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1843.

BEDFORD

v.

FORBES.

action against the auctioneer for money had and received, and he having applied to the Court under the stat. 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 58, the present issue was directed to be tried, in order to determine whether the vendee was entitled to rescind the contract, and receive back his deposit (a).

CRESSWELL, J., (in summing up).—I am of opinion that the outstanding judgment in question was not a valid objection to the title, as it had not been registered in pursuance of the provisions of the statutes which have been cited.

There was another objection to the title, which turned entirely on matters of fact, which were left by his Lordship to the jury.

Verdict for the plaintiff.

Shee, Serjt., and E. James, for the plaintiff.

Dowling, Serjt., and Bramwell, for the defendant.

[Attornies-James, and Teague.]

(a) By the stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 13, it is enacted, that "a judgment already entered up or to be hereafter entered up against any person in any of her Majesty's superior courts at Westminster, shall operate as a charge upon all lands," &c.; but, by sect. 19 of the same statute, it is provided, that no such judgment shall, by virtue of that act, affect any lands, &c., until it be registered in the manner therein mentioned; and by the stat. 1 & 2

Vict. c. 11, s. 2, it is enacted, "that no judgment already docketed and entered" under the stat. 4 & 5 Will. & M. c. 20, shall, upon the 1st of August, 1841, affect any lands, &c., until it is registered in the manner prescribed by the stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110; and by sect. 3 & 4 of the stat. 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, the date of the registering is to be inserted in the book kept for that purpose, and all judgments must be re-registered every five years.

COURT OF EXCHEQUER.

First Sitting in London in Hilary Term, 1843.

1843.

WAITHMAN v. ELSEE.

ASSUMPSIT for money lent, with a count upon an ac

count stated. Plea, non assumpsit.

The cause was undefended, and Bramwell, for the plaintiff, offered in evidence an I. O. U., signed by the defendant, but not addressed to any one, which was in the following form:

"I. O. U. £85, to be paid May 5.

Jan. 19.

A paper, signed

by the defendant, was in the

following form:

-"I. O. U.

£85, to be paid May 5:"Heid, that this

was a promissory note, and required a stamp.

It was not stamped.

"WM. ELSEE."

ROLFE, B.-This is a promissory note. I cannot allow it to be read in evidence, as it is unstamped (a).

The I. O. U. was not given in evidence, and other evidence was given.

Bramwell, for the plaintiff.

Verdict for the plaintiff.

[Attornies-Walters, and Leigh.]

(a) Baron Bayley lays down, (Bay. on Bills, ch. 1, s. 2), "No particular words are necessary to make a bill or note, but it must be a written order or promise, which, from the time of making it, cannot be complied with or performed without payment of money. Thus, an order or promise to de

liver, or that I. S. shall receive
money, or to be accountable or re-
sponsible for it to him or order is
a good bill or note; but a mere ac-
knowledgment of a debt, without any
promise to pay, is not a bill or note."
See, also, the case of Evans v.Phill-
potts, 9 C. & P. 270.

1843.

Second Sittings in London in Trinity Term, 1843.

BEFORE BARON PARKE

Mr. A., the plaintiff's at

torney, wrote

to the defend

WATSON V. HETHERINGTON.

ASSUMPSIT for goods sold, work and labour, and on

an account stated.-Pleas, 1st, as to all, except 167. 7s. 2d., ant, stating that non assumpsit, and as to that sum a tender; 2ndly, to the whole declaration, payment.-Replication, denying the tender and the payment.

a debt due from the defendant

to the plaintiff "must be paid to me on the next day.-A tender was made on the next day to a writing clerk of Mr. A., in Mr.

A.'s office, who said that he could not take the

money, as

Mr. A. was out, and the person must wait till he came:Held, not a good tender, as not being made

to a person authorized to

receive money;

A.'s letter had

asked payment

With respect to the tender, it appeared that Mr. Ashley, the plaintiff's attorney, had written a letter to the defendant as follows:—

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"9, Shoreditch, 4th August, 1842. Sir, I am desired by Mr. Harris Watson to apply to you for payment of 371. 7s. 6d., and beg to say, that the same must be paid to me in the course of to-morrow.

"I am, Sir,

"Yours obediently,

"HY. ASHLEY."

It was proved, that, on the 5th of August, Mr. Green, a

but that, if Mr. clerk of the defendant's attorney, went to the office of Mr. Ashley to make a tender of 167. 17s. 2d., and that he "at my office," offered the money to a writing clerk in the office of Mr. Ashley, who would not receive it, and who said that he carrying on the could not do so, as Mr. Ashley was out, and that Mr.

a tender to any person in the

office who was

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PARKE, B.-This is not a good tender. The cases go to shew, that, where an attorney asks payment at his office, a tender to any person who is in the office carrying on the

business will do (a); but here the attorney writes asking
payment to himself, and the tender is made to a writing
clerk, who says he cannot take the money because Mr.
Ashley is out, and the person must wait till he came. A
writing clerk in an attorney's office is not a person gene-
rally authorized to receive money. This tender was not
made to a person who had authority to receive money,
and who was authorized to give a discharge for money, the
attorney having written asking payment to himself.

Verdict for the plaintiff on all the issues,
damages 371. 78. 6d.

Jervis, E. James, and Hubert Lucas, for the plaintiff.
Crowder and Davison, for the defendant.

[Attornies-H. Ashley, and Tyrrell.]

(a) In the case of Kirton v. Brathwaite, 1 M. & W. 310, the plaintiff's attorney, before action brought, wrote to the defendant, saying, that, unless the debt, together with his (the attorney's) charge for that letter, were paid "at my office" on the following Wednesday at 12 o'clock, proceedings would be commenced. On the Wednesday, at 10 o'clock, an agent of the defendant went to the attorney's office, and there saw a boy, to whom he tendered the amount of

the debt only. The boy, after re-
ferring to the letter book, refused
to accept it unless the charge for
the letter were also paid. It ap-
peared that the writ was issued at
11 o'clock on that day:-Held,
(Baron Parke, dubitante), that this
was a good tender; and Baron Bol-
land said, "There is no doubt the
letter would authorize any body in
the office to receive the money."-
See also the case of Wilmot v.
Smith, 3 C. & P. 453.

1843.

WATSON

v.

HETHERING

TON.

1843.

June 10.

MILLER V. KER.

Where the pro- ISSUE directed by the Court of Exchequer to try whether the plaintiff was entitled to the possession of certain assignations of debts to John James Fraser, deceased.

perty of a de-
ceased debtor
has been se-
questrated un-
der the Scotch
Bankrupt
Act, 2 & 3 Vict.

c. 41, the title
of the trustee
under the se-
questration is
made out by
proof of the
act and war-

rant," in the

manner pre

48th section of

that statute, whether the

property of the deceased debtor

It was opened by J. Henderson, for the plaintiff, that the plaintiff was the trustee of the sequestrated estate of Mr. Fraser, under the Scotch Bankrupt Act, 2 & 3 Vict. c. 41, the documents in question having belonged to Mr. Fraser at the time of his death, which took place in London on the 3rd of June, 1839. Mr. Fraser was a writer to the signet, who had an office in Albany Street, Edinburgh, scribed by the and, by means of a clerk, carried on business there, down to the time of his death, and had desks and books there, he himself being in bad circumstances, and in London, to avoid his creditors. By the 4th section of the Scotch Bankrupt Act, 2 & 3 Vict. c. 41, Mr. Fraser's property would be liable to the Scotch Bankrupt Laws if he was a deceased debtor, (although not a trader), who, at the time of his death, carried on business in Scotland, and was at that time owner of heritable or moveable estates in Scotland; but he submitted, as matter of law, that, upon proof, on the part of the plaintiff, of a copy of the act and warrant in favour of the plaintiff as trustee, verified and authenticated in the manner prescribed by the 48th section of the The property act, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover in this action, and that, after such proof, it would not be competent to debtor, who, at the time of his the defendant to dispute the plaintiff's title as trustee. death, resided

was subject to Scotch bankrupt laws or not; and,

semble, that, in an action by such trustee, the defendant cannot, after

such proof, impeach the trustee's title, the only mode of doing so being by application in the Scotch Courts.

of a deceased

or had a dwell. He cited the case of Viscount Melville v. Paterson (a). ing-house, or

carried on busi

ness in Scotland, and was at that time owner of heritable or moveable estates in Scotland, is liable to the Scotch Bankrupt Act, 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11; and it is not necessary that the deceased debtor should have been a trader, and the amount of his heritable or moveable estate in Scotland at the time of his death is immaterial.

(a) 4 Bell & Murray, (Decis. of the Court of Session, New Ser.), 1311. In that case it appeared that John Plummer, who was pos

sessed of heritable property near Dalkeith, died in 1841, and that his estates were thereafter sequestrated, in terms of the bankrupt

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