1842.

REGINA

v.

Good.

it is very probable that some marriage did take place in the kingdom of Ireland, at a place where the registers were very imperfectly kept. There is no doubt that Daniel Good and the prisoner for many years considered each other as man and wife; and, under these circumstances, though it might be difficult for the prisoner to prove a marriage in fact, I do not intend to offer any evidence on the part of the prosecution.

ALDERSON, B., to the jury.-No evidence being offered in this case, it is your duty to acquit the prisoner. Persons charged with such an offence, ought to know that it is a very serious offence to afford any assistance to a criminal, so as to obstruct the course of public justice. But a wife is in a peculiar situation: she cannot be found guilty of comforting and assisting her husband. And if the prisoner in this case went through the ceremony of marriage, and it should have turned out that there was some irregularity in the marriage, nevertheless, if it appeared that she had acted under the supposition that she was the wife of Daniel Good, and according to the duty which she considered to be cast upon her, the Court would have felt it right to have inflicted a very slight punishment upon her. I think, therefore, that the Attorney-General has only acted consistently with the duties of his high office in taking the course which he has taken, and which the Court entirely approves.

Verdict-Not guilty.

Sir F. Pollock, A. G., Adolphus, Waddington, and R. Gurney, for the prosecution.

Ballantine, for the prisoner.

AUGUST SESSION, 1842.

BEFORE BARON ROLFE.

1842.

REGINA V. SARAH STROUD.

MURDER.-The prisoner was indicted for the murder An indictment

of her female child, by drowning her. The indictment consisted of two counts. In the first count, the child was described as Harriet Stroud, and in the second count the child was described as "a female of tender age, whose name is to the jurors aforesaid unknown."

It appeared by the evidence, that on the 16th of June, 1842, the prisoner, being a single woman, gave birth to a female child in St. Pancras work house, and that the child was called "Harriet," and was baptized by that name on the morning of the 16th of July. No copy of the register was given in evidence, but it was proved by one of the witnesses, that the child was baptized by the name of "Harriet” only, and not "Harriet Stroud;" and there was no evidence that the child had ever been called by any name, except Harriet.

It was further proved, that, on the evening of the 16th of July, the prisoner left the workhouse with the child, and immediately proceeded to the Regent's Canal, and there

drowned the child.

Verdict-Guilty.

Prendergast and Thomas, for the prosecution.

Doane, for the prisoner.

[Attornies-M'Gahey, and -]

ROLFE, B.-Ordered the judgment to be respited, his lordship being of opinion, on the authority of the case of Reg. v. Waters (a), that the prisoner could not be convicted

(a) 7 C. & P. 250.

for the murder

of an illegiti

mate child, a month old, in the first count,

described the

child as Harriet

Stroud; and in the second, as 66 a female of tender age,

whose name is to the jurors aforesaid un

It

known."
was proved that

the child
baptized Har-
riet, and was

so called, but

there was no

evidence that the child had ever been called Harriet Stroud: -Held, that the prisoner

could not be convicted on

either of these

counts, as the

child clearly
had the name
of Harriet,
though not that
of Stroud; and
that, in order
to sustain the
second count,
there must be
evidence shew-
ing that the
name of the

child could not
reasonably have

been supposed

to be known to

the grand jury.

1842.

REGINA

v.

STROUD.

on the first count of the indictment, and that there should have been a count for the murder of a child named "Harriet," and his lordship reserved the case for the opinion of the fifteen Judges on the question, whether the prisoner ought to have been convicted on the second count.

In the ensuing term, the case was considered by the Judges, who held the conviction wrong, their lordships being of opinion, that in order to sustain a count for the murder of a child whose name is to the jurors unknown, there must be evidence shewing that the name could not reasonably have been supposed to be known to the grand jury, and that here the child clearly had the name of "Harriet" (b).

(b) See the case of Regina v. Campbell, ante, p. 82.

REGINA V. STRINGER and NEWSTEAD.

A. and B. on a ASSAULT, with intent to rob.—The indictment charged

concerted plan to obtain money from C., threatened to accuse him of an indecent exposure of his person, and A. (B. being present) seized C. by the collar, and A. and C. went to a sta

there A. made

the threatened

the prisoners with having assaulted John Ellis Churchill, with intent to rob him, and charged that the prisoner Stringer had been previously convicted of felony.

It was proved by Mr. Churchill, the prosecutor, that on the morning of the 11th of August, 1842, he was walking in Hyde Park, at a little after nine o'clock, when he was accosted by the prisoner Newstead, who asked him the tion-house, and nearest way to the city. The prosecutor told him the best way was to go straight on, which would take him to Cumcharge:-Held, berland-gate. The prisoner Newstead then said he had lost his way, having been passing the day at Kensington. Almost immediately after this had occurred, the prisoner Stringer came up from behind, and seized the prosecutor threats used did by the collar, and said to him, "You damned beast, you not come within have been indecently exposing your person; I have been

that, on these

facts, A. and B.

might be convicted of an assault with in

tent to rob C.,

although the

the terms of

the stat. 7 & 8

Geo. 4, c. 29, ss. 7 and 9, or of the stat. 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 87, s. 4.

watching you with your friend (pointing to the prisoner Newstead) for three quarters of an hour." The prisoner Stringer then forced the prosecutor to go with him to a police-station, the prisoner Newstead accompanying them during a part of the way, but leaving them before they got to the station. At the station the prisoner Stringer repeated the charge which he made when he first seized the prosecutor, and added that the private parts of both the men were exposed; that one had his arms round the neck of the other, and each of them had hold of the private parts of the other. The whole of this charge was a fiction, and many circumstances were given in evidence to shew that the whole was a preconcerted plan between the two prisoners, for the purpose of extorting money from the prosecutor. No money, however, was given.

ROLFE, B., in summing up, told the jury that, if the prisoner Stringer was acting in pursuance of a previous plan arranged with the prisoner Newstead, with a view to induce Mr. Churchill to give him money, in order that he might escape the annoyance attending such a charge, that was an assault with intent to rob, and would warrant them in finding both the prisoners guilty on this indictment.

The jury found both the prisoners guilty (a).

Clarkson and Bodkin, for the prosecution.

[Attorney-Robinson.]

1842.

REGINA

v.

STRINGER.

THE learned Baron afterwards reserved the case for the opinion of the fifteen Judges on the question, whether the conviction could be sustained, as the subject of the charge made by the prisoner Stringer against Mr. Churchill did not come within the terms either of the stat. 7 & 8 Geo. 4,

(a) See the cases of Reg. v. Norton, 8 C. & P. 671, and Reg. v. Henry, 9 C. & P. 309.

1842.

REGINA

v.

STRINGER.

c. 29, ss. 7 and 9, or the stat. 1 Vict. c. 87, s. 4; but the case having been considered by the fifteen Judges, their lordships held the conviction right, as there was actual violence and an attempt to extort money by means of that violence combined with threats, which might be reasonably supposed calculated to induce the party assaulted to part with his money through fear of the charge.

OCTOBER SESSION, 1842.

BEFORE MR. JUSTICE MAULE AND MR. JUSTICE ERSKINE.

Oct. 27th. A person was indicted for uttering a coun

REGINA V. ELLEN CONNEll.

THE prisoner was indicted for felony in uttering, after a previous conviction, a piece of false and counterfeit coin, terfeit coin, in- resembling and apparently intended to resemble, and pass for a piece of the Queen's current silver coin called a groat, well knowing the same to be false and counterfeit, &c.

tended to re

semble and pass for "a groat." All

the witnesses

for the prose-
cution, except

the inspector of
coin for the
Mint, called it
a fourpenny

The witnesses who proved the uttering &c., all called the coin by the name of a fourpenny piece; but Mr. Field, the inspector of coin to the Mint, having said that the groat was counterfeit, was asked, on cross examination, piece. The in- "What do you call this coin?" He replied, “A groat— a groat, and said it has had that name, I believe, from the earliest period;

spector called it

he believed that

it had had that

name from the earliest period.

He added, that the original groat of Edw.

it has the words 'fourpence' on it, but the original name

was groat, in the time of Edward the Third: they were not then the same size and weight as this." On re-examination he was asked, "Have you heard them called groats?" and 3rd's reign was larger and hea- his reply was, "Yes, they are called groats as well as fourpenny pieces in the proclamation."

vier than the

coin in ques

tion; and that,

in the Queen's

proclamation, these coins were called both groats and fourpenny pieces. The proclamation was not produced, and the inscription on the coin itself was "fourpence:"-Held, that if the jury, from their own knowledge of the English language, without considering any evidence at all, were of opinion, that a groat and fourpenny piece were the same, the prisoner was rightly indicted and might be convicted.