administrators of him the said Owen Bennion shall and will, within the space of twelve calendar months next after the decease of the survivor of him the said Owen Bennion and Mary his wife, pay or deliver over to the said John Latham the younger, his executors or administrators, in money or value, such further or other sum or property as will be equal with the portion or fortune given to or intended for the said Sarah Bennion." The marriage was duly had and solemnized between the said John Latham the younger and the said Elizabeth Bennion on the 6th January, 1800. And on the 25th March, 1801, the said Owen Bennion paid to the said John Latham the younger the sum of 1000l., in part payment of the said sum of 1500l.; and on the 25th March, 1802, the said Owen Bennion paid to the said John Latham the younger the further sum of 500l. In the month of January, 1809, the said Sarah Bennion, the other daughter of the said Owen Bennion, intermarried with John Owen, and upon said marriage, and in consideration thereof, the said Owen Bennion agreed to give to his said daughter Sarah Bennion the sum of 1500l., and it was agreed that the same should be paid to the said John Owen. In pursuance of such lastmentioned agreement the said Owen Bennion, shortly after such last-mentioned marriage, paid such sum of 1500l. to the said John Owen. The said Elizabeth Latham, the wife of the said John Latham the younger, died on the 24th day of November, 1814, and in the lifetime of the said Owen Bennion; and Mary Bennion, the wife of Owen Bennion, died in the month of October, 1825. On the 15th April, 1829, Owen Bennion made his will, whereby, after directing that all his just debts, funeral and testamentary expenses should be paid and discharged as soon after his decease as conveniently could be, and charging all his real and personal estate and effects with the payment thereof, he gave, devised, and bequeathed all that his messuage, farm, or tenement, with the lands, hereditaments, and premises to the same belonging, situate or lying in Baddeley, in the county of Chester, with their and every of their appurtenances, and then in the possession or occupation of Robert Jennings, his assigns or undertenants, unto his (the said testator's) nephew Owen Bennion and Joseph Starbuck, their heirs and assigns, upon the following trusts, intents, and purposes, (that is to say), upon trust for his (the said testator's) daughter, the said Sarah Owen, the wife of the said John Owen the elder, to receive the amount, with rent and profit thereof, during her natural life, and which should not be subject to the debts or engagements of any husband she might have, subject only to the payment of 47. a year, or 1007., as it might be agreed, upon the following trusts, unto his (the said testator's) granddaughter Eliza Lloyd; and after the decease of his the said testator's daughter Sarah Owen, wife of the said John Owen the elder, then he did thereby give, devise, and bequeath the said estate at Baddeley unto his (the said testator's) grandson J. Owen the younger, to hold to him, his heirs and assigns for ever; and if the said J. Owen the younger should die without issue, then the said testator willed that the said estate at Baddeley should go to and be equally divided amongst his the said John Owen the younger's three sisters and younger brother, (that is to say), Sarah Owen, Mary Owen, Elizabeth Owen, and Peter Owen, share and share alike, as tenants in common and not as joint tenants. The said testator also gave, devised, and bequeathed all that leasehold messuage, farm, or tenement, lands and premises, situate, lying, and being in the township of Sound, in the said county of Chester, and then in the possession of Robert Jennings, his assigns or undertenants, subject nevertheless to the rents, heriots, covenants, conditions, and agreements in the lease thereof contained, and also the yearly sum or rent-charge of 157., to his (the testator's) granddaughter Eliza Lloyd, unto the said Owen Bennion the nephew, and the said Joseph Starbuck, their heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, upon the following trusts, intents, and purposes; (that is to say), upon trust for his (the said testator's) said daughter, the said Sarah Owen, the wife of the said John Owen the elder, to receive the annual interest, rent, and profit for and during her natural life, and which also should not be subject to the debts or engagements of any husband she might have; and that the said estate should be wholly and entirely at her command; and the said testator appointed his said nephew Owen Bennion and the said Joseph Starbuck executors of his said will. Owen Bennion died on the 12th July, 1829, without having revoked or altered his said will; and, on the 18th De cember, 1829, the said Joseph Starbuck alone proved the same. Owen Bennion, the nephew, having renounced probate thereof on the death of Owen Bennion, the said Sarah Owen, the wife of the said John Owen the elder, under or by virtue of the said will of the said Owen Bennion, the testator, entered into the possession or receipt of the rents and profits of the said freehold and leasehold hereditaments so devised and bequeathed by the same will. Owen Bennion also died seised of a freehold estate not comprised in his will. John Latham the younger died in the month of July, 1833, having, by his will, dated the 17th May, 1839, appointed Thomas Wilson, John Shufflebotham, Wiliam Eardley, Thomas Latham, and Richard Lathamese cutors thereof; and, on the 27th January, 1834, the said W. Eardley, T. Latham, and R. Latham alone proved the same. This suit was instituted by the executors of John Latham, seeking to have under O. Bennion's covenant with John Latham, such sum paid to them out of Bennion's real and personal assets as would make the portion or fortune of Elizabeth Latham equal to that of her sister, including in the portion or fortune of the latter certain sums which Owen Bennion was alleged to have paid her during his life, and also the freehold and leasehold estates given to her for her separate use for life by Owen Bennion's will, and also the value of the household goods and furniture thereby bequeathed to her. And the bill accordingly, amongst other things, prayed that an account of the sums paid by Owen Bennion to Sarah Owen and her husband, and the value of the freehold and leasehold estate bequeathed her, and a declaration that the plaintiffs were entited to be paid such value out of the real and personal estate of the testator, Owen Bennion, as a specialty debt. I was stated, though not ascertained in the regular way. that Owen Bennion left no personal estate besides the leasehold given to Sarah Owen, and his househ goods and furniture; and the real object of the suit was to obtain the relief prayed out of his real estate, inciu!ing therein the interest devised and bequeathed to Sarah Owen. So far as related to the gifts of money alleged from time to time to have been made by Owen Betnion to his daughter, Sarah, in his lifetime, in addition to the 15007. given on her marriage, the claim was waived; but the claim was insisted upon to the extent of the freehold and leasehold property, and furniture, which, it was alleged, was an additional portion or for tune given to Sarah. The principal questions dis cussed were, first, whether the gifts, by the testator's will, were such a portion or additional fortune as was contemplated by the covenant; and, secondly, whether the obligation under the covenant was such a debt as the testator intended to include in his charge of debts, and whether, if it was, the beneficial interest given by the will to Sarah was liable to answer it. Turner and Haldane, for the plaintiffs. Kindersley and Charles Hall, for Owen and wife. Roupell, Anderdon, F. J. Hall, and Goodere, for other defendants. The following cases were cited:-Morse v. Tucker (5 Hare, 73); Lomas v. Wright (2) M. & K. 769); Earl of Bath v. Earl of Bradford (2 Ves. 587); Price v. Morgan (2 Ch. Cas. 205); Wineholt v. Logan (7 Bligh, N. S., 1). and Stephen Robinson, her two sons by her first husband, and had agreed to settle 5007. on them, he, therefore, for himself, his heirs, executors, and adminiDec. 22.-Lord LANGDALE, M. R., after stating the strators, for the motives and considerations aforesaid, settlement and will, and facts, said-By the gift under covenanted with Bryan Robinson to pay him, his exethe will, Sarah Owen received more than Elizabeth; cutors, administrators, or assigns, the full sum of 500%., and one question was, whether that ought to be treated at the end of twelve months next after the death of as a portion, so as to entitle the executors of John La- Jane Tiplady, his wife, upon trust to lay out the same, tham to claim under the covenant such further sum as &c., and hold the same for the benefit of the said John would make Elizabeth's fortune equal to her sister's. It and Stephen Robinson, and of their respective children, was a provision made by the father for his daughter out as in the deed mentioned. The settlor, by his will, of his estate, in addition to the portion given on her dated 9th March, 1818, charged all his property with marriage, and constituted with that the whole portion the payment of his funeral and testamentary expenses or fortune provided for her. It appeared to him that and debts, and bequeathed all his personal estate to his such a gift as this, of an interest in freehold and lease-wife, except certain specific parts thereof, which he behold estate, could not be considered otherwise than as queathed to his daughter, Alice Tiplady; and he depart of the fortune given by the father; and he thought vised to three trustees all his real estate, upon trust it must be considered as an additional fortune or portion for the benefit of his wife, Jane Tiplady, during her within the meaning of the covenant. But as to the life, and, after her decease, upon trust to pay the rents furniture, it did not appear to him to come within the to his daughter, Alice Tiplady, for life, and after her same principle. There was nothing in the covenant to death to sell the same and hold the produce upon cerprevent the father from making such a gift as this, and tain trusts, for the benefit of the children of Alice he did not think it was to be considered as an additional Tiplady; and the testator appointed his wife, Jane portion or fortune, within the meaning of the covenant. Tiplady, sole executrix of his will. That the executrix As to the second question, whether the obligation under proved the will in the Consistory Court of the Bishop. the covenant was to be considered as a debt charged on of Chester, at Lancaster. That the personal estate had the real estate by the will, it was not denied that such been long ago exhausted by the executrix in payment an obligation was to be paid out of the personal estate, of the debts, and that there was no personal estate apand was recoverable out of the real estate, under the plicable to the satisfaction of the covenant. That the statute against fraudulent demises. But it was said widow died in 1840, leaving Alice Bell, formerly Alice that it could not be applied to the gift in question. It Tiplady, the daughter of the testator, surviving, who, appeared to him that the testator must be deemed to or her husband in her right, entered into possession of have intended that all his obligations should be charged the real estate. That she had four children, all of on his real estate; and supposing him to have that in- whom claimed an interest in the real estate. That tention, he must be considered to have charged this John and Stephen Robinson attained twenty-one before particular obligation. For these reasons, and upon the the death of their mother; and that, at the expiration authority of the cases cited in the argument, he thought of twelve months from her death, they became entitled the claim under the covenant was a debt charged by the to the 5007. covenanted by the deed to be paid; and will. The personal estate was admitted to be insuffi- that the covenant constituted a charge upon the testacient; but this must be ascertained in the usual way. tor's real estate, or, at all events, that the freehold parts If this should turn out to be so, and it became neces- thereof were assets, and the only assets for the payment sary to resort to the real estate, there might be a diffi- thereof. It was charged, that Bryan Robinson died, culty, but he thought not an insuperable difficulty, in having by his will appointed his sister, Jane Robinson, ascertaining the exact value of the gift to Sarah, as the sole executrix, who duly proved his will; and that property given to her by the will would, in that case, letters of administration of the goods, chattels, and crebe liable to answer the obligation in question. There dits of Alexander Tiplady, the testator, left unadmimust be a declaration that the plaintiffs were entitled nistered by his widow and executrix, but limited to to receive out of the real and personal assets of the tes- the purposes of the suit, had been granted by the said tator a sum equal to the value of the beneficial interest Consistory Court, at Lancaster, to the said Jane Rogiven to Sarah. binson, but that there were in fact no personal assets of Alexander Tiplady to be administered, the whole having been long ago applied by his widow and exe VICE-CHANCELLOR KNIGHT BRUCE'S COURT. cutrix, Jane Tiplady; and that all his debts had been ROBINSON. BELL.-Nov. 12 and 13. A Party equitably entitled to the Benefit of a Covenant The bill in this case stated that Alexander Tiplady, in 1814, married Jane Minikin, widow, and by deed, dated 716th March in that year, after reciting that the marriage between the parties took place some time since, and that the husband had at the same time received considerable personal estate with his wife, and was desirous of making some provision out of the same for John fully paid, except the debt due on the covenant; but the plaintiffs, who were John and Stephen Robinson, were willing, if necessary, that the suit should be treated and taken as a suit on behalf of themselves and all others the unsatisfied creditors. It was then prayed, that an account might be taken of what was due to the plaintiffs in respect of the 5007., and that the freehold estates, or such parts as remained unsold, or a competent part, might be sold for satisfaction of the money,an account of rents and profits received by Mrs. Bell and her husband from the death of Jane Tiplady, and payment of what should be found due in respect of the 5001.; and in case it should appear that there were any other debts of the testator remaining unpaid, then in payment of the same and the plaintiffs' debt in due course of administration; and that, for that purpose, if necessary, the suit might be deemed to be a suit on behalf of the plaintiffs and all other unsatisfied creditors of the testator. The defendants were Mr. Bell and his wife, the tenant for life of the real estate, their four children, the heir-at-law of Bryan Robinson, the trustee of the deed of covenant, and Jane Robinson, his executrix, which Jane Robinson was also the admini- Russell and Phillips were for the plaintiffs, and A decree was about to be pronounced for the general administration of the estate of the testator, when Phillips suggested, that, as it was clear that the real estate would be required for the discharge of the covenant, a difficulty might hereafter arise, or a question be made on the conveyance, that there was no complete legal personal representative of the testator before the Court; and he was prepared to shew from the authorities, that the limited administration granted to Jane Robinson, of the goods unadministered by Jane Tiplady, the executrix of the testator, was sufficient, as that administratrix admitted there were no personal assets. He had supposed that the objection would be made as a preliminary one by the defendants, and it would have been convenient if it had. Wigram consented that the plaintiffs' counsel should open the point, and that then the defendants' counsel should be heard, and that the same should be considered as a preliminary objection taken for the defendants. on what he knew to be the rule of the Court in which he so long practised. No old case has even been thought of to contradict what his Lordship has laid down; but it has been said that more modern cases have shaken that doctrine. But that is not the case; for all the authorities are plainly distinguishable from this. The only principle of all the modern cases is this: that every accounting party, who is made a defendant to a suit in this Court, has a right to say to the plaintiff, "You shall frame your suit in such a way as will at the hearing finally conclude the matter in dispute between us;" and, therefore, if the defendants in this case can shew that the limited administration the plaintiff has taken out will leave them open to another suit in respect of the personal estate, then they may require the plaintiffs, if the plaintiffs be the parties who are entitled to do so, to take out general letters of administration. The modern cases go no further, and they establish no more on that head. The modern cases, however, shew this: that a limited administration is sufficient to establish a charge against the personal estate; and a charge against that estate is all that is now sought. Payment of course is not sought, as that would be wholly vain, for we go on the ground that there is no personal estate to pay; and had there Nov. 13.-Russell.-The bill in this case has been been, it is plain from authority, that a limited adminifiled, the general estate of the testator being only strator cannot get in the assets, if there be any. In represented by the limited administration, on the Clough v. Dixon, (10 Sim. 564), a bill was filed by a authority of Lord Redesdale. In his Treatise on residuary legatee against the administrators of the Pleading, (p. 177 of the 4th edition), he speaks thus: effects of the deceased for an account of the assets re"Where there has been no general personal represen-ceived by them. One of the administrators died with tative, a special representative, by an administration limited to the subject of the suit, has been required. In other cases, where a demand is made against a fund entitled to exoneration by general personal assets, if there are any such, a like limited administrator is frequently required to be brought before the Court. This seems to be required rather to satisfy the Court that there are no such assets to satisfy the demand; for, although the limited administrator can collect no such assets by the authority under which he must act, yet, as the person entitled to general administration must be cited in the Ecclesiastical Court before such limited administration can be obtained, and, as the limited administration would be determined by a subsequent grant of general administration, it must be presumed that there are no such assets to be collected, or a general administration would be obtained." The administration granted by the Court at Lancaster is granted by a court of competent jurisdiction, and is, in all respects, according to the express opinion of one of the highest authorities known to the profession. All that is wanted in such a case as this, is to shew that the personal estate, if any, is represented; and here we have a limited administration; and it must be assumed, that, if there had been any personal estate applicable to the discharge of the claim, a general administration would have been taken out. All that we were bound to do was to constitute our suit in such a manner as that it may be ascertained whether there is any personal estate applicable to the purpose; and that has been done; for had Mrs. Bell known or supposed there were any of the personal assets of the testator in existence, she was and is most interested in obtaining a general administration, and she would be entitled to it, for she is the sole next of kin of the testator, she being his only daughter and heiressat-law, and, therefore, his only child. Phillips on the same side.--If there be no decision contrary to the rule laid down by such a man as Lord Redesdale, the profession is always in the practice of considering what he says as conclusive. Though there be no authority cited by him in support of the doctrine he has laid down, still it is impossible to imagine that a lawyer so learned, and a writer so accurate, should have deliberately laid down that which was not grounded out having appeared to the bill, and letters of administration were obtained by another person to his goods, but limited only to this purpose, "to attend, supply, substantiate, and confirm the proceedings in the suit until a final decree should be made and executed," and the limited administrator was brought before the Court by supplemental bill. The Vice-Chancellor of England held, that, owing to the limited nature of those letters of administration, an account of the receipts of the deceased administrator could not be taken, but that ge neral letters of administration to him must be taken out, and the administrator brought before the Court. In giving his opinion, his Honor observed, "Mary Collins, under the limited letters of administration which have been granted to her, has no dominion over the general assets of T. R. Dixon, nor could she, under those letters of administration recover any part of his assets." Croft v. Waterton (13 Sim. 653) is involved in much doubt and uncertainty on account of the looseness and vague ness of the report on the point of limited administra tion. It does not appear from whom the objection arose, nor can it be collected on what principle the Court came to the conclusion that it would not decree a general account and administration of assets in a suit in which the deceased is represented by an administrator ad litem. In Davis v. Chanter, (14 Sim. 212), since heard on appeal, and now standing for judgment, by a decree made in a prior suit, the bill had been dismissed with costs as against Ann Chanter, one of the defendants, and she was to be paid her costs. She died intestate, and letters of administration limited to the purposes of the suit were taken out to her, and her administrator was made a defendant. There the Vice-Chancellor of England held, that Ann Chanter was not properly represented in the suit, as it sought to deprive her estate of a benefit; and he also held, that the limited administrator could not relinquish the costs of the former suit, on the ground that such administrator cannot renounce any benefit to which his intestate's estate is entitled. At the close of the report it is stated, that Dr. Addams appeared in court, and certified that the Ecclesiastical Court never granted full letters of administration of an intestate's effects to any person, unless he was either a creditor of the intestate, or was interested in the estate under the Statutes of Distribution. So, in the case now before the Court, the plaintiffs having taken out limited letters of administration, they have done enough for all the purposes of the decree asked. The decision last referred to conflicts with that made by this branch of the Court in Ellice v. Goodson, (2 Coll. C. C.4). [Knight Bruce, V. C.-When I decided that case, was Davis v. Chanter cited, or was it in fact decided?] It was not cited. Davis v. Chanter was decided in July, 1844; Ellice v. Goodson in March, 1845. None of these cases, decided by the Vice-Chancellor of England, conflict with the principle we contend for, but a limited administration is sufficient to represent the estate for the purposes of the suit; and the objection taken in all those cases, that something ultra the estate to be dealt with in the suit was intended to be effected, and the Court, therefore, uniformly decided that a general administration must be obtained, does not apply to this case. I now refer to Falkner v. Daniel, (3 Hare, 199), chiefly for the purpose of referring to the opinion of Vice-Chancellor Wigram, as shewing that the decisions of the Vice-Chancellor of England are consistent with the doctrine laid down by Lord Redesdale. He says, at p. 207 of the report, "In no possible view of the case can John's estate ever become accountable to the plaintiff's in this suit; but, in taking the accounts, John's estate may have something to receive, and that appears to me to be the only way in which John's personal representative is a necessary party to the record. John's representative is to be brought before the Court, not because the plaintiff seeks to charge John's estate, but because John's estate may have an interest in the accounts to be taken in the cause. The state of the authorities makes it proper that I should express myself with great caution on the point I am now considering. In principle, I think it is clear, that where a limited administration is granted by the proper Ecclesiastical Court, and the limited administrator is made a party to the cause, the estate of the deceased is perfectly represented for all purposes, to the extent of the authority conferred by the letters of administration. A court of exclusive jurisdiction has power to grant letters of administration; and to whatever extent that court grants administration, to that extent the estate will be represented in any suit to which the administrator is a party. It is not inconsistent with this to say, that, if the administration granted be more limited than the purposes of the suit require, and it is in the power of the plaintiff to obtain a general or more extensive representation, the Court may require the plaintiff to do the utmost he can to make the suit perfect by obtaining a representation commensurate with the objects of the suit, or as nearly so as the practice of the Ecclesiastical Court will enable him; but if the plaintiff has obtained an administration, as extensive as the practice of the Ecclesiastical Court will give him, I cannot, without the clearest authority, admit that the suit is not properly constituted, especially in a case in which the parties who take the objection might themselves obtain a more general administration. The passage in Lord Redesdale's treatise, the case of Brant v. King, the opin ion of Sir Herbert Jenner in Cawthorn v. Chalie, and the cases in the Ecclesiastical Reports-In the Goods of the Elector of Hesse, Harris v. Milburn, and Woolley v. Gordon, appear to me to be authorities in accordance with the principle I have stated; and there is nothing in the cases of Moores v. Choat and Clough v. Dixon inconsistent with that principle." The opinion of this Court in Cave v. Cork (2 You. & C., N. C., 130) seemed to be in the same direction; and Ellice v. Goodson (2 Coll. C. C. 4) is an express authority, decided also by this branch of the Court, in support of the principle, although the Court, in giving judgment, carefully guarded itself, by saying, "Without giving any opin ion whether the letters of administration granted to Mr. Forsyth did or did not authorise the administrator to collect all or any of the assets, he was of opinion, that, for the purpose of that particular suit, circumstanced as it was, there was a sufficient personal representative of William Law before the Court." The case on the pleadings is this, that the widow received all the personal estate and paid the debts, but not the debt due on the covenant, and thus the personal estate was exhausted, and even if she did not, at any rate she died insolvent, and it is idle, therefore, for any person to take out general administration. Knowing that the only fund for payment of the debt due on the covenant is the real estate, the plaintiffs have taken out the limited administration, in order to comply with the rules of the Court, and enable it to make a decree against the real estate, in order, in fact, to shew that there is no personal estate to be administered. This is shewn, because no limited administration is granted by the Ecclesiastical Court, without the next of kin being cited to take out general administration; and that Court grants the limited letters on the presumption, that, if there were any assets, the next of kin would appear, and on that this Court acts and makes a decree against the real estate. [Knight Bruce, V. C.-You are a creditor, and could, I suppose, according to the rule of the Ecclesiastical Court, take out administration.] No party could go to the Ecclesiastical Court, as I understand, saying that there are no assets, and take out administration. It would be, in fact, taking out administration to nothing. The opinion of Sir Herbert Jenner, as stated in the report of Cawthorn v. Chalie, (2 S. & S. 129), shews the practice of the Ecclesiastical Court, that where a partner dies leaving the partnership accounts unsettled, that Court will grant limited administration of his effects to the surviving partner, or to a person nominated by him, for the purpose of substantiating proceedings in this court on the refusal of the next of kin after citation, and upon shewing the necessity of such a representation. In Moores v. Choat, (8 Sim. 508), the plaintiff obtained the only administration that he could; and although the Court did not actually decide that the limited administration was enough, it did not decide that it was insufficient. On the whole, the principle appears to be, that, if in a suit the plaintiff only wants to establish a liability against the personal estate, a limited administration is sufficient; but if it is wanted to enforce the claim by payment, then a general administration becomes absolutely necessary. Wigram and Stinton, contra.-This must be considered as only an objection for want of parties. The question is, who is the proper party to take out the letters of administration. The Court does not look to ascertain who is next of kin, but who is the party most interested in seeing to the due administration of the personal estate. The residuary legatee has first come in before the next of kin. The Court, however, requires something more than a formal representative. If necessary, the Court itself will administer the estate. The present limited administration would not be able to get in the assets. Suppose it should appear that the widow received 10,000l. and did not account for it, what could be done? [Knight Bruce, V. C.-Is there any instance whatever of a decree being made on behalf of a creditor against the real estate, which did not direct an account of the personal estate?] It is admitted, that a limited administration may be sufficient to enable a party to substantiate his claim, but here the object is to administer the estate. The argument on the other side, if worth anything, would tend to show that a party may dispense with any administration at all. How would a decree in this suit, with this limited administration, be a protection against another suit by another creditor? It is absolutely necessary to have the general administrator before the Court, and this is in accordance with the usual practice of the Court. As to Lord Redesdale's dictum, although entitled to very great respect, yet it is not conclusive. His work was written when a young man, and it was well and elegantly written, but no authority was cited in support of his position. [Knight Bruce, V. C.-It may be true that no authority is cited, but his own is very considerable.] In Falkner v. Daniel, (3 Hare, 208), Wigram, V. C., says, "A court of exclusive jurisdiction has the power of granting letters of administration, and to whatever extent that Court grant administration, to that extent the estate will be represented in any suit to which the administrator is a party. It is not inconsistent with this to say, that, if the administration granted be more limited than the purposes of the suit require, and it is in the power of the plaintiff to obtain in general a more extensive representation, the Court may require the plaintiff to do the utmost he can to make the suit perfect, by obtaining a representation commensurate with the objects of the suit, or as nearly so as the practice of the Ecclesiastical Court will enable him." The personal representative ad litem can have no authority to get in the assets; he could not sue any debtor. If it should be necessary to have the personal assets applied in the first instance, there is no party before the Court who is entitled to get in those assets. Russell, in reply.-As to Lord Redesdale's authority, each successive edition of his work was published under his own personal superintendence. He had passed his whole life in the Court of Chancery, and he was conversant with the rules of practice until the day of his death. The rule requiring a personal representative, is simply a rule of convenience. Such an administration as this, although limited, enables a party, as a preliminary step, to establish the debt in the first instance, and that is all we want. tained, and as the limited administration would be determined by a subsequent grant of general administra tion, it must be presumed that there are no such assets to be collected, or a general administration would be obtained." Undoubtedly there might be many cases in which that observation of Lord Redesdale would directly apply in a particular manner. But this does not seem to be a case of that description, for the reasons I have stated. The plaintiffs themselves are the next of kin, or two of the next of kin of the deceased, who was the sole residuary legatee, and are also creditors of the deceased. What I should have thought it right to do in this case if I had been satisfied that the plaintiffs could not obtain a general administration de bonis non to the deceased, it is not necessary for me to say. This case comes before me in a form in which I think myself bound to say, that the plaintiffs, in my judg ment, could have obtained, and can now obtain, or could have procured, and can now procure, general letters of administration de bonis non to the deceased. That being so, I think in this case I ought to accede to the objection that has been made, especially considering the recent authorities in another branch of this Court, which have been cited during the argument. The case must stand over, with liberty to amend. I must reserve the costs. GREATREX v. GREATREX.-Dec. 4 and 7. Injunction-Partnership Books. A Partner, having removed the Books of the Partnership Business, on a Motion in the Cause made by his CoPartners, was restrained from hindering them from having Access to them, and from placing, deporting, or keeping the same in any other Place than the Plat of Business. The bill in this case was filed by two partners, Messrs. C. and J. Frederick Greatrex, against the third partKNIGHT BRUCE, V. C.-The present case stands, as I ner, Mr. Norris Greatrex, carrying on business as sadapprehend, thus: it is a creditors' suit against the real dlers and coach ironmongers, alleging, amongst a variety and personal estate of a deceased debtor, or at least of misconducts, that the defendant had not attended the against the real estate of a deceased debtor, whose name place of business at Walsall from 19th August, 1847, was Alexander Tiplady. The plaintiffs' debt or de- until 2nd December following, when "between eight mand was thus constituted: it is not a legal debt or and nine o'clock in the morning, before the plaintiff, demand; it is one purely equitable; it is a debt claim- James Frederick Greatrex, had arrived at the place of ed in respect of the plaintiffs being beneficially enti- business, and the other plaintiff was absent in Lond tled to any advantage which may result from a cove- the defendant went to the said place of business, and n nant into which the testator entered with a lady of the some pretext sent out two of the apprentices, who we name of Jane Robinson, who is now dead, but whose the only persons there; he opened the iron chest there, personal representative is not a defendant in the suit. in which all the books belonging to the partnersh Alexander Tiplady appointed his widow sole execu- firm were usually kept, and then were, and without trix; he died many years ago, I think more than the knowledge, consent, or privity of the plaintiffs, twenty. She proved his will, and has since died intes- either of them, removed and took away from out of the tate, as I collect. Of her there is not any personal said iron chest, and from off the said partnership prerepresentative; and of the testator, the debtor, there is mises, the ledger, day-book, and other books belonging to not any personal representative, with the exception of the said firm, in a large box which he had provided for such representative as is constituted by the letters of that purpose, and which he had employed a porter conadministration now before the Court, which are letters nected with one of the coach offices in Walsall to carry of administration granted to a person in whom the legal away, and the said books were taken by the defen ant right to sue on the covenant is vested, and who, there- away from Walsall, and the plaintiffs had hitherto been fore, I should have thought, might have obtained gene- unable to trace the said books, or to find out where ral letters of administration. Upon that point I am they had been taken to, save that the defendant, and not clear, and I desire not to be understood as giving the porter with the box on a wheelbarrow, were seen in any opinion. There is this further fact in the case, company together on the road to Birmingham, where that the plaintiffs, who are equitably entitled under the the plaintiffs believed the books then were." The Fu covenant to which I have just referred, are the next of charged that this was done contrary to the wishes, and kin to the deceased executrix. Now, upon these facts without the consent of the plaintiffs, and that the same it may be useful to consider the reason for Lord Redes- was contrary to the articles of partnership; and it then dale's statement upon the subject in the passage which prayed a dissolution of the partnership so far as the de has been read. He says, "This seems to be required fendant was concerned, and the taking of the accounts, rather to satisfy the Court that there are no such assets and an injunction as to drawing cheques, &c., and from to satisfy the demand, for although the limited admin-keeping possession of, or using, or intermeddling with istrator can collect no such assets by the authority under which he must act, yet, as the person entitled to general administration' must be cited in the Ecclesiastical ourt before such limited administration can be ob the partnership books, or any of the papers, bills, notes cash, or securities of the said firm, and from hindering or preventing the plaintiffs, or either of them, from having full access to the said partnership books, and |