was intended to be addressed to the insurgents by the foreign minis. ters united at Constantinople. It awaited only the sanction of the principal courts of Europe. The refusal of that sanction was, I believe, first notified by the Cabinet of Vienna. That of St. Petersburgh is stated to have been equally violent (and with more reason) in its expressions of disapprobation; and the late minister of Great Britain is said to have subscribed, without hesitation, to the political principle which prevented the ministers of legitimate sovereigns from all interference between the established Government of Turkey and its Christian rebels.'

This ‘political principle,' however, did not prevent the interference of the ministers and armies of legitimate sovereigns between the established Government of Spain and Italy, and the rebels in those countries; any more than it prevented the French Government from interfering between Great Britain and ber rebel colonies during the American war. Nor would there have been any scruple, probably, on the part of Austria, to interfere for the purpose of establishing the Imperial Butcher'

• more fumly on his throne, had not the sure and speedy extinction of the Greek Revolution been confidently anticipated as the result of the unaided might of the Porte. That it has not been extinguished, has been owing to noihing so much as to the weakness, imbecility, and infatuation of the Turkish Government. The Greeks have had every thing else against them, except the nature of their country and the providence of Heaven. All the efforts of British diplomatists have had for their sole object, not to meliorate the condition of the Greeks, but to prevent on the one band a Russian, on the other a Turkish war. It must be admitted, that to have taken part openly with the Greeks against Turkey, would have been an unwise and not altogether justifiable measure. It does not appear that the Greeks ever courted our aid, or would cordially have accepted it, or were capable of being benefited by such co-operation. Mr. Emerson states, that an honourable predilection in favour of England has long been manifested by the Greek Islanders. But the Capitani or military party, who affect to consider the negotiation of the loan as equivalent to the sale of the Morea, call themselves Anti-Anglicans. On this account, Mr. Waddington says, they are stigmatised by their adversaries with the name of Russians; but he is of opinion that there does not exist in the whole country, a party either really Russian or really English. In the first instance, it is certain, however, that the Patriots looked to Russia for aid. Since then, German, French, and American adventurers and intriguers have had no small share in the affairs of Greece. The British Government of the Ionian Isles was long regarded

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by the Greeks as actually inimical to their cause. Even if the military occupation of Greece by Great Britain could have been deemed a feasible and justifiable measure, it is not clear that we should not have found, at one time, a hostile population in the Greeks themselves, and traitors in their leaders. But had a favourable disposition towards the Greeks existed in the British Government at the commencement of the struggle, had the claims of humanity, to say nothing of policy, been allowed their due weight, some effort might surely have been made, without endangering the peace of Europe, to put a stop to a contest which involves every passive looker-on in almost the guilt of an accomplice.

• When the continental cabinets,' remarks Mr. Waddington, shall at last perceive, that there is no longer any prospect of the subjugation or extirpation of the insurgents; when they shall at last be brought to confess, that nearly half a million of human beings whom they have allowed to be sacrificed in their presence, have poured forth their innocent blood in vain; and that the nerveless arm of the Sultan is unequal to the task of restoring the social order of his dominions ;-hen perhaps will the philanthropic president of the Holy Alliance and its pacific and social minister unite with the British Government in the easy effort of obliging the Sublime Porte to some sort of convention with its intractable rebels.'

A single effort of sincere union between England and • Russia, with or without Austria,' would, he adds, be sufficient to effect the emancipation of Greece from the Turkish yoke.- At length, however, even the Porte itself seems disposed to come to terms; and in the event either of a Russian war, or of the Pasha of Egypt being embroiled with the Porte, their independence, if not their liberty, may be considered as achieved.

In the mean time, the most interesting inquiry relates to the real character of the leading men in the conflicting parties. The cause of freedom in Spain was lost through the want of efficient leaders,--the imbecility of the Constitutionalists, the jealousies, venality, and treachery of the Captains. These two great parties are now contending in Greece for ascendancy. This is always the case in revolutions. The Legislature seeks to usurp the prerogatives of the Executive, and to make the army its tool. The army, the only efficient Executive, is impatient of its many-headed master. The one grasps at the sword, while the other demands the purse, both of which are never safe in the same hands. The happiest event for Greece would be, that some Cromwell should step in between the two parties, and lay the foundations of a Grecian monarchy. But neither

Cromwells nor Washingtons, nor even Bolivars and Victorias are to be looked for among the Capitani of Greece.

The most prominent and clever personage among all who have taken any share in public affairs, is the person styling • himself Prince Mavrocordato,'-as Sir Thomas Maitland chose contemptuously to designate him. He may be considered as the head of the Constitutionalists. His person is thus described by Mr. Emerson.

• I was rather disappointed in the appearance of Mavrocordato : bis figure is small, and any thing but dignified or prepossessing. The little of bis countenance which is visible through his bushy hair and eye-brows, and his fiercely, curling mustachios, indicates more of childishness than intellect, though the deep glance of a penetrating ege gives it an occasional animation. His manners, like those of all Fanariots, though easy and obliging, contains too much of an overstrained politeness, which seems like intriguing servility; and this, together with a studied lightness of conversation and an extremely silly laugh, renders the first impression of him by no means favourable.'

This is not a very pleasing portrait. Count Pecchio speaks of him in the following terms.

• His countenance appeared to me much handsomer and more avimated than the pictures of him in London. He dressés à la Francaise. When I saw him the first time at Calamata, his dress was in holes, or rather torn, which proceeded, in my opinion, more from affectation than necessity. He speaks French with facility and elegance ; his conversation is lively, agreeable, and full of wit. He is very ready in his answers. One day, General Roche remarked, “ It is really a singular thing, that more is said at Paris about the affairs of Greece, than in Greece itself.” Mavrocordato replied, “ That is, because it is easier to talk than to act." The General then replied, " I believe it rather proceeds from our always speaking, like lovers, of those we love." Mavrocordato rejoined, " Pity that hitherto your love has been only Platonic.” He has all the talents requisite in a secretary of state ; and understands and expedites business with readiness. His enemies, unable to deny his ability on this point, say, that he handles the pen better than the sword. He does not possess such influence over his countrymen, as his talents and patriotism authorize; the reason is, that being born at Fanari, without connexions in Greece, without wealth, he is obliged to struggle singly against factions and cabals. For the same cause he is frequently obliged to make use of the arms of his enemies, and will find it difficult to reach the supreme authority in Greece. He is versed in the labyrinth of European politics, and his primary object is to preserve Greece independent. But, if ever she should be compelled to choose a protector, I am of opinion that Mavrocordato would give the preference to the most powerful and disinterested state to Great Britain.'

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Next comes Mr. Humphreys, who styles himself a young soldier,' and openly avows that not only his enthusiasm has been damped by what he has witnessed in Greece, but that their intrigues, dissensions, and singular want of spirit and activity have excited his vexation and indignation.

"Every Englishman,' he says, who arrived in Greece, was greatly prepossessed in favour of Mavrocordato, and we all at first thought him a princely fellow as well as a Prince; but he is neither the one nor the other. mentioned in a work entitled" Essai sur les Fanariotes."...He pos. His having no hereditary pretensions to the title is sessed at this time an unmerited reputation in other countries, facilitated by his knowledge of Europe, great tact in letter-writing, and indefatigable correspondence; though he well merits celebrity, if duplicity, intriguing talents, and total want of all rectitude of principle, be sufficient claims on notice. of the party of the Franc Greeks. He might be considered at the head chiefs were held not only as rebels and enemies to all order and estabColocotroni and other military lished government, but at Messolunghi, their fidelity to their country's cause was questioned.'

'Mavrocordato had been recalled from his command by the Government to resume his former post of secretary of state. But it seems his favourite ambition is, to figure as a great military commander; a strange perversion,-for, besides possessing neither military knowledge nor talent, he is utterly devoid of courage, a quality so indispensable in a general, On the appearance of danger, he loses all presence of mind; as he shewed at the battle of Peta, though he was not within five hours' march of the scene of action, and on the night of an expected attack of Lugovitza; at raising the siege of Patras, and his precipitate retreat; and, on the authority of a French officer on Mavrocordato's staff, the night of the assault of the Turks on Messolunghi, he embarked for Anatolia.'

"A sum of money entrusted to Mavrocordato by the German Greek Committee for the relief of the distressed Germans in Greece, he reserved to his own use; but he has been fortunate in receiving donations from distant countries. from Corfu; the London Committee sent him clothes and boots from Lord Guilford sent him 4000 dollars Bond Street; and the burghers of the good city of Rotterdam, addressed to his serene highness a cargo of pipkins.'

To these charges of imposture, duplicity, cowardice, and peculation, this young soldier adds, in the following paragraph,

a still blacker accusation.

'A Captain Fenton, according to his own account a British Officer, a native of Scotland, and at that time a captain of Ulysses, to whom Trelawney had given the command of some artillery he had taken for him from Messolunghi, commenced an intrigue within the month of September, with Mavrocordato, in which he engaged to assassinate Ulysses and his own countryman Trelawney. Whoever first made

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this infamous proposal, an argument used by Mavrocordato was, that Trelawney, as a native of Great Britain, being in the service of the Greeks, was out of the pale of his country's laws; and an American of the name of Jarvis, now a Greek lieutenant-general, was Mavrocordato's agent in the affair, and negotiated between them. The entire development of this affair is yet a mystery, but Trelawney's attempted assassination by Fenton has taken place."

Mr. Emerson states, that this Fenton had stooped' so low as to offer himself to a person in power as the assassin of • Ulysses, for a remuneration of a few dollars ;' but he does not name Mavrocordato as the individual to whom the proposal was made. He adds, that it was accepted, but a disagreement in the terms, or some other circumstance, had prevented its execution. This Fenton afterwards resolved to join the party of the very man he had offered to assassinate, and was accordingly received among the inmates of his strong hold. Here, after the surrender of Ulysses, who had deserted to the Turks, this exquisite villain Fenton remained as the dependant of Trelawney, who had espoused the sister and fortunes of Ulysses ; till, on the death of that chieftain, he formed the desperate resolution to make himself master of the cave by murdering Trelawney. A young English gentleman, aged nineteen, was easily prevailed upon by Fenton to become his accomplice, under a promise that, if successful, he should be made a prince of Livadia.' One day, after dinner, Fenton proposed that himself and the young Englishman should fire at a target, while Trelawney stood umpire. As soon as the latter unsuspectingly advanced to examine the first shots, both made their attempt at the same moment. Fenton's pistol missed fire, but the young Englishman's took effect. Trelawney fell, dangerously though not mortally wounded ; his attendants, alarmed at the reports, rushed forward and instantly poignarded Fenton, wbo died on the spot. His accomplice was placed in irons, but has since been generously let loose on society, ‘in con• sideration of his youth, and from a regard to the feelings of • his family, who are stated to be of the first respectability:'.

This strange and horrible story, which is brought forward by Mr. Humphreys for the purpose of blackening the character of Mavrocordato, only serves, in truth, to disclose the humiliating fact, that the caves and mountains of Greece contain no worse brigands than some of the adventurers who have gone forth from our own country to disgrace the English name. The attempt to implicate Mavrocordato in the assassination of Trelawney, does no honour to Mr. Humphreys. It either betrays the blindness of prejudice, or shews that he drew his information from partial and polluted sources. That Fenton