was sought to fix the liaold company. I asked him if this would af- bility of the former company upon its sucfect my claim in any manner, and he assur- cessor, as a matter of law, independent of ed me that the new company had assumed proofs. It will be seen that the War Eagle the obligations of the old one-would no Case differs from this, in that there was evidoubt be able to make settlement." Another dence submitted in the present case tending witness testified as follows: "To my knowl- to show the assumption of liability by the edge, Mr. Dare acted as manager of this new company which succeeded to the rights Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1919-1923; Dec. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal 4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 294*)-PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS-PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS-NOTICE. tion of liability was an original obliga- | substantially complied with the statutory retion, or, in other words, was another means quirements. of paying its own debt. Instead of paying the purchase price for the property directly to the Utility Power Company, the Dredge & Exploration Company apparently undertook to pay the purchase price by paying the creditors of the old company. If this be true, as it would appear, or at least tends to appear, from the evidence in the record, it would be an original obligation and fall within the rule announced by this court in Sherer v. Rubedew, 11 Idaho, 536, 83 Pac. 512. See section 6010, Rev. Codes. For the foregoing reasons the judgment must be reversed, and it is so ordered, and a new trial is granted. Costs awarded in favor of appellant. Held, that ordinance No. 154 of the city of Payette, giving notice of intention to create a local sewerage improvement district, sufficiently describes the property sought to be charged with the cost of the improvement, and the general character of the proposed sewer sysmated cost of such improvement. tem and sewerage disposal works, and the esti [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 776-788; Dec. Dig. § 294.*] 5. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 294*)—PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS-NOTICE. SULLIVAN, J., and BUDGE, District what shall be contained in an ordinance giving Judge, concur. (19 Idaho, 470) PLATT v. CITY OF PAYETTE. (Supreme Court of Idaho. March 4, 1911.) (Official Syllabus.) 1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 907*)-BONDS -CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE AS A WHOLE "ANY." The word "any," as used in section 2315 of the Revised Codes of Idaho, as amended by Sess. Laws 1909, p. 174, and section 2316, Rev. Codes, should be considered in connection with the entire body of existing statutory law relating to municipal improvements, keeping in mind the purpose of such legislation and the object to be attained, and should not receive a technical or limited construction, but should be construed in harmony with the evident intention of the lawmaking body in enacting such legislation. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1895; Dec. Dig. § 907.* For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 1, pp. 412-433; vol. 8, pp. 7575–7577.] 2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 918*)-BONDS -ISSUANCE SUBMISSION OF QUESTION TO POPULAR VOTE. Section 2316, Rev. Codes, does not require a separate election ordinance for each proposed issue of municipal bonds. Different propositions for different objects may be embodied in one ordinance, provided that each proposition is so clearly and distinctly submitted to the electors of the municipality that they may adopt or reject it independently of the others. Whether several such propositions are submitted in one ordinance or in separate ordinances is immaterial, so long as the voters are not deceived or misled, or prevented from voting upon each proposition separately. Sommercamp v. Kelly, 8 Idaho, 712, 71 Pac. 147, approved and fol: lowed. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1919-1923; Dec. Dig. § 918.*] 3. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 918*)-BONDS -ISSUANCE-SUBMISSION OF QUESTION TO POPULAR VOTE. Held, that the election proclamation and the notices of the holding of the special election with reference to the bond issues in controversy Section 2353, Rev. Codes, providing for notice of intention to construct a sewer system, must be liberally construed, and a substantial compliance with the provisions of the statute is all that is required of the council, in view of the fact that its passage constitutes merely a preliminary step leading up to the final issue of the bonds, in case the voters should decide at the special election in favor of such improvement being undertaken. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 776-788; Dec. Dig. § 294.*] 6. MUNICIPAL BONDS-VALIDITY. Appeal from District Court, Canyon County; Ed. L. Bryan, Judge. Action by W. H. Platt against the city of Payette. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Richards & Haga, for appellant. F. H. Lyon, for respondent. BUDGE, District Judge. This is an appeal from a judgment rendered in the district court of the Seventh judicial district in favor of the respondent and against the appellant. Sid action was brought in the district court upon an agreed statement of facts, under the provisions of chapter 2, title 3, part 3 of the Revised Codes of Idaho. This action was prosecuted to determine the validity of the issue of certain municipal coupon sewer and waterworks bonds of the city of Payette, Idaho. The agreed state ment of facts is as follows: "(1) That the said plaintiff, W. H. Platt, is a citizen and taxpayer of and within the said defendant, the city of Payette, and is one of the persons against whose property, and is the owner of a portion of the property against which, the special assessment herein set forth was made by the said defendant, the city of Payette, and is bene For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep'r Indexes ficially interested in the matter set forth in that: "Whenever the common council of this agreed statement of facts. "(2) That the said defendant, the city of Payette, is a municipal corporation situate in the county of Canyon, state of Idaho, duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Idaho. "(3) That attached hereto marked Exhibit A, and made a part of this statement, is a copy of the proceedings of the council of the said defendant, the city of Payette. “(4) That attached hereto is a copy of an ordinance passed by the council of the said defendant, the city of Payette, marked Exhibit B and made a part hereof. "(5) That the said defendant, the city of Payette, is about to issue and sell the bonds so provided for as above set forth. such city or the trustees of such town * * * shall deem it advisable to issue the coupon bonds of such city or town for any of the purposes aforesaid, the mayor and common council of such city or the trustees of such town shall provide therefor by ordinance, which shall specify the purpose of issuing such proposed bonds; if it is to create a new debt the object thereof must be stated, or, if it is to fund or refund any existing indebtedness, it must be described; and, when it consists of warrants or other securities, they must be described by giving their number, date and amount and the fund out of which the same, according to the terms thereof, are payable; and the ordinance shall declare the purpose and the total amount for which such bonds shall be issued and designate the provisions to be made to pay the interest on such bonds as it falls due, and also to constitute a sinking fund for the payment of the principal thereof within twenty years from the time of the issuance of the same, and shall also provide for the holding of an election of the qualified electors who are taxpayers of such city or town, of which thirty days' notice, to be provided for in such ordinance, shall be given in a newspaper of such city or town designated in said ordinance. Such election The questions that this court is asked to shall be conducted as other city elections. pass upon are as follows: "(6) That the respective parties hereto hereby reserve the right to appeal to the Supreme Court of the state of Idaho from any judgment that may be rendered by the court herein, and that the agreed statement of facts herein set forth shall be and become a part of the judgment roll herein, and that no other statement on appeal shall be required." Attached to the agreed statement of facts are all the proceedings of the council of said city of Payette leading up to the passage of the ordinance. "(1) Does section 2316, Revised Codes of Idaho, require a separate ordinance for each issue of bonds? and "(2) Was there a proper notice of an election and election held thereunder, as is required under the statutes of Idaho? and "(3) Were all the statutory provisions so complied with as to make said bond issues when sold binding obligations against the city and enforceable against the property against which special assessments have been made?" Section 2315 of the Revised Codes of Idaho, as amended by Sess. Laws of 1909, at page 174, provides: "Every city or town incorporated under the laws of the territory of Idaho, or of the state of Idaho, shall have power and authority to issue municipal coupon bonds, not to exceed at any time in the aggregate fifteen per cent. of the real estate value of said city or town according to the assessment of the preceding year, for any or all of the following purposes: "(1) To provide for the construction and maintenance of necessary waterworks and supplying the same with water, and to provide lights for streets, public buildings and grounds. ...... The voting at such election must be by bal- "(2) To provide for the laying, construct-vide the funds necessary to pay the costs of ing, equipment and maintenance of sewers extending the water mains and water system and drains," and other improvements men- of said city, for the purchasing of a power tioned under separate headings and subdi- site for pumping purposes, and the power visions. necessary for such pumping; and $10,000 redeeming certain created, existing, and outstanding indebtedness of the said city. By stipulation of counsel for the respective parties in this case the $10,000 so to be provided for is not in controversy in this action, and will therefore not be further discussed or referred to in the determination of the issues involved herein. The said city council of the city of Payette, to provide for the amounts of money heretofore referred to, passed an ordinance, which ordinance contained all of the propositions sought to be submitted to the electors of the said city, detailing the various amounts to be raised and containing a full statement of the several improvements that were to be made. The said ordinance, after specifying the three separate amounts that were to be realized by the sale of the said municipal coupon bonds for the construction and maintenance of the sewer system and the waterworks extension, provided, also, for the holding of a special election by giving legal notice thereof for at least 30 days, said notice to be published in the Payette Enterprise; the said election to be conducted in accordance with the ordinance of the city and the laws of the state applicable to the holding of municipal elections. The ordinance also provided that the election should be by ballot, and the electors should be permitted to express their desire on the issue of each one of the three classes of bonds separately, and each proposition was separately submitted to the electors of the said city of Payette. The question whether or not the city should be bonded for the construction of the sewer in local sewer improvement district No. 1 at a cost of $12,000, or against the issuance of bonds for the construction of the said sewer, was specifically and clearly submitted to the electors of the said city of Payette, separately and apart from any or either of the other propositions, and from a canvass of the votes after the election had been duly held by the council of said city of Payette, 304 of the electors of said city voted in favor of the issuance of the bonds for the construction of said sewer, and 68 of the electors of said city voted against the issuance of said bonds. The second proposition was also submitted to the electors of the said city in precisely the same manner, and they were asked directly if they were in favor of issuing bonds for the extension of the waterworks system to the amount of $12,000, or if they were against the issuance of said bonds in such amount for the extension of said waterworks system, to which 283 of said electors answered in the affirmative and 58 in the negative. It appears from the record that these two propositions were so clearly and concisely presented to the electors of the city of Payette for their determination that they could not, under any circumstances, have been misled. The propositions were not intermingled one with the other, but, on the contrary, the voter was permitted to cast his vote independently upon each proposition submitted separately, and not upon two or more jointly. The learned counsel for appellant contends that the city council of any municipality or town cannot submit to the electors the question of the issuance of bonds, except by separate ordinances; in other words, that the submitting by the council of the city of Payette to the electors of said city the question of the issuance of bonds for more than one proposition was invalid, and that said bonds would not be a legal, binding obligation against the said city of Payette, and counsel bases his contention upon the wording of the statute which says: Section 2315 (as amended): "Every city * # * Ishall have power and authority to issue municipal coupon bonds * * for any or all of the following purposes." Section 2316, among other things, provides that: "Whenever the common council of such city or the trustees of such town shall deem it advisable to issue the coupon bonds of such city or town for any of the purposes aforesaid, the mayor and common council may. * We We think that the word "any" used in the sections heretofore cited of the Revised Codes and the Sess. Laws, when considered in connection with the entire sections of the statute relating to municipal improvements, and at the same time keeping in mind the purpose of such legislation and the object to be obtained, should not receive at our hands a technical or limited construction; but, on the other hand, we should so construe the word with reference to the enactment of the law upon this subject as to be in harmony with the intention of the Legislature. are of the opinion that it was the intention of the lawmaking power that the municipal authorities of any city or town could, by proper ordinance, provide for as many of the necessary improvements in any of the cities or towns of our state as they (the council) deem advisable. The question to be determined in our opinion in a case of this kind is, Was the proposition, or were the proposi tions, so clearly and distinctly submitted to the electors of the city or town that they could intelligently and positively express their wishes in regard to each, or any, or all of the propositions so submitted? Was the proposition, or were the propositions, so submitted to the electors that they could adopt or reject either, any, or all of the propositions so submitted? Whether these propositions were provided for in one ordinance, or in separate ordinances, would be immaterial, so long as the electors were not deceived, misled, or prevented from voting upon each proposition separately and independently of the others. In all probability the council of the city |