the receipt of them, or rendered any written account in which they were omitted:-Held, that, if the servant wilfully omitted to account for these sums, and pay them over on the respective days on which he received them, these were embezzlements, and that such wilful omissions to account and pay over were equivalent to a denial of the receipt of them. Reg. v. Jackson,

ENTERING CAUSES FOR TRIAL.

See TRIAL, 3, 4.

ESTATE.

See TENANT IN COMMON.

EVIDENCE.

384

See AGENT, 3.--ATTORNEY.-BIGAMY, 1, 4.-CONFESSION.-CoRONER. COURT ROLL, 1, 2. DYING DECLARATION.-EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORs, 4.FOREIGN LAWS (PROOF OF). LARCENY, 7, 8.-LIBEL, 2. MAP.-OPENING OF COUNSel.PERJURY, 6.-RAPE, 2.-TRESPass, 3, 4.—Trover, 8.

1. A defendant had written a letter to Mr. H., the plaintiff's attorney, who stated in evidence that he had written a letter in answer to it, which he gave to the defendant at his (Mr. H.'s) office on the 4th of April. This letter of the 4th of April being called for under a notice to produce, the defendant's counsel stated that there was no such letter, and proposed to shew by evidence that Mr. H. had not given his letter to the defendant on the 4th of April, at his office, as stated, because the defendant was at another place, and also because Mr. H.'s letter was dated on the 6th of April, and was sent by post on that

day. The Judge received the evidence thus proposed to be given for the defendant before allowing the plaintiff to go into secondary evidence of Mr. H.'s letter of the 4th of April; but held, that such evidence was not evidence to the jury, but to himself only, and that any part of it which was written evidence should not be read by the officer of the court, but should be handed to the Judge and then shewn to the opposite counsel. Smith 48 v. Sleap,

2. If a witness, who is called to disprove the signature of the defendant to an acceptance, states that he believes the signature is not that of the defendant, and gives, as his reason for that belief, the absence or presence of certain peculiarities which he says do or do not exist in the genuine signatures of the defendant, the opposite counsel may put into his hand a paper unconnected with the cause, and ask if, in his opinion, that contains a genuine signature of the defendant; and, if he answer in the affirmative, he may then be asked, "Does the signature in this paper, which you say is genuine, contain the same peculiarities, or want the same peculiarities, (as the case may be), which you have before stated as your reasons that the signature in dispute is not genuine?" And, semble, that, if the witness says it does not, it would be competent to lay that paper before the jury that they might judge of that answer. Younge v. Honner, 51

3. To give evidence of the transcript of the rules of a benefit society inrolled at the office of the clerk of the peace, by proof of an examined copy of it, the witness who examined the copy with the transcript must prove that he examined the copy of all the rules with the transcript. Reg. v. Boynes, 65

4. In an action against an attorney for negligence respecting a reference of an action for breach of promise of

marriage, brought by Miss S. against the present plaintiff, in which he was attorney for the present plaintiff, it appeared that there were two parts of the agreement to refer, one signed by Miss S.'s attorney, (unstamped), which was in the possession of the present defendant, the other signed by the present defendant as attorney for the present plaintiff, and in the hands of Miss S.'s attorney. The latter had been stamped within twenty-one days after its execution, and the expense of the stamping, and part of the expense of the making of it, had been paid by the present plaintiff, the rest being taxed off. The part in the hands of the present defendant being called for and produced under a notice to produce, being unstamped, could not be read in evidence:-But held, that the present plaintiff was entitled to have the stamped part of the agreement produced by Miss S.'s attorney, although Miss S. had desired her attorney not to produce it. Held, also, that Miss S.'s attorney was not bound to produce letters written to him by the present defendant, as attorney for the present plaintiff, he stating that he was desired by his client, Miss S., not to produce them; but that, if letters written by Miss S.'s attorney to the present defendant, as attorney for the present plaintiff, were not produced when called for under a notice to produce, Miss S.'s attorney was bound to give secondary evidence of their contents, although desired by Miss S. not to do so. Higgs v. Taylor, 85

5. A. brought trover for goods which had been seized at the house of B. by the defendant, as sheriff of S., under a fi. fa. against B. A. claimed under a sale at auction, which was stated at the time of the sale to have been made under an assignment by B. for the benefit of his creditors. To shew that the sale was fraudulent,

the defendant's counsel proposed to give evidence, that, when the execution went in, and while the goods remained in B.'s possession, B. said that the goods were his son's: -Held, that this evidence was not receivable. Roberts v. Justice, 93

6. On the trial of an issue directed to try whether goods seized by the sheriff of H. under a fi. fa. against G. were the goods of the plaintiff, the plaintiff's counsel proposed to give evidence of a statement made by G., before the execution went in, that he (G.) was indebted to the plaintiff, and was going to assign his goods to him, by way of payment:-Held, that this evidence was not receivable. Prosser V. Gwillim,

95

7. On the trial of an issue directed to try whether goods seized under a fi. fa. sued out against A., at the suit of the defendant, were the goods of the plaintiff, the declarations of A., as to the property of the goods, are not receivable in evidence on the part of the plaintiff. Stothert v. James, 121

8. Assumpsit by a servant against his master, for not employing him under a written agreement to serve for a year, which had not expired. The agreement was produced under notice:-Held, that it was not necessary to call the subscribing witness to prove the execution. Bell v. Chay

tor,

162

9. Semble, that on the trial of a cause a party ought not to be allowed to go into evidence to shew why he could not procure the attendance of a particular person as a witness, or to shew what steps he has taken to procure such person's attendance at the trial. Turpin v. Heald, 264

10. In an action by B. against A. for false imprisonment, A. pleaded a justification, that B. had been guilty of embezzlement. A. and his witnesses having made the charge before a magistrate, depositions were taken

in the hearing of B., and he made a statement in answer:-Held, that, on the trial of the action for false imprisonment, these depositions, and the plaintiff's statement in answer, were receivable in evidence for the defendant, as being matters stated in the hearing of the plaintiff, to which he made an answer, but that the depositions were no proof of any fact therein stated. Jones v. Morrell, 266

11. In trespass for taking the plaintiff's goods, with a plea of not possessed, it was proposed to shew that the goods were not his, by shewing, inter alia, that he was not twentyone. To shew this, it was proved, that, by the custom of the law of the Jews, children are circumcised on the eighth day from their birth, and that it was the duty of the chief rabbi to perform this rite, and make an entry of it in a book. It was proposed to give in evidence the entry in this book of the plaintiff's circumcision, the entry being in the handwriting of a chief rabbi, who was dead:-Held, that the entry was not receivable in evidence. Davis v. Lloyd,

275

12. In case for running down the plaintiff's ship, a nautical witness may be asked, whether, having heard the evidence, and admitting the facts proved by the plaintiff to be true, he is of opinion that the collision could have been avoided by proper care on the part of the defendant's servants. Fenwick v. Bell,

312

14. The editor of a newspaper swore that A. was the writer of a certain article which had appeared in that paper many years before, and that the MS. had been lost. A. stated that he had been in the habit of writ

ing such articles for the newspaper in question, but that he had no recollection of having sent the particular article now referred to. He swore, however, that all the statements made in the articles he did send were true:Held, that the newspaper might be put into A.'s hand, in order to refresh his memory; and that he might be asked, whether, looking at the article, he had any doubt that the fact was as therein stated. Ibid.

15. In an action by a sheriff for his poundage, proof that he has acted as sheriff is sufficient evidence of his being so without proof of his appointment. Bunbury v. Matthews,

380

16. In an action for sheriff's poundage, the sheriff's officer produced the sheriff's warrant under which he had acted, which concluded, “given under the seal at my office." The only seal to it was a small piece of blue paper wafered to it and stamped with a wafer stamp. The officer stated that he did not know this to be the seal of the sheriff or his office, but stated that he had received the warrant from Mr. B., who acted as the plaintiff's undersheriff, and that it was precisely similar to all the other warrants on which he had acted:-Held, sufficient proof of the seal. Ibid.

17. On an indictment against accessaries before the fact to the forgery of an administration bond on administration granted of the effects of J. S: -Held, 1st, that a session-clerk from Scotland had no right to look at a kirk session book to learn the writing of a clergyman to enable him to swear to the writing of a certificate found, on the death of J. S., among his papers.

2ndly, That such book was not evidence itself, and, not being so, could not be looked at for any purpose whatever. 3rdly, That the certificate in question, which was a certificate purporting to have been given by the minister and elders to J. S. on leaving the kirk, would not be evidence, even if the minister's writing were proved. 4thly, That the proof that the certificate was found among papers indorsed on the outside in J. S.'s handwriting, which papers were delivered, after his death, by a servant to J. S.'s master, who produced them at the trial, was no proof that the certificate had been in J. S.'s possession, the servant not being called as a witness; that the indorsement only shewed that that one paper had been in Stewart's presence, and the statement in his writing was not evidence. Reg. v. Barber, 434

18. In cross-examining the master of J. S., the prisoner's counsel asked whether he did not put the age (sixtyfive) on the tombstone from the best information he could get; and he said he put it there in consequence of what J. S. told him. Ibid.

19. The counsel for the prosecucution asked what it was that J. S. told him:-Held, that this question could not be put. Ibid.

20. An indictment for perjury in an affidavit stated the affidavit to have been sworn "before one R. G. W., then and there being a commissioner duly authorized and empowered to take affidavits in the said county of Gloucester in or concerning any cause depending in her said Majesty's Court of Exchequer at Westminster." It was proved by Mr. R. G. W. that he had acted as a commissioner for taking affidavits in the Exchequer for ten years, but had never seen his commission, and that ten years ago he applied to his agent to procure for him a commission to take affidavits in the Exchequer, and that his agent had told him

that he had done so:-Held, that the proof of Mr. R. G. W.'s acting as a commissioner was primâ facie evidence that he was so. Reg. v. Newton,

469

21. T. occupied lands from 1790 to 1815, but had ceased to occupy them before the time of his death. At T.'s death, among his papers were found a series of receipts for the rent of this land from 1790 to 1804, signed by M. P. sen., who died in 1806, and a similar series of receipts for rent from 1806 to 1815, signed by M. P. jun., (the daughter of M. P. sen.), who died in 1826:-Held, in ejectment for these lands, that these receipts were receivable as evidence of the seisin of M. P. sen., and M. P. jun. Doe d. Blayney v. Savage, 487

22. An examined copy of an entry in a parish register of marriages is receivable in evidence to prove a marriage, although the entry in the register purport to be attested by one witness only, the words "In the presence of" in the entry being followed by one name only. Ibid.

23. In an action for use and occupation by the assignees of a bankrupt, it was proved that the defendant had said that he had been served with a writ for rent by the attorney for the assignees, but that the bankrupt was his landlord, and his attorney had sent an indemnification for the bankrupt to sign, which the bankrupt had signed:-Held, that the assignees were entitled to give in evidence statements made by the bankrupt, without any further proof of the nature or extent of the indemnity. Arkle v. Wakeman, 516

24. A., by an agreement in writing, agreed to win stones, &c., "for the purpose of building" certain cottages: -Held, that parol evidence could not be given, to explain the sense in which the word "building" was used. Charlton v. Gibson, 541

25. In order to shew that the defendant, in an action for goods sold and delivered, was not liable, it was proposed to ask a witness, whether the plaintiff's wife had said anything to him as to the person whom her husband had trusted for the goods:Held, that the question could not be put. Duckworth v. Johnson, 584

26. In an action for goods sold and delivered upon the credit of the defendant, a question as to the amount of the defendant's income cannot be put, if the evidence be tendered with a view to shew the improbability of authority having been given to purchase the goods. Rowe v. Polkinghorne, 618

27. Where, however, an action was brought against a widow for dresses ordered and worn by her daughter, who was about to be married: -Held, that evidence of the amount of the defendant's income was admissible, as tending to shew that the dresses were not supplied upon her credit, but upon the credit of her daughter's future husband.

Ibid.

28. It was proposed on the part of a plaintiff to give in evidence a letter written by the defendant's attorney, which purported to be an answer to a letter written to him by the plaintiff's attornies: Held, that, if the plaintiff's counsel put in this letter of the defendant's attorney, he should also call for and put in the letter to which it was an answer, and not leave it to the defendant to put in the letter of the plaintiff's attornies as his evidence. Walson v. Moore, 626

29. On the trial of an issue directed by the Court of Chancery to try whether a deed of assignment was fraudulent or not, a witness was called to prove that another deed, which bore date more than three years before the trial, was not executed on the day on which it bore date, but was executed by one party on the day after, and by the

other three days after. The witness stated, that he could not recollect how this was, but stated that he had been examined on this subject before commissioners of bankrupt within a fortnight of the time when the matters occurred, and when the facts were fresh in his memory. He stated that his examination before the commissioners was not in his own handwriting, but he had signed it. The witness was allowed to look at his examination, to refresh his memory. Wood v. Cooper, 645

30. In covenant on a lost deed with non est factum pleaded, it was proved that, on search, the deed, which by the date was sixty years old, could not be found in the muniment-room of the plaintiff, but that there was found there a paper which purported to be an attested copy of it. It was proved that both the persons whose signatures were to it as attesting the copy were dead; and the handwriting of one of them was proved; and it was also proved that persons of the same names as those who had attested the original deed were also dead:Held, that upon this proof, this paper was not receivable as secondary evidence of the deed. Brindley v. Woodhouse, 647

31. In an action against a sheriff for a false return to a fi. fa., office copies of the fi. fa. and return which are not proved to have been examined copies, are not receivable in evidence, even where the original cause was in the same court as the action against the sheriff. Pitcher v. King, 655

32. On the trial of an indictment for a conspiracy, the answers in Chancery of the defendants, made on oath by them in a suit instituted against them by the prosecutor, are receivable in evidence on the part of the prosecution. Reg. v. Goldshede, 657 33. An information was filed by the Attorney-General, under the stat. 33