only a sensitive, but a rational and immortal creature, he hath a right to be treated as such by all that are of his class and order. And for a man to treat a man otherwise, is wrongfully to depose and degrade him from that noble rank of being wherein the God of nature hath placed him. For whatsoever his outward condition may be, I ought to consider him as a man, as one that is placed in the same rank of being with myself; though he be my slave or vassal, I ought to respect him as an individual of my own kind, and not use him rudely, harshly, or contemptuously like a dog; though he be poor and mean in his outward circumstances, yet I ought to regard him as a branch that is sprung out of my own stock, and not to contemn or despise him, as if he were a creature of an inferior species; though he should be a fool or a madman, yet I ought to respect him as my brother man, i. e. endowed with the same faculties with myself, though through the unhappy defect of his bodily organs he cannot exert and exercise them; and not to scorn and deride him, as if he were an ape or a baboon, that seemed to be made on purpose to be laughed at: yea, though (which is worst of all) he should be a lewd or wicked man, yet I ought to consider him as a stem of my own root, and not abuse, disdain, or vilify him, as if he were only a two-legged brute, or an upright animal. So that there is a respect that is eternally due to human nature; wherever it is, or whatever disadvantages it is attended with, it is stamped with the image of God, and that ought to be reverenced by the whole creation. And therefore whoever uses a man inhumanly, affronts both God and his own kind, and violates the most sacred right of human nature. If

therefore we would render to men their natural right and due, we must take care not to behave ourselves rudely and insolently, superciliously and contemptuously, towards them; and we must endeavour, as much as in us lies, to accommodate ourselves to their particular tempers, and not be froward and untractable, or tenacious of our own humour, especially when it lies in another man's way; but be apt to recede and give place, that there may be room for other men's humours as well as ours. For what reason is there, that our particular humour should take up all the world? We have no more right to be morose and inflexible than other men; and should they be as unyielding as we, we must either stand at a perpetual bay, or resolve to justle with every one we meet, till we have forced all to give way, or they have forced us. For whilst we want this complaisance towards others, we are in society like irregular stones in a building, which take up more room than they fill; and, till they are polished and made even, will not permit others to lie near them. This respect therefore we owe to human nature, which is common to all men, to file off that unmanly sharpness and ruggedness of humour, which renders us perverse and untractable in our conversation; that so we may be able to compose ourselves into such respectful, courteous, and obliging deportment towards all men, as is due to the essential dignity of human nature. And thus you see what rights are accruing to men as they are rational creatures, and consequently what acts of justice, as such, they owe to one another.

CHAP. III.

Of justice in preserving the rights of men, as united together by natural relations, and as joined together in society.

III. WE will consider men as rational creatures united together by natural relations; such as parents and children, brothers and sisters, and consanguineous kindred; in which several relations they have their peculiar rights appertaining to them. Thus parents, by giving nurture and education to their children, have a natural right to be beloved and reverenced and obeyed by them; and for children to withhold these dues from them is not only a foul ingratitude, but a great injustice. They owe their parents for their lives and limbs, for the health of their bodies, and the use of their faculties; and what a small composition is there in their love and obedience for so great a debt? They borrowed their being from their parents, and therefore are their natural subjects, properties, and pensioners; and to be sure every lord hath a right to the obedience of his subject, every owner to the disposal of his property, every benefactor to the love of his pensioner; and consequently every parent, who is all these together, to all these respects and duties from their children." And so on the other hand, children have a right to be treated as children to their parents, that is, as their natural images and copies, as parts of their own substance, as flesh of their flesh, and bone of their bones, or as themselves derived and multiplied; which gives them a natural right to be dearly beloved and kindly treated, to be fed and clothed, instructed and provided for by their parents, according

to their power and ability: and for any parent not to render these dues and rights to his children, is not only an unnatural cruelty, but a barbarous injustice. And then for brethren and sisters and consanguineous relations, their partaking of the same blood and substance, as being coined in the same mint, and more immediately derived from the same root and fountain, gives them a natural right to be mutually beloved, and esteemed, and relieved, and assisted by one another; and they cannot be unkind, ill-natured, or hard-hearted towards one another, without breaking all the ties of nature, and being unjust violators of its sacred rights. These, in short, are the rights which accrue to men, as united together by natural relations.

IV. Fourthly, and lastly, We will consider men as rational creatures joined together in society and because society is natural to men, and that not only as they are rational creatures, but as they were always born and bred in society; therefore whatsoever rights accrue to them from hence may be justly ranked among those rights which are natural. And men being by nature united in society with one another, there doth from thence accrue to us a right to all that is necessary to the obtaining the common benefits of society; otherwise our being united in society would be perfectly insignificant to us. Now the common benefit of society is mutual assistance, comfort, and support; to the obtaining of which these things are absolutely necessary: first, Love: secondly, Peace: thirdly, Truth: fourthly, Repute: fifthly, Protection: sixthly, Communication in the profits of intercourse. To all which every man must have a right by virtue of his being in society; other

wise he is in society to no purpose. These things I shall but very briefly insist on, because I have handled most of them at large upon another occasion a.

1. By virtue of our being united in society, we have a right to be beloved of one another. For being all incorporate members of one body, we naturally owe each other a mutual sympathy and fellow-feeling of each other's pains and pleasures; without which we can never be concerned as we ought to succour and relieve one another. If I partake in another's joys and sorrows, it is my interest to contribute all I am able to his happiness; but unless I am partner in his fortunes, it will be indifferent to me whether he be happy or miserable. And as it is sympathy that engages us to a mutual assistance, so it is love that engages us to a mutual sympathy: it is love that confederates our souls, and causes us to espouse one another's interests; and therefore, so far as we fall short of this, we must necessarily fall short of the end of our society, which is to aid and assist one another: which we shall never do, unless we are constantly inclined to it by a mutual benevolence. But while we hate and malign one another, our being united together in society will only furnish us with surer means and fairer opportunities to wreak our spite upon each other. So that not to love one another, while we are thus associated, is not only uncharitable, but unjust; since we thereby rob one another of one of the most necessary means to obtain the end of our society. For when men's hearts are di vided, it is impossible their hands should be long united in a mutual defence and assistance; so that by withdrawing our love from each other, we do, so

a Vol. i.