which we have arrived. Their observations upon this section, so far as it refers to an "offer" or "promise" not accepted, merely expressed a rule of prudence and caution. as to the quantum and character of the evidence by which such an "offer" or "promise" should be considered as proved. In the present case we are relieved from considering the truth of the evidence, as it is the statement of the defendant himself which is submitted to us for consideration. We cannot doubt that the words admitted to have been used by the defendant, viz., "that the voter would be remunerated for what loss of time might occur," did, under the circumstances, amount to an "offer," or "promise" to procure or to endeavour to procure, money or valuable consideration, to a voter, "in order" to induce him to vote at the election in question. The expression, "remuneration for loss of time," would necessarily convey to the apprehension of the voter that if he would vote for a particular candidate, he should receive, either directly from the person offering or by his procurement, money or valuable consideration which he would not otherwise obtain; and any assurance of that kind which can only be so understood is calculated to operate upon the mind of the elector as a direct inducement to vote for such candidate. If any authority were required to induce us to adopt this view of the transaction in the present case, it is supplied by that of Cooper v. Slade (5), which upon this point is not distinguishable in principle from the present case. It is so important to the public interest that at elections voters should be left to vote without any disturbing influence of any kind that we feel ourselves bound, in construing the statute in question, to give full effect to the plain meaning of the words used, and to apply them to the substantial parts of the case without raising subtle distinctions or refinements as to the precise words or expressions in which the promise or offer may be conveyed. The case will be remitted to the Judge of the county court, who will set aside the verdict for the defendant, and enter it for the plaintiff for 40s, being the penalty provided by (5) 6 H.L. Cas. 746; s. c. 27 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 449. the Municipal Act for the offence in question. Judgment accordingly. Attorneys-J. & C. Cole, for plaintiff; W. Thistlethwaite, agent for W. Wilson, Burton-on-Trent, for defendant. 1869. June 5. Poor THE GUARDIANS OF THE POOR OF THE MACHYNLLETH UNION, appellants, v. THE CHURCHWARDENS AND THE OF THE PARISH OF POOL, Union, Resi dence in-24 & 25 Vict. c. 55. s. 1. The parish of P. was divided into the Upper, Lower, and Middle Divisions, each separately maintaining its own poor. By act of parliament the parish is incorporated with others into a district, and the provi sions of the act are administered by di rectors. They maintain a house of industry for the poor, who, while in the house, are under their control, but the relief of such poor is provided by the respective places to which they belong. The general expenses of the maintenance of the poor are paid by the several places in certain fixed proportions, and the directors issue warrants, for the sums required to be paid by such, places. The three above-mentioned divisions pay separately and in different proportions towards such general expenses, and there is no common fund otherwise than above mentioned. R. had resided in the Middle Division up to the 3rd of February, 1866, and was irremovable therefrom by reason of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66. On that day he removed into the Lower Division, and continued to reside there till the 11th of January, 1867, when an order for his removal was made: Held, that this "district" was a union within the meaning of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 55. s. 1; that the residence in the two divisions might be joined together, and that therefore R. was irremovable. [For the report of the above case, see 38 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. p. 148.] The Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act (12 & 13 Vict. c. 106), s. 113, which makes any officer" who shall detain a bankrupt in custody after he shall have produced his protection liable to penalties, does not apply to the gaoler or governor of a prison to which the bankrupt is taken after his arrest, but only to the officer actually arresting the bankrupt. Declaration-That, after the passing of the Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849, the plaintiff was duly adjudicated a bankrupt under the provisions of this statute and the other statutes in force concerning bankrupts, and had duly surrendered, and at the time of the committing of the grievances hereinafter mentioned was protected and free from arrest and imprisonment by virtue of an order of the Court having jurisdiction in that behalf; and whilst the plaintiff was so protected by the order, he was arrested for debt within the meaning of section 113. of the Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849 (1); and the defendant, being an officer within the meaning of the section, detained the plaintiff after the plaintiff had shewn to the defendant such protection for a longer time than was necessary for obtaining a copy of it, and, after the (1) By the Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act (12 & 13 Vict. c. 106), s. 113, "If any bankrupt shall be arrested for debt, or on any escape warrant, on coming to surrender, or shall after his surrender, and while protected by order of the Court, be so arrested, he shall, on producing such protection to the officer who shall arrest him, and giving such officer a copy thereof, be immediately discharged; and if any officer shall detain any such bankrupt after he shall have shewn such protection to him, except for so long as shall be necessary for obtaining a copy of the same, such officer shall forfeit to such bankrupt, for his own use, the sum of 51. for every day he shall detain such bankrupt, to be recovered by action of debt in any court of record at Westminster, in the name of such bankrupt, with full costs of suit." plaintiff had given the defendant a copy of the same, that is to say, for six days there after, contrary to the statute in that case made and provided; whereby the defendant forfeited and became liable to pay to the plaintiff the sum of 51. for every day the defendant so detained the plaintiff. Pleas-First, not guilty by statutes 21 Jac. 1. c. 4. s. 4, and 21 Jac. 1. c. 12. s. 5. Secondly, that at the time of committing the alleged grievances the defendant was not an officer within the meaning of section 113. of the Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849. Thirdly, that the plaintiff did not shew to the defendant the protection as alleged. Issues thereon. At the trial, before Lush, J., at the Liverpool Winter Assizes, 1868, it appeared that the plaintiff was adjudicated bankrupt on his own petition on the 16th of June, 1868, and obtained protection until the 23rd of July. On the 15th of July he was arrested on a ca. sa. by the assistant of one Ambler, a sheriff's officer. He shewed his original protection to the man arresting him, and to Ambler, to whose office he was taken, but was unable to give them a copy of it, as he had no such copy in his possession. He was on the same day lodged in Walton Gaol, of which the defendant was governor. On the 17th of July an office copy of the protection was served on the defendant, but the plaintiff was detained in custody till the 23rd, when he was discharged under an order of the Court of Bankruptcy. A verdict was directed for the plaintiff, with 301. damages, leave being reserved to the defendant to move to enter a nonsuit, on the ground that he was not an officer within the meaning of the Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, section 113. A rule having been obtained accordingly, C. Russell shewed cause.-It is submitted that the gaoler is an officer within the meaning of section 113. The section may be divided into two parts: the object of the first is to procure the release of the bankrupt directly after his arrest, and the words "officer arresting the bankrupt❞ are used. In the latter part it is assumed that this object has failed, and it is intended to secure the bankrupt from a prolonged detention in prison. And the general words "any officer" are substituted for "officer arresting." But if the defendant's construction is adopted and a gaoler is not such an officer, this part of the section can have no operation, for it is the duty of the bailiff arresting the bankrupt to lodge him in prison with as little delay as possible. The omission of the word "such" in the latter part of the section strengthens the defendant's argument. [BLACKBURN, J.-In the old act, 5 Geo. 2. c. 30. s. 5, it was provided that in case any bankrupt should be arrested for debt, &c., he should, on producing a summons or notice under the hand of the Commissioners to the officer who should arrest him, and making it appear to such officer that such notice or summons was signed, as aforesaid, be discharged. And the section proceeds, "And in case any officer shall detain such bankrupt." There the general word "any" is used, but it is quite plain that what is meant is the officer arresting the bankrupt; and I can find nothing to shew that section 113. was intended to alter the law in this respect. Bancroft v. Mitchell (2) is an authority that the gaoler is an officer" within this section. [BLACKBURN, J.-No such point was raised in the case.] The Court will consider the hardship of leaving the bankrupt without any remedy for an unjust imprisonment. He also cited Lees v. Newton (3). C. Crompton, in support of the rule, was not heard. BLACKBURN, J.-I am of opinion that this rule should be made absolute to enter a nonsuit. It must be remembered that this section is a penal one, and that we have to find out the person upon whom the penalty is imposed. The section is as follows -[The learned Judge read the section],and it appears that the plaintiff after he had become bankrupt was arrested by a sheriff's officer. Now, if he had produced his protection to the officer arresting him, and given the officer a copy of it, he would have been entitled to be forthwith discharged, just as under the old act he would have been protected by a notice or summons signed by (2) 36 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 257. the Commissioners. He did not, however, furnish the sheriff's officer with a copy of his protection, and was lodged in gaol. Now, I cannot see that the statute imposes any duty on the gaoler with reference to any bankrupt so arrested, and I think it extremely doubtful whether the gaoler could safely discharge him without the order of a Judge or of some Court of competent jurisdiction. It has been argued, that the meaning of the word "officer" in the latter part of the section may be extended beyond the meaning of the words "officer who shall arrest" in the earlier part; and the simple word "officer" may include the gaoler who detains the bankrupt in custody after receiving a copy of his protection. But this requires us to assume that the gaoler has the power of discharging the bankrupt (which, as I have already said, I think very doubtful), because if he had no such power there would be no reason for imposing the penalty upon him. And I think that such a construction of the section is not the right one. I think that, as in the former act, 5 Geo. 2. c. 30. s. 5, upon which the section in the later statute was evidently founded, the penalty is confined to the sheriff's officer who actually arrests the bankrupt, and then after receiving a copy of his protection refuses to discharge him. But when once the bankrupt has been lodged in prison, I do not see how the enactment can be made to apply to the gaoler. LUSH, J.-I am of the same opinion. I cannot think that we are justified in extending by implication a penal section to a class of officers who are not mentioned in the earlier part of it. I agree with my Brother Blackburn that the section was only intended to apply to the officer arresting the bankrupt; and that the word "officer" in the latter part of the section is used in the same sense as the word "officer who may arrest" in the earlier part. HAYES, J. concurred. Rule absolute. Attorneys-Underhill & Field, agents for T. Etty, Liverpool, for plaintiff; Wright & Venn, agents for J. Rayner, Liverpool, for defendant. Bankrupt Act, 1861, s. 153.—" Contract or Promise"- -"Demand in the Nature of Damages"-Discharge-Bar to ActionLandlord and Tenant-Under-tenantDistress for Rent-Under-tenant's Goods. The plaintiff rented a room of the defendant, who was tenant of the whole house under P, the owner. The defendant's rent being in arrear P. put in a distress, and seized the plaintiff's goods. To obtain the release of his goods the plaintiff was obliged to pay 15l. to P. The defendant then became bankrupt, and obtained his order of discharge; subsequently to which the plain tiff commenced an action to recover from the defendant compensation for the injury and loss sustained by the plaintiff in conse-· quence of the defendant allowing the rent to be in arrear:-Held, that the right of action was not barred by the discharge in bankruptcy, inasmuch as the defendant was not liable, "by reason of any contract or promise, to a demand in the nature of damages," within the meaning of the 153rd section of the Bankrupt Act, 1861, so as to make the claim of the plaintiff provable under the bankruptcy. CASE stated on appeal against a judgment obtained by the plaintiff in the Liverpool County Court. The action was tried, before the Judge of the Liverpool County Court, with a jury, on the 5th of November, 1868, when a verdict was returned for the plaintiff with 251. damages. The following are the particulars of demand: "This action is brought to recover compensation for the injury and loss sustained by the plaintiff in consequence of the defendant wrongfully allowing certain rent payable by him, as the tenant of a warehouse, No. 4, Argyle Street, Liverpool, to be in arrear and unpaid, whereby the goods of the plaintiff (who occupied one of the rooms of the warehouse as tenant to the defendant) were lawfully distrained by the defendant's landlord for such arrears of rent, and the plaintiff was compelled to pay to such landlord certain moneys in order to obtain the release of his said goods, and was put to great inconvenience, and was injured in his credit. The plaintiff claims 501." The defendant occupied as tenant to one Mr. Pemberton (the owner) a warehouse at a certain yearly rent. Whilst the defendant was such tenant, the plaintiff became his sub-tenant of one of the rooms, into the occupation of which room the plaintiff entered, and placed therein cotton, his property, of considerable value. In the month of February, 1868, whilst the defendant's tenancy and the plaintiff's sub-tenancy continued, the defendant's rent being then in arrear to the amount of 307., his landlord lawfully distrained the goods in the warehouse, including those of the plaintiff. To obtain the release of his goods the plaintiff was required by the defendant's landlord to pay, and did in fact pay to him the sum of 15ł., and upon that payment being made his goods were restored to him. After the distress and payment by the plaintiff of this sum of 157. the defendant became bankrupt on his own petition in the Liverpool Bankruptcy Court, and in due course obtained his order of discharge. The plaintiff has not proved, or claimed to prove, under the bankruptcy in respect" of the subject-matter of this action, nor have any steps been taken under the 153rd section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, to obtain an order of the Court of Bankruptcy directing an assessment of the damages which the plaintiff sustained by reason of the entry by bailiffs employed by the defendant's landlord, upon the room in the warehouse occupied by the plaintiff and the seizure of his goods thereon, nor were such damages assessed until the jury assessed them on the trial of this action. After the defendant had obtained his order of discharge in bankruptcy the plaintiff commenced this action, in which he claimed, as part of his special damage, the 157. before referred to. At the trial, in addition to the defence raised by the defendant on the merits, it was contended on his behalf that the plaintiff's right of action for damages was barred by the order of discharge. The Judge ruled that it was not. 1. The question for the opinion of this Court was whether this ruling was correct in point of law. R. G. Williams, for the defendant (1).The question turns upon the 153rd section of the Bankrupt Act, 1861, which pro vides that, "If any bankrupt shall at the time of adjudication be liable, by reason of any contract or promise, to a demand in the nature of damages, which have not been and cannot be otherwise liquidated or ascertained, it shall be lawful for the Court, acting in prosecution of such bankruptcy, to direct such damages to be assessed by a jury, either before itself or in a court of law, and to give all necessary directions for such purpose; and the amount of damage when, assessed shall be provable as if a debt due at the time of the bankruptcy. Provided that, in case all necessary parties agree, the Court shall have power to assess such damages without the intervention of a jury or a reference to a Court of law." It is submitted that the county court Judge was wrong in deciding that the claim of the plaintiff was not barred. The defendant was liable by reason of the contract made by him to a demand in the nature of damages. The action is not brought against the landlord for seizing the goods, but against the defendant upon the contract for quiet enjoyment of the room which the plaintiff occupied as under-tenant, and for the non-interference with that occupation by the landlord. In the books upon Pleading this action has always been treated as an action upon contract-see Bullen and Leake upon Pleading, 3rd ed., 179. Next, the Court of Bankruptcy is empowered, by the section above referred to, to direct that the damages shall be assessed, and therefore the demand would then be provable as a debt under the bankruptcy, the consequence being that the plaintiff's right of action would be barred. Such an interpretation has been put upon the 154th section, the language of which is almost identical-see Saunders v. Best (2). Other (1) The arguments brought before the Court several important questions, but it is thought better to confine this report to the single point decided by the Court. (2) 17 Com, B. Rep. N.S. 731. decisions have been given upon deeds of this kind, such as Hagaston v. Taylor (3), Sharland v. Spence (4), and Robertson v. Goss (5); but there is no decision to be found which is against the view, now submitted on behalf of the appellant. See also Ex parte Townsend (6), Woods v. De Mattos (7), and Ex parte Willmott (8). Wheeler, for the plaintiff. This case does not fall within section 153. at all, and the action was maintainable. The defendant cannot be said to have been liable by reason of any "contract," and the word "promise" does not carry the meaning any further. The action was not brought upon the contract, but for the tort. A construction has been put upon the words "action of contract in the County Court Act, 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108. s. 30, in Tattan v. the Great Western Railway Company (9), where it was held that an action against common carriers for the loss of goods delivered to them, as common carriers, to be carried for hire, is founded upon the breach of the common law duty, independently of contract, and therefore is not an action of contract within that section-see also Griffiths and Holmes's Bankruptcy, p. 588. Again, Burnett v. Lynch (10) shews that this is not an action on contract. In that case, Littledale, J. says, at page 609, "Assumpsit lies where a party claims damages in consequence of a breach of promise not under seal. That promise may either be express or it may be implied from a legal obligation to do a particular act. Where there is an express promise, and a legal obligation results from it, then the plaintiff's cause of action is most accurately described in assumpsit, in which the promise is stated as the gist of the action. But when, from a given state of facts, the law raises a legal (3) 36 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 61. (4) Ibid. C.P. 230. (5) 36 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 251. (6) 35 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Bankr. 17. (7) 35 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 64; s. c. Law Rep. 1 Exch. 91. (8) 36 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Bankr. 17; s. c. Law Rep. 2 Ch. Ap. 795. (9) 29 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 184. (10) 5 B. & C. 589. |