PART

III.

God's

revealed

not these 'reprehensions ?' Or doth not he maintain, that God had determined man antecedently to do what he did? Yes; but he saith, "God convinceth man and instructeth him, that though immortality was so easy to be obtained, as that it might be had for the abstinence from the fruit of one only tree, yet he could not obtain it" thereby. If God would only have "convinced" man, certainly He would have convinced him by fitter and juster means than hypocritical exaggerations. But how doth he say, that "immortality was so easy to be obtained," which by his doctrine was altogether impossible to be obtained by man by that means? It is neither so easy, nor possible, to oppose and frustrate the decrees of an infinite God.

I shall reserve his errors in theology for a fitter place. Whosoever would trouble himself with his contradictions, might find more than enough. Here he telleth us, that "the dependance of the actions on the will is that which properly and truly is called liberty;" elsewhere he told us, that rivers are free agents, and that a river hath true liberty; which, if my ignorance do not mislead me, have no wills.

That God hath a secret and revealed will, no man denieth. secret and To say that these wills are opposite one to another, all good men do detest; because, as I said formerly (which he taketh and why. no notice of), they "concern several personsd." The secret

will not contrary;

will of God is what He will do Himself; the revealed will is [Gen.xxii.] that which He would have us to do. He objecteth,-" God

commanded Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, yet His will was he [Jonah iii.] should not do it;" Jonah, by God's command, denounced the destruction of Nineveh, yet "it was God's will it should not be destroyede." Doth not he see, that the person is varied in both these instances? God would prove Abraham's faith by his readiness to sacrifice his son upon His command. He did it. He would have Nineveh prepared for repentance by Jonah's denunciations of His judgments; His will was accomplished. But it was not God's will, that Isaac should be sacrificed, or Nineveh destroyed. All denunciations of God's judgments are understood with exception. He who fancieth

II.

any contradiction in these two instances, understandeth little DISCOURSE of the rules of contradictions. There is great difference between that which God will have done by others, and what He will do Himself. There was just reason for what Abraham did, and what Jonah did; but there can be no reason for God to contradict Himself. If God had reprehended Abraham or Jonah for what they did in obedience to His own commands, and punished them for it, and justified it by His omnipotence, which is T. H. his inexcusable error (as I have shewed him already, and shall shew him further in due place, if there be occasion), this had been something to his purpose; now, all that he saith, is wholly impertinent.

Likewise, whereas he saith, that "the expostulation of man against God will be equally just or unjust, whether the necessity of all things be granted or denied, because God could have made man impeccable and did note," he doth but betray his own weakness and presumption, to talk of any "just expostulation with God" in any case. I have shewed him already, what a vain recrimination this is, and given him just reason, why God Almighty did not make man impeccable.

CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS;-NUMBER XI.

In these Animadversions is contained, first, a repetition of my argument to which he answereth nothing but this,that "liberty is to choose what we will, not to choose our will," which he saith "no inculcation is sufficient to make" me "take notice of." I know not what he calleth "taking notice." I have confuted it over and over again, both in my Defence formerly, and now in these Castigations; and shewed it to be a vain, silly, unprofitable, false, contradictory, distinction. What he would have me to do more for it, I understand not; but I observe, that he never mentioneth

III.

PART this distinction but he is presently up upon his tiptoes. He 776 will find by degrees, how little ground he hath for it.

[T. H.'s most ridiculous pre

away

Then he proceedeth to my reply, to which he giveth two "that if answers. First, you take these words from it, sumption.] knowledge of approbation-practical knowledge-heavenly bodies act upon sublunary things, not only by their motion, but also by an occult virtue (which we call influence)—moral efficacy-general influence-special influence-infuse something into the will-the will is moved the will is induced to will-the will suspends its own acts;' which are all nonsense, unworthy of a man, nay, if a beast could speak, unworthy of a beast!" There is a hundred times more sense in these phrases, than there is in his great Leviathan put all together. He who dare abuse and so much vilify many of the ancient Fathers, and all the lights of the Schools, for so many successive ages, and all philosophers, natural and moral, who have written any thing, as to style them all, without exception, "beasts," and worse than beasts, deserves no other answer but contempt of his ignorant presumption, or pity of his bold blindness. He saith, this malady happened to us by having our "natures depraved by doctrinem." We say, his malady happened to him, because his nature was never polished with "doctrine," but he would needs be a master in all arts before he had been a scholar in any art. The true reason why he slighteth these words is because he understandeth very little of them; and what he doth understand, he is not able to answer. So it fareth with him, as with one that hath a politic deafness, who seemeth not to hear what he knoweth not how to answer; as I could shew him by many and many instances, but that I dare not tell him, that any thing is "too hot for his fingers ".'

Occult virtue or influence.

I said, that "the heavenly bodies do act upon sublunary things, not only by their motion and light, but also by an occult virtue, which we call influence." Against the matter he excepteth not, but against the expression,—“an occult virtue,”– whereas I should have said, "I know not how P." If he alone

[Defence, Numb. xi. above p. 60; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

P [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xi. p. 86.]

31

II.

be so happy as to know distinctly the causes of all acts, it is Discourse well for him; but if this be nothing but bold presumption, it is so much the worse. I have good ground for the thing itself;" Canst thou bind the sweet influences of the Job xxxviii. Pleiades ?" If he be so much more skilful than all other men about the influences of the stars, I desire to know of him a natural reason of that peculiar virtue which the moon hath of moistening, and Saturn of cooling, and Mercury of raising winds, &c. I fear, when all is done, he will prove to be but one of Æsop's companions, who pretended to know all things, and did know nothing.

duced to

I argued from his principles, that if God by special in- [T. H. refluence did necessitate the second causes to operate as they an absurdid, and if they, being thus determined, did necessitate man dity.] inevitably, unresistibly, by an essential subordination of causes, to do whatsoever he did, then one of these two absurdities must follow,-either that there is no such thing as sin in the world, or that God is more guilty of it than man, as the motion of the watch is more from the artificer who makes it and winds it up than from the watch itself. To this he answereth only this, that my "consequence is no stronger, than if out of this-that a man is lame necessarily

-one should infer, that either he is not lame, or that his lameness proceeded necessarily from the will of Gods." And is it possible, that he doth not see, that this influence followeth clearly and necessarily from his principles? If he doth not, I will help his eyesight. All actions and accidents and events whatsoever do proceed from the will of God, as the principal cause, determining them to be what they are by a natural necessary subordination of causes, this is the principle; I assume that which no man can deny,-but the lameness of this man (whom he mentioneth) is an accident or event; therefore this lameness (upon his principles) is "from the will of God," &c.

σε Ως

9 [“ Καὶ τίς ἂν εἴη τούτου δυσσεβέστερος ἄλλος, τοῦ τῶν ὅλων θεὸν, . επάναγκες ἐκβιαζόμενον τόνδε μὲν οὐκ ἐθέλοντα ἀσεβεῖν, μηδ' εὐλόγως ἐπιμέμφεσθαι τοῖς πλημ μέλουσιν· ἀλλ ̓ ἤτοι μηδὲ ἁμαρτήματα ταῦτ ̓ εἶναι ἡγεῖσθαι, ἢ τῶν κακῶν ἁπάντων ποιητὴν εἶναι τὸν θεὸν ἀπο

r

[Defence, Numb. xi. above p. 63; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

PART

III.

It is blasphemy to say, that

cause of

sin.

CASTIGATIONS UPON THE ANIMADVERSIONS;-NUMBER XII. In this section, he behaveth himself as the hound by Nilus, drinketh and runneth, as if he were afraid to make any stay1; quite omitting the whole contexture and frame of my discourse, only catching here and there at some phrase, or odd ends of broken sentences. The authority of St. Paul was formerly his palladium, the fate of his opinion of fate, or his sevenfold shield, which he bore up against all assailants. And now to desert it, as the ostrich doth her eggs in the sand, and "leave it to the judgment of the reader, to think of the same as 777 he pleaseth"," seemeth strange. That man usually is in some great distress, who quitteth his buckler. I desire but the judicious reader, upon the by, to compare my former Defence with his trifling exceptions; and I do not fear his verdict.

He saith, "it is blasphemy to say that God can sin." So it is blasphemy also to say, that God is the author or cause of God is the any sin. This he himself saith (at least implicitly); and this he cannot but say, so long as he maintaineth an universal antecedent necessity of all things flowing from God by a necessary flux of second causes. He who teacheth, that all men are determined to sin antecedently without their own concurrence, irresistibly beyond their own power to prevent it, and efficaciously to the production of sin; he who teacheth, that it is the antecedent will of God, that men should sin and must sin; he who maketh God to be not only the cause of the act and of the law, but likewise of the irregularity or deviation, and of that very anomy wherein the being of sin (so far as sin hath a being) doth consist;-maketh God to be the principal cause and author of sin: but T. H. doth all this.

Or to say, efficacious

by God.

He saith, "it is no blasphemy to say, that God hath so that sous ordered the world, that sin may necessarily be committed"." ly decreed That is true in a right sense; if he understand only a necessity of infallibility upon God's prescience, or a necessity of supposition upon God's permission. But what trifling and mincing of the matter is this! Let him cough out, and shew us the bottom of his opinion, which he cannot deny :-that God

[Plin., Nat. Hist., viii. 61. "Certum est" (canes) "juxta Nilum amnem currentes lambere, ne crocodilorum aviditati occasionem præbeant."]

U

[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. p. 107.]