There being no unity of estate in the several owners of the two franchises, the interest affected was several, and although the injury to each was due to a common cause, separate actions must be brought: Columbia Bridge Co. v. Geisse, 9 Vroom.

AGENT.

Tenant of Corporation, under Lease made by Agent, cannot dispute Agent's Authority-Ratification of Agent's Acts-Evidence of Autho rity. If a tenant enters into possession of premises under a parol lease, made by the attorney of a corporation, the tenant will not be permitted. to dispute the agent's authority if the company subsequently ratifies the agent's act: Brahn v. Jersey City Forge Company, 9 Vroom.

An agent who demands possession for his principal, must have authority to make the demand at the time of making it. A subsequent assent on the part of the landlord will not establish, by relation, a notice given in the first instance without authority: Id.

It is not necessary to prove an express authority to the agent; it may be inferred from circumstances which show the concurrence of the principal in his act: Id.

It is not necessary to show the tenant by proof at the time of the service that the agent had due authority; it is sufficient if such authority actually exists: Id.

Parol Proof of Agency.-Agency, as a question of fact, may be proved by the acts, declarations or conduct of the principal and agent, although the agent was appointed by power of attorney: Columbia Bridge Co. v. Geisse, 9 Vroom.

AMENDMENT.

Pleading-False Imprisonment.-In trespass for assault and battery, the declaration may be amended so as to include an allegation of unlawful detention or imprisonment: Cahill v. Terrio, 55 N. H.

ATTACHMENT.

Municipal Corporation subject to.-A municipal corporation is subject to garnishment under our attachment act: Mayor, &c., of Jersey City v. Horton, 9 Vroom.

ATTORNEY.

Authority to refer pending Cause.-An attorney of record, in an action which had been sent to a referee by order of court, signed an agreement in writing that the report of the referee should be final, and the agreement was entitled as of the term of the Circuit Court, to which the report was to be made. Held, that his client was bound by such agreement: Brooks v. New Durham, 55 N. H.

BANKRUPTCY.

Fraud-Adverse Proceedings under a Judgment by Default, not Fraudulent per se.-A creditor sued a debtor and obtained judgment by default, under which his goods were sold by the sheriff; within four months, proceedings in bankruptcy were commenced against the debtor, who was adjudged a bankrupt. These proceedings were not per se in fraud of the Bankrupt Law, although the creditor had reason to believe

that the debtor was insolvent at the time: Loucheim Brothers v. Henszey, 77 Pa.

In an action against the marshal for the sale of goods claimed to be the plaintiff's, although the uncontradicted evidence of plaintiff showed a clear case of fraud in fact, the question of fraud was for the jury: Id. Actual collusion, or fraud in fact, is always for the jury: Id.

Renewal of Security within Four Months of Decree-Fraud.-Where a person owing money, principal and interest, for some time overdue, but secured by mortgage, accounts with his creditor and on computation a sun is found as due for the principal and interest added together, any new mortgage given for the whole and on the same property on which the former mortgage was given, is not, upon satisfaction being entered on the old mortgage, to be considered as a new security and so open to attack under the Bankrupt Law, if made within four months before a decree in bankruptcy against the debtor. If the old security was not a preference, neither will the new one be so. They are to be considered as being for the same debt: Burnhisel v. Firman, 22 Wall.

CAPTURED AND ABANDONED PROPERTY.

Executed and Executory Contracts.-On the 31st of July 1863, during the late rebellion, E. and C., owning certain crops of cotton in Wilkinson county, Mississippi, executed a paper thus:

"We have, this 31st of July 1863, sold unto Mr. L. our crops of cotton, now lying in the county aforesaid, numbering about 2100 bales, at the price of ten cents per pound, currency, the said cotton to be delivered at the landing of Fort Adams, and to be paid for when weighed. Mr. L. agreeing to furnish, at his cost, the bagging, rope, and twine necessary to bale the cotton unginned, and we do acknowledge to have received, in order to confirm this contract, the sum of thirty dollars. This cotton will be received and shipped by the house of D. & Co., New Orleans, and from this date is at the risk of Mr. L. This cotton is said to have weighed an average of 500 pounds when baled."

At the time of making the contract, the cotton baled was stored under a covering of boards, and a small part of the cotton (about twenty bales) not baled, was in the gin-house on the Buffalo Bayou, about ten miles from the Mississippi river, at a place known as "The Rocks," or "Felter's Plantation," then without the Federal military lines; and C. and L. were together there. Immediately after the sale, L. employed a person, living near where the cotton was stored, to watch and take care of the same, and paid him therefor; and this person continued his care of it, till it was taken possession of in the name of the United States. Held, that, notwithstanding the words above italicized, the paper of the 31st of July 1863 was executory only and had not divested E. and C. of their property in the cotton; no money but the thirty dollars having been paid, and nothing else done in execution of the contract; and that in a suit for the proceeds of it under the Captured and Abandoned Property Act, which gives to the "owner" a right to recover, under certain circumstances, property captured or abandoned during the late civil war, they alone could sue: The Elgee Cotton Cases, 22 Wall.

The same E. and C. (or rather E. alone, who had now become sole owner of the cotton) subsequently to the above quoted contract with L.,

made another contract with N. (he not having notice of the first contract), by which E. contracted for the sale to N. "for so much of the 2100 bales as N. should get out in safety to a market, for the price of 157. per bale, to be paid at Liverpool. The risk of the cotton to be on the vendors." Held, equally, but as a matter even more plain than in the former case, that no property passed by the contract; no cotton ever having been got out. Held, further, that this was not altered by a letter in these words from the owners of the cotton :

"It having been agreed on between you and myself, that I sell to you all the cotton of E. and C. now baled and under shed, for the price of 157. sterling, per bale, payable in Liverpool, you will cause the same to be placed to my credit with J. A. J. & Co., of Liverpool:" Id.

CHURCH. See Taxation

Presbyterian Church Government-Acts of Synod ultra vires.-In the Reformed Presbyterian Church, the General Synod, its highest judicatory, is bound by its system of religious principles with the same force as individual members: McAuley and others' Appeal, 77 Pa.

A congregation, organized and holding its property as a constituent part of any particular religious denomination, or in subordination to its government, which, without just cause, severs such connection or government, forfeits its rights and property to those who maintain the original status: Id.

If such severance be alleged, the burthen is upon those alleging to show that the others voluntarily, by their own act and without sufficient cause, renounced their connection with the general organization and invaded the chartered rights of their fellows to the church property: Id.

A Presbytery of the Reformed Presbyterian Church, deeming that acts of the Synod were in disregard of the constitutional rights and jurisdiction of the Presbytery, resolved to suspend its "relations to Synod until such action be revoked, or (it) obtain further light, and in the meantime remain in the Reformed Presbyterian Church," &c. the allegations were correct, the Presbytery was justified: Id.

If

The resolution having been laid before Synod, it, without notice or trial, resolved that the officers and members of the Presbytery were out of the jurisdiction of the Synod; and such officers and members of the Fifth Congregation (and others) who might not identify themselves with the act of Presbytery, &c., be declared the Fifth Congregation, &c.: Held, that this action of Synod did not unchurch the Fifth Congrega. tion, &c. Id.

By the Presbyterian policy, officers and members of a church cannot be unchurched by an arbitrary decree of Synod without notice or trial, although the admitted act complained of be contumacious and worthy of censure: Id.

A Presbyterian congregation does not select its representatives to its higher courts; the pastor is a delegate by virtue of his office, and the lay representative is chosen by the Session; a congregation cannot be chargeable with the acts of its delegates: Id.

The excision of the Presbytery could not work the deposition of officers in the church previously called and ordained: Id.

Under its legislative powers Synod may dissolve a Presbytery and

assign its churches to some other Presbytery; under its judicial powers, it may, for proper cause and in due form, depose a presbyter, dissolve churches and reorganize them: Id.

A legislative act of Synod which forfeits the franchises and property of a congregation, is in the nature of a judicial sentence and inoperative; it is ultra vires: Id.

Synod has no more power to exscind a church than a state legislature to exscind a county; the forfeiture of its rights by the church must be made to appear by a regular judicial decree: Id.

The only constitutional method by which a congregation can express itself is by congregational meetings regularly called: Id.

The decree of excision of the Synod amounted at most but to a dissolution of the original compact of union, leaving the several churches free to seek their own connections or to arrange themselves as might seem meet, provided they did not radically depart from the faith or doctrines under which they were organized: Id.

COMMON CARRIER.

Delivery-Goods marked C. O. D.—A bailee of goods, sending them by a carrier, may sue the carrier for the delivery of the same to the consignee without payment, when payment was imposed as a condition of delivery: Murray v. Warner, 55 Ñ. H.

CONFEDERATE NOTES.

Debtor and Creditor-Payment in Notes not Legal Currency in the United States.-After the late rebellion broke out, debtors in the rebellious states had no right to pay to the agents or trustees of their creditors in the loyal states, debts due to these last in any currency other than legal currency of the United States. Payment in Confederate notes or in Virginia bank notes (security for whose payment was Confederate bonds, and which notes like the bonds themselves never, after the rebellion broke out, were safe, and before it closed had become worthless), held to have been no payment, and the debtor charged de novo: Fretz v. Stover, 22 Wall.

CONFLICT OF LAWS. See Execution.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Ferry.

Title of Act. It is sufficient if the title of an act fairly give notice of its subject so as reasonably to lead to any inquiry into the body of the bill State Line and Juniata Railroad Co.'s Appeal. 77 Pa.

An original act was, To incorporate the State Line, &c., Railroad," another was "A supplement to an act to incorporate the State Line, &c., Railroad;" another, "A further supplement to an act to incorporate the State Line, &c., Railroad." All the provisions in both supplements related to the State Line, &c., road. The object of the supplements was sufficiently expressed in their titles, the object being germane to the original act: Id.

CONTEMPT.

Res adjudicata-Setting up Title after Injunction and Final Decree. -In the original decree in the case of Texas v. White & Chiles, 7 Wall. 700, the defendants were perpetually enjoined from setting up

any claim or title to any of the bonds, or coupons attached to them, which were the subject-matter of the suit. The bill, answers, and proceedings in the case show that the purpose of the suit was to establish the title of the state to these bonds, and to free it from the embarrassment of the claim of defendants: In re Chiles, 22 Wall.

All parties to the suit were, therefore, bound by the decree as to that title, and because Chiles was the owner, or now asserts himself to be the owner, through a transaction not set up in his answer, he is not the less concluded and bound to obey the above injunction: Id.

Notwithstanding he now asserts a different title, or source of title, held by him when the suit was brought, from the one imputed to him in the suit and defended by him, he is in contempt of court in setting up and seeking to enforce his claim: Id.

Punishments for contempt of court have two aspects, namely: 1. To vindicate the dignity of the court from disrespect shown to it or its orders. 2. To compel the performance of some order or decree of the court which it is in the power of the party to perform and which he refuses to obey Id.

:

In the present case there is no part of the original decree which Chiles can perform which remains unexecuted, and no additional order or decree can be made for him to perform in this proceeding for contempt. The court, therefore, sentences him to a fine of $250 and costs for his contempt in setting up a claim of title to seventy-six of the bonds mentioned in the decree: Id.

CORPORATION. See Agent.

Treasurer-Interference with by Directors.-The treasurer of a corporation is the proper officer charged by law with the custody of its funds, and responsible for their safe keeping. The directors cannot lawfully deprive the corporation of the benefit of this responsibility by depositing the funds with others for safe keeping, or causing such disposition of the funds to be made, and may be restrained by injunction from so doing at the suit of any stockholder, on a proper case being made: Pearson v. Tower, 55 N. H.

COVENANT. See Deed.

CRIMINAL LAW. See Habeas Corpus; Intoxicating Liquors.

Confessions-Motives of others jointly Indicted, but on Separate TrialDeclaration. The burden of showing that a confession of guilt was obtained by improper inducements rests with the defendant: Rufer v. The State, 25 Ohio St.

Where, on a criminal trial, a witness is offered by the state to prove a confession made by the defendant, to the admission of which testimony the defendant objects, on the ground that the confession was not voluntary, it is the right of the defendant to inquire of the witness and prove his objection before the confession is given in evidence; and it is error for the court, in such case, to refuse him leave to make such examination until after the examination in chief has been concluded and the confession given to the jury: Id.

Where it is shown that two or more persons acted in concert in the commission of an alleged murder, it is competent for the state, by proper