beth Stephens as their relation. Witnesses for the defendants gave similar evidence of reputation as to the legitimacy of Elizabeth Stephens, and proved that a share of a legacy of 2001., bequeathed by David Davies to his nieces, had been paid to her as his niece without dispute; and that David Davies had, by letter in 1777, recognised Elinor as his sister. An attorney was called, who produced the following paper: "Feb. 5, 1761. "John Davies and Elinor Dillon were lawfully married the 25th January, 1761, as appears by the register of St. James, Bristol. "W. DAVIES, curate." The witness stated that he received the document from Elizabeth Stephens when he was inquiring into her pedigree in 1839, and when he did not know that her legitimacy was disputed. He was asked whether Elizabeth Stephens made any statement respecting her mother's marriage. It was objected, for the lessors of the plaintiff, that her declarations on this subject were not admissible, inasmuch as she was not proved to be legitimate; and that this was the issue for the jury. The learned judge overruled the objection, and the witness answered, that Elizabeth Stephens told him: "This paper was given me by my mother, who said it was her marriage certificate." The parish clerk of St. James, Bristol, produced the register of marriages of that parish for 1761, which contained an entry of the marriage exactly corresponding with the certificate. He said that he had been clerk for seven years, and during that time had acquired a knowledge of the handwriting of the signature of W. Davies from other signatures in that name in the register, and believed the certificate to be in the handwriting of W. Davies; that he had never seen W. Davies, and did not know when he died. The certificate was objected to, but admitted in evidence. The defendants then tendered in evidence the deed of conveyance of 24th May, 1839, which, after objection, was also admitted: it described Elizabeth Stephens as the daughter and heiress of John Davies. Letters of administration granted to Elinor Davies as the widow of John Davies, in 1788, were also put in. The learned judge left the question to the jury, whether Elizabeth Stephens was legitimate; and the jury found a verdict for the defendants. A rule nisi was obtained in the following term, (Nov. 6), on the ground of the improper reception of evidence. In last Michaelmas Term* 471); The Fitzwalter Peerage case, (10 Cl. & Fin. 952); and The Sussex Peerage case, (11 Cl.& Fin. 99), in which a prayer-book was admitted as evidence that there was a marriage, though not to prove the marriage. Declarations are admitted to prove identity. (R. v. St. Mildred's, 2 Jur. 46). The statement by the mother of Elizabeth Stephens was admissible as a declaration accompanying an act. The certificate was in effect an ancient document; and, therefore, there was sufficient evidence of the handwriting of the curate, if any was necessary, by comparison of it with the register itself, which was in court. (Doe d. Tilman v. Turver, Ry. & M. 141). It was not reasonable to expect evidence of the handwriting by a person who had seen him write or knew his handwriting, the defendants having no knowledge of him since 1761. John Evans & E. L. Richards, contra. First, hearsay, in a question of pedigree, is not admissible unless it comes from members of the family. (Johnson v. Lawson, 2 Bing. 86; 9 B. Moore, 183; Monckton v. The AttorneyGeneral, 2 Russ. & My. 147, 156, 162; Doc d. Bamford v. Barton, 2 M. & Rob. 28). An illegitimate child is a stranger to the family. Declarations cannot be received to prove a fact, the proof of which fact is necessary to render the declarations admissible. [Lord Denman, C. J.-Sometimes the judge looks at documents, the handwriting of which is disputed, and allows them to be shewn to the jury; but ultimately leaves it to the jury to say whether they are in the handwriting of the party. Erle, J.-Suppose that there was no other evidence of a defendant's promise but the declarations of an agent, they are admissible after primâ facie evidence that the party was agent; yet, ultimately, the question for the jury is, whether he was agent, and had authority to bind the defendant, the contract being proved, and the question being as to the authority. Coleridge, J.-The judge often says there is a preliminary question before the evidence can be given. In Doe d. Molesworth v. Sleeman (10 Jur. 568), the proper direction to the jury was that they must be satisfied that there was a reputed manor before they gave any weight to the declarations.] In order to render the representations of an agent admissible, it is necessary to give primà facie evidence of his being agent, and the judge is to tell the jury what is prima facie evidence of agency; the question of agency would be collateral, and not the main issue. [Coleridge, J.-It may be the main issue; for example, the authority of an agent to determine a Chilton and Lucena shewed cause.-First, the decla- tenancy may be a question upon the letting of premises rations of Elizabeth Stephens, as a reputed member of sought to be recovered.] Acts could not be given in evithe family, were admissible, though ultimately the jury dence till primâ facie evidence of agency had been given. might find that she was illegitimate. (Johnson v. [Coleridge, J.-The defendant would not be debarred Lawson, 2 Bing. 86; 9 B. Moore, 183). In Doe d. from proving that there was no agency. If, indeed, the Bamford v. Barton (2 M. & Rob. 28) the declarations judge in this case left the declarations of Elizabeth Stewere made by a person who was on both sides admitted phens to the jury, as part of the proof that she was a to be illegitimate. Elizabeth Stephens was recognised member of the family, he would have done wrong. as his niece by the testator, David Davies, under [Chilton referred to Smith v. Sleap, (1 Car. & K. 49).] whom both parties claimed. Secondly, when there [Lord Denman, C. J.-The judge admits the declarais no lis mota, the declarations by a person in pari tions upon such evidence as he assumes the jury will causâ are admissible; (Monckton v. The Attorney-be satisfied with if uncontradicted.] It has never been General, 2 Russ. & My. 147); and, therefore, the decided that the declarations of persons whose legiti deed of 1839 was properly admitted. (Doe d. Til-macy is in dispute are admissible. [Coleridge, J.-Supman v. Turver, Ry. & M. 141). There was no lis mota until the death of Evan John in 1842; at any rate it was admissible as a declaration by Evan John that Elizabeth Stephens was his relation. Thirdly, the certificate of marriage was admissible; it was primâ facie authenticated by being produced from the custody of the mother; (Lord Cottenham, C., in Slaney v. Wade, 1 M. & Cr. 338, 355): and it falls within the rule in Monckton v. The Attorney-General, (2 Russ. & My. 147); Davies v. Lowndes, in error, (6 M. & Gr. *Nov. 16 and 20.-Before Lord Denman, C. J., Coleridge, Wightman, and Erle, JJ. pose an issue as to the legitimacy of A., and the judge decided that there was sufficient evidence of the legiti macy of B. to render his declaration admissible; that decision would only be subject to the review of this Court. Does it make any difference that the declarations are respecting the legitimacy of B.?] According to Monckton v. The Attorney-General, (2 Russ. & My. 156), there must be no dispute as to the legitimacy of the party. Secondly, the deed of conveyance was not admissible. As to declarations ante litem motam there is a restriction on their admissibility, when the parties making them are interested. Further, it is not necessary that the party making the declaration should know of the lis mota. (Monckton v. The At- Cur, adv. vult. Lord DENMAN, C. J., now delivered the judgment of the Court.-It was admitted that the defendant was entitled to his verdict if one Elizabeth Stephens was legitimate, i. e. if her mother was the wife of her father, John Davies. The lessor of the plaintiff began and brought forward facts to make this impossible, particularly the declarations of John Davies, who was reported to have said, that he had not married her, because she was a bad woman. It appeared, however, that they lived together, and passed as man and wife; some members of the family had treated her as his wife, others had treated her daughter, Elizabeth Stephens, as their relation. Witnesses were then called for the defendant, who gave additional evidence to the same effect, and then an attorney produced a certificate of the marriage of John Davies with Elinor Dillon, and stated that he had received it from Elizabeth Stephens when he was inquiring into the pedigree. He was then asked whether Stephens made any statement respecting her mother's marriage, and the question was objected to on various grounds: first, that she was not yet conclusively proved to be a member of the family. The answer is, that it was the duty of the judge to decide whether it was proved to him, and he decided that it was. There are conditions precedent which are required to be fulfilled before evidence is admissible for the jury. Thus an oath or its equivalent, and competency, are conditions precedent to admitting vivâ voce evidence; and apprehension of immediate death to admitting evidence of dying declarations; and search to secondary evidence of lost writings; and stamp to certain written instruments; and so is consanguinity or affinity in the declarant to declarations of deceased relatives. The judge alone has to decide whether the condition has been fulfilled. If the proof is by witnesses, he must decide on their credibility. If counter evidence is offered, he must receive it before he decides, and he has no right to ask the opinion of the jury on the fact as a condition precedent. (See Bartlett v. Smith, 11 Mee. & W. 483). In this case the judge thought the condition had been fulfilled, and we are of the same opinion. It was further objected, that the question whether Elizabeth Stephens was a member of the family was in fact the issue for the jury, as she was not contended to be so unless she was legitimate, and if she was decided to be legitimate, her declarations to prove her legitimacy were superfluous. The answer is, that neither the admissibility nor the effect of the evidence is altered by the accident, that the fact, which is for the judge, as a condition precedent, is the same fact which is for the jury in the issue. It was further objected, that the evidence of the declaration of the delivery of the marriage certificate to Elizabeth Stephens by her mother ought not to have been received, but the handing down of pedigree papers is a fact which may be proved by declaration, according to the class of cases, where family pedigrees have been held admissible by reason of their being handed down from past generations. But this declaration appears to us to be no more than the act done; the handing her marriage certificate from her own keeping to that of her daughter. We must now consider the objections to this copy certificate. It was signed with the name of the person who appeared in the register of a parish at Bristol as the officiating curate in 1761. The clerk who produced it said he had seen the same signature at several places in the original register, and he believed it to be the same from the knowledge so acquired of that clergyman's writing. But there was no witness to speak to his death, or to shew when he died, nor was any search made for witnesses who might have seen him write, and would have been able to form an opinion whether the writing was his. We are of opinion that quite enough was done. He must have been at least twenty-three four score years ago; it was not surmised that he was a kinsman of the parties, nor in any way known to them. To seek about for all persons bearing his name, in order to identify the individual, and speak to his character of writing at that great distance of time, would have been a useless waste of labour. As curate of the parish he was the proper officer to give out such a document; and the proof of his writing as such was the same as that received in respect to entries by corporate officers, stewards, &c. The last disputed piece of evidence was a deed to which Elizabeth Stephens, then Davies, was a party, under the description of daughter and heiress of John Davies, and one Evan John, an undoubted relation, was also a party. E. John was the tenant for life of the property in question, and she joined with him in conveying to those under whom defendant claimed to hold. Here was the declaration, therefore, both of Elizabeth Davies and of Evan John. It was objected to on account of the interest they had in making out things to be as there represented; and at least this intention of disposing of the property was said to be equivalent to a lis mota. But we think that this objection also fails. No dispute existed; but the parties did what they had a right to do, if members of the family. Almost every declaration of relationship is accompanied with some feeling of interest, which will often cast suspicion on the declarations; but has never been held to render them inadmissible. One remark alone is required. The case of Doe d. Bamford v. Barton (2 M. & Rob. 28), which was the most relied on for the plaintiff, is wholly foreign to the present; but in the course of it my Brother Patteson properly said that the Courts are not disposed to extend this privilege of proving facts by declarations. We agree; and because, on the trial of this cause, it was not extended beyond the principles that have often been approved and acted on, the rule nisi for a new trial must be discharged. -Rule discharged. they are granted, and not at the Time of the Death of the Intestate. An Intestate died possessed of a Leasehold Estate under the Value of 100l., which, by the subsequent Erection of a Building upon it, was of the Value of 1001. and upwards at the Date of the Letters of Administration:— Held, that a Stamp of 11. was insufficient. Ejectment. On the trial, before Wightman, J., at the spring assizes at Swansea, in 1846, it appeared, that, in 1807, Evan Richards (the father of Thomas Richards, the lessor of the plaintiff) took a lease of the land, the site of the premises in question, for ninety-nine years, and built two cottages upon it, in one of which he lived until his death in June, 1845. Jenkin Richards, the brother of Evan Richards, lived in the other cottage for about a year before Evan Richards's death, and was after that event in possession of the whole of the premises till his own death, which took place about a year afterwards. Jenkin Richards, by his will, bequeathed the premises in question to the defendant, James Evans. About nine years before the commencement of the action, the defendant built a beer-shop upon the land. The lessor of the plaintiff took out letters of administration on the 8th July, 1841. The effects were sworn to be under the value of 100%., and the letters of administration were stamped with a 17. stamp. It was contended, for the defendant, first, that the possession of Jenkin Richards was as tenant, and not as purchaser; and, therefore, a demand of possession was necessary. Secondly, that the property, though not worth 100%. at the time of the death of Evan Richards, had, by the erection of the beer-shop, become worth more than 100%. in 1841, when the letters of administration were obtained; and, therefore, the stamp was insufficient. The jury found, that Jenkin Richards was put into possession as purchaser; and that the property was worth more than 1007. when the letters of administration were obtained. A verdict was given for the plaintiff, leave being reserved to the defendant to move to enter a nonsuit, if the Court should be of opinion that there ought to have been a demand of possession before action brought, or that the letters of administration were not properly stamped. In the following Easter Term a rule nisi accordingly was obtained. J. Evans and Davison now shewed cause.-[The decision of the Court makes it unnecessary to report the argument on the first point.] The stamp is insufficient. By sect. 38 of stat. 55 Geo. 3, c. 184, the oath to be taken by an administrator, upon application for letters of administration, is, that the estate and effects of the deceased are under the value of a certain sum. The administration is of the property which the intestate possessed in his lifetime and at the time of his death. In Gwynne on Probate Duties, 23, it is said, "The value of the personal estate should be taken, for the purpose of ascertaining the duty, at the time of proving the will and obtaining the letters of administration, and not at the decease of the testator or intestate;" and that the Commissioners of Stamps require all rents, interest, and dividends accruing after death and before the date of the probate on letters of administration to be included in the estimate upon which duty is paid; but the writer adds, that there has been no judicial decision upon the point, and that counsel of great eminence have held a different opinion. The practice of the Stamp-office cannot make the law. This building is not part of the estate and effects of the deceased, but is an accretion to the body of the estate. In Hunt v. Stevens, (3 Taunt. 113), the property did belong to the intestate. Suppose a snuff-box belonging to the intestate, into which diamonds are inserted after the death. [Wightman, J.-If the building does not pass under the letters of administration, the lessor of the plaintiff has no title; he cannot recover the land without the building: the diamonds might be separated from the box. Patteson, J.-Suppose the increased value of the property had arisen from improvements in the land by drainage.] That is an investment in the land by making it more productive; this building is not an improvement in the land. [Patteson, J.-Would not the increased value be assets? If the property was sold, would not the produce of the increased value be liable for the debts of the intestate?] In Whyte v. Rose, in error, (3 Q. B. Rep. 493, 499), Lord Abinger said, "Can the courts of common law enter into such an inquiry at all? I recollect once objecting to a probate, on the ground that the stamp was not sufficient for the amount of property, but Lord Kenyon would not listen to the objection." Chilton and Peacock, contra, were not called upon. Lord DENMAN, C. J.-This building has become inseparably part of the estate which belonged to the testator, for which probate was taken out. A court of common law cannot inquire how much the estate was worth at the time of the death of the intestate. PATTESON, WIGHTMAN, and ERLE, JJ., concurred.Rule absolute. BAIL COURT.-EASTER TERM. SEALE V. HUDSON.-May 6 and 7. Evidence of a Usage is inadmissible by which the Liability to pay the Fees of a Sheriff's Officer attaches to the Attorney instead of to his Client. This was an action brought by a sheriff's officer for fees and expenses incurred in executing a writ in an action, in which the defendant was the plaintiff's attorney. The fi. fa., levy, &c. was in the defendant's handwriting, together with the words “ Accept 91. 58.,” and the name of the plaintiff Seale, which were endorsed on the writ. The plaintiff was the officer usually employed by the defendant, and was requested by him by letter to remain in possession without selling until he received further instructions. At the trial, evidence was tendered on the part of the plaintiff to prove a custom and usage, by which, when the name of a particular officer was endorsed on a writ, he was entitled to look to the attorney for payment, and not to the party; the secondary refused to admit the evidence and nonsuited the plaintiff. Pearson then obtained a rule nisi to set aside the nonsuit and for a new trial. Hudson shewed cause.-Except under peculiar circumstances, such as where he has entered into a special contract, or in cases where he is bound to pay ready money, the attorney is never liable; he is in the position of an agent with a disclosed principal, even where the party is unknown. This was expressly laid down as to the payment of witnesses and of the messenger in cases of bankruptcy, in Robins v. Bridges (3 Mee. & W. 114) and Hartop v. Juckes, (2 M. & S. 438). And in Mayberry v. Mansfield, (16 Law Journ., N. S., Q. B., 102), the same doctrine was held as to the payment of sheriff's fees for executing writs, at any rate where no custom to the contrary was proved. In this case there were no peculiar circumstances, as the officer could not be constituted special bailiff merely by endorsing his name on the writ, and proof of that fact was not evidence to go to the jury of his appointment as special bailiff. It was well settled, that the plaintiff's requesting the sheriff to deliver the writ to a particular officer, did not constitute the latter special bailiff, so as to render him the plaintiff's agent, and the endorsement of the name on the writ did not amount to anything more than such request. (Balson v. Meggat, 4 Dowl P. C. 557; Ford v. Leche, 1 N. & P. 737; Corbet v. Brown, 6 Dowl. P. C. 794). Ford v. Leche was decided on its own special circumstances, but the general principle was recognised. Pearson. Whether the endorsement of the name of the officer constituted him special bailiff or not, the secondary ought to have received the evidence as to the usage, by which, in such cases, the liability attaches to the attorney and not to his client. It was expressly decided in Newton v. Chambers, (1 Dowl. P. C. 869), that such evidence was admissible, and that if usage and also an employment of the officer by the attorney himself were proved, the former could recover from the latter for the amount of the caption fee and conduct money. This case was clear and decisive. In that of Mayberry v. Mansfield, cited on the other side, the judgment was expressly grounded on the absence of proof of usage. COLERIDGE, J.-This case cannot be considered as one of an appointment as special bailiff; and as to the evidence of usage that the liability should attach to the attorney, I think the secondary was right to refuse it. To admit such evidence would be to set aside the provisions of law, and to substitute for it the decision of a jury.-Rule discharged. BRIGGS. PEEL.-May 7. A Specification referred to in Agreement, but not annexed thereto, may be stamped as a separa ́e Imstrument. Where several Parties contract to do respectively certain different kinds of Work set forth in a Specification, Held, that the Contract is several, and that Part of the Specification only which relates to the Work to be done by any one of the Contractors, is Part of the Agreement of such Contractor, and that the Agreement may be stamped accordingly by him. Quære, if such is the Case when a Provision in the Specification refers to all the Contractors? one, as the one was not intelligible without the other, and upon one alone no action could lie. It was immaterial that the parts were not stitched together. In Lake v. Ashwell, (3 East, 326), it was held, that under sect. 7 of the 37 Geo. 3, c. 90, a schedule referred to in a deed to which it was annexed, must have the proper deed stamp, according to the number of words and sheets, and not merely the single schedule stamp of 2s. 6d. imposed by the 1st section of that act; and Lord Ellenborough, in his judgment, laid it down, "that the meaning of the clause was, if the schedule were attached to or formed part of anything else which required a different stamp, it should have the stamp of 2s. 6d. thereby imposed; but that if the schedule were annexed to or formed part of any instrument which required a specific stamp, it must have the proper stamp required for that instrument of which it formed part.' The case of Atwood v. Small (7 B. & C. 390) was not applicable, as there the Court had made a mistake respecting the endorsement. If the construction contended for on the part of the plaintiff were adopted, the revenue would suffer to a great extent. In railway matters, for example, an immense series of contracts might be made under the smaller stamp. Peacock, contra.-The contract was not one and entire, but several; each of the contractors agreed to do certain specific work, such as the work of a mason, a carpenter, &c. The plaintiff had to look only to the agreement, to that part of the specification which referred to his own department, and to the general provision at the end; and as these, taken together, did not exceed thirty folios, the stamp was sufficient; he was right in leaving out of consideration the other parts of the specification. Of course, the stamps he used would not be applicable to the other contractors. As to the other point, the terms of the act were plain and decisive: any schedule, &c., which shall be distinct and separate from any agreement chargeable with duty, and not endorsed thereon or annexed thereto," &c. Here, we may say in the very words of the act, that the specification was distinct and separate from, and not endorsed on or annexed to, the agreement. The act contemplates the agreement not being perfect in itself; the very words suppose incompleteness without the additional instrument. This action was brought upon a building contract between the defendant, as the builder, on the one part, and the plaintiff and several others on the other part, who agreed to work for the defendant respectively as masons, carpenters, &c. The agreement was about four folios in length, but referred to a specification, which was upwards of thirty folios, and in which were set forth in detail the manner in which the work was to be done, the nature of the materials to be used &c., in the respective departments of the parties contracting with the defendant. At the end of the specification was a general provision applicable to all the parties. At the COLERIDGE, J.-On the latter point the rule must be trial, the agreement and specification were held to con- made absolute, as I think the terms of the act are clear. stitute one entire contract, and as taken together they As to the former, there would be no difficulty in diexceeded thirty folios in length, and the stamp was in-viding the agreement, as it is indisputable that several sufficient for an agreement of that length, the plaintiff was nonsuited. Peacock obtained a rule nisi to set aside the nonsuit and for a new trial, on the ground, first, that the specification was not a part of the agreement, but was of the nature of a schedule, only referred to therein; and, secondly, that, even if they were to be taken together, the agreement and that part only of the specification that related to his department of the work, constituted the contract entered into by the plaintiff, and together were less than thirty folios; in either case the stamp was sufficient under the act. The first part only had been taken at the trial. Wamen shewed cause.-The contract here was entire; it was joint and single. A contract might well be single, although there were several parties on one side, and it was not necessarily several, because it contained stipulations as to the different kinds of works the parties respectively would undertake. The contract was in its nature single, and otherwise, as the rule would be generally applicable, great hardship would be imposed upon parties who contracted singly with several 'individuals. Further, it would be absurd to suppose that such a series of stamps was required as this rule would necessitate. As to the other part, the specification was clearly part and parcel of the agreement; it was one contract written on two pieces of paper, but essentially parties may contract on the same piece of paper if the agreement stood alone; but when we come to the specification, the general provision at the end creates, I think, a difficulty, and leaves the question open to doubt. However, as that point was not taken at the trial, I will not express any further opinion upon it.— -Rule absolute. TRINITY TERM. An Affidavit in Support of a Motion for Judgment upon an old Warrant of Attorney stated, that the Deponent "verily believed Defendants to be alive," but did not state "that they had been seen alive,"-Held insufficient. Petersdorff moved for leave to enter up judgment upon an old warrant of attorney. The affidavit in support of the motion stated that the deponent "verily believed all the defendants (naming them) to be now living, and one of them to be confined in York Castle." WIGHTMAN, J.-Your affidavit does not state that the deponent saw the parties alive. In the case of Chell v. Oldfield, (4 Dowl. P. C. 629), the omission of such a statement was held to render the affidavit insufficient. In Watson v. Matthews, (2 Dowl. P. C., N. S., 670), the affidavit was precisely in the same form as the one produced by you, and my Brother Williams refused the rule.-Rule refused*. * See Richardson v. Scholefield, (2 Dowl. P. C., N. S., 36). Solicitor-Mutual Promises-Consideration. and wrongfully, and without any just or reasonable The first Count of the Declaration alleged an Agreement by a Company to retain and employ the Plaintiff as their permanent Solicitor, and assigned as a Breach, the discharging of the Plaintiff without just Cause from being such Solicitor. The Evidence was, that, by a Resolution of a Committee, the Plaintiff was appointed permanent Solicitor to a Company, which afterwards amalgamated with another Company; and the Plaintiff then acted as Solicitor to such Company until his Dismissal:-Held, that, even assuming the amalga-pany as such attorney and solicitor, and should and annum would, for such salary of 100l. per annum, advise and act for the said company on all occasions in all matters connected with the said company, (the prosecuting or defending of suits, the preparation of bonds or other disbursed by the plaintiff, being excepted, and the securities for advances by the said company, and monies make the usual and regular charges of an attorney and plaintiff being allowed in respect of such matters to solicitor), and that the plaintiff should attend the secre mated Company had adopted the Resolution appointing the Plaintiff, the Appointment was only meant to be as the ordinary, and not as the temporary, Solicitor of the Company, so that the Plaintiff might be dismissed without Cause, and that such, therefore, was not Evidence to support the first Count. The second Count stated an Agreement, by which the Plaintiff was to receive from the Company a Salary in Lieu of rendering a Bill of Costs for general Business done by him as their Attorney and Solicitor, and al-tary of the said company as well as the board of directleged, that, in Consideration that the Plaintiff promised the Company to perform the Agreement in all Things on his Part, the Company promised the Plaintiff to perform the same in all Things on their Part, and to retain and employ him as Attorney and Solicitor of the Company. The Count assigned as a Breach, the Dismissal of the Plaintiff from such Employment, alleging also, that the Company had, since such Dismissal, refused to retain or employ him as such Attorney, or to pay him the Salary-Held, bad in Arrest of Judgment, there being no Consideration for the Promise to retain and employ. Held, also, that, even if there was a good Breach for the Non-payment of the Salary, there was no Necessity for a Venire de Novo, though general Damages had been assessed on this Count, inasmuch as the Promise could not be severed, and there was no Consideration for the entire Promise. This was an action against the secretary of the Church of England Life and Fire Insurance Trust and Annuity Company*. The first count of the declaration stated, that theretofore, to wit, on &c., in consideration that the plaintiff, at the request of the said company, had agreed to become the permanent attorney and solicitor of the said company, and to act as such for reasonable reward, to be therefore paid by the said company to the said plaintiff, for his services in that behalf, they the said company promised the plaintiff to retain and employ him as such permanent attorney and solicitor; and the plaintiff saith, that, after the making of the said agreement, and in pursuance thereof, to wit, on the day and year aforesaid, the said company did, in fact, retain and employ him as such permanent attorney and solicitor as aforesaid, and he the plaintiff then became and was, and acted as, the permanent attorney and solicitor of the said company, and hath always from thence been ready and willing to continue to act as the permanent attorney and solicitor of the said company, of which the said company had at all times notice; yet the said company, disregarding their said promise, did not nor would permit or suffer the plaintiff to continue to be the attorney and solicitor of the said company, or to act as such, but afterwards and before the commencement of this suit, to wit, on &c., without the consent of the plaintiff, and against his will, appointed certain other persons, to wit, J. C. and D. L., to be the attornies and solicitors of the company, *This company is empowered by the 4 & 5 Vict. c. 92, to sue and be sued in the name of the managing director or other officer of the company. when required. And the said agreement being so made, ors thereof, and the meeting of the proprietors thereof, afterwards, to wit, on &c., in consideration that the plaintiff had, at the request of the said company, promised the said company to perform and fulfil the same in all things on his part, the said company promised the plaintiff to perform and fulfil the same in all things on their part, and to retain and employ him as terms aforesaid; and although the said company did, such attorney and solicitor of the said company on the for a certain small space of time thereafter, to wit, for the space of four months, in pursuance and fulfilment half, retain and employ the plaintiff as such attorney of the said agreement, and of their promise in that beand solicitor on the terms aforesaid, and did pay him a small part of the said salary, to wit, 50%.; and although the plaintiff was at all times, from the making of the said agreement thitherto, ready and willing to advise and act for the said company, and accept the said salary on the terms aforesaid, and in all other respects to fulfil the said agreement on his part, of which the said company always had notice; yet the said company, disregarding the said agreement and their promise, did not nor would continue to retain or employ the plaintiff as such attorney or solicitor of the said company on the terms aforesaid, but, on the contrary thereof, afterwards and before the commencement of this suit, to wit, on the 25th day of May, 1845, wrongfully and without any reasonable cause, dismissed and discharged the plaintiff from such employment and retainer, and then and from thence thitherto had wholly refused to retain or employ him as such attorney and solicitor of the said company, or to pay him the salary aforesaid, by reason of which last-mentioned premises the plaintiff had wholly lost and been deprived entirely of the said salary of 1007., and also of divers great gains, &c. Pleas, inter alia, non assumpsit. At the trial, before Cresswell, J., at the Middlesex sittings after Trinity Term, 1846, it appeared, that, in April, 1840, a company called "The Church of England Trust and Assurance Institution," united with "The City of London Annuity and Loan Company," under the name of "The Church of England Life and Fire Insurance Trust and Annuity Institution." The defendant was the secretary of this united company, and, as such, was sued. The plaintiff had been appointed the permanent solicitor of the Church of England Trust and Assurance Institution, as appeared from the minutes of a meeting of the committee of that company held on the 13th of April, 1840, and which were entered in the books of the united company, and which, amongst other resolutions, contained the follow |