past two to three o'clock. If the ticket be regularly passed before twelve o'clock, the person holding it at two o'clock shall be responsible for the loss occasioned by selling out on that day, but should the stock or shares not be sold out until the following day, then the person who held the ticket at THREE o'clock on the preceding day shall be liable. When the name-day is fixed for a Saturday, the time of selling out shall be from half-past twelve to one o'clock, and the person holding the ticket at halfpast twelve o'clock shall be liable. Every person passing a ticket is required to write on the back of the ticket the name of the Member to whom it is passed. A Member dividing a ticket shall retain the original ticket, that access may be had to it, should any portion of the shares have been sold out; and the Member who has passed on the original ticket shall be required to trace it, in the event of any portion of the stock or shares having been sold out. Tickets may be left at the office of the seller up to one o'clock on name-days. Every person who receives a ticket "after two o'clock," or 66 after three," on the name-day, shall notify the same on the back of the ticket, by drawing a line, or otherwise, in order to facilitate the tracing when shares are sold out; and any person neglecting to do so will be held responsible for any loss that may be incurred.

88. A Member who makes an alteration in a transfer ticket for stock or shares, or improperly detains the same, shall make good any loss that may occur thereby.

89. The seller of shares or stock shall cause the same to be transferred at the price marked upon the ticket given him by the buyer; but the seller shall not be compelled to take a ticket at a price not quoted in the authorised list during the account, unless the bargain represented by such ticket shall have been made within the two preceding accounts.

90. The seller may, previous to delivery, pay any call made on registered shares, although not due, and claim the same of the buyer.

91. The buyer of transferable shares or stock, shall pay the ad valorem duty, and all expenses attending the conveyance of the same; and shall state on the ticket the amounts in which he may desire to have the shares or stock transferred, (provided no such amounts require a higher stamp than 97. 158.)-and the seller shall pay any increased expense caused by the sub-division of a ticket. Split tickets must bear the name of the original buyer.

92. The buyer of shares or stock shall, in the event of his ticket being divided, pay for any portion which may be presented, provided the number be not less than 10 shares, or the value less than 2007.

93. The buyer of stock or shares may refuse to pay for a transfer unaccompanied by coupons or certificates, unless it be certified thereon officially that the coupons or certificates are at the office of the company. But if the transfer presented be perfect in all other respects, the stock or shares must not be bought in until reasonable time has been allowed to the seller to obtain the verification required. If the seller have a larger coupon than the amount of stock conveyed, or only one coupon, representing stock conveyed by two or more transfers, the coupon may be deposited with the Secretary of the Share and Loan Department of the

Stock Exchange, who shall forward it to the office of the Company, and certify to that effect on the transfers, which shall then be a valid delivery. No person is to look to the Managers or Committee of the Stock Exchange, as being liable for the due or accurate performance of those duties, the Managers and Committee holding themselves, and being held, entirely irresponsible in respect of the execution, or of any mis-execution, or non-execution, of the duties in question.

94. The buyer is entitled to new stock or shares issued in right of old, provided that within reasonable time, he specially claim the same, in writing, from the seller. Claims should be entered as bargains, and as such be checked in the usual manner.

When practicable, claims are required to be settled by Letters of Renunciation, but if not practicable, and there be sufficient time for registration, the seller may, after due notice, require the buyer to complete the bargain in old stock or shares. If the new stock or shares cannot be obtained by Letters of Renunciation, or by the transfer of the old, the Committee will fix a price at which the same shall be temporarily settled, and which amount may be deducted by the buyer from the purchasemoney of the old stock or shares, until the special settlement. The Committee will not entertain any dispute relating to unchecked claims, unless brought before them within ten days after the special settling-day.

95. A Member not refusing an antedated ticket, when tendered as such, takes it with all its liabilities; but if it be passed as an ordinary ticket, the liabilities remain with the Member putting such ticket again into circulation; and any person holding an undated ticket shall not be liable for any loss arising from the shares or stock having been bought in, if such ticket had not been ten days in his possession.

96. A Member who shall allow two clear days to elapse, without availing himself of his right to sell out shares or stock, shall release the buyer from all loss caused by the failure of any person, through whose default the ticket was not passed; and if the stock or shares be not delivered within fifteen clear days, the issuer of the ticket shall alone remain responsible.

97. When stock or shares are sold out, if a ticket be not given within half an hour after the time of sale, the transfer may be made into the name of the buyer; and if a name is guaranteed, the rule shall apply as if the stock or shares had been actually sold out.

98. Registered shares, or stock, if not delivered within ten days, may be bought in against the seller, at or after twelve o'clock on the eleventh day after the date of the ticket, and all loss incurred thereby shall be paid by him. The Broker employed to buy in the shares is required to give one hour's public notice before proceeding to make such purchase, and if the purchase be not made or attempted within half an hour after the expiration of the time fixed, the notice shall be cancelled. Shares or stock thus bought in, and not delivered by one o'clock on the following day, may be repurchased for immediate delivery without further notice, and the loss, if any, shall be paid by the member causing such repurchase.

99. A Member, who shall allow fifteen clear

days from the date of the ticket to elapse, without buying in, or attempting to buy in, registered shares or stock, shall release the seller from all loss, caused by the failure of any member, through whose default the shares or stock were not delivered, unless such right has been waived at the request, or with the consent of, the seller. The right to buy in shares or stock is limited to the original buyer, whether the name of the first buyer or that of any other Member is placed on the ticket to pay; but in order to identify the original ticket, the name into which the stock or shares are to be transferred must be stated on the order given to the broker employed to buy in, to whom holders of over-due tickets may apply.

100. On the day previous to, and on the nameday of, every settling-day in securities deliverable by transfer, the clerk of the House shall, at twelve o'clock, fix the making-up prices for such securities at the actual market prices, and no making up shall be binding, unless at such fixed prices. On namedays the clerk of the stock and share market shall (with the concurrence, if necessary, of a Member of the Committee) fix the price of shares at three o'clock (or on Saturdays at one o'clock), at which prices unsettled accounts shall be temporarily made up, and the differences paid in the usual way.

101. No person shall be required to pay for registered shares or stock presented after half-past two o'clock; or after one o'clock on Saturdays.

Costs-County Court-Action on Bill of Exchange under 201

The County Court Act (19 & 20 Vict. c. 108. s. 4.) has not deprived the county court of its jurisdiction to issue a summons under the Bills of Exchange Act (18 & 19 Vict. c. 67). A refusal therefore of the officer of a county court to give a plaintiff any other than the ordinary summons in respect of a claim for less than 201. on a bill of exchange is no ground for allowing the plaintiff, under 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142. s. 5, his costs of proceeding under the Bills of Exchange Act in the superior Court; nor is it any ground for allowing such costs that the expense and delay of obtaining judgment in the county court on the ordinary summons would be greater than that of obtaining judgment in the superior Court under the Bi's of Exchange Act.

W. Willis moved for an order for the plaintiff's costs. The action was brought

under the Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 67, to recover the sum of 15l. 15s, balance due upon a bill of exchange for 217. 58.

By an Order in Council, made on the 30th of January, 1856, pursuant to the power given by section 9. of 18 & 19 Vict. c. 67, that act was extended to all the county courts in respect of actions upon bills of exchange where the sum claimed did not exceed 50l. The affidavit of the plaintiff's attorney in support of the present motion stated that before he commenced this action he applied to the proper officer of the Lambeth County Court, within the jurisdiction of which court both the plaintiff and the defendant resided, for a summons under the Bills of Exchange Act, but he was told by that officer that he could not have such summons, as the claim was under 20., and that he must take an ordinary summons. The attorney also stated in such affidavit that he well knew the defendant would avail himself of every delay, and that he had ascertained that the hearing under the ordinary summons would be at the end of about twenty-one days, and by the rules of that court payment would be ordered about ten days after such hearing; that a sum of 178. would be required to be paid for the summons, and Il. 128. for hearing fees, besides expense of witnesses' and attorney's attendance, amounting to 31. 10s., beyond the fact of delay; whereas in the superior Court the costs to and including judgment, would amount-to 21. 14s., and the judgment might be obtained in twelve days from service of the writ and enforced immediately.

By the County Court Act, 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108. s. 4, the provisions of that act and of previous County Court Acts there recited, "which apply to any debt not exceeding 207., shall apply to such debt or any part thereof, although the same shall be secured by or claimed upon bills of exchange or promissory note, and notwithstanding the statute 18 & 19 Vict. c. 67." It was considered by the Judge of the Lambeth County Court that that 4th section has deprived the county court of the jurisdiction which it had, by the application to such Court of the Summary Procedure of Bills of Exchange Act, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 67.

[MONTAGUE SMITH, J.-The language of the 4th section is not restrictive.]

No; and it is difficult to understand why the county court had not jurisdiction to issue a summons under the Bills of Exchange Act.

[MONTAGUE SMITH, J.-How can we fix the defendant with costs in the superior Court because the county court Judge has put a wrong construction on this act?]

The 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142. s. 5, which has deprived a plaintiff of costs if less than 201 be recovered in an action on contract, gives the Court or Judge a discretionary power to allow them; and the present, it is submitted, is a fit case for the exercise of such power.

[BRETT, J.-It may be morally right that the plaintiff should have the costs, but not that the defendant should have to pay them.]

It is shewn by the affidavit that, had the ordinary summons been taken out in the county court, there would have been greater delay and more expense before judgment could have been obtained than by proceeding in the superior Court under the Bills of Exchange Act.

Cur, adv. vult.

The judgment of the Court (Montague Smith, J. and Brett, J.) was delivered on Nov. 9, by

MONTAGUE SMITH, J. — In this case we think there should be no rule. The action was brought to recover a balance of 15. 158. due on a bill of exchange. The application was made on two grounds: first, on the ground that the officer of the county court refused to give a summons under the Bills of Exchange Act, although ready to issue an ordinary summons; and secondly, on the suggestion of the greater expense and delay in the county court. It was stated at the Bar that the county court refused the summons under the Bills of Exchange Act on the ground that the jurisdiction to do so was taken away by the 4th section of the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108. That section, however, does not seem to us to take away any jurisdiction possessed by the county court under the Bills of Exchange Act, and the learned counsel did not contend before us that the construction of the act attributed to the Judge of the county court was correct. This being so, we think the alleged refusal of the summons is not a ground for placing the costs of the action

in the superior Court upon the defendant. The proper course would have been for the plaintiff to have applied for an order on the Judge. We also think that the suggested greater expense and delay is not a ground for allowing the costs. The legislature clearly intended, by the enactment in section 5. of 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142, that actions for small amounts which are defined by the act should be brought in the county courts, and that if brought in the superior Courts the plaintiffs, as a rule, should not be entitled to costs; and we think the expense and delay, if they really are greater in the county court, do not form, in cases like the present, a sufficient exceptional ground for an order for costs. If the costs are really unduly heavy, or the delays unduly long, in the county courts, no doubt their practice in these respects will be reformed in conformity with this view of the act. Court of Queen's Bench has already decided that the distance at which the plaintiff and defendant resides from each other, and the expense occasioned thereby, is no ground for allowing costs-Thompson v. Dallas (2). This rule, therefore, must be refused.

The

Rule refused.

Attorney-C. Robertson, for plaintiff.

1868. Nov. 25.

GUEST

V.

THE WORCESTER, BROMYARD AND LEOMINSTER RAILWAY COMPANY.

Scire Facias against Shareholder-Shares allotted as Security.

By agreement a railway company were to allot paid-up shares to A. and B, as trustees for a banking company, as security for overdrawing their account. The certificate stated that the shares were registered as paid up, but in the register there was no such entry, whilst in the call-book they were stated to have been deposited as security for an overdrawn account. A judgment creditor of the railway company applied for a scire facias against A. and B.-The Court held A. and B. not liable, but allowed the scire facias to issue so that the question might be taken to a Court of error.

(2) 37 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 133; s. c. 3 Law Rep. Q B. 258.

This was a rule calling on two persons, named Padmore and Abell, to shew cause why a writ of scire facias on the judgment obtained by the plaintiff in this action should not be issued against them as share holders of the defendants' company, to enable the plaintiff to have execution upon the said judgment to the extent of the amount not paid up on their shares.

The following facts were admitted on behalf of the plaintiff.

The railway company, having an account with the Worcester City and County Banking Company, were desirous of overdrawing their account, and it was therefore agreed between the banking company and the railway company that the latter might overdraw to the extent of 5,000l. on giving to trustees for the former 1,500 paid-up shares in the railway company, as security, till debentures might be lawfully issued and exchanged for them. The railway company thereupon allotted to Padmore and Abell, as such trustees, 1,500 shares (value 107. each), and gave them a certificate that they were registered proprietors, across which was written that the shares were registered as fully paid, and then overdrew the 5,000. The register however, in fact, did not shew that any calls had been paid, though in the call-book various calls were entered as paid by other shareholders, whilst against these shares was merely written "deposited as security for draft overdrawn."

Mellish and A. Wills shewed cause. The other side are in this dilemma, either these are paid-up shares if the transaction be good, or Messrs. Padmore and Abell are not shareholders if it be bad. As Lord Justice Turner said in the similar case of Ex parte Currie, in re the Great Northern Coal Company (1), "The agreement with B. was either valid or invalid; if the agreement was valid, then neither B. himself nor any alienee from him can be called upon to contribute in respect of those shares; but if, on the other hand, that agreement is invalid, the transaction must be disregarded altogether." The creditors are in the same position as the company, and they could not make a call. Further, the point was in truth decided in Ashworth v. Bristol (2) and Ex parte Leifchild (3).

(1) 32 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 57.
(2) 15 Law Times, N.S. 561.

(3) 13 Ibid. 267.

Bridge, in support of the rule.-On the register nothing appears to be paid, and therefore there was a holding out to the public which would induce credit to be given. The cases cited were between companies and their shareholders, and the difference between the cases of a company and creditors is shewn by Oakes v. Turquand (4). It is said in 1 Lindley on Partnership, 618, 2nd edit., "But the issue of paid-up shares otherwise than for full value received is prima facie a breach of trust on the part of the directors and the company, and its creditors are entitled to have such shares treated as not paid up," though certainly the cases there referred to hardly support the proposition. At all events, the Court will not now decide the question, but let the writ go, so that the question may go into error if desired.

BOVILL, C.J.-As the case is now put, the plaintiff accepts the facts stated in the affidavits, and, in truth, we cannot doubt the nature of the transaction, and that no liability was dreamt of. We can have on the facts no reasonable doubt that Messrs. Padmore and Abell are not liable. They accepted a certificate which stated that the shares were registered as fully paid up. If this be so, it disposes of the point that they held out that they were liable. The authorities which have been cited are strongly in favour of these gentlemen, and even without them we should come to the same conclusion. We are asked, however, not to exclude the plaintiff from going into error, and as there is a large amount at stake, if it be desired, we will not exclude him, and will let the writ go on condition, as the facts are undisputed, that the question be raised by special case to be stated within a month. If no notice be given within a fortnight this rule to be discharged without costs; but if the plaintiff goes on, the question of costs is reserved, and the general rule is to apply.

KEATING, J. and BRETT, J. concurred.
Judgment accordingly.

Attorneys-Bircham & Co., for plaintiff; Church,
Sons &Clarke, for defendants.

(4) 36 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 949.

(Appeal from Revising Barrister's Court.) 1868. I CHORLTON, appellant, v. LINGS, Nov. 7, 9.} respondent. Parliament-Borough Vote-Women. Neither at common law nor by statute are women entitled to vote at elections for members of parliament.

This was an appeal (consolidated with a great many others) from the decision of the Revising Barrister for the borough of Manchester.

CASE.

At the Court, held at the Town Hall, in

the city of Manchester, on the 15th of September, 1868, for the revision of the list of voters for members of parliament for the parliamentary borough of Manchester, before the Revising Barrister appointed to revise the said list, the name of Mary Abbott, appearing on the list, published by the overseers, of claimants to vote in the township of Manchester, was duly objected to by Matthew Chadwick, a person on the list of voters for the said parliamentary borough..

The name of the said Mary Abbott appeared upon the said list of claimants in the following manner:

It was admitted that the said Mary Abbott was a woman of the age of twentyone years and unmarried, and that she had for twelve months previously to the last day of July, 1868, occupied a dwellinghouse, stated in the said claim, within the said township, and had been duly rated by the said overseers in her own name, for such occupation, and that she had paid the rates for the relief of the poor assessed in respect of such dwelling-house before the 20th day of July last, and in other respects had complied with the requirements of the Registration Acts.

On behalf of the claimant it was contended that, under the existing statutes, the claimant was duly qualified and entitled to be registered as a voter, and when registered to vote in the election of a member of parliament; and that women for the purpose of being registered as electors and voting in elections for members of parliament are not subject to any legal incapacity. It was maintained on the part of the objector that, under the existing statutes, the claimant was disqualified on account of

her sex.

The Revising Barrister held that Mary Abbott, being a woman, was not entitled to NEW SERIES, 38.-C.P.

be placed on the register, and her name was erased from the said list of claimants.

If the Court should be of opinion that the said Mary Abbott was not entitled to have her name inserted in the list of voters for the said borough of Manchester, then her name was to remain erased; but if the Court should be of opinion that the said Mary Abbott was entitled to have her name inserted in the said list of voters, then her name was to be restored.

Coleridge (Dr. Pankhurst with him), for the appellant. The contention on behalf of the appellant is, that women have the franchise, as men have, as a matter of law, and that they have in fact exercised it in ancient times in cases where men exercised it, and that no statute has taken away this identity of position of the sexes; in other words, it is contended that, as regards the franchise, there was no distinction of sex in early times, and that there is no statute which has altered the rights of women in this respect. In the first place, it is proposed to shew that women have exercised a right of voting for members of parliament in counties, because if they have in counties, this fact will go a great way towards shewing they also have done so in boroughs. The

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