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As to appeals from the determination of commissioners of highways, 1 R. S. 518 to 521.

The general jurisdiction of the late courts of common pleas will be found laid down in title V. chap. I. part III. of the Revised Statutes, 2 R. S. 208 to 218, and in various local statutes, some of which will be found collected in vol. 2 of the third edition of those Statutes, page 273 to 293, and the remainder in the laws of the different years subsequent to the publication of that edition.

The provisions as to the collection and remission of fines and forfeited recognizances, are contained in art. II. title VI. chap. VIII. part III. of the Revised Statutes, 2 R. S. 483 to 488.

On reference to the Codes of 1848 and 1849, it will be seen that the jurisdiction of these courts is most materially extended by the recent amendments. In the first place, they now possess original cognizance of actions in general, instituted for the recovery of either money or property, to the value of $500, (but subject to the controling powers of the supreme court,) which, under the former measures, did not come within the scope of their jurisdiction. The local exceptions in this respect with reference to the counties of Kings and Erie, will, however, be noticed; Albany and Monroe were likewise excluded under the Code of 1851. In the second place the statutory authorities, formerly vested in the courts of common pleas, are more extensively attributed to them; and, in the third, by subdivision 13 as it now stands, the full powers of the higher courts of record, with reference to the review of their own decisions on case or exceptions, are, for the first time, distinctly given to them. They thus possess within themselves all the usual powers of courts of record, in reference to the decision of the questions submitted to them; though, of course, only within the limits of their peculiar jurisdiction, and subject, in all cases where a ministerial statute authority is not exercised, to the control of the appellate tribunal. Their proceedings are governed by the new rules of the supreme court, so far as they are applicable.Sec. 470. In the Codes of 1848 and 1849, the sittings of this class of tribunals were called and treated as general terms, although held by only one judge. In the present measure, however, this nomenclature is abandoned, and it will be seen by consulting section 31, that these courts are always open for the transaction of business in matters which are not litigated, and that at least

two terms, and as many more as the judge may appoint, are to be held yearly in each county, for the trial of issues of law and fact in the ordinary course, at periods to be fixed by such judge, and to be advertised for at least four weeks in the state and county papers; with power for the designation of terms to be held for the trial of issues of law only, or of those proceedings at which no jury shall be required to attend.

The provisions of sect. 24, as last amended, confer the fullest powers of adjournment with reference to the different terms to be held as above stated.

The appellate jurisdiction of these tribunals has been before defined. Their decisions are reviewable by the general term of the supreme court under chap. III. of title XI. of the second part of the Code.

By the amendments of 1851 and 1852, these tribunals are substituted for the supreme court, as the proper forum for the decision of questions of title in suit originally commenced in the justices' courts, but discontinued under the provisions of secs. 55 to 62, inclusive. Sec. 68, as printed in the laws of 1851, has been omitted to be corrected in this respect, but, that this is a mere clerical error, is self-evident.

If a county court entertain a suit for an amount exceeding the limits of its jurisdiction as above defined, the proceedings will of course be void.-Griswold v. Sheldon, 4. Comst. 581; 1 C. R. (N. S). 261.

In proceedings supplementary to an execution issued by the county court, a judge of the supreme court has no power to make an order, and if made, such order will be vacated. The power in this respect is limited, by sec. 292, to a judge of the court or a county judge, and therefore the county judge alone has jurisdiction.--Blake v. Locy, 6 How. 108.

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE SUPERIOR COURT AND COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.

THOUGH, relatively speaking, of far higher authority than the courts treated of in the last division, these tribunals possess, in some features, an analogous jurisdiction. The superiority alluded to, consists in the fact of their decisions being reviewable at once by the court of appeals, without any intermediate revision. Their jurisdiction is also, within its peculiar scope, unlimited in its nature, and unfettered by any restriction as to the form or amount of the controversies brought before it. These two tribunals are, in fact, of coördinate and equal authority with the supreme court, in all matters duly brought under their cognizance; and, although the decisions of the latter are, of course, always considered by them as entitled to the highest respect; still, wherever any disagreement of opinion has occurred, they have never hesitated to disregard the authority of those decisions, and to make rulings to the contrary effect.

The cases of Ford v. Babcock, 2 Sandf. S. C. R. 519, and The Washington Bank of Westerly v. Palmer, Id. 686, may be mentioned as two out of the many instances of the exercise of this discretion, appearing upon the recent reports. In the case of Cashmere v. De Wolf, 2 Sandf. S. C. R. 379, the powers of this court to assume jurisdiction of a matter, which, under ordinary circumstances, would have been one of admiralty cognizance, were also distinctly asserted: and, although in Sturgis v. Law, 3 Sandf. S. C. R. 451, the court there refused to assume jurisdiction of a case arising out of salvage, still that decision proceeded on a general view of common law jurisdiction, and not on any point in connection with the special powers of these courts.

It would seem that doubts have been started as to the equity jurisdiction of the superior court, but, when examined into, those doubts appear to rest upon little or no foundation. The preamble of the Code, and sec. 69, when read in connection with the unlimited cognizance of actions within their local limits,

which is conferred upon these courts in general by sec. 33, and moreover with the peculiar cognizance of transferred equity cases given to the superior court by sec. 47, are utterly and irreconcilably at variance with any such notion; and jurisdiction of this nature has been exercised by this court from the original passage of the Code, without any question whatever. To cite cases upon the subject would be really superfluous, as the exercise of that jurisdiction appears in almost every page of the three volumes of Sandford's Reports.-Cashmere v. De Wolfe, above cited; Linden v. Hepburn 3 Sandf. S. C. R. 668; 3 C. R. 165; 5 How. 188. and Mayne v. Griswold, 3 Sandf. S. C. R. 463, may be taken as types of this class of cases, but to attempt to cite the whole of them, would be unnecessary.

It need scarcely be said that the reports of cases decided in this court are of high authority, and possess, moreover, a general character of unity with each other, owing to the peculiar centralization of the court, and to that constant communication which takes place between all the judges composing it, which, in the more widely-diffused attributes of the supreme court is, of course, physically impracticable.

The jurisdiction of these courts and of those comprised in the next division are thus defined by the Code.

§ 33. The jurisdiction of the superior court of the city of New York, of the court of common pleas for the city and county of New York, of the mayors' courts of cities, and of the recorders' courts of cities, shall extend to the following actions:

1. To the actions enumerated in section one hundred and twentythree and one hundred and twenty-four, when the cause of action shall have arisen, or the subject of the action shall be situated, within those cities respectively.

2. To all other actions where all the defendants shall reside, or are personally served with the summons within those cities respectively, or where one or more of several defendants, jointly liable on contract, reside or are personally served with the summons, within those cities respectively, except in the case of mayors' and recorders' courts of cities, which courts shall only have jurisdiction where all the defendants reside within the cities in which such courts are respectively situated. The supreme court may remove into that court any action brought under this subdivision and pending in the superior court, or court of common pleas for the city and county of New York, and may change the place of trial, therein, as if such action had been commenced in the supreme court; such order for re

moval and for change of place of trial to be made in the supreme court upon motion, and on filing a certified copy of such order in the office of the clerk of the superior court, or of the court of common pleas, such cause shall be deemed to be removed into the supreme court, which shall proceed therein as if the same had originally been commenced there; and the clerk with whom such order is filed, must forthwith deliver to the clerk of the county in which, by such order, the trial is ordered to be had, to be filed in his office, all process, pleadings, and proceedings relating to such cause. And any action or proceeding pending in any mayor's or recorder's court, in which the judge is for any cause incapable of acting, may by such court be transferred to the county court of the county; and thereupon the papers on file in the mayor's or recorder's court shall be transmitted to the county court; which shall thenceforth have jurisdiction of such action or proceeding.

3. To actions against corporations, created under the laws of this state, and transacting their general business, or keeping an office for the transaction of business within those cities respectively, or established by law therein, or created by or under the laws of any other state, government, or country, for the recovery of any debt or damages, whether liquidated or not, arising upon contract made, executed, or delivered within the state, or upon any cause of action arising therein.

The actions enumerated in subdivision 1, are all either real actions, or otherwise of a local nature, requiring trial by a local court, and,a s such, peculiarly falling within the cognizance of these courts, as answering that description. Subdivision 2 is extended in operation, and somewhat altered in phraseology from the same provision as it stood in the Code of 1851. The extension is with reference to actions against defendants jointly indebted on contract; service on any one of whom within the limits is now sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Under these provisions any cause of action whatsoever is now cognizable by these courts, provided the conditions precedent as to residence or service are satisfied; but it will be seen that, under the latter part of the clause, the supreme court possesses the same powers of removing actions from these courts into any other county within its own peculiar cognizance, which it possesses with reference to the change of the place of trial from one of those counties to another; and this power has been extended by the last amendment and made applicable to any action brought under this last subdivision, whether transitory or not, without restriction. This

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