I.

voluntary

For the clearer understanding of these things, and to DISCOURSE know what spontaneity is, let us consult awhile with the 4. [DefiSchools about the distinct order of voluntary or involuntary nition of actions. Some acts proceed wholly from an extrinsecal and involuntary cause; as the throwing of a stone upwards, a rape, or the acts.] drawing of a Christian by plain force to the idol's temple. These are called violent acts. Secondly, some proceed from an intrinsecal cause, but without any manner of knowledge of the end; as the falling of a stone downwards. These are called natural acts. Thirdly, some proceed from an internal principle with an imperfect knowledge of the end, where there is an appetite to the object, but no deliberation nor election; as the acts of fools, children, beasts, and the inconsiderate acts of men of judgment. These are called voluntary or spontaneous acts. Fourthly, some proceed from an intrinsecal cause with a more perfect knowledge of the end, which are elected upon deliberation. These are called free acts. So then the formal reason of liberty is election. The necessary requisite to election is deliberation. Deliberation implieth the actual use of reason. But deliberation and election cannot possibly subsist with an extrinsecal predetermination to one. How should a man deliberate or choose which way to go, who knows that all ways are shut against him, and made impossible to him, but only one? This is the genuine sense of these words "voluntary" and "spontaneous" in this question. Though they were taken twenty other ways vulgarly or metaphorically (as we say "spontaneous ulcers," where there is no appetite at all), yet it were nothing to this controversy; which is not about words, but about things, not what the words voluntary or free do or may signify, but whether all things be extrinsecally predetermined to one.

election

tent in the

These grounds being laid for clearing the true sense of the [5. Neceswords, the next thing to be examined is that contradiction sity and which he hath espied in my discourse, or how this argument inconsisfights against its fellows." "If I," saith T. H., "make it same act.] appear," that the spontaneous actions of "fools, children, madmen, and beasts," do "proceed from election and deliberation," and that "inconsiderate" and indeliberate actions

* [Thom. Aquin., Summ., Prim. Secund., Qu. vi. artt. 1, 2. And compare

Aristot., Ethic., V. x. 6-9; Rhet., I.
x. 7, 8.]

BRAMHALL.

E

PART
III.

6. [Irrational beings nei

ther deliberate

are found in the wisest men, "then his argument concludes,
that necessity and election may stand together; which is
contrary" to his assertion. If this could be made appear as
easily as it is spoken, it would concern himself much; who,
when he should prove that rational men are not free from
necessity, goes about to prove, that brute beasts do de-
liberate and elect, that is as much as to say, are free from
necessity. But it concerns not me at all. It is neither my
assertion, nor my opinion, that necessity and election may
not meet together in the same subject. Violent, natural,
spontaneous, and deliberative or elective acts, may all meet
together in the same subject. But this I say, that necessity
and election cannot consist together in the same act. He
who is determined to one, is not free to choose out of more
than one. To begin with his latter supposition,—that wise
men may do "inconsiderate" and indeliberate actions. I
do readily admit it. But where did he learn to infer a
general conclusion from particular premisses? as thus,-be-
cause wise men do some indeliberate acts, therefore no act they
do is free or elective. Secondly, for his former supposition,
-"that fools, children, madmen, and beasts, do deliberate
and elect." If he could make it good, it is not I who contra-
dict myself, nor "fight against" mine own assertion; but it
is he who endeavours to prove that which I altogether deny.
He may well find a contradiction between him and me;
otherwise to what end is this dispute? But he shall not be 662
able to find a difference between me and myself. But the
truth is, he is not able to prove any such thing; and that
brings me to my sixth consideration:-

That neither horses, nor bees, nor spiders, nor children, His first nor fools, nor madmen, do deliberate or elect. instance is in the horse or dog, but more especially the nor elect.] horse. He told me, that I divided my argument "into squadrons," to apply myself to your Lordship, being “a military man';" and I apprehend, that for the same reason he gives his first instance of the horse with a submission to your "own experience." So far well, but otherwise very disadvantageously to his cause. Men use to say of a dull fellow, that he hath no more brains than a horse. And the

[See above T. H. Numb. v. p. 37.]

I.

Ps. xxxii. 9.

Prophet David saith, "Be not like the horse and mule, which DISCOURSE have no understanding." How do they "deliberate" without "understanding?" And Psalm xlix. 20, he saith the same of all brute beasts;-"Man being in honour had no understanding, but became like unto the beasts that perish." The horse "demurs upon his way." Why not? Outward objects or inward fancies may produce a stay in his course, though he have no judgment either to deliberate or elect. He "retires from some strange figure which he sees, and comes on again to avoid the spur." So he may, and yet be far enough from deliberation. All this proceeds from the sensitive passion of fear, which is "a perturbation arising from the expectation of some imminent evil." But he urgeth, "what else doth man that deliberateth?" Yes, very much. The horse feareth some outward object, but deliberation is a comparing of several means conducing to the same end. Fear is commonly of one, deliberation of more than one; fear is of those things which are not in our power, deliberation of those things which are in our powerz; fear ariseth many times out of natural antipathies, but in these disconveniences of nature deliberation hath no place at all. In a word, fear [" Fear is is an enemy to deliberation, and betrayeth the succours of else but a the soul.' If the horse did deliberate, he should consult betraying with reason, whether it were more expedient for him to go that way or not; he should represent to himself all the son offerdangers both of going and staying, and compare the one with xvii. 12.] the other, and elect that which is less evil; he should consider, whether it were not better to endure a little hazard, than ungratefully and dishonestly to fail in his duty to his master, who did breed him and doth feed him. This the horse doth not; neither is it possible for him to do it. Secondly, for children, T. H. confesseth, that they may be so "young," that they "do not deliberate at all." Afterwards, as they attain to the use of reason by degrees, so by degrees they become free agents. Then they do deliberate; before, they do not deliberate. The rod may be a means to make them use their reason, when they have power to exercise it; but the rod cannot produce the power before they have it.

nothing

III.

PART Thirdly, for fools and madmen :-it is not to be understood of such madmen as have their lucida intervalla, who are mad and discreet by fits; when they have the use of reason, they are no madmen, but may deliberate as well as others : nor yet of such fools as are only comparative fools, that is, less wise than others; such may deliberate, though not so clearly nor so judiciously as others: but of mere madmen, and mere natural fools:-to say that they, who have not the use of reason, do deliberate or use reason, implies a contradiction. But his chiefest confidence is in his bees and spiders; of whose "actions" (he saith) if I had been "a spectator," I "would have confessed, not only election, but also art, prudence, policy, very near equal to that of mankind;" whose "life," as "Aristotle saith, is civil." Truly I have contemplated their actions many times, and have been much taken with their curious works; yet my thoughts did not reflect so much upon them, as upon their Maker, Who is "sic magnus in magnis," that He is not "minor in parvis”—“so great in great things, that He is not less in small things." Yes, I have seen those silliest of creatures; and seeing their rare works, I have seen enough to confute all the bold-faced atheists of this age, and their hellish blasphemies. I see them, but I praised the marvellous works of God, and admired that Great and First Intellect, Who had both adapted their organs and determined their fancies to these particular works. I was not so simple. to ascribe those rarities to their own invention, which I knew to proceed from a mere instinct of nature. In all other things they are the dullest of creatures. Naturalists write of bees, that their fancy is imperfect, not distinct from their 663 common sense, spread over their whole body, and only perceiving things present. When Aristotle calls them "political" or sociable creatures, he did not intend it really that they lived a civil life, but according to an analogy,-because they do such things by instinct, as truly political creatures do out of judgment. Nor when I read in St. Ambrose of their " hexagonies" or sexangular cells, did I therefore conclude,

λον.” κ. τ. λ.]

I.

that they were mathematicians. Nor when I read in Cres- DISCOURSE pet, that they invoke God to their aid, when they go out of their hives, bending their thighs in form of a cross and bowing themselves, did I therefore think, that this was an act of religious piety, or that they were capable of "theological virtuese;" whom I see in all other things, in which their fancies are not determined, to be the silliest of creatures, strangers not only to right reason but to all resemblances of it.