GENERAL PROVISIONS AND DEFINITIONS APPLICABLE TO THIS CODE. SECTION 1045. Rule of construction of this code. 1046. No part of this code retroactive, unless expressly so declared. 1047. Present tense includes future. Masculine includes feminine and neuter. Singular includes the plural, and the plural the singular. Person includes corporation. 1048. Definition of "writing." 1049. Definition of " oath." 1050. Definition of "signature." 1051. Definition of "magistrate.” 1052. Definition of "peace officer." 1053. To what actions and proceedings this code applies. 1054. This code to take effect July 1, 1850. § 1045. The rule of the common law, that penal statutes are to be strictly construed, has no application to this code. This code establishes the law of this state, respecting the subjects to which it relates; and its provisions, and all proceedings under it are to be liberally construed, with a view to promote its objects, and in furtherance of justice. This section declares the same principle in reference to penal statutes, as is declared in the code of civil procedure respecting statutes in derogation of, or variant from, the common law. The rule applicable to penal statutes, is well settled to be, that they are to be strictly construed; Sprague v. Birdsall, 2 Cowen, 419; that they, as well as statutes in derogation of the common law, are not to be extended beyond their express words, or their clear import; Sharp v. Speir, 4 Hill, 76; Sharp v. Johnson, 4 Hill, 92; Bennett v. Ward, 3 Caines, 259; Hallett v. Novion, 14 Johns., 273; and that it is not open to an equitable construction. Myers v. Foster, 6 Cowen, 567. This rule differs from that applicable to ordinary statutes, which is, that they are to be so construed as to give effect to the will of the legislature, as either expressed in the language of the statute itself, or as deducible from the fair and reasonable import of its terms, its object, the evil to be remedied, and the circumstances under which it was passed. If any reason were wanting, to show the inutility, not to say absurdity of this distinction, it is to be found in the refinements and subtleties to which it has led, and of which some idea may be formed, from the specimens already given, in the remarks of the Commissioners on the existing rules of pleading. See p. 144, 145. This section is proposed, for the purpose of abrogating a distinction which has in it no principle of substantial justice, and whose highest aim, practically considered, seems to be, to render the law inconsistent with its spirit, and as a consequence, absurd and ridiculous. § 1046. No part of this code is retroactive, unless expressly so declared. § 1047. Unless when otherwise provided, words used in this code in the present tense, include the future as well as the present. Words used in the masculine gender comprehend as well the feminine and neuter. The singular number includes the plural, and the plural the singular. And the word person includes a corporation, as well as a natural person. §1048. The term "writing" includes printing. 1049. The term "oath," includes an affirmation. 1050. The term "signature," includes a mark, when the person cannot write; his name being written near it, and the mark being witnessed by a person who writes his own name as a witness, except to an affidavit or deposition, or a paper executed before a judicial officer; in which case the attestation of the officer is sufficient. § 1051. Unless when otherwise provided, the term magistrate" signifies any one of the magistrates mentioned in section 147. See p. 69, 70. § 1052. Unless when otherwise provided, the term peace officer," signifies any one of the officers mentioned in section 154. See p. 73. § 1053. This code applies to criminal actions, and to all other proceedings in criminal cases which are herein provided for, from the time when it takes effect; and all such actions and proceedings, theretofore commenced, must be conducted in the same manner as if this code had not been passed; except, that sections 16 to 59, both inclusive; 84 to 87, both inclusive; 97 to 99, both inclusive; 145 to 842 both inclusive; 884 to 896, both inclusive; and 1039 to 1052, both inclusive, apply thereto, so far as they are applicable; without prejudice however to any proceeding already had therein. § 1054. This code shall take effect, on the first day of July, 1850. APPENDIX: REFERRED TO IN SECTION 293, OF THIS CODE, AND CONTAINING THE MANNER OF STATING THE ACT CONSTITUTING THE OFFENCE. The forms given in this Appendix, embrace a few only of the indictments for public offences. The Commissioners have selected them promiscuously, from a large number which they had prepared and considered. Believing, however, that the forms here presented will sufficiently illustrate the principles upo: which indictments should be drawn, they have deemed it unnecessary to swell their report, by the addition of a larger number. The prefatory matter is stated in section 292, p. 150, 151. The forms given, follow that statement. No. 1. IN AN INDICTMENT FOR MURDER. Without the authority of law, and with malice aforethought, killed C. D., by [shooting him with a gun or pistol, or, by administering to him poison, or, by pushing him into the river, whereby he was drowned, or, by throwing him from the window of a building, or, by means unknown to the grand jury, or as the case may be.] In this form, the words "with malice aforethought," are used in the same sense in which they are understood in the existing forms of indictment for murder; and are intended to comprehend the several divisions of that offence, as it is defined by statute. 2 R. S., 3d ed. 746, sec. 5. IN AN INDICTMENT FOR ARSON. No. 2. Arson, in the first degree. Wilfully set fire to, [or burned,] in the night time, a dwelling house, in which there was at the time, a human being, namely, C. D., [or whose name is unknown to the grand jury.] 2 R. S., 3d ed, 747, sec. 9. No. 3. Arson, in the second degree. Wilfully set fire to, [or burned,] an inhabited dwelling house in the day time, in which there was at the time, a human being namely C. D., [or whose name is unknown to the grand jury.] 2 R. S. 3d ed. 755, sec. 1. No. 4. or, Wilfully set fire to, [or burned,] in the right time a shop, [or warehouse, or building,] (not being a dwelling house, in which there was at the time a human be ing,) and which shop, [or warehouse or building,] was adjoining to, [or within the curtilage of] an inhabited |