SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, BART., D.C.L., LL.D., 8 MOORE, P. C.; 2 SMALE & GIFFARD; 3 ELLIS & LONDON: SWEET AND MAXWELL, LIMITED, 3, CHANCERY LANE. BOSTON: LITTLE, BROWN & CO. PREFACE TO VOL. XCVII. In the first case of this volume the names of the parties are disguised in the barbarous manner of transcription which prevails to this day in the High Court of Calcutta, but has been reformed at Bombay. The more general grounds of decision are important, notwithstanding subsequent changes in the law and government of British India, in the learning of Statutes of Limitation considered as part of the lex fori. Voyle v. Hughes, p. 107, shows Vice-Chancellor Stuart at his best in the discussion of the steps by which equity judges came to recognize that an equitable reversionary interest in personalty was after all a form of property, and there was no reason why it should not be assigned and capable of even a merely voluntary assignment. That such an interest should for a long time seem of too fleeting and subtle a nature to bear conveyance was not surprising; and certainly there was nothing peculiar to equity in that habit of mind. At common law it was long doubtful whether the general owner of a chattel had any remedy at all in respect of it unless he had the immediate right to possession. Freeland v. Stansfeld, p. 306, may still be of some use for the guidance of the Court in exercising the large discretion purposely given by the Partnership Act, 1890, s. 40, as to the return of a proportionate sum where a premium has been paid on entering a partnership, and the partnership is prematurely dissolved. The effect of this and other authorities before the Act (which were not quite uniform) is summed up by Lord Cairns in Atwood v. Maude, L. R. 3 Ch. 369, 372. Beanland v. Bradley, p. 228, is doubtless very good law. The only difficulty is to see how the plaintiff's counsel made any show of serious argument. Really the case almost |