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For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am,Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER

by circumstances that he had not consented to the entry. such error was fatal.-Russell v. State, 218 S. W. 1051.

have alleged an offer or tender to return payment made before suit or alleged an excuse for not making tender.-Davis v. Burkholder, 218 S. W. 1101.

CARMACK AMENDMENT.

28(6) (Tex.Cr.App.) Where the property of D. and S. was taken from their room, if a burglarious entry was made of said room, it might support a conviction under a count alleging that the burglarized premises belonged See Commerce, 10. to D., and that the property intended to be taken was his.-Russell v. State, 218 S. W. 1051.

28(7) (Tex.Cr.App.) Where defendant was indicted for burglarizing a house with the intent to take the property of H., proof that he took the property of D. and S. therefrom_is insufficient.-Russell v. State, 218 S. W. 1051. Where the property of D. and S. was taken from their room, if a burglarious entry was made of said room, it might support a conviction under a count alleging that the burglarized premises belonged to D., and that the property intended to be taken was his.-Id.

29 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where the state relies for a conviction upon the circumstance that accused is found in possession of property recently stolen from burglarized premises, the identity of the property in his possession must be established.-Wayland v. State, 218 S. W. 1065.

37 (Tex.Cr.App.) The discovery of pistols and flashlights on premises occupied by defendant and others, and upon which the stolen goods were found, is evidence tending to connect the defendant with the burglary.-Russell v. State, 218 S. W. 1049.

41(7) (Tex.Cr.App.) In prosecution for entering a garage at night and stealing automobile casings, evidence held insufficient to identify tires found in defendant's possession as those stolen from the garage.-Wayland v. State, 218 S. W. 1065.

42(2) (Tex.Cr.App.) Evidence that a burglary had been committed and property stolen February 25, and that some of the stolen goods was found April 4 in a house occupied by defendant and his wife and by a man with opportunity equal to that of defendant, and not showing defendant's personal possession or scious assertion of property, is insufficient to sustain a conviction.-Russell v. State, 218 S. W. 1049.

con

CARRIERS.

See Appeal and Error, 216, 1048, 1050,
1064, 1173: Commerce; Damages, 130,
131, 135; Evidence, 20, 72, 119, 123, 158,
314, 529, 537, 553; Judgment, 253; Jus-
tices of the Peace, 86; Limitation of Ac-
tions, 24, 30; Municipal Corporations,
642; Pleading, 129; Railroads,
52, 17; Telegraphs and Telephones, 26;
Trial, 191, 252, 256, 296.

II. CARRIAGE OF GOODS.

(F) Loss of or Injury to Goods. 132 (Tex.Com.App.) In action against carrier for loss of baled cotton by fire, plaintiff had the burden of showing the amount of his damage, which was not discharged by evidence failing to show the grade of the cotton or number of pounds destroyed.-Brass v. Texar kana & Ft. Smith Ry. Co., 218 S. W. 1040. 134 (Tex.Com.App.) In action against carrier for loss of goods by fire while awaiting transportation, plaintiff makes a prima facie case of negligence by proof of delivery of the goods to the carrier and nondelivery by the carrier at destination.-Brass v. Texarkana & Ft. Smith Ry. Co., 218 S. W. 1040.

134 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for injuries to shipment of household goods, testimony that the goods were delivered by warehousemen to initial carrier in good order, coupled with a bill of lading acknowledging receipt of the goods apparently in good order, was sufficient to show delivery to initial carrier in good order.-Baker v. Lyons, 218 S. W. 1090.

III. CARRIAGE OF LIVE STOCK.

215(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) Where an act of negligence on the part of a carrier of live stock concurs with an act of God in producing an in42 (2) (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for jury, and the injury would not have happened burglary, evidence which goes no further than without the negligent act, the carrier is responthe finding of a part of the alleged stolen prop-sible for the damages arising from its act.-Kanerty a month or more after the burglary in a house occupied by defendant, his wife, and another party, and does not establish any claim or assertion of defendant to ownership or possession of the property found is insufficient to sustain a conviction.-Russell v. State, 218 S. W. 1051.

sas City, M. & O. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Blackstone & Slaughter, 218 S. W. 552.

216 (Tex.Civ.App.) Though shipper of cattle cannot recover from carrier for injuries which were the proximate result of weakness at time cattle were tendered for carriage, carrier, having received cattle, is bound to exercise or42(3) (Tex.Cr.App.) The possession of the dinary care, and to transpert them with reasonproperty recently stolen is a circumstance suf-able dispatch, and upon breach of such duty is ficient to support verdict of guilty, where the liable for injuries proximately resulting therebreaking is proved by other evidence.-Way- from, though results were more disastrous than land v. State, 218 S. W. 1065. if cattle had been in good condition.-Panhandle & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Sanderson, 218 S. W. 540.

CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS.
See Courts, 231; Insurance, 246; Plead-
ing, 279; Taxation, 805, 810.
I. RIGHT OF ACTION AND DEFENSES.

217(1) (Ark.) In an action by a shipper of mules which ate off one another's tails and manes, the animals being confined for more than 40 hours without food, etc., held, that the failure of the shipper to place chemicals on the animals' manes and tails was not negligence as a matter of law; there being no such universal practice as to make it a custom and the carrier not requiring such treatment.Hines v. Morgan, 218 S. W. 672.

18 (Tex. Civ.App.) Where plaintiffs by false representations of defendant and notary who took acknowledgment to lease sought to be canceled were induced to sign a contract which in fact they never made, that plaintiffs, who re-227 (1) (Tex.Civ.App.) In shipper's action lied upon the integrity of defendant and notary, signed lease without reading it, is not such negligence as will deprive them of equitable relief. Davis v. Burkholder, 218 S. W. 1101.

against railroad for damage to cattle, shipper's allegations that the railroad was negligent by reason of delays on sidings and switches, rough handling, and sudden stop of train because of collision, or near collision, with motorcar or II. PROCEEDINGS AND RELIEF. section hand car, resulting in damage to cat37(4) (Tex.Civ.App.) In action by lessors tle, held sufficient, as against objection that alto cancel oil lease, if petition specifically allegations were too general and did not specify in leged payment of consideration, plaintiffs should what the alleged negligence consisted.-Pan

handle & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Sanderson, 218 S. W. | loading, refusal to instruct jury not to consider 540. damages caused by overloading of cattle held 228(1) (Ark.) Where the evidence raised error.-Panhandle & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Sanderthe inference of unreasonable delay, the car- son, 218 S. W. 540. rier had the burden of proof to remove pre-230 (12) (Tex.Civ.App.) Refusal to submit sumption of negligence in transportation, caus- defense that shipper failed to unload cattle after ing damage to live stock shipment.-Missouri sudden stop in an effort to diminish or mitiPac. R. Co. v. Block, 218 S. W. 682. gate the damages was not error, where there 228(3) (Mo.App.) In an action against a was no definite evidence that to have so uncarrier for damages to a shipment of live stock, loaded the cattle would have resulted in any maevidence by plaintiff that the cattle were in terial benefit to them, nor that any definite inbetter condition when starting on the journey jury which could be measured by delays propthan they were when brought from another erly resulted by failure to so unload.-Panhandle point to the point of shipment was not inad- & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Sanderson, 218 S. W. 540. missible; the carrier's defense being that the cattle were so poor and emaciated that they were not physically strong enough to endure the shipment.-Cravens v. Hines, 218 S. W. 912.

In action for damages to a shipment of live stock, evidence as to the condition of the cattle prior to shipment was not incompetent, notwithstanding that there was no allegation in the complaint that the cattle were in good condition when received for shipment; defendants having raised the issue in the answer.-Id.

IV. CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS. (A) Relation Between Carrier and Pas

senger.

234 (Ark.) Where the acts of a drunken passenger in assaulting plaintiff passenger occurred in Missouri, the laws of that state must govern in determining whether there is liability on the part of the railroad.-Hines v. Rice, 218 S. W. 851.

(C) Performance of Contract of Trans

portation.

In action for damage to a shipment of, live stock because of rough handling and severe weather, it was not error to exclude the shipping contract whereby the shipper assumed all 275 (Tex. Civ.App.) In an action against a risk and expense of feeding, watering, and car- carrier for refusing to transport a passenger, a ing for the shipment, in effect shipping the cat-petition alleging that she suffered actual damtle at his own risk, in view of Laws 1911, p. 153, providing that no carrier can by contract exempt itself from liability as a common carrier.

-Id.

228(5) (Ark.) In an action by a shipper for loss on a shipment of mules, evidence held to warrant a finding that the animals, which were confined in cars without food or water for more than 40 hours, ate off one another's manes and tails because of hunger.-Hines v. Morgan, 218 S. W. 672.

Under Act Cong. June 29, 1906 (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8651-8654), it is the duty of interstate carriers of live stock, such as mules to feed and water the same at periods of 28 consecutive hours, which may be extended to 36 hours at the request of the shipper, and where the carrier failed to feed and water stock, and gave the shipper no opportunity until after the animals had been confined for more than 40 hours, such fact was evidence of the carrier's negligence on which a recovery for injuries to the animals, which ate off one another's tails and manes because of hunger, might be based.

-Id.

228 (5) (Mo.App.) In an action for damages to a shipment of live stock because of rough handling and severe weather, evidence held to support finding that the carrier was negligent.-Cravens v. Hines, 218 S. W. 912.

229(2) (Ark.) In an action by a shipper of mules for damages, the animals having eaten off one another's tails and manes because confined for an excessive period, the measure of damages is the depreciation in market value because of the loss of tails and manes, and recovery cannot be defeated on the ground that the animals were as capable of work as before. -Hines v. Morgan, 218 S. W. 672.

230(1) (Ark.) Evidence as to whether cholera caused death of hog in transit held conflicting, making question for jury.-Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Block, 218 S. W. 682.

230(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) Refusal to submit question of whether plaintiff overloaded cattle, where there was evidence thereof, held error, -Panhandle & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Sanderson, 218 S. W. 540.

230(3) (Ark.) Conflicting evidence as to whether there was delay in transportation of live stock makes case for the jury.-Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Block, 218 S. W. 682.

230(10) (Tex.Civ.App.) Where carrier had taken charge of cattle under contract stipulating that it would not be responsible for over

ages in a specified sum, including among other items one for medicine and doctors, but not alleging that she paid the sum claimed, or assumed to pay it, or that it was a reasonable charge, did not support a recovery for such item. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gordon, 218 S.

W. 74.

276(3) (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action against a carrier for refusing to transport a passenger, the evidence did not warrant a recovery for doctor's bills where the doctor to whom plaintiff said she owed the bill denied attending her on account of any sickness contracted at the time in question, or any knowledge of such sickness, or any charge for such service.-Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gordon, 218 S. W. 74.

277 (3) (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action against a carrier to recover for mental suffering caused to children by being carried five miles past their destination, so that they were compelled to walk back, there could be no recovery for men. tal suffering alone, in the absence of proof of any physical injury.-Texas Electric Railway Co. v. Price, 218 S. W. 1092.

(D) Personal Injuries.

302(2) (Ky.) Where the brakeman, in violation of the rules of a railroad company, left the coach door open as the train was about to enter a tunnel, and as a result of the open door a cinder blew into a passenger's eye and injured the same, held, that the carrier was liable.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Roberts, 218 S. W. 713.

314(2) (Mo.App.) Petition of one who, having alighted from defendant's train on which he was a passenger, in walking on the path from the depot to town, slipped into an unguarded hole beside it on defendant's premises held to charge negligence as to the unguarded hole; averments as to ownership, construction, and maintenance of the path, if not surplusage, being as to another ground of negligence.Kaenter v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 218 S. W. 349.

315(3) (Mo.App.) On proof merely of alleg ed negligent maintenance by defendant carrier on its premises of unguarded hole beside a path for travel between town and depot, and that this was the immediate and proximate cause of injury of plaintiff, who in leaving the depot by the path slipped into the hole, he can recover, irrespective of the question of negligence as to the path.-Kaenter v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 218 S. W. 349.

For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER

317(1) (Ky.) Where an injured passenger had a telephone conversation with the conductor

CERTIFICATE.

CERTIORARI.

of the car more than one year after the accident, See Partnership, 76; Taxation, 629. in which the conductor asked if the passenger was going to sue the street railway, evidence of such conversation was irrelevant and wholly immaterial in an action by the passenger against the street railway company.-South Covington & C. Ry. Co. v. Goldsmith, 218 S.

W. 286.

318(2) (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action by passenger who claimed to have contracted la grippe resulting in pneumonia and tuberculosis from exposure in cold waiting room, evidence held sufficient to sustain a finding that the passenger suffered such injuries as claimed, and the denial of a new trial was not error.-Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Shaw, 218 S. W. 814.

II. PROCEEDINGS AND DETER

MINATION.

64(1) (Mo.) On certiorari to quash a deciCourt cannot consider whether the decision is sion of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme unjust, and may interfere with it only if it conflicts with a previous controlling decision Bank v. Reynolds, 218 S. W. 337. of the Supreme Court.-State ex rel. Boatmen's

CHAIR CARS.

CHANCERY.

319(3) (Ark.) One thousand dollars verdict against the federal Director General of See Carriers, 330. Railroads in favor of a female passenger, in- ́ sulted and assaulted by a drunken fellow passenger, who alleged she had his ticket, and who laid hands on her, held not excessive in view of the fright she suffered, the nervous shock, and her resulting physical condition.-Hines v. Rice, 218 S. W. 851.

320(6) (Ark.) In an action against the federal Director General of Railroads for injuries to a female passenger assaulted by a drunken fellow passenger, issue of the conductor's negligence held for the jury under the evidence.-Hines v. Rice, 218 S. W. 851.

320(7) (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action by passenger who claimed that he suffered la grippe and cold resulting in pneumonia and tuberculosis from waiting in a cold waiting room, held, that the submission of the questions whether pneumonia and tuberculosis resulted from the la grippe was, under the evidence, proper. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Shaw, 218 S. W. 814.

321(5) (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action by passenger for claim that as result of exposure in cold waiting room he contracted la grippe resulting in pneumonia and tuberculosis, instructions submitting those issues held correct. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Shaw, 218 S. W. 814.

See Equity.

CHARITIES.

II. CONSTRUCTION, ADMINISTRA-
TION, AND ENFORCEMENT.

37 (Mo.) In a suit by the trustee to have the court apply the cy pres to a trust fund created by decedent in his will "to furnish relief to all poor emigrants, and travelers coming to St. Louis, on their way bona fide to settle in the West," evidence held insufficient to show a total or partial failure of the object for which the trust fund was created.-City of St. Louis v. McAllister, 218 S. W. 312.

≈48(2) (Mo.) A decree ordering the sale of all the real estate of a charitable trust estate, and the reinvestment of the fund in high class bonds and securities, held erroneous, in view of evidence that the realty could not be sold for more than 50 per cent. of its value.-City of St. Louis v. McAllister, 218 S. W. 312. the alienation of property belonging to a chariThe power of a court of equity to authorize table trust should be exercised with caution.

and one of the prerequisites to the exercise of such power is that it shall clearly appear that the proposed alienation is for the benefit of the

charity. Id.

CHASTITY.

321(15) (Ky.) In an action against a street railway, where plaintiff passenger's theory was that the car was started before she was clear of it, and defendant's theory was that she fell, after safely alighting from the car, by twisting her foot on the rough edges of the brick street, and there was no evidence of contributory neghgence, it was not error to refuse to give an in- See Criminal Law, 309. struction presenting the converse of one given by the court that "the jury will find for defendant, unless they believe from the evidence that when the plaintiff was leaving the car, and before she was clear of the car, the defendant's employés negligently and carelessly started said car, and by reason of such starting of said car the plaintiff was thrown," etc.-South Covington & C. Ry. Co. v. Goldsmith, 218 S. W. 286.

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CHATTEL MORTGAGES.

See Appeal and Error, 930, 1091; Bank-
ruptcy, 212; Husband and Wife,
1332; Landlord and Tenant, 252; Part-
nership, 69, 183; Pleading, 392; Trial,
251.

1. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY. (A) Nature and Essentials of Transfers of Chattels as Security. C6 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 5654, a contract of sale of an auto in Texas, where the contract was made and was to be performed, passed title, leaving in the seller no other interest than that of lienor, notwithstanding provision reserving title to the seller till paid for.-Buchanan-Vaughan Auto Co. v. Woosley, 218 S. W. 554.

(B) Form and Contents of Instruments.

47 (Mo.App.) A chattel mortgage, describing the property as "six head of horses, one cow, three farm wagons," etc., and as being on the farm of B. in Wayne township, Buchanan county, was sufficient; it being shown that B. owned only one farm in such township.-Cook v. Wheeler, 218 S. W. 929.

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CINDERS.

113 (Tex.Civ.App.) A chattel mortgage, executed to indemnify a surety on a claimant's See Carriers, 302. bond authorizing the trustee to take possession and sell the property if judgment should be rendered against the mortgagor and he should not

CITIES.

CIVIL RIGHTS.

appeal, and providing, in case of an appeal the See Municipal Corporations.
mortgage should remain in force, and if judg-
ment should be rendered against the surety the
same remedy should apply, and providing that See Constitutional Law, 83.
the surety's remedies and rights should be fully
matured without it being required to first pay
any judgment, costs, and expenses, did not

CLERICAL ERRORS.

authorize a seizure and sale in case of a judg- See Pleading, 392.

ment against the claimant from which he appealed. Warren v. Johnson, 218 S. W. 104.

A chattel mortgage to indemnify the surety

CLERKS OF COURTS.

on a claimant's bond, authorizing a sale of See Criminal Law, 1106, 1109.

the property if judgment was rendered against the mortgagor and no appeal taken, used the

COAL.

word "appeal" as meaning a taking of the See Mines and Minerals,
case to a higher court by any authorized meth-
od, including a writ of error.-Id.

(C) Property Mortgaged, and Estates and Interests of Parties Therein.

117 (Tex.Civ.App.) In a mortgage on entire crop of 130 acres of rice to be planted on the B. farm, the particular description of the farm is controlling over the general description by number of acres, so that the mortgage would not include 30 acres planted on the J. farm, with the 100 acres actually planted on the B. farm, particularly where mortgagor was not contemplating planting the 30 acres when executing mortgage.-D. S. Cage & Co. v. Southern Rice Growers' Ass'n, 218 S. W. 78.

IV. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF
PARTIES.

58.

COLOR OF TITLE.

See Adverse Possession.

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I. POWER TO REGULATE IN GEN-
ERAL.

10 (Tex.Com.App.) The liability of a carrier for loss of goods received under a contract for export to foreign country is governed by the law of the forum; Congress not having exercised its power to regulate such matter, the Hepburn Act and the Carmack Amendment (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8604a, 8604aa) applying only when the shipment is from one state to another. Brass v. Texarkana & Ft. Smith Ry. Co., 218 S. W. 1040.

II. SUBJECTS OF REGULATION.

172(4) (Mo.App.) A petition, in an action in replevin brought by the holder of a mortgage of chattels, describing the property as a certain number of horses, cows, wagons, etc., "kept and contained on the farm known as the Watson farm, approximately two miles north- 27(5) (Ky.) That a railroad employé when east of the city of St. Joseph, in Washington injured was assisting in loading old rails on a township," held to sufficiently describe the prop-car for delivery and shipment because they had erty. Cook v. Wheeler, 218 S. W. 929.

172(9) (Mo.App.) In a replevin action by a holder of a chattel mortgage, it was not necessary to require the jury to find in so many words that the defendant wrongfully detained the property, where it was required to find that defendant had defaulted in payment of the debt, and had moved the property from his premises, which under the mortgage entitled the holder of the mortgage to possession.-Cook v. Wheeler, 218 S. W. 929.

been sold is insufficient to show that he was injured while employed in interstate commerce. -Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Probus, 218 S. W. 724.

28 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where there was continuous transmission of a telegraph message from a place in Mississippi to a place in Texas, the message was interstate commerce.-Mackay Telegraph & Cable Co. v. Martin, 218 S. W. 133.

COMMERCIAL PAPER.

VII. REMOVAL OR TRANSFER OF See Bills and Notes.
PROPERTY BY MORTGAGOR.

(A) Rights and Liabilities of Parties.

COMMISSION AND COMMISSIONERS.

225(1) (Tex. Civ.App.) Where mortgagor's See Animals, 29; Statutes, 141.

purchaser had not paid mortgagor the price,
the court in mortgagee's action against mort-
gagor and purchaser properly gave mortgagee
judgment against purchaser for such price, See Brokers,
even though purchaser was a bona fide purchas-
er, since the payment thereof to mortgagee re-
lieves the purchaser from his indebtedness to
mortgagor and does equity between parties.
West Furniture Co. v. Cason, 218 S. W. 774.

CHECKS.

See Mines and Minerals, 75.

CHILD LABOR.

See Master and Servant, 95.

COMMISSIONS.

~53.

COMMON LAW.

See Trial,
14 (Ky.) The Negotiable Instruments Laws
are always construed as declaratory merely of
the law merchant, unless plainly a change was
intended.-Mueller & Martin v. Liberty Ins.
Bank, 218 S. W. 465.

150; Wills, 194, 767.

COMMUNITY PROPERTY.
See Husband and Wife, 249–264.

For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am.Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER

COMPENSATION.

CONSPIRACY.

See Attorney General, 2; Brokers, 53. See False Imprisonment, 39; Homicide,

COMPOSITIONS WITH CREDITORS. See Contracts, 113.

COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT. See Attorney and Client, 101; Estoppel, 91; Executors and Administrators,

491.

83.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

See Statutes,

39-64.

For validity of statutes relating to particular
subjects, see also the various specific topics.

II. CONSTRUCTION, OPERATION,
AND ENFORCEMENT OF CON-
STITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.

cer

~~5(3) (Ark.) If there was a complete oral agreement to settle disputed claim arising un-13 (Tex.) In ascertaining whether a der written contract for payment of royalties tain interpretation should be given a constituon coal mined, the parties were bound by it, tional provision, it is proper to consider whetheven though it was to be reduced to writing.- er its framers and the voters adopting it intendArkansas Anthracite Coal & Land Co. v. Dun-ed the consequences which must follow a given lap, 218 S. W. 839. construction. Koy v. Schneider, 218 S. W. Even if the original written agreement with 479. respect to payment of royalties was a matter 48 (Tex.) A statute will not be declared unwithin the statute of frauds, so as to require constitutional in a doubtful case.-Koy V. evidence of the written agreement, the con- Schneider, 218 S. W. 479. tract for the settlement of the disputed claim was not one within the statute of frauds, and it is not essential to its validity that it should be in writing.—Id.

48 (Tex.Civ.App.) Statutes should not be annulled by the courts merely because doubts may be suggested as to their constitutionality. -King v. Terrell, 218 S. W. 42.

III. DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERN-
MENTAL POWERS AND
FUNCTIONS.

Thereof.

6(2) (Ark.) Though contract for payment of royalties on coal mined provided for a mode of arbitration of differences which might arise with respect to amount of coal mined, parties could settle a disputed claim by a new agree- (A) Legislative Powers and Delegation ment, without regard to method specified in original contract; the settlement constituting a consideration, and there being mutuality in 65 (Tex. Civ.App.) Rev. St. 1911, arts. 1006agreement to settle according to new terms. 1017, relating to street improvements, is not Arkansas Anthracite Coal & Land Co. v. Dun- unconstitutional in that article 1016 provides lap, 218 S. W. 839. for a delegation of legislative power to the people of the various cities of the state; the act being an amendment of existing charters which the inhabitants may accept or reject.-Keller v.

-

15(2) (Ky.) Where a compromise agreement was entered into, a pending action could nevertheless be continued on the prior original contract, where the compromise contract contain-Western Paving Co., 218 S. W. 1077. ed a clause to the effect that if it was not complied with within a certain time the suit founded on the original contract should proceed as if no compromise had been made, and the compromise agreement was not complied with within such time.-St. Marys Mach. Co. v. Cook,

218 S. W. 733.

(B) Judicial Powers and Functions.

70 (1) (Ark.) The legislative determination as to the extent in point of distance of benefits from a road improvement is conclusive, unless manifestly arbitrary and without foundation.Easley v. Patterson, 218 S. W. 381.

powers over the taking of fish, the state may regulate the manner thereof, and the necessity of particular regulations is a legislative question, and the courts will not set up their judgment against that of the Legislature and hold a police law to be invalid, unless it is clearly shown to have no reasonable tendency to accomplish the desired end.-State v. Adams, 218 S. W. 845.

23(2) (Ark.) In action based on oral agree-70(3) (Ark.) In the exercise of its plenary ment for settlement of disputed claim arising out of written contract for payment of royalties on coal mined, testimony that oral agreement was made with defendant's president, and that its terms were accepted by plaintiffs, was competent, since it had a bearing directly on the main issue in the case, which was whether there had been such a contract entered into between the parties.-Arkansas Anthracite Coal & Land Co. v. Dunlap, 218 S. W. 839.

COMPTROLLER.

See Hospitals, 5.

CONCURRENT INSURANCE.

See Insurance, 336.

CONDEMNATION.

See Eminent Domain.

CONFLICT OF LAWS.

See Commerce, 10; Husband and Wife, 1462; Railroads, 480.

CONGESTION OF LUNGS.

See Evidence, 14.

CONSCRIPTION.

See Homicide, 172.

70(3) (Mo.) Whether the inclusion of the city of St. Louis, which maintains a hospital for the treatment of tuberculosis, in Rev. St. 1909, § 1465, as amended by Laws 1919, p. 200, directing the comptroller to certify at once the name of one applying for free treatment at the state sanatorium, subserves the public welfare, is a matter for the Legislature and not for the courts; the statute being concededly valid and unambiguous.-State ex rel. Conway v. Nolte, 218 S. W. 862.

73 (Ky.) Courts will not interfere with executive acts unless the exercise of this authority is clearly within the scope of its jurisdiction.-Gordon v. Morrow, 218 S. W. 258.

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