135. Paley is thus the typical example of the moralists who enjoyed the greatest reputation throughout the eighteenth century. His theology, as we have already seen,' is essentially a belief in God as the contriver, not as the ever-present regulating power of the universe. The world,' he says, 'abounds with contrivances,' 2 and it is entirely upon those contrivances that here, as in the Natural Theology,' he rests his proof of the Divine benevolence. The contemplation of universal nature rather bewilders the mind than affects it,' 3 but when we see teeth made to bite and eyes to see, we are convinced of God's love for his creation. He declares, with

a higher tone of sentiment, that he sees the benevolence of the Deity more clearly in the pleasures of very young children than in anything else.' In one shape or another, however, it is by regarding the world as a collection of cunningly contrived machines that we learn to adore the machine-maker. Theological utilitarianism is essentially connected with this. form of theology. Heaven and hell are the weights which work the great machine of the universe, so far as it has any moral significance, and love of pleasure and fear of pain the passions through which they act. Paley, however, is not only the clearest, but the last, representative of the doctrine. The system, in fact, when thus elaborated, was rapidly becoming intolerable. Heaven and hell had retired too far from men's minds, and the authority of Scripture had become too feeble to provide an effectual rule. The characteristic laxity of the contemporary theology, represented by such men as Paley, Watson, and Hey, shows that it was, in fact, a rationalism thinly concealed; and men who wished to affect the thoughts of the world, rather than to compile orthodox summaries for students, hastened to discard the flimsy theological disguises which might do for the schools, but had lost their potency with the mass of mankind. And here, therefore, we arrive at a critical point. The Deism, whether it called itself orthodox or infidel, which had hitherto given a decorous vent to the quasi-scientific systems of morality, was to be thrown aside, and the divorce of ethics and theology openly proclaimed. Hume had already reached that point; but Hume's speculations were too much in advance of his age, and too far Above, ch. viii. 2 Paley, i. 44. 3 Ib. i. 45.

removed from practical application to give birth to a corresponding movement in the sphere of practice. A thinker of a very different order was to take the next step, and to open a warfare along the whole line of politics, legislation, and morals, which has not yet subsided.

136. When Paley's treatise appeared, a friend wrote to Jeremy Bentham, then travelling in Russia, that the new writer had anticipated the doctrines of Bentham's 'Principles of Morals and Legislation '--then already in print, though not as yet published.' The coincidence, he added, was so close that it almost seemed as if Paley must have seen Bentham's introduction. The relation, indeed, of Bentham's ethical doctrines to Paley's may be expressed by saying that Bentham is Paley minus a belief in hell-fire. But Bentham, in another sense, is Paley plus a profound faith in himself, and an equally profound respect for realities. Benthamism represents a phenomenon common enough in the history of thought. The conditions have changed, and the germs of belief long dormant suddenly develop unsuspected powers of growth. As Rousseau took the doctrine of abstract rights from the schools into the streets, so Bentham transferred the doctrine of utility from the sphere of speculation to that of immediate legislation. The belief in future rewards and punishments was too effete and too little congenial to the tendencies of that party to which Bentham belonged to survive in his teaching. He held to facts, and was scornful of obsolete theological figments as of obsolete legislative principles. For Paley's placid conservatism, he substituted an ardent desire to bring every existing institution to the test of immediate practical utility; and though rejecting the principles of the revolutionary party, as represented by French or American declaimers, he applied a method less calculated to produce catastrophes, but equally adapted to effect a thorough reconstruction of the old order.

2

137. I shall not, however, attempt to discuss Bentham's principles or influence. The history of utilitarianism as an active force belongs to the present century; and an adequate estimate of Bentham's achievements would take me far beyond

Bentham's Works, x. 163.

The famous American Declaration of Independence' was, in Bentham's view, a hodge-podge of confusion and absurdity' (Works, x. 63).

the scope of this book and of my knowledge. Moreover, it is admitted even by Mr. J. S. Mill, the great writer who has pronounced the best judgment upon Bentham from a disciple's point of view, that vast as were Bentham's labours, and great as were their results upon jurisprudence, he effected little or nothing as a philosophical moralist. What he did was to utter, with an emphasis not previously attained, the verdict of common sense upon the flimsy nature of the rival theories; to stimulate the belief in the possibility of basing a moral theory upon observation, and, it may be added, by constantly applying the celebrated 'greatest happiness' formula to bring into clear relief some leading ethical problems, and to help on the emancipation of ethics from theology.

138. All this, however, throws little light upon speculative problems. Bentham, as a moral philosopher, was certainly not in advance of Hume, and is only so far in advance of Tucker or Paley as he abandons the incongruous addition by which they had striven to affiliate their doctrine to the orthodox teaching. The main difficulty remained unaltered. Utilitarianism is an attempt to base morality upon observation, instead of following the a priori method. But from the point of view of Bentham, as from that of his predecessors, this was to reduce it to a mere chaos of empirical doctrines. A science of morality presupposes certain principles which belong to the sciences of psychology and sociology. Whilst the very conception of such sciences was scarcely entertained, the attempt to give a scientific account of morality was necessarily imperfect. According to Mr. Mill, Bentham overlooked the 'moral part of man's nature in the strict sense of the term,'' and was totally indifferent to historical considerations. That is to say, he was ignorant or careless of the two kinds of knowledge which are most essential to ethical speculation. Naturally, his results were unsatisfactory.

139. Bentham, indeed, attempted to provide a scientific apparatus by a classification of pains and pleasures. Such a classification could not be exhaustive, except as a statement of his own emotions; and, as Mr. Mill fully shows, his life and character made his knowledge of the great springs of action singularly limited. But, in any case, it could not afford

1 Mill's 'Dissertation,' i. 360.

a secure base for reasoning. To compare the value to the individual of different classes of pleasures and pains, we must understand something of the nature and relations of the faculties affected. To understand their importance to the community, we must have a clear view of the nature of the social organisation. Otherwise our attempts at calculating the consequences of action leave out the only element by which unity can be given to the resulting system. We may roughly sum up the evil consequences produced by a murder to its victim, and the people more indirectly affected. But we cannot treat the question scientifically till we can analyse the nature of the moral disease of which the murderous impulse is a symptom, and of the morbid social conditions which generate murderers. Thus the method is as crude as, in some cases, the results are unworthy. With Bentham the altruistic impulses are still scarcely admitted, as he contemplates society as a mere aggregate of jostling individuals. Virtue is scarcely intelligible, for he identifies the moral with the 'popular' sanction, and says that 'popular' is the best name as most indicative of the constituent causes.' That is, virtue means simply the average belief of mankind as to what will produce the greatest quantity of happiness. Though the doctrine may be, in a sense, true, it is but a rough approximation to any tenable theory upon the subject.

140. The attempt to found a scientific system of morality was thus doomed-not indeed to failure, for it stimulated further enquiries—but to remain in the stage of crude empiricism. That it produced so vast an impression is due to the fact that it was in reality a first step towards a more systematic and satisfactory conception, and to the other fact, that the doctrines which it opposed were not really better founded, though put forward with higher pretensions, with pretensions which were becoming rapidly untenable. Bentham's influence on morality was destructive of many phantoms which were still going about in spite of Hume's more searching scepticism, and if its constructive efficacy was not great in the sphere of speculation, it encouraged the adoption of profounder methods. Mr. Mill describes in his 'Autobiography' See vol. i. Principles of Morals,' &c., p. 14, and 'Table of Springs of Action,' p. 195.

the immense effect which the perusal of one of Bentham's treatises produced upon his mind, by holding out prospects of useful effort in the cause of mankind. With all Bentham's faults, he gave a vast stimulus, if only through his disciples, to others who were wearied of the old effete assumptions, and longing for more fruitful methods of enquiry. But here, again, I must pause on the threshold of a new era. To discuss the relations of Benthamism to the scientific morality of which we may hope that later thinkers have at least laid the foundations, is a task not here to be attempted.

NOTE TO CHAPTER IX.

The principal authorities for the above chapter and the editions cited are as follows:

BALGUY, John (1686-1748), Letter to a Deist,' 1726. 'Foundation of Moral Goodness,' 1728.

BENTHAM, Jeremy (1747-1832), Principles of Morals and Legislation,' 1789 (printed in 1780).

BROWN, John (1715-1766), Essay on Characteristics,' 1751. Third edition. London: 1752.

BUTLER, Joseph (1695-1752), ‘Sermons on Human Nature,' 1726. Works. Oxford: 1836.

CLARKE, Samuel (1675-1729), ' Demonstration of Being and Attributes of God,' 1704-5. Works: 1738.

COCKBURN, Catherine (1679-1749), Remarks on Foundation of Morality,' 1743. Works. London : 1751. 'Remarks on Rutherforth,' 1747.

FORDYCE, James (1711-1751), 'Elements of Moral Philosophy,' 1754. GISBORNE, Thomas (1758-1846), Principles of Moral Philosophy,' 1789. HARTLEY, David (1705-1757), 'Observations on Man,' 1749. London :

1791.

HOME, Henry (Lord Kames), (1691-1782), Essay on Principles of Morality,' 1751. Third edition : 1779.

HUME, David (1711–1776), ‘Treatise of Human Nature,' 1740, vol. iii. Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals,' 1751. Four Dissertations,' 1757. Philosophical Works, by Green and Grose. HUTCHESON, Francis (1694-1747), 'Ideas of Beauty and Virtue,' 1725. 'Passions and Affections,' 1728. System of Moral Philosophy,' 1755.