1844. REGINA v. HORNBY. ment, Hornby requested two of his workmen to go to the warehouse of W. B. P., in order to get some yarn. They went accordingly, and, on arriving at the place in question, they found Hornby and W. G. there. Certain parcels of yarn were pointed out to them, as the yarn which they were to take to Hornby's premises; and they, thereupon, in the presence of Hornby and of W. G., carried away the yarn in question, which yarn was afterwards wrought up into canvass by Hornby's servants. There was no evidence of any invoice having passed between the parties in the course of this latter transaction; nor did it appear whether Hornby was or was not aware that W. G. had no authority to sell; but it was proved, that, when Hornby was charged with having been concerned with W. G. in the above transactions, he produced the invoice which W. G. had given him on the first occasion, and stated, that, except on that occasion, he had had no dealings with him. On this evidence, it was objected, by Foot, for the prisoner Hornby, that, as against him, the facts proved did not support the indictment. It was clear, that, so far as Hornby was concerned, the first transaction had been a bona fide purchase from W.G.; and he submitted, that, with respect to the second, there was, at least, no evidence to support the charge of larceny,-the facts proved against him amounting, at the utmost, merely to evidence that he had received the goods in question knowing them to have been stolen. COLTMAN, J., however, told the jury, that if Hornby knew that, in the transaction in question, W. G. was in fact committing a felony, he, as well as W. G., was guilty of a felony; and that, therefore, the question for them to consider was, whether, at the time of the pretended sale by W. G., Hornby did or did not know that he W. G. was exceeding his authority, and defrauding his employers. Had the transaction been accompanied with an invoice, as it was on the former occasion, it would have been much less suspi- The jury returned a verdict of Guilty Ingham and Granger, for the prosecution. Foot and Selby, for the prisoners. 1844. REGINA ข. HORNBY. (Civil Side). BEFORE MR. BARON ROLFE. GEECKIE V. MONK. DOE d. MONK v. GEECKIE. March 1st. nant from year to year is in possession of lands under an THE former of these cases was an action of replevin. If, whilst a teThe plaintiff had become tenant from year to year to the defendant, under an agreement in writing, whereby a rent of £240 per annum was reserved, payable at May-day and Martinmas in each and every year of the said tenancy. One half-year's rent became due at May-day, (12th May), 1843, and for that rent the distress was made which was the sub ject of this action. It appeared, however, that, in the course of the previous year, an arrangement had been come to agreement re serving a cer tain rent, he landlord to pay an increased agrees with his rent, this will not have the ef fect of creating a new tenancy. 1844. GEECKIE v. MONK. DOE d. MONK v. GEECKIE. between the plaintiff and the defendant, to the effect, that the former should pay to the latter, during the continuance of his tenancy, an additional rent of £2 per annum. Such being the case, Dundas, for the plaintiff, argued that he was entitled to recover in the present action. He contended, that the fact of there having been an agreement between the parties for an increased rent constituted an entirely new tenancy; and that, therefore, the defendant was not entitled to retain the distress which he had levied under the terms of the original agreement. ROLFE, B., overruled the objection. THE next case was an action of ejectment between the same parties, and having reference to the same premises. Notice to quit had been duly served on the defendant, according to the terms of the original agreement, and on the expiration of that notice this ejectment was brought. In this case, likewise, Dundas argued, that the agreement for an increase of rent had created a new tenancy between the parties, and that, therefore, the tenancy could not be determined by a notice to quit given under the original agreement. ROLFE, B., however, in this, as in the previous case, overruled the objection (a). [Attornies-Welford, and Meggison & Co.] (a) See, also, Doe d. Bedford v. Kendrick, reported, Adams on Ejectment, 129. METCALFE v. LUMSDEN. TROVER for thirteen heifers.—Pleas :—-1st, not guilty; 2nd, that the plaintiff was not possessed; and, 3rd, leave and license. pur The The evidence was as follows:-The plaintiff had chased thirteen heifers, and, on the 6th of September, 1843, he had taken them to Morpeth-market for sale. heifers were not sold, and the plaintiff accordingly intrusted them to one R., who was a common drover, with instructions to take them to some land belonging to the defendant, in order that they might graze there until the next market-day. This was proved to be a customary mode of proceeding on the part of farmers and cattlejobbers frequenting Morpeth-market. R. accordingly took the cattle to the land in question; and it appeared, that, on the 7th of September, he offered to sell them to the defendant. The defendant, at first, refused to purchase them from R.; but, on the latter representing to him that he had authority from the plaintiff to dispose of them, he did purchase and pay for them at what was proved to be a fair price. R. absconded with the money. About a week after the above transaction, the plaintiff went to the premises of the defendant for the purpose of getting his cattle; but, on their being demanded from the latter, he refused to give them up, on the ground that he had bought them from R. At the time the demand was made, the plaintiff tendered to the defendant the sum due to him for agistment. R. had, in fact, no direct authority to sell the cattle in question; but the following evidence was given on the part of the defendant, for the purpose of shewing that he had an implied authority to that effect. It was proved that R. had, on former occasions, sold cattle for the plaintiff in Morpeth-market, and that he had also stood in the market with the cattle in question. It was further proved to be customary for drovers to sell cattle in the 1844. METCALFE v. LUMSDEN. market for the farmers and jobbers by whom they were employed; but there was no evidence that R. had ever sold cattle for the plaintiff, except in the market; nor was there any evidence that drovers had, by custom, an implied authority to sell cattle on the road. Under these circumstances, Knowles, for the defendant, contended, 1st, that there was no evidence of a conversion by the defendant; and, 2ndly, that R. had clearly an authority to sell the cattle in question. On the former of these points he submitted, that, in order to make a demand and refusal amount to evidence of a conversion by the defendant, it was necessary to take into consideration all that was said by him at the time such demand and refusal were made; and that as, in the present case, the ground alleged for the refusal was a bond fide purchase by the defendant of the cattle demanded, this circumstance rendered the refusal a qualified and justifiable refusal on his part. And on the second point he argued, that, under all the circumstances of the case, R. must be taken to have had an authority to sell. It was clear that he had had an authority to sell in the market on the 6th of September, and he submitted that this authority must be taken to have been a continuing authority; so that, unless the plaintiff could shew that the defendant, on the 7th of September, knew that it had been determined, the property in the cattle must vest in him by virtue of the sale by R. ROLFE, B., (to the jury).-In this case there are two questions. 1st, was there a conversion by the defendant? The answer to that is, that, if the defendant refused to give up the cattle because he had bought them, at the same time that the person from whom he bought them had no authority to sell, such refusal amounted to a conversion by him. Then, 2ndly, had the drover authority to sell? An authority to sell may be either express, as when an |