within two months afterwards. It is like the old acting on her course, without the slightest deviation, when of bankruptcy by lying in prison for a certain time she saw, or might have seen, that The Test could not, when the term of imprisonment was complete the act of bankruptcy took effect from the beginning of it*. In the present case a fiat did issue within two months after the declaration of insolvency, and there consequently was an act of bankruptcy committed at the time when the trader filed that declaration. The sole question then before us is, is this execution creditor deprived of his remedy by notice of an act of bankruptcy; now there was notice of an act of bankruptcy before the levy, and he therefore is deprived of the benefit of the stat. 2 & 3 Vict. c. 29. The point is perfectly clear. ALDERSON and ROLFE, BB., concurring-Rule absolute. COURT OF ADMIRALTY. THE TEST.-April 16. In Cases of Collision, it is no Defence to a Vessel clearly in the wrong, that the other Vessel might, by departing from the ordinary Rules of Navigation, have avoided the Collision, but the whole Damage will fall upon the Vessel which did not adopt the Measures proper for her in the particular Circumstances. This was a case of collision, which took place off the coast of Yorkshire early in the morning of the 20th November, 1846, between two colliers laden and bound from the north; both were close hauled, The Mayflower being on the starboard, and The Test on the larboard tack. The Mayflower, within a few minutes of the collision, went down in deep water with all her crew, and the case on her behalf depended upon the statements, and was supported by the evidence of two of the crew of The Test, who deposed, that when The Mayflower was first seen from the deck of The Test, she was distant about a quarter of a mile; that one of the deponents suggested to the mate who had the watch the expediency of wearing The Test, as she would not be able to go to windward of The Mayflower, but that the mate, thinking he could pass to windward, did not alter the ship's course till just before the collision, when the helm was put down. The case on the part of The Test was, that she was a very difficult and slow vessel to wear, and could not have done so in time to avoid the collision; that her helm was put down, as the only available means she had, and that, if a good look-out had been kept on board The Mayflower, she might, by the slightest alteration of her course, have gone clear. At the time of the collision The Test was in stays, and the bow of The Mayflower struck against the side of the stern of The Test, the effect of the blow being, as deposed, to cut quite through the sides of The Mayflower; it was alleged, on the part of The Test, that one man only was seen on the deck of The Mayflower. Addams and Robinson, for The Mayflower, relied upon the rule, requiring a ship on the larboard tack to give way. [They cited The Anne and Mary, (2 W. Rob. 195), and The Traveller, (Id. 197). Bayford and Deane, for The Test.-Whether The Test could have avoided the collision by wearing, and whether in the circumstances she could wear, are points on which the evidence is contradictory, and as they are of a technical and practical kind, the Trinity Masters will decide them according to their own experience, judging from all the facts of the case. But it is submitted, that the case of The Mayflower is not made out, for it is stated that she had but one man on her deck, and if a proper look-out had been kept, it is not to be conceived that this collision would have happened, so easily might those on board that vessel have avoided it. And this brings in a very important question in this case, whether The Mayflower was justified in hold*See Archb. Bank. Law, 10th ed., 70. or would not, alter her course. In running-down cases on land, it is not enough to be on the right side of the road. Of the sea, as of the road, the law recognises no inflexible rule, the neglect of which by one party will dispense with the exercise of ordinary care and caution in the other. Two things must concur to support this action-a collision by the fault of the defendant, and no want of ordinary care to avoid it on the part of the plaintiff. (Abb. Shipp. 208, 6th ed.) This appears to have been the principle on which this Court acted in The Seringapatam, (10 Jur. 1064, but not on this point). There, The Seringapatam being close haulei, was on the starboard tack, and The Harriet, the other vessel, was on the larboard tack. The latter vessel endeavoured to keep close to the wind, and made no atteng to give way; the former put her helm down to port in mediately before the collision. These questions were put by the Court to the Trinity Masters:-First, was The Harriet right in keeping as close to the wind as possible; secondly, was The Seringapatam right in putting her helm to port; thirdly, if so, did she adopt that measure in due time. And the answers were First, that The Harriet was wrong; secondly, that The Seringapatam was right; thirdly, that The Seringapo tam did not port her helm in due time. Consequently, The Seringapatam was held partly to blame, upen the principle, it is submitted, that she ought to have proved she kept a proper look-out, and should have ported her helm, without relying upon The Harrier's doing what was right on her part. Dr. LUSHINGTON, after stating the facts, left it to the Trinity Masters to form their opinion whether Ine Test was able or not to wear or stay in time to avoid the collision; it being clearly the rule, that it was her dasy to give way, if she had the power so to do. [He then continued.] An argument, however, has been raised, that, even if The Test was in fault, The Mayflower was also to blame, because she might have avoided the collision, and that it is a principle of law, that the strict rales of navigation are not to be adhered to, but an accident avoided, if possible. This is a doctrine which must be very carefully watched; I do not mean to say that any vessel is justified in coming into collision with anothe if she can avoid it, because common sense and regar to property and life establish it as an universal principle, that you must not wilfully come into collisi with other vessels. But it would be a very dangerous doctrine to hold without evidence, that The Mayflower, whose duty it was to keep her course, ought to have deviated from that rule, and given way, there being no circumstances established by evidence to shew that she ought so to have done. I cannot conceive any thing more likely to lead to mischievous consequences, than that a vessel, whose duty it might be to keep her course, should anticipate that another vessel wou not give way, and so give way herself. The conse quence would be, that there would be no certainty; whereas the doctrine which I have upheld, sup ported by your authority, is, that, in cases of this description, you ought always to follow the gener rule. The certainty which results from an adherenc to general rules is, in my opinion, absolutely essential to the safety of navigation. I think I am bound to tell you my opinion. I see no excuse on the part of The Test, and no reason to impute any blame to The Mayflower. The TRINITY MASTERS having given their opinion that The Test might have worn in time to avoid ta collision, the Court pronounced for the damage. ERRATUM.-P. 934, c. 2, line 17, from the bottom, i 'possession," read "payment.' ་ COURT OF CHANCERY. Pleading-Bill of Review. To support a Bill of Review there must be Error on the Face of the Decree complained of, such Error applying to Matter contrary to the Forms and Rules of the Court, not to an erroneous Judgment on the Case. Where a Plaintiff had obtained a Decree consistent with the Prayer of his Bill, but where from either not asking for it at the Hearing, or from the Court having refused to grant it, he had not obtained certain other Relief to which he contended that he was entitled under the Prayer for general Relief:-Held, that this was not Matter which would support a Bill of Review, not constituting Error on the Face of the Decree. The Rule laid down by Lord Eldon in reference to Bills of Review in Perry v. Phelips, (17 Ves. 173), approved of. The Case of Brend v. Brend (1 Vern. 213) observed upon. v. Newcomb, (Id. 214); Dormer v. Fortescue, (3 Atk. 124); Smart v. Hunt, (at the Rolls, 14th February, 1788, referred to in note, 1 Vern. 418); Matthews v. Walwyn, (4 Ves. 119); Chambers v. Goldwin, (9 Ves. 254); Hiern v. Mill, (13 Ves. 114); Perry v. Phelips, (17 Ves. 173); Bradwell v. Catchpole, (3 Swans. 78, n.); Norrish v. Marshall, (5 Mad. 475); Wilson v. Metcalfe, (1 Russ. 530). He concluded by urging, that the present was a case in which it was clear that a sum was due to the plaintiff; that the decree made was evidently in error in not properly dealing with this matter; that the decree having been inrolled, no rehearing could be obtained, and the plaintiff's only resource was an appeal to the House of Lords; that this course, besides being on the ground of expense an actual denial of justice in the present instance, might also, from the form of the pleadings, fail of effecting the purpose of correcting the error complained of; that it was thus evident that this was a case in which the proceeding by a bill of review was proper. The LORD CHANCELLOR, (without calling on the other This was an appeal from the decision of the Vice-side).-I am of opinion that the rule, in reference to Chancellor of England, allowing a general demurrer to a bill of review filed by the plaintiff (a pauper) in this suit. As the facts of the case have been recently reported at length, (see ante, p. 597), it may be sufficient to state here that the object of the plaintiff's present bill was to have reviewed and reversed a decree made in the cause dated the 19th day of November, 1841, on the ground that it was erroneous, by reason of the omission of certain directions in reference to accounts to be taken, which the plaintiff contended it ought to have contained. The bill of review set out the pleadings in the suit, the decree, Master's report, and subsequent proceedings, and it thus appeared that the decree complained of had been made in conformity with the prayer of the plaintiff's bill, except so far as any other matter might have been introduced into the decree under the prayer for general relief, had the plaintiff asked and the Court thought proper to grant it. Under these circumstances the defendant filed a demurrer to the bill of review, and the same was on the 2nd June, 1846, allowed by the ViceChancellor of England. The plaintiff now appealed to the Lord Chancellor. Miller, (with whom was Koe), for the plaintiff, contended, that the Court was, on the present proceeding, bound to look at the whole of the pleadings to find the error in the decree complained of; that, by taking this course, it would be seen that the decree in question was wrong, and that the error ought now to be set right; that if the state of things before inrolment was such as to warrant a rehearing, the same state of things would, after inrolment, warrant a bill of review. [Lord Chancellor.-As far as the fact goes, justice may possibly not have been done in the mode in which the accounts have been directed to be taken; but the question here is, whether you have adopted the right course to set this right. The decree seems to have been right according to the prayer of the bill, and the Master's report according to the decree. The decision of the Court at the hearing cannot be reviewed in this form. Taking all the proceedings together, you may, perhaps, find the Court has come to a wrong conclusion, but to set this right is not the province of a bill of review.] Miller then cited and commented on the following cases, viz. Venables v. Foyle, (Ch. Ca. 2); Anon., (1 Freem. 59); Brend v. Brend, (1 Vern. 213*); Bonham In reference to this case, (Brend v. Brend), the Lord Chancellor remarked,-The cases in Vernon are not considered to be very accurate, and this is an instance; for, according to this report, the Registrar would have in every case to take upon himself to determine what were the facts proved at the hearing, a duty which no one ever heard as devolving upon him. bills of review, is correctly laid down by Lord Eldon The passage referred to by the Lord Chancellor is as follows: There is a great distinction between error in the decree and error apparent. The latter description does not apply to a merely erroneous judgment; and this is a point of essential importance; as, if I am to hear this cause, upon the ground that the judgment is wrong, though there is no error apparent, the consequence is, that, in every instance, a bill of review may be filed; and the question, whether the cause is well decided, will be argued in that shape: not whether the decree is right or wrong on the face of it. The cases of error apparent found in the books are of this sort; an infant not having a day to shew cause, &c., not merely an erroneous judgment." (17 Ves. 178). with that interest before the bill was filed, and by their answer disclaimed. (Tipping v. Power, 1 Hare, 403). And that the plaintiff, by replying to the answer of s defendant who had disclaimed, had in any event ren dered himself liable to pay the costs of such defendant. (Wy. Pract. Reg. 176; Williams v. Longfellow, 3 Atk. 582). Heathfield, in reply, submitted that the defendants not having gone into any evidence to prove the assig ment, the plaintiff did not even now know that such a assignment had ever been executed, and that a motion had been made for production of the deed, and that it was alleged it was lost. Under these circumstances defendants were not entitled to their costs if the ought now to be dismissed against them. of the said account, that anything remained due to him, the said John Robey the younger, in respect of the moiety of the said mortgage money and interest, then that, upon payment to him by the plaintiff of what might so be found due to the said John Robey the younger, he might be ordered to surrender; and that the plaintiff might have such further or other relief in the premises as the nature of the case might require. This was what the plaintiff asked, and what he obtained from the Court on the hearing; but he says now, that he intended to ask, and that he thought that the decree he had taken would have given him an account also of the rents and profits which were received by Robey the elder when in possession. This, if asked at the hearing and refused by the Court, cannot be set right by bill of review; but it was not asked, and the plaintiff can- Lord LANGDALE, M. R.—In this case the bill was fled not now come and say there was error on the face of in the first instance against parties who at one time had the decree. He obtains all that he asks, and all he an interest in the matters in question. The defendants thought he could take by his decree. Either he asked put in their answer, alleging that they had assigned and was refused, or he did not ask; but in neither case whatever interest they had to a third party, and can he make the omission a ground for having the de- claimed. It might possibly not have been theaght cree reviewed. I cannot, of course, tell what passed in prudent at that time by those who advised the plaintif court. The present case is, in any view of it, foreign to dismiss the bill against those defendants, either with to those cases where there has been error apparent on or without costs. However, the plaintiff amends his the face of the decree. It may be, that less has been bill, making the assignee of that interest a party whe given than the plaintiff was entitled to; but if all he puts in his answer, admitting the assignment, and asked has been given, there is not error on the face of claiming the interest. The plaintiff then replies to the decree. It bears no resemblance to what is meant both answers, and now contends that the defendants by the expression "error on the face of the decree," signing ought to have gone into evidence to prove the which is the sole ground for a bill of review. The assignment. Is it to be said, that a defendant is to 29 Vice-Chancellor is right, and the appeal must, there-into evidence to prove that he has no interest? for that fore, be dismissed. I may add, that all has been said in the way of argument of which the case admitted; but the case is in itself infirm. ROLLS COURT. GLOVER V. ROGERS.-Nov. 6. A Supplemental Bill being filed against the Assignees of a Defendant to the original Suit, who had become bankrupt, they put in their Answer, stating that they had re-assigned their Interest to the Bankrupt, and disclaiming all Interest. The Plaintiff then made the Bankrupt (who had got his Certificate) a Defendant, and he put in his Answer admitting the Re-assignment, and claiming the Interest which had vested in the Assignees. The Plaintiff filed Replications to both Answers, but no Evidence was gone into:-Held, on the Hearing of the Supplemental Suit, that the Assignees were entitled to have the Bill dismissed as against them, with Costs, notwithstanding there was no Evidence of the Re-assignment to the Bankrupt. This was a supplemental suit against the assignees of one of the defendants in the original suit, who had become bankrupt. The assignees put in their answer, stating, that, before the filing of the bill, they had reassigned to the bankrupt (who had obtained his certificate) all their interest in the matters in question, which passed to them under the bankruptcy, and disclaimed all interest in the subject-matter of the suit. The plaintiff then amended the bill, and made the original defendant a party, who put in his answer, admitting the re-assignment by the assignees, and claiming the interest which had vested in them under the bankruptcy. The plaintiff then replied to both answers, but no evidence was gone into, and the cause now came on for hearing. Heathfield, for the plaintiff, stated the facts, and claimed the ordinary supplemental decree. Roxburgh, for the defendants Rogers and Hutton, the assignees, submitted that the bill, as against them, ought now to be dismissed, with costs. The bill being filed against them, as parties who once had an interest in the subject-matter of the suit, but who had parted is in effect the proposition contended for. I think The bill must, therefore, be dismissed against the defendants disclaiming, with costs. VICE-CHANCELLOR OF ENGLAND'S COURT. and Miss Maitland, on 9th March, 1846, indorsed the takes place, which, in their answer, they describe as an note, as the bill alleged, knowing that Maclean was operation of discount, in which the sum of 867. was largely indebted to her, and supposing that her signa- taken away for discount, and the remainder carried to 1ture was required as a receipt or acknowledgment, and their account. It is remarkable that there does not apunder the influence of Maclean. In the course of their pear another like transaction of discount upon the business Bolekow & Vaughan paid the note into the face of the account. The whole sum is carried to the bank of Messrs. Backhouse. În June, 1846, Maclean credit of Bolekow & Vaughan, whereby the debt stated became bankrupt; and an action had been commenced on a prior day is reduced exactly by the amount of the by Messrs. Backhouse against the plaintiff on the note, whole promissory note, without any deduction. It is as the bill alleged, for the benefit of Bolekow & made out, therefore, that, upon the face of the whole Vaughan. The bill further charged various circum- account, a sum was carried to the credit of Bolekow stances to shew that Messrs. Backhouse and Bolekow & Vaughan. Now, these defendants state themselves & Vaughan were aware of the relation of the plaintiff to be ignorant, if any consideration was given by Macwith Maclean, and of the circumstances under which lean to that young lady; but I do not think that ignothe note was given; and charged, that Messrs. Back-rance of consideration is a sufficient defence against the house had not in fact discounted the note or given necessity for more inquiries; and it seems to me a most credit to Bolekow & Vaughan for the 5000. The de- valuable part of the jurisdiction of this Court, that the fendants, Messrs. Backhouse, by their answer stated, Court can interfere in such cases. When gentlemen, that Bolekow & Vaughan handed to them the promis- such as Messrs. Backhouse, have this brought to their sory note, and that they discounted it, charging 867. knowledge, that there is brought to them an engage68. 1d. for interest. It seemed, however, from the ex- ment such as this note,-a promise to pay 5000l., intract of their books, which was produced, that they had dorsed by her, and bearing no other signature except that credited Bolekow & Vaughan with the whole 5000l. of Bolekow & Vaughan,-they knowing that she had These defendants also stated, that when the note was but a little while before been under the charge of Macbrought to them by Bolekow & Vaughan, they in- lean, living with his family, possessed of a large fortune, quired what was the age of the plaintiff, and what pro- without any inquiry of the facts from the young lady perty she had, and denied that they were aware of any herself, they content themselves with making inquiries influence which Maclean had over the plaintiff. The which led them to see that she was solvent. Whether plaintiff obtained an injunction to stay proceedings at they saw that valuable consideration was given, is not law, and the defendants having obtained an order to even stated in the argument; and I doubt whether shew cause why the injunction should not be dissolved, they, having averred total ignorance, would be at liberty the plaintiff now shewed cause. to prove that there was actually some consideration given at a former time. Then they have this case upon the face of it: it is a case of strong presumption; and though the general law of this Court is in favour of the easy transmission of property by promissory note, yet I do not think there can be any doubt as to the jurisdiction of this Court to make an inquiry, whether there has not been an undue exercise of influence over a person under protection. I do not wish to make any hard observations against Messrs. Backhouse for having framed their answer as they have, and then produced their account. It is the duty of the Court when an application is made to look into the answer, and it is absolutely necessary that the answer should appear upon the face of it, such as that you cannot reasonably withhold your belief. But if I contrast the body of the answer with the account, I have reason for withholding belief; and I pause before I give credit to the whole. My opinion is, that there never was a clearer case for inquiry than this; and the injunction must be continued. Bethell and Bazalgette for the plaintiff. (Maitland v. Irving, 10 Jur. 1025). Rolt and Cairns for the defendants, Messrs. Backhouse. There is no evidence that no consideration was given. Maclean owed money to Miss Maitland, and might have given her this note, and she might have indorsed it over. How could we know anything of the circumstances under which the note was given. In Archer v. Hudson, (7 Beav. 551), the agent of the bank had arranged the whole plot. Is Miss Maitland never to be of age? and is she never to be able to enter into a contract with Maclean? The defendants were simply bankers, and received this promissory note in the course of their business, making all usual inquiries; and there is no evidence whatever of fraud. In Maitland v. Irving (10 Jur. 1054), it is clear, that there was not consideration: here it is probable that there was consideration. VICE-CHANCELLOR.-It appears to me that this is a case in which it is evidently necessary that there should be a further inquiry. This state of facts is quite undisputed. It came to the knowledge of Messrs. Backhouse that the young lady had been either a ward of Maclean's, in the sense of his being the sole guardian or one of her guardians; that she lived with him; that she had attained the age of twenty-one in September, 1844; and it was within their knowledge, that, before the year 1846, Maclean was in difficulties; they knew it from transactions between themselves and him: they had also in a general way information that the young lady was of considerable fortune. Then it appears that there having been some transactions between them and Bolekow & Vaughan, and that Bolekow & Vaughan produced to them the promissory note in question, which is a note on the face of it purporting to be due from Donald Maclean, whereby he promised to pay &c. 50007. This note is brought to the bankers, and at that time the state of the account between them and Bolekow & Vaughan was such, that Bolekow & Vaughan were indebted to them in a large sum of money. They do not immediately discount it, but cause some inquiry to be made, and learn that she was of age, and had some property. Then the operation Costs. VICE-CHANCELLOR KNIGHT BRUCE'S COURT. OHRLY. JENKINS and Others.-Nov. 12. Foreclosure Suit-Puisne Incumbrancer-DisclaimerIn a Foreclosure Suit brought by a prior Mortgagee against a Puisne Incumbrancer and the Assignees of the Mortgagor, the Puisne Incumbrancer, although he disclaims, is not entitled to his Costs as against the Plaintiff. The bill in this case was filed by the first mortgagee against the assignees of the mortgagor and a second mortgagee, for the purpose of obtaining a foreclosure of the mortgaged premises. By the answer of the second mortgagee, it appeared, that, in February, 1847, after appearance had been entered for him, his solicitor received from the plaintiff's solicitor a letter, requesting him to take no further steps towards putting in his client's answer until he heard from him, the plaintiff's solicitor; that the defendant's solicitor, by letter, replied, that he was happy to accede to his request, and that he had that morning received a letter from his client, stating that he made no claim whatever in respect of the matters contained in the bill; that the defendant's solicitor subsequently received a letter from the plaintiff's solicitor, stating that he could not come to terms with the mortgagor's assignees; that the suit must, therefore, proceed, and requesting him to get his client's answer in as soon as convenient. The defendant, the second mortgagee, by his answer, after stating the above circumstances, disclaimed all estate, right, title, and interest in and to the mortgaged premises, and, under the circumstances aforesaid, claimed to be paid his costs of the suit. The only question raised at the hearing was, whether the second mortgagee was entitled to be paid his costs by the plaintiff, he the plaintiff adding them to his mortgage debt. Beavan, for the plaintiff.-A puisne incumbrancer is not entitled to have his costs as against a prior mortgagee. [He cited Appleby v. Duke, (1 Phil. 272); Gabriel v. Sturgis, (5 Hare, 97).] [Knight Bruce, V. C. -Those were the cases of a provisional assignee of a bankrupt or insolvent mortgagor, but this is the case of a puisne incumbrancer.] The case of Gibson v. Nicol (24 Law Journ., N. S., 195) is in point. [Knight Bruce, V. C.-That case appears more like the one now before me. I cannot, however, at present, see that the case of an assignee of a bankrupt or insolvent mortgagor is the same with that of a puisne incumbrancer. My impression is, that, when I first came to the bar, nobody would have doubted but that a second incumbrancer disclaiming would have his costs against the first mortgagee.] W. W. Cooper, for the defendant, the second mortgagee, submitted, that, under the special circumstances of this case, the defendant having, in fact, disclaimed previous to putting in his answer, and having filed his answer only at the special request of the plaintiff, ought to have his costs as against the plaintiff, the plaintiff adding them to his mortgage debt. [He cited Tipping v. Power, (1 Hare, 408), and Glover v. Rogers, (decided by the Master of the Rolls on the 6th November, but not reported).] Beavan, in reply. KNIGHT BRUCE, V. C.-My impression is, that, when I was first in practice at the bar, the rule was, that a puisne incumbrancer disclaiming had his costs as a matter of course paid to him by the prior mortgagee, who added them to his mortgage debt; but it appears to me that the modern decisions are too strong against the rule to allow me to give the defendant his costs in this case. I will give no opinion as to which I consider the better rule. terest in that Portion of the Stock to A. B. absolutely; and it was also thereby agreed and declared, and the said A. T. and A. B. and her Husband did consent and direct, that the Trustees should hold the Sum op‐ pointed in Trust for the Wife for her Life to her separate Use, then in Trust for the Husband fœ Life, and then, as to the Capital, in Trust as the Wije should appoint among the Children; and, in De fault of Issue of the Marriage, for such Person as the Wife, whether covert or sole, should appoint. The Husband and Wife joined in assigning her Life In terest for securing Annuities, and he afterwards died, leaving her surviving:-Held, that the Wife took a parate Estate for Life under the Deed, and that such Estate was bound by the Assignments. The Costs of the Suit directed to be apportioned between the two Funds, and not to be paid out of the unappointed Fund; and when so apportioned, the Amount parale by each Fund to be apportioned between the several Interests in that Fund. In this case the Master, by his report, had found that, by indenture, dated 7th July, 1789, being the settlement made on the marriage of Thomas Trollope and Ann his wife, and made between Anne Barne, widow, therein described, of the first part; Ann Steel, therein also described, of the second part; the said Thomas Trollope, of the third part; and Francis Morland and Jota Crutchfield, of the fourth part; after reciting, that George Barne, therein named, had, by his will, given unto the said Ann Steel 1000l., to be paid to her on at taining twenty-one or marriage, provided she married with the consent of the said Anne Barne; and that Sarah Gwill had, by her will, given to the said Ann Steel 5007. on her attaining twenty-one; and reciting, that the said Ann Steel had not then attained twentyone; and that, upon the treaty for the marriage be tween the said Ann Steel and Thomas Trollope, the said Anne Barne had agreed to give the sum of 2000%. to the said Ann Steel in addition to her said fortune; and that the heirs, executors, or administrators of the said Anne Barne should, within six months after her death, pay the further sum of 20007. as a further skition to the fortune of the said Ann Steel; and that the said Anne Barne had laid out the said sum of 2000, s agreed to be given, and the said sum of 10007., so bequeathed by the will of the said George Barne to the said Ann Steel, in the purchase of the sum of 30774,4 per Cent. Consolidated Bank Annuities, and had caused the same to be transferred unto and into the names of the said Francis Morland and John Crutchfield; it was by the said indenture, agreed and declared, that the said Francis Morland and John Crutchfield should stand possessed of the said Bank Annuities and the said sum of 500%. under the will of the said Sarah Gwill, and the said sum of 2000l. thereby covenanted to be paid after the decease of the said Anne Barne, and the securities on which the same should be invested, from and after Action-the solemnisation of the said intended marriage, up trust for the said Thomas Trollope and Ann his wife, during their respective lives, as therein mentioned, and from and after the decease of the survivor "upon trust for all or any of the children of the said Thomas Trol lope, on the body of the said Ann Steel to be begotten, in such parts, shares, and proportions, manner and form, and with, under, and subject to such powers provisoes, declarations, and limitations over, being for the benefit of some or one of such children, as they, the said Thomas Trollope and Ann Steel his wife, by any deed or deeds, writing or writings to be by them sealed and delivered in the presence of and attested by two of more credible witnesses should direct, limit, or appoint, and for want of such joint direction, limitation, or sp pointment, then as the survivor of them, the said Thomas Trollope and Ann Steel, by any deed or deeds, writing or writings, to be by such survivor sealed and HIS HONOR referred to Mr. Lovat, as amicus curiæ, as to whether the rule was not formerly as he had stated. Lovat replied.-Most undoubtedly. TROLLOPE v. ROUTLEDGE.-Nov. 19. A Party having a Power of Appointment over two Funds, |