in equitable as in legal cases; though wider in their general scope, in those falling under the former category. Objections to pleadings, on the score of indefiniteness or uncertainty, do not appear to be of such frequent occurrence. The reported cases, on that branch of the subject, are only two. In Smith v. Shufelt, 3 C. R. 175, a motion of this nature was refused; though the answer merely alleged, on information and belief, that the plaintiff had received something on account of his demand, and was not entitled to the whole sum claimed. The allegation there appears to have been, at all events, sufficient to raise an issue, on which the real question between the parties would be triable. In Wiggins v. Gaus, 3 Sandf. S. C. R. 738; 1 C. R. (N. S.) 117, a stricter view was taken, and it was held that two successive answers, pleading a set-off, the first, by mere reference to the complaint, without stating particulars, and the second, in the words of a common count for work and labor in assumpsit, under the old practice, were both of them indefinite and uncertain; and the former of them was stricken out with costs. In Tallman v. Green, 3 Sandf. S. C. R. 437, it was laid down that a pleading must set forth the case with sufficient certainty, so as to give the court adequate data on which to ground the judgment. The criterion here laid down will be useful on motions of this nature, though, in that case, the objection was raised by demurrer, and sustained by the court. The latter proceeding will, in fact, be, for the most part, the proper course under such circumstances. In the Appendix will be found a form of notice of motion, under the above circumstances. The notice should specify exactly the parts objected to. This motion being made on the pleading itself, no affidavit will be necessary. See Darrow v. Miller, 5 How. 247. In case, however, the opposite party does not appear, it will be necessary to be prepared with proof, that the pleading moved upon is the one actually served by him, and of the date when it was so served.--Rogers v. Rathbone, 6 How. 66. In Howell v. Fraser, 6 How. 221, 1 C. R. (N. S.) 270, it was held, that where a pleading is correct in substance but not in form, the objection, on the ground of uncertainty, should be raised by motion of the above description, and not by demurrer. See, also, Fry v. Bennett, 9 L. O. 330; 1 C. R. (N. S.) 238, as before stated. BOOK VI. OF THE PLEADINGS IN AN ACTION, AND THE PROCEED- CHAPTER I. OF THE COMPLAINT, AND THE PROCEEDINGS COLLATERAL THEREWITH. THIS pleading answers to the declaration at common law, or the bill in chancery, under the old practice. It contains the statement of the case of the plaintiff, under which he seeks relief, and a definition of the relief sought by him. It is, therefore, the foundation of the action, and the original source of all other proceedings, down to the period of its final termination. In justices' courts, as before remarked, the complaint and all other pleadings are verbal, except in certain cases, before adverted to. The provisions of the Code on the subject of this important pleading, are as follows: § 141. The first pleading on the part of the plaintiff, is the complaint. § 142. The complaint shall contain: 1. The title of the cause, specifying the name of the court in which the action is brought, the name of the county in which the plaintiff desires the trial to be had, and the names of the parties to the action, plaintiff and defendant. 2. A plain and concise statement of the facts constituting a cause of action without unnecessary repetition. 3. A demand of the relief, to which the plaintiff supposes himself entitled. If the recovery of money be demanded, the amount thereof shall be stated. The first requisite, then, for the regularity of a complaint is, that it should be properly entitled, a precaution which ought indeed to be observed, with reference to every pleading or proceeding in the cause. The questions as to the name of the court in which relief is sought, have already been anticipated, and the cases thereon cited, under the head of summons. It is peculiarly essential that this should be properly stated in the complaint, and that the names of the parties should also be correctly given. A practice has obtained of occasionally entitling this pleading by the name of the plaintiff, and the name of the first defendant alone, with the words "et al." subjoined, to signify that there are others. This seems to be decidedly incorrect, and contrary to the evident meaning of the statute. It is, however, one of that species of objections which the court will, in no case, allow to be insisted upon to the obstruction of justice. Thus, in Hill v. Thacter, 3 How. 407, 2 C. R. 3, where the complaint, was entitled," Emily Hill, &c. v. Christian Thacter," instead of Emily Hill, by Daniel Hill, her guardian, that title was sustained, in as much as the facts of Daniel Hill's guardianship, and the names, were correctly given in the body of the complaint itself. This is, however, one of those cases of occasional occurrence, which serve rather as beacons to point out the mistakes to be avoided, than as guides in any respect whatever. Another point essential to the proper entitling of a complaint, is the statement of "the name of the county in which the plaintiff desires, the trial to be had." In courts of special jurisdiction, such as the New-York superior court, and court of common pleas, this precaution is not necessary. The name of the court itself, points out with certainty the place where the trial is to be had. In all other cases, however, the precaution is absolutely essential. The governing sections of the Code on the subject of fixing the venue, are 123 to 125, inclusive. By sec. 123, actions in respect of real or specific personal property must be tried in the county in which the subject of the action, or some part of that subject, is situate, and the venue must be laid accordingly; and by sec. 123, the venue as to actions for penalties and forfeitures, and against public officers, for acts. done in the execution of their offices, is also declared to be local, except as regards offences committed on rivers, &c., between two counties, in which case the action may be brought in either. In foreclosure, the venue must be fixed in the county, or in one of the counties in which the mortgaged premises are situate, without regard to that in which the loan was actually made.-Miller v. Hull, 1 C. R. 113. In actions not of a local nature, the venue may be fixed in any county in which the parties or any of them reside, at the commencement of the action: or, if none of the parties reside in the state, the plaintiff is at liberty to designate any county he may choose. In all these cases, however, the plaintiff's power to fix the venue is subject to the defendant's right to change it, if improperly fixed, or to move the court for a change on other grounds, which subjects will be treated of hereafter. The next requisite as to the due preparation of the complaint, is that prescribed by subdivision 2, with reference to the proper statement of the cause of action. The observations as to the necessary averments of fact in this pleading, have, in a great measure, been anticipated in the preceding chapters. It remains, then, to point out some considerations applicable to the proper form of complaint, separately considered in different special cases. In every instance, as before observed, the statements in it should be strictly confined to facts, establishing or tending to establish the main cause of action, or the plaintiff's right to some peculiar relief arising out of it, and this with regard to the essence of that relief, and not to its mere form; nothing collateral, nothing unconnected, nothing merely probative is striatly anaabi. 5སས་སཅས against in the framing on the complaint, will be found collected at sec. 144 of the Code, under the head of demurrer. See hereafter on that subject. The plaintiff's counsel must be especially careful, that the facts on which the jurisdiction of the court, or the plaintiff's right to sue depends, should be specially and plainly averred in all cases which admit of any doubt as to either. He must also direct his peculiar attention to the joinder of all proper parties, and to the making a clear, and, above all, a sufficient statement of the cause or causes of action sought to be established, taking the utmost care to separate and classify the latter, where more than one is sought to be enforced in the same proceeding. By section 167, special provisions are made upon this last, subject as follows: § 167. The plaintiff may unite in the same complaint several causes of action, whether they be such as have been heretofore denominated legal or equitable, or both, where they all arise out of 1. The same transaction, or transactions connected with the same subject of action; ог 2. Contract, express or implied; or 3. Injuries with or without force, to person and property, or either; 4. Injuries to character; or 5. Claims to recover real property, with or without damages for the withholding thereof, and the rents and profits of the same; or 6. Claims to recover personal property, with or without damages for the withholding thereof; or 7. Claims against a trustee, by virtue of a contract, or by opera tion of law. But the causes of action, so united, must all belong to one of these classes, and must affect all the parties to the action, and not require different places of trial, and must be separately stated. Subdivision 1 of this section is new, and extends the possibility of joinder of causes of action to an almost indefinite extent, when arising out of the same transaction; unless, as is probable, that subdivision be held to be controlled by the remainder of the section, and in particular by the last clause.Subdivisions 2 and 3 in the Code of 1851 have been amalgamated, and now form subdivision 3. The word "only" has been stricken out of the concluding clause.-V. Alger v. Scoville, 6 How. 131, 1 C. R. (N. S.) 303, subsequently cited under that head. The question as to the possibility of including claims for legal and equitable relief in the same pleading, before settled, or nearly so, is now put out of doubt by the changes effected in the earlier part of the section. The fusion of subdivisions 2 and 3, of 1851, into subdivision |