2. Where one of two executors of a deceased conusee of a judgment resided in England, and the other could not be discovered, the Court refused to substitute service of the scire facias on a party who had acted as Solicitor for the said executor in some late Chancery proceedings; but required that the executor residing in England should be served, and granted a conditional order, that service on him should be deemed good service on his co-executor. C. P. Atteridge v. Lord Audley 90 3. An affidavit to ground a motion for substitution of service upon parties out of the jurisdiction, should state the grounds of the belief of the deponent that the parties are resident out of the jurisdiction. Q. B. Lessee Trumbal v. Ejector SHERIFF. See GUARANTIE. Where it had been sworn that a writ had been delivered to the Returning Officer of the Sheriff, and a conditional rule entered, requiring the Sheriff to return it; the Court refused to discharge the rule, on an affidavit of the Sub-sheriff denying the reception of the writ by him or the Sheriff. Held also, that the Sheriff could not object to the regularity of the writ, for want of the indorsement required by the 43rd General Rule, on the ground of its not having been stated in the affidavit on which the conditional rule was obtained, that it had been so indorsed. C. P. Knipe v. Patterton 181 2. "The Sheriff is the mere officer or means by which the party is restrained from his liberty; the plaintiff is the principal in causing the restraint; the Sheriff is the agent and instrument in action; if there be several plaintiffs, he is the agent of every one of them-he acts by their direction and for their interest. If he have several writs he makes the caption, and arrests for all, and when he detains, it is at the suit of all who have lodged detainers, and not at the suit of one, two or three detainers; and the debtor is detained at the suit of the whole, each of whom commands him to be kept in prison, and it is plain then he could not be discharged by one or two. If none of the plaintiffs could justify, they would all be equally guilty of false imprisonment, nor can it be assumed that each is not the cause of the imprisonment, just as if there were six locks on E more costs than damages. Q. B. Martin v. Cochrane 374 SPECIAL VERDICT. Verdict. STAMP. See ATTORNEY. clause in the 56 G. 3, c. 56, sched. P.1 (imposing additional duties on leases, &c., executed by power of Attorney) is applicable to leases, &c., for terms not exceeding three lives or thirty-one years. Q. B. Lessee Mannix v. M'Carthy 372 the prison and each held a key." Per Perrin, J., in Coppinger v. Bradley 261, 270 3. "But a distinction has been taken by the defendant's Counsel between the case of the Sheriff and the case of the party who sues out the writ; and it is contended that although the Sheriff, after the detainer lodged, shall not be allowed to say that he did not arrest and detain the The party according to his duty, yet that the law is otherwise as to the plaintiff in the writ-that as to him there must be an actual arrest to make him a trespasser. Now, I must say that I do not find this distinction to have been ever established, and I do not know any principle upon which to rest it." Per Crampton, J., in ibid 274 4. Where a Sheriff deducted from the proceeds of a sale under an execution, a sum of money which he in the first instance retained on account of auctioneer's fees, but which he subsequently claimed to be entitled to on account of extra expenses incurred in laying on the execution; he was ordered, upon motion, to refund the sum so retained, and to pay over the amount to the execution creditor; but in consequence of delay on the part of the latter in bringing forward the motion, the Court withheld the costs of the application. Hayden v. Barton L. E. STATUTES. 1. "There are a great variety of statutes regulating the law of ejectment in this country, and although no doubt all are. to be considered as one code, yet I am far from thinking the whole are to be considered as incorporated in the first statutes passed upon the subject; on the contrary there has been shown by the Legislature an anxious desire to give an easier remedy to the landlord for the recovery of his rent, and to prevent frauds from being committed by the tenants. All those Acts, in reference to landlord and tenant, show that the object was to give the person entitled to a year's rent, a remedy by ejectment; although at first, such was not the immediate object of the Legislature, yet it grew in process of time to that: as the devices by the tenant increased, so in process of time a variety of Acts were passed for the purpose of assisting the landlord, and putting an end to frauds committed by the tenant." Per Pennefather, C. J., in Delap v. Leonard 307 7. A Sheriff may maintain an action for v. Malone SOLICITOR. See ATTORNEY. SPECIAL JURY. 454 A party applying for a special Jury must pay the costs of the same, unless the Judge certifies under 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 91, s. 27, even in a case where there are no "Although the recital of the 15 & 16 G. 3, c. 27, has been referred to for the purpose of putting a construction upon it different from the view I take of it, I must say, that that is a clear mis-recital of the 4 G. 1, and that the latter statute appears to me, when construed as I construe it, to be consonant to the general and particular views and intentions of the Legislature in the formation of this code, that is, to facilitate the remedies of reversion 11, 544 457 of landlords, and to put down the frauds, at liberty, therefore, to say this is a Charles II. Reversal of Judgments William and Mary. 325 309 2, sess. 1, c. 5, s. 2, Eng. Distress 71 William III. 7, c. 12, s. 10, Ir. 57 Service of Process 123 3. "I do not dispute the rule in Heyden's Henry VI. 237 4, 5, c. 16, s. 11, Eng. Dilatory Plea 131 307 29, c. 4, Eng. Sheriff's fees-Execution 25, c. 13, Ir. 8, c. 12, s. 5. Statute of Jeofails Henry VIII. 27, c. 16, Eng. and Sale Enrolment of Bargain 3, c. 15, Eng. 32, c. 2. Limitation of Suits 553 of Rent 33, c. 6, Ir. Marriage-Prohibited De- 8, c. 4. Ir. Philip and Mary. 1, 2, c. 8, Eng. Marriage-Prohibited 57 12, c. 4, s. 10, Ir. Sheriff George II. 3, c. 7, Ir. Judgment 456 25, c. 13, s. 2, Ir. Ejectment for Non- 293, et seq. 10, sess. 2, c. 4, Ir. Covenant-Assignees 15, 16, c. 27, Ir. Ejectment for Non- 40, c. 39, Ir. 43, c. 46, Ir. 3, 4, c. 42, Eng. 577 Women 374 358 Particulars of Dis- 6, c. 14, Ir. Bankrupt 223 tress Court of Exchequer Cham- 6, 7, c. 116, s. 117, Ir. Grand Jury Act 391 Sheriff's fees-Execution 456, 459 Victoria. 354 1, c. 55, Eng. 441 166 373 1, 2, c. 109, Ir. Ir. 41, 409 56, c. 56, ss. 64, 68. Stamp Act-Attor- ney 1, 2, c. 55 3, 4, c. 105, s. 23, Ir. Excise Paper 475 3, 4, c. 105, s. 26, Ir. 88 terest 92, 165 578 George IV. 1, 2, c. 78, Eng. 3, c. 124, Ir. Insolvent Debtor 9, 231 3, 4, c. 105, s. 66, Ir. 7, 8, c. 53, Ir. Excise-Information 474 5, 6, c. 97, Ir. Double Costs custody of the Sheriff of Kildare, at the suit of J. S. M. and others, the defendant issued a ca. sa. against him on foot of a judgment previously obtained. During the year 1839 the plaintiff, being still in confinement, obtained in various ways discharges from several of the writs under which he was detained, and amongst others, from that of the defendant, which together with the judgment under which it was issued, was set aside by an order of the Court, on the 23rd of November 1839. There was slight evidence that the judgment was set aside for misconduct on the part of the defendant or his Attorney. Under these circumstances, upon the question whether the plaintiff having been in lawful custody at the suit of other creditors, during all the time that the defendant's detainer was laid on, an action of trespass did not lie at the suit of the plaintiff against the defendant-PENNEFATHER, C. J., and PERRIN, J., were of opinion that it did not; BURTON, J., and CRAMPTON, J., dissentientibus. Q. B. Coppinger v. Bradley 4. Ibid "It is wrong to say that no man shall be made a trespasser by mere construction of law; it is true no man can be a trespasser in any sense when no trespass has been committed; but when a trespass is committed, persons may by construction of law be parties to that trespass; it is upon this principle that the advisers of a trespass before the act, and the assenters to it afterwards, are trespassers all are principals in trespass : and one then may be a trespasser in relation to an act which he has advised or directed, although the man by whom the act is done is no trespasser at all; as in the familiar instance of the execution of a false writ by a Sheriff-the Sheriff is |