contract to all those intents and purposes it extends

to.

6. There is the relation of masters and servants. For between master and servant there are mutual engagements, which are either expressed in their contract or implied in their relation; and whether there be any formal contract between them or no, their very relation is an implicit bargain, and supposes a mutual engagement to one another. By being a servant to another, I put myself into his hands and disposal, and devote my time and pains and labour to him; by virtue of which he acquires a just right to my time and service, my fidelity and cheerful obedience: and therefore if, either by gaming, loitering, or company-keeping, I alienate my time from him; or if by my sloth and idleness I rob him of my pains and labour, or by my hypocritical eyeservice, or betraying his trusts, or wasting or embezzling his goods, I deprive him of my truth and fidelity; or if, lastly, by my stubbornness and obstinacy, I purloin from him my duty and obedience, I am a dishonest and unjust servant, and, however I may escape now, must one day expect to give an account to my just and all-seeing Master in heaven. Accordingly in scripture servants are enjoined to obey their masters in all things, Col. iii. 22. and to do service to them with good will, Eph. vi. 7. to serve them with singleness of heart, not to purloin their goods, or answer them again in a froward and surly manner, Tit. ii. 9, 10. Since then they stand obliged to these duties, both by precept of scripture and the natural engagement of their relation, it is plain they cannot act contrary thereunto, without openly transgressing the laws of God, and trespass

ing on the rights of men. And so on the other hand, by being a master to another, I stand engaged to maintain and protect him in my service, to pay him the wages, or teach him the trade for which he serves me; not to out-task his ability, nor impose any thing on him but what is tolerable and merciful; to correct him with gentleness, prudence, and mercy, and not to restrain him too rigidly from fitting and healthful recreation; and above all, to admonish him of his faults, instruct him in his duty, and give him all cheerful encouragements to welldoing. For I ought to consider, that I am master of a man of the same kind with myself, that hath a right upon that account to be treated humanely; which if I do not, instead of being a just master, I am a savage tyrant; and also I should consider that I am master of an immortal man, who upon that account hath a right to be treated religiously, that hath a soul to be saved, and an eternal interest to be secured; which if I take no care of, I treat him rather as my dog than my servant, as a beast that perishes, than as a man that is to live for ever. So that if any of these ways I am wanting to my servant, I am a transgressor of that rule of righteousness that is founded in my relation to him; and though the crying necessities of his soul and body cannot penetrate my ears, nor move my adamantine bowels to a more just and pious treatment; yet the cry of those wrongs and injuries I do him by my unjust, inhuman, and irreligious usage, will certainly penetrate the ears of God, and provoke his vengeance to a dire retribution of it.

7. There is the relation of trustees to those that trust them: for he who trusts another doth thereby

create a very near and intimate relation to him; so far forth as he trusts him, he puts his case into his hands, and deposits his interest in his disposal, and thereby creates him his proxy, or his second self. So that when I accept of the trust which another offers me, whether it be to be an arbitrator in his cause, or an executor of his will, or a guardian to his children, or a keeper of any pledge or depositum he commits to me, I do thereby enter into a close alliance and relation with him; I put on his person, engage to supply his place, to act as his representative, or alter ego, and, so far as he trusts and confides in me, to do for him as if the case were my own, to determine his cause, to execute his will, and dispose of his children, and secure his pledges to him, as if I were himself, and those were all my own. And by entering into this near relation to him, I give him a right, so far forth as he intrusts me, to my skill and care, fidelity and industry; all which, by putting on his person, I have listed and engaged in his service. So that if, by my own carelessness or neglect, I suffer any of his trusts to miscarry, I am highly dishonest and injurious to him; because I undertook to do for him all that I can suppose he would have done for himself, had he been master of my skill and ability. But if for a bribe, or to serve my interest, I betray the trust he committed to me, or convert it to my own advantage, I rob him more basely and infamously, than if I bade him stand, and demanded his purse on the highway: for then I had robbed him in the person of an enemy, but now I rob him in his own, and make use of that trust to betray his interest, by which I was as much obliged to secure and defend it, as if I had exchanged per

sons with him, and his interest were my own: and to betray his interest for my own advantage, when he had made me his second self, and I had engaged myself to be so, is a piece of the most inhuman and disingenuous perfidiousness and injustice; because by thus doing I abuse his good opinion of me, for which I stand obliged to him, into an occasion of betraying him. So that in effect I have borrowed his person, which he freely lent me, only to rob and despoil him; and from his confidence in my truth and fidelity, by which he was justly entitled to it, have basely taken occasion to defraud him of that trust which he freely deposited in my hands and disposal.

8. There is the relation of the benefactor to the receiver. For he who doth good to another doth thereby contract a relation to him; because in doing good to him he espouses his interest, and in espousing his interest he espouses himself; he performs the part of his brother, of his father, and his God, whose highest character and eulogium is to be good and to do good; and consequently in all these capacities he stands related to him. And by virtue of this relation he acquires a right in the person obliged to be esteemed and beloved by him; to be prayed for and requited by him, whenever he hath opportunity and ability. For there is always a right acquired by benefits, where there was none antecedently: he who doth a good turn deserves and merits of him that receives it; and what he deserves, he hath a right to. So that every receiver is debtor to his benefactor; he owes him all the good he receives from him, and is always obliged to a thankful acknowledgment, and, whenever he hath opportunity,

to an equivalent requital. For though my benefactor gives me his benefit freely, as having no need of it himself, or at least not so much as I, and therefore cannot legally demand a repayment of it; yet whatsoever he gives me he deserves of me, and whenever our circumstances change, and he hath my need, and I his ability, I am in conscience as much obliged to repay it, as if he had lent it me upon bond. In this case, my ability is security for the benefit I owe him, and his need is a just demand of it; and therefore since what he hath merited of me is his due, I am extremely unjust, if, when his needs do demand it, I do not repay him so far as I am able. But if either I am not able to repay him an equivalent benefit, or he hath no need or occasion for it, I am bound in justice to express my gratitude to him in thankful remembrances and acknowledgments, to take all fair occasions to own and celebrate his goodness, and, by all the little services I can render him, to express a forward willingness to make him a full requital. For as in matter of debt, he who cannot pay all must compound, and pay so far as he is able; so in the matter of benefits, he who cannot make a complete requital, is obliged in justice to make some small composition, and pay so much in the pound as his ability extends to; and if he can do no more, to express a grateful sense of them, and give thankful words for beneficial deeds; which all generous benefactors esteem the noblest requital. But he who receives benefits without some thankful acknowledgment acts the part of a swine, that greedily devours the acorns, and never looks up towards the tree from whence they drop; and he who requites benefits with injuries acts the part of a devil, that would fain have thrown that blessed