Rule All Round, and that he merely threw out as a suggestion. It is true that during his lifetime the Liberal party has turned from the Manchester doctrines to a kinder philosophy of economics. But it has not been his doing. Rather he has moved with the party, with the forward part of it. His has not been the highest leadership of those who foresee the right course and drive parties willy-nilly into following. Quite otherwise, he has understood the way the party would go and has led. Perhaps that is all we can ask of our modern political masters. Perhaps democracies have become too massive, too inevitable in their movements to be susceptible of real guidance; perhaps what they demand are men quickest to guess their inclinations and give concrete expression to them. It may be we have come to that pass where we shall call that man the greatest statesman who proves the greatest opportunist. Mr. Asquith has been essentially an opportunist-for his party. He has served his party. He has loved Liberalism.

Years ago after the struggle over the Parliament Act he looked weary and grown old. Then came the wracking fight for Home Rule. At the end of that Mr. Asquith might well have sought those quiet seats which the fates are said to prepare for those who have gone through many chances of fortune. The fates were not so kind. He had to gird himself anew and lead Britain in her desperate fight against the onrush of the Prussian. Wars have not seldom proven the undoing of the great. No one has forgotten how the younger Pitt, successful in great undertakings, found himself overmatched by Bonaparte, and went out to Putney to die, a baffled man. It is one of the shortcomings of democracy that it must put politically trained men at directing wars. About Mr. Asquith's part in the war it is yet too early to render an assured verdict. When the war began, men who had watched the career of the Prime Minister had a good deal of confidence in him. Was he not "Asquith the Achiever"? Did he not know men? Had he not the knack of putting them to use? He had qualities that had stood him well in a time of peace. The two years of the war have not changed the impression that in some ways Mr. Asquith is fitted to lead England, even in a time of emergency. When the Coalition gov

ernment took the place of the Liberal, it became evident that his cunning had not deserted him. The ablest leaders of the Unionist party were put in important places while others that had to be recognized were placed where they could do the least harm. The storm over conscription he has weathered with little loss. The Irish rebellion has proved a flash in the pan and, at this writing, it looks as if Mr. Asquith might come nearer to making a settlement in Ireland than ever before. In many other matters he has been abundantly able to justify the course of the government. Nevertheless, many men, while recognizing the defences and excuses offered, while realizing that Britain has done wonderful things in a short space of time, feel that her leaders have lacked foresight, have exhibited little of that high imagination which war relentlessly demands. The Antwerp expedition can be defended. The Dardanelles attempt may have been worth the trying. But the leaders of Britain should have foreseen the munitions problem, they should have anticipated the Serbian drive, and they should have managed the Balkan diplomacy better.

Yet the English have seldom started so well in war. Mr. Asquith has met the sudden problems of such a time better than most politicians raised up by democracy. He is not the ideal leader of a nation in arms. Few if any such leaders have as yet emerged in this war anywhere. So far as England is concerned that ideal leader does not seem to be in sight. Certainly he is not Lloyd George. If the war should for a long time go wrong, no doubt a discontented public will visit the blame on Mr. Asquith's head and forget for a while his great services. If he should despite some blunders carry affairs to victory-he has a habit of doing that-the English, glad to have muddled through, will give him an earldom and later carve his name on the Abbey stones; they will rate him in history with Chatham. That is the way things go.

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA.

WALLACE NOTESTEIN.

THE RUSSIAN OFFER OF MEDIATION IN THE WAR OF 1812

TH

HE main facts connected with the offer of Alexander I to mediate between England and America in the war of 1812 are well known. There seems, however, to be some uncertainty as to the part played by the Russian diplomatists, in particular by the Chancellor Romanzoff. It has generally been suspected that the Emperor and his minister were not of one mind in this affair, but the inside history of their misunderstandings has never been told. This working at cross purposes caused confusion and irritation for which Romanzoff has been blamed. Lord Walpole openly and deliberately accused him of duplicity, and the American commissioners were at times strongly inclined to question his veracity. Appearances were against him and he knew it. It would have been easy enough to clear himself of these unjust charges and suspicions had it not been for his official position and the honor of his master. The account of the negotiation is important, not only for students of American history, but for those of European history as well, because it throws light on the policies and methods of Alexander I.

The conflict which broke out between England and America in 1812 caused Alexander considerable anxiety; one of the belligerents was a political ally and the other a commercial friend. A struggle between them would weaken both and might lead to an alliance between France and the United States, a situation which must be prevented. Under the circumstances it is easy to understand why Alexander was eager to bring the two parties together in order to help them settle their differHe discussed the subject with Romanzoff, as was to be expected. The Chancellor questioned whether England would be willing to admit a third party into the dispute and attempted, as gently as he could, to dissuade the Emperor from putting his plan into execution. Seeing, however, that he was determined, Romanzoff suggested that before a formal offer of medi

ences.

ation was made to the United States it would be well to ascertain England's attitude on the subject. Alexander would not agree to this proposal; and requested that the offer be laid before the two belligerents at the same time. There was nothing left but to obey. It is to the credit and honor of Romanzoff that he at once set aside his own doubts and put his heart and soul into the undertaking. He realized that to bring about peace through the efforts of Russia would give the Emperor a high standing in the eyes of the world, that failure would be regarded as a rebuke to Russia, an abasement on the part of the United States, if that nation accepted the offer, and a diplomatic victory for Great Britain.

With these ideas in mind, Romanzoff, on September 18, 1812, addressed a letter to Baron Nicolay, who was at the time at Copenhagen but was on the point of starting for London, directing him to submit the offer of mediation to the English governAbout the same time the subject under consideration was brought directly to the attention of Lord Cathcart, the British representative at St. Petersburg.3 The American minister, John Quincy Adams, was approached on the matter on September 21; and towards the end of the same month instructions were prepared for Dashkov, Russian diplomatic agent in the United States, to bring officially before the American government the propositions of the Emperor.

Ibid.

1 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (Philadelphia, 1874), vol. ii, pp. 541-542. American Historical Review, vol. xx, p. 109. Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, vol. ii, p. 403. Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Washington," 1812, carton 2. Nearly all the Russian diplomatic papers since 180t are kept in the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Petrograd. For the period of Alexander I, the documents are almost wholly in French. They are classified as follows. Correspondence between the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and his ministers abroad is classified under the name of the capital where the minister resides, as “Washington," "Londres" etc. Correspondence between the minister and the foreign diplomats in the Russian capital is classified under the name of the country of the diplomat, as "Etats-Unis," "Grande-Bretagne" etc. Notes which pass between the Emperor and his ministers are labeled, “Ministère." A full account of the different archives in Russia with a description of the material they contain on American history will soon be issued by the Department of Historical Research, Carnegie Institution of Washington.

According to Dashkov's reports, President Madison accepted the offer on February 24, but it was March 11 when formal action was taken.' Without waiting to learn whether England would agree to negotiate, the President nominated three commissioners to go to Russia to treat with the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain.

It was near the middle of October when Nicolay took up the question of mediation with Lord Liverpool, the prime minister. Without accepting or rejecting the offer, Lord Liverpool said that Admiral Warren, in command of the English fleet in America, had full power to make peace with the United States and that it seemed probable that he would soon bring it about, and, therefore, it would perhaps be better to leave things as they were for the time being. On November 18, Castlereagh, foreign secretary, acknowledged Nicolay's note and in a very polite way intimated "that the intervention of a friendly power is not calculated to accelerate the return of peace." This reply was not encouraging; it did not, however, close the door altogether to further negotiations. At least this was the view taken by Romanzoff.

In diplomatic circles Englishmen were saying that America had declared war on Great Britain largely at the instigation of France. Thus they schemed to conceal the real issues and gain the sympathy of all nations opposed to Napoleon. Romanzoff did not believe that French influence had anything to do with the war; and he went to work to bring this fact home to the English ministry, hoping thereby to remove one of the reasons for the refusal of the mediation. He called in Adams on December 7 to talk over the Franco-American situation. Adams assured Romanzoff that the two countries had no understanding and, what is more, that there was no intention on the part of the United States to draw any closer to France.

To get more evidence on this point the mail of the American

Ibid., 1813, carton 3, documents 8, 17, 18, 20.

American Historical Review, vol. xx, p. 110.

Archives Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Londres," 1812, no. 12.

4 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, vol. ii, p. 427.