III.

PART the understanding shall be absolute, not this or that indifferently, nor this rather than that comparatively, but this posi- 659 tively, not this freely, but this necessarily; and suppose the will do will efficaciously, and do not suspend its own act; then here is a necessity indeed, but neither absolute, nor extrinsecal, nor antecedent, flowing from a concourse of causes without ourselves, but a necessity upon supposition, which we do readily grant. So far T. H. is wide from the truth, whilst he maintains, either that the apprehension of a greater good doth necessitate the will, or that this is an absolute necessity.

[6. T. H.'s affectation of new terms of

art.]

[Further

T. H.]

Lastly, whereas he saith, that "the nature of election" doth "consist" in "following our hopes and fears," I cannot but observe, that there is not one word of art in this whole treatise which he useth in the right sense. I hope it doth not proceed out of an affectation of singularity, nor out of a contempt of former writers, nor out of a desire to take in sunder the whole frame of learning, and new mould it after his own mind. It were to be wished that at least he would give us a new dictionary, that we might understand his sense. But because this is but touched here sparingly and upon the by, I will forbear it, until I meet with it again in its proper place. And for the present it shall suffice to say, that hopes and fears are common to brute beasts, but election is a rational act, and is proper only to man, who is

"Sanctius his animal mentisque capacius altæ "."

T. H.-The second place of Scripture is Josh. xxiv. 15, answer of the third is 2 Sam. xxiv. 12; whereby 'tis clearly proved, that there is election in man, but not proved, that such election was not necessitated by the hopes, and fears, and considerations of good and bad to follow, which depend not on the will, nor are subject to election. And therefore one answer serves all such places, if they were a thousand.

[Reply.]

J. D.-This answer being the very same with the former, word for word, which hath already been sufficiently shaken in pieces, doth require no new reply.

DISCOURSE
I.

NUMBER VIII.

answer of

T. H.-Supposing, it seems, I might answer as I have [Further done, that necessity and election might stand together; and T. H.] instance in the actions of children, fools, and brute beasts, whose fancies, I might say, are necessitated and determined to one; before these his proofs out of Scripture he desires to prevent that instance, and therefore says, that the actions of "children, fools, madmen, and beasts," are indeed "determined," but that they proceed not from election, nor from free, but from spontaneous agents; as, for example, that the bee when it maketh honey does it spontaneously, and when the spider makes his web, he does it spontaneously, and not by election. Though I never meant to ground any answer upon the experience of what children, fools, madmen, and beasts do, yet, that your Lordship may understand what can be meant by spontaneous, and how it differs from voluntary, I will answer that distinction, and shew, that it fighteth against its fellow arguments. Your Lordship is therefore to consider, that all voluntary actions, where the thing that induceth the will is not fear, are called also spontaneous, and said to be done by a man's own accord. As when a man giveth money voluntarily to another for merchandise, or out of affection, he is said to do it of his own accord; which in Latin is sponte, and therefore the action is spontaneous : though to give one's money willingly to a thief to avoid killing, or throw it into the sea to avoid drowning, where the motive is fear, be not called spontaneous. But every spontaneous action is not therefore voluntary: for voluntary presupposes some precedent deliberation, that is to say, some consideration and meditation of what is likely to follow, both upon the doing and abstaining from the action deliberated of; whereas many actions are done of our own accord, and be therefore spontaneous, of which nevertheless as he thinks we never consulted, nor deliberated of in ourselves; as when, making no question nor any the least doubt in the world but that the thing we are about is good, we eat, or walk, or in anger strike or revile, which he thinks spontaneous but not voluntary nor elective actions. And with such kind of actions

III.

PART he says necessitation may stand, but not with such as are voluntary, and proceed upon election and deliberation. Now if I make it appear to you, that even these actions which he says proceed from spontaneity, and which he ascribes only to fools, children, madmen, and beasts," proceed from deliberation and election; and that actions inconsiderate, rash, and spontaneous, are ordinarily found in those, that are by themselves and many more thought as wise or wiser than ordinary men are; then his argument concludeth, that necessity and election may stand together, which is contrary to that which he intendeth by all the rest of his arguments to prove. And, first, your Lordship's own experience furnishes you with proof enough, that horses, dogs, and other brute beasts, 660 do demur oftentimes upon the way they are to take. The horse retiring from some strange figure he sees, and coming on again to avoid the spur. And what else does man that deliberateth, but one while proceed toward action, another while retire from it, as the hope of greater good draws him, or the fear of greater evil drives him? A child may be so young as to do all which it does without all deliberation; but that is but till it chance to be hurt by doing somewhat, or till it be of age to understand the rod; for the actions wherein he hath once a check, shall be deliberated on the second time. Fools and madmen manifestly deliberate no less than the wisest men, though they make not so good a choice, the images of things being by diseases altered. For bees and spiders, if he had so little to do as to be a spectator of their actions, he would have confessed not only election, but also art, prudence, and policy in them, very near equal to that of mankind. Of bees, Aristotle says, their life is "civilt." He is deceived, if he think any spontaneous action, after once being checked in it, differs from an action voluntary and elective; for even the setting of a man's foot in the posture of walking, and the action of ordinary eating, was once deliberated how and when it should be done; and though it afterward become easy and habitual, so as to be done without forethought, yet that does not hinder but that the act is voluntary and proceeds from

I.

election. So also are the rashest actions of choleric persons DISCOURSE
voluntary and upon deliberation for who is there but very
young children, that has not considered, when and how far
he ought or safely may strike or revile? Seeing then he
agrees with me, that such actions are necessitated, and the
fancy of those that do them is determined to the actions
they do, it follows out of his own doctrine, that the liberty of
election does not take away the necessity of electing this or
that individual thing. And thus one of his arguments fights
against another.

J. D. We have partly seen before, how T. H. hath coined [Reply.] a new kind of liberty, a new kind of necessity, a new kind of election; and now, in this section, a new kind of spontaneity, and a new kind of voluntary actions. Although he say, that here is nothing "new"" to him, yet I begin to suspect, that either here are many things new to him, or otherwise his election is not the result of a serious mature "deliberation."

the author's

The first thing that I offer is, how often he mistakes my [1. T. H. meaning in this one section. First, I make voluntary and mistakes spontaneous actions to be one and the same; he saith I dis- words. ] tinguish them, so as spontaneous actions may be necessary, but voluntary actions cannot. Secondly, I distinguish be- dep. 28 tween free acts and voluntary acts. The former are always deliberate, the latter may be indeliberate; all free acts are voluntary, but all voluntary acts are not free. But he saith I confound them, and make them the same. Thirdly, he saith, I ascribe spontaneity only to fools, children, madmen, and beasts; but I acknowledge spontaneity hath place in rational men, both as it is comprehended in liberty, and as it is distinguished from liberty.

contradicts

Yet I have no reason to be offended at it; for he deals no [2. And otherwise with me than he doth with himself. Here he himself.] tells us, that "voluntary presupposeth deliberation." But, Numb. xxv, he tells us contrary;-" that whatsoever followeth the last appetite" is "voluntary, and where there is but one appetite, that is the last;" and that "no action of a man can be said to be without deliberation, though never so sudden." So, Numb. xxxiii, he tells us, that "by spon[Below, p. 712. fol. edit.]

u

[See above T. H. Numb. ii. p. 26.]

V

III.

PART taneity is meant inconsiderate proceeding, or else nothing is meant by it" yet here he tells us, that "all voluntary actions" which proceed not from "fear," are "spontaneous;" whereof many are deliberate, as that wherein he instanceth himself, to give "money for merchandise." Thirdly, when I said, that children before they have the use of reason, act spontaneously (as when they suck the breast), but do not act freely, because they have not judgment to deliberate or elect, here T. H. undertakes to prove, that they do deliberate and elect; and yet presently after confesseth again, that a child may be so young, as to do what it doth without all deliberation."

which pro

or may not be spontaneous.]

3. [Actions Besides these mistakes and contradictions, he hath other ceed from errors also in this section. As this, that no actions proceedfear, may ing from "fear" are "spontaneous." He who throws his goods into the sea to avoid drowning, doth it not only "spontaneously" but even freely. He that wills the end, wills the means conducing to that end. It is true, that if the action be considered nakedly without all circumstances, no man willingly or spontaneously casts his goods into the sea. But if we take the action as in this particular case invested with all the circumstances, and in order to the end, that is, the 661 saving of his own life, it is not only voluntary and spontaneous, but elective and chosen by him, as the most probable means for his own preservation. As there is an antecedent and a subsequent will, so there is an antecedent and a subsequent spontaneity. His grammatical argument, grounded upon the derivation of spontaneous from sponte, weighs nothing; we have learned in the rudiments of logic, that conjugates are sometimes in name only, and not in deed. He who casts his goods in the sea, may do it of his own accord in order to the end. Secondly, he errs in this also, that nothing is opposed to spontaneity but only "fear." Invincible and antecedent ignorance doth destroy the nature of spontaneity or voluntariness, by removing that knowledge which should and would have prohibited the action. As a man, thinking to shoot a wild beast in a bush, shoots his friend, which if he had known, he would not have shot. This man did not kill his friend of his own accord.