1844. REGINA v. TIVEY. ment of this act, of any of such offences respectively, shall Wilmore, for the prosecution.-I submit, that the true meaning of the 25th section is, that malicious offences shall be deemed complete without proof of malice against the owner of the property, or, if that section be inoperative, that general malice is sufficient. PATTESON, J., reserved the point for the consideration of the fifteen judges. Verdict-Guilty. Wilmore, for the prosecution. W. H. Adams, for the prisoner. [Attornies and Flewker.] In the ensuing term the case was considered by the fifteen judges, who held the conviction was right. 1 1844. WELCH WINTER CIRCUIT, 1844. CHESTER ASSIZES. BEFORE BARON GURNEY. REGINA V. RADFORD. FORGERY.-The prisoner was indicted for uttering a forged receipt for 5l. 14s. 6d., with intent to defraud Mr. Lee. There were other counts, which laid the intent to be to defraud George Turner and John Forster. If A. exhibit a forged receipt with whom he to B., a person is claiming credit for it, this is an utter ing within the stat. 1 Will. 4, although A. c. 66, s. 10, refuse to part with the pos session of the paper out of his It was proved that the prisoner was a stone-mason, and had purchased stone at a quarry, the property of Mr. Lee. It was also proved that the prisoner incurred a debt of 57. 14s. 6d. on the 6th of July, 1840, and that an invoice was sent without any receipt, and that the prisoner, on being from time to time called on for payment of the hand. amount, repeatedly promised payment, but that, on his being again applied to in the month of July, 1844, he, for the first time, alleged, that he had paid for the stone at the time, viz., on the 6th of July, 1840, and that he had a receipt signed by Turner. On hearing of this, Mr. Forster, who had succeeded Turner as manager at the quarry, went over to the prisoner on the 17th of August, when the prisoner produced the receipt, and exhibited it to him to look at, but would not part with it out of his hand. On the 21st of August, Mr. Forster returned to the prisoner, taking Mr. Turner with him, and again called on him to 1844. REGINA ข. RADFORD. produce the receipt; he did produce it, and held it up for Mr. Forster and Mr. Turner to look at, but refused to part with it out of his hand. Mr. Forster, however, got it from him, and he was apprehended. Townsend and Egerton, for the prisoner, contended that this was not an uttering, and cited the case of Rex v. Shukard (a). GURNEY, B.-I am inclined to think that the exhibiting of this receipt to the person with whom the prisoner was claiming credit for it was an uttering, even though he did not part with it out of his hand; but I will reserve that point for the consideration of the judges. Verdict-Guilty. J. Hill and L. Trafford, for the prosecution. Townsend and E. Egerton, for the prisoner. Feb. 14. At Serjeants' Inn Hall. BEFORE LORD DENMAN, C. J.; TINDAL, C. J.; POLLOCK, C. B.; Townsend, for the prisoner.-I submit, that in this case there was no uttering of this receipt by the prisoner. In the case of Rex v. Shukard, the production of flash notes, in order to give the person who saw them a false idea of (a) R. & R. C. C. 200. In that case it was held, that shewing a person a flash note, the uttering of which would be criminal, with an intent to raise in him a false idea of the party's substance, was not an uttering within the stat. 13 Geo. 2, c. 79, which prohibited the uttering of notes expressing the sum in white letters on a black ground, without being authorized by the Bank of England. the party's substance, was held not to be an uttering of the flash notes, and I submit, that, in the present case, although there might be an intent to utter the forged receipt, and even a beginning to utter it, yet the uttering was not complete. POLLOCK, C. B.-Suppose a man were to pass a turnpike gate with a forged ticket in his hand, and shewed the ticket to the gate-keeper, and rode on, and was pursued and taken, would you say that that was not an uttering of the forged ticket? Townsend. It might be there, that, from the gate-keeper letting the person pass, he acted on the production of the ticket as if it had been uttered. Tendering and uttering are not equivalent terms, as was held in the case of Rex v. Franks (b), which was a case on the stat. 15 & 16 Geo. 2, c. 28, which related to base coin. COLERIDGE, J.-How could it be said that this receipt was tendered, as the prisoner refused to part with it? Townsend. The words in the 18th section of the stat. 1 Will. 4, c. 66, are "offer, utter, dispose of, and put off." From Johnson's Dictionary it appears that the word "offer" imports that the person may either accept or decline the thing offered, and, from the illustrations given in Webster's Dictionary, a similar option appears to be implied. POLLOCK, C. B.-In all these cases reference must be had to the subject. A purse is of no use except it be given. Not so a receipt or a turnpike ticket. A promissory note must be tendered, to be taken. Not so a receipt, as the person who has it is to keep it. Townsend. The prisoner here is convicted of "uttering." In the different statutes as to forgery, different (b) 2 Leach, 736. 1844. REGINA v. RADFORD. 1844. REGINA v. RADFORD. expressions are used. In the stat. 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 24, s. 3, as to protections from service in the navy, the words are "produce, utter, or make use of." In the 4th section of the stat. 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 16, as to excise permits, the words are "utter, give, or make use of," and in the 13th section of the same statute, the words are "utter or produce." In the stat. 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 59, s. 19, as to forged registers, the words are "utter, or deliver, or produce;" and in the stat. 5 Eliz. c. 14, as to the forging of evidences and writings, the words are," publish, or shew forth in evidence." The case having been considered by the judges, their Lordships held the conviction right. WELCH SPRING CIRCUIT, 1845. CARDIGAN ASSIZES. BEFORE MR. JUSTICE CRESSWELL. March 14. In trespass against two excise officers for entering the plaintiff's DAVIS V. MOSELEY and LLOYD. TRESPASS.-The first count of the declaration was for breaking and entering the plaintiff's house on the 16th of house, there was at the close of the plaintiff's case no evidence against one of the defendants:Held, that, if no further evidence was given for the plaintiff, the plaintiff's counsel must then elect to go on as to the other defendant only, and could not wait till the defence was concluded. In order to shew in trespass that the defendant, an excise officer, entered the plaintiff's house, the defendant's affidavit was put in, by which he stated that he entered the house by virtue of a magistrate's warrant, to search for malt that had not paid duty:-Held, that the putting in of this affidavit by the plaintiff did not make out a defence for the defendant, as the affidavit did not state that the warrant was granted upon oath made by an officer of excise, as required by the stat. 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 53, s. 34. |