of the bill, which was not in his handwriting, evidence was allowed to be given of an admission by the defendant of liability on another bill accepted in his name by the same party who had written the acceptance sued on.

· [BRETT, J.-There there was evidence to shew that the party who had so written the acceptance had a general authority from the defendant to accept bills in his name, and, as said by Pollock, C.B., the evidence was admitted "only to confirm the witness who had proved the general authority."]

Suppose the plaintiff in the present case to be able to give evidence at the trial of a general authority, then surely the fact that he had discounted a former bill with a similar acceptance would be good corroborative evidence, and the case cited would be an authority for its admissibility. The question is not whether this would be sufficient evidence against the defendant, but whether it be not evidence on which a jury might act.

[KEATING, J.-If the jury did act on it, the verdict would be set aside.]

Admitting that to be so, still it is submitted that for the purpose of the present application the plaintiff is not bound to shew he must have the verdict; it is enough if he shew a case in which the evidence may be admissible. According to the decision of the Court of Exchequer in M'Fadzen v. the Mayor, &c. of Liverpool (3) interrogatories which are asked bona fide, and are material to the case of the party putting them, ought to be allowed by the Court in the exercise of its discretion.

KEATING, J.-In this case I am of opinion that there ought to be no rule. The application is for a rule to shew cause why the order of my Brother Martin should not be varied in respect of the disallowance of certain interrogatories. It appears that the action is by an indorsee against the acceptor of a bill of exchange, and that the acceptor obtained leave to defend on an affidavit that the acceptance was not written by him or by any one by his authority, and is therefore a forgery. The plaintiff applied to

(3) 37 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 193; s. c. Law Rep. 3 Exch. 279.

my Brother Martin for leave to deliver interrogatories to the defendant, and accordingly a set of interrogatories were framed, and allowed by the learned Judge, interrogating the defendant as to whether the acceptance was his, or by his authority, so as to obtain from him precisely and without doubt a repetition of the statement made by him in the affidavit under which he obtained leave to appear to the action. These interrogatories were followed by a set of other proposed interrogatories, that is to say, interrogatories which it was proposed should be put in case the defendant should answer the first set to the effect stated in the affidavit, and which required that the defendant should then say whether, on a previous occasion, he had not paid another bill held by the same plaintiff having a similar acceptance, payable at the same bankers'. The suggestion, as I understand it, is that in the event of the defendant having paid another bill with the like acceptance and under similar circumstances as the bill sued on, this may be treated as evidence that the defendant authorized the drawer to hold out to the plaintiff that he was the defendant's agent to accept the bill. It seems to me that no foundation has been laid for this. It is said that there may be evidence at the trial of a general authority, but I cannot shut my eyes to the fact that, if the present acceptance is a forgery, the real object of these interrogatories is to interrogate the defendant whether on one single occasion he had not paid another forged acceptance under similar circumstances. The learned Judge refused to allow these interrogatories, and we are called on to review his decision. Now, we have held over and over again that we will not review the way in which the discretion of a Judge has been exercised, unless we clearly see that he was wrong. I do not see that he was wrong in this case, and therefore I decline to interfere.

BRETT, J.-These interrogatories cannot be material. If the first set, which has been allowed, is answered by the defendant in the affirmative, it is then obvious that these must become immaterial; but, supposing the first set is answered in the negative, then the only way in which it can be suggested that the answer to these can be used is, that the acceptance was by one

having a general authority to accept for the defendant, or authorized by the defendant to accept this particular bill. The plaintiff must be bound to shew such general authority, or authority to accept this particular bill, but no questions are put as to general authority; and I think that, if every one of these interrogatories was answered in the affirmative, the answers would be no evidence to go to the jury. They would not be evidence of the defendant's having authorized the acceptance to the bill in question. The case of Cash v. Taylor (4), cited in Llewellyn v. Winckworth (2), is an authority that they would not be evidence at all, and that case of Llewellyn

(4) 8 Law J. Rep. K.B. 262.

v. Winckworth (2) is not in favour of the present application, for it is stated that the evidence there was admissible, not for the purpose of inferring a general authority, but only for confirming a witness who had proved a general authority. Here it is not proposed by these interrogatories to ask as to any general authority. There seems to be no ground from which any reasonable inference may be drawn that these interrogatories may become material; and that being so, I think that they ought not to be allowed. No rule.

Attorneys-E. G. Lawrence, for plaintiff; Harrison, Beal & Harrison, for defendant.

Action, When Maintainable-Customary Right of Inhabitant Householders of a District to Flow of Water-Diversion-Action by Individual Inhabitant without Proof of Actual Damage.

An individual inhabitant householder of a district may maintain an action against one who infringes a customary right common to the inhabitant householders of such district, without proving actual damage to himself personally by reason of such infringement, where the acts done by the person infringing such right would, if repeated and continued, be evidence of the existence of a right in such person, in derogation of the right of the inhabitants of the district.

The principle laid down in the notes to Mellor v. Spateman, 1 Wms. Saund. 346 b, viz., "that wherever any act injures another's right, and would be evidence in future in favour of the wrongdoer, an action may be maintained for an invasion of the right without proof of any specific damage," approved and followed.

The inhabitant householders of a certain district were entitled by custom to the flow of water to a spout in a public highway, and the use of such water, for domestic purposes, in their habitations. A riparian proprietor, through whose land the water flowed on its way to the spout, on various NEW SERIES, 38.-EXCHEQ

occasions diverted the water so as sensibly and materially to diminish the flow, and various inhabitants of the district were on such occasions inconvenienced by failing to obtain water at the spout when they wanted it. The plaintiffs, who occupied a house in the district, brought an action against the riparian proprietor for an infringement of their right; but the jury found, on the trial, that the plaintiffs had not personally sustained any actual inconvenience from the want of water :-Held, that the action was, nevertheless, maintainable.

The declaration stated that from time whereof the memory of man was not to the contrary there had been, and of right ought to have been, and still ought to be, a certain public water-spout in a public highway called Kiln Lane, within the district of Tamewater, in the parish. of Saddleworth, in the West Riding of the county of York; and during all the time aforesaid the water of a spring arising in a certain close, now called the Wharnton Grammar School Close, ran and flowed, and of right ought to run and flow, from and out of the said spring in and along a certain watercourse, through divers closes unto and into the said spout, for the supply of water to the said spout for the purposes thereinafter mentioned; and during all the time aforesaid, by an ancient and laudable custom and usage of the said district, the inhabitants for the time being of the said

B