III. PART that men have liberty or power of election. He answered, that men are necessitated, they choose by antecedent causes". I took away this answer three ways. First, by reason. To this he is silent. Secondly, by instances. Thirdly, by the texts themselves. To this he rejoineth ;-that these texts and instances "do only prove, that a man is free to do if he will, which" he "denieth not;" but they do "not prove, that he is free to will:" and in the second instance, "the senior of the mess chooseth what he hath an appetite to, but he chooseth not his appetited." This is all he answereth. Freedom to do if one out free dom to distinction. This distinction hath been already sufficiently refuted as will, with contradictory to his own grounds, which do as much necessitate a man to do as to will; secondly, as unprofitable, the will, a vain necessity of willing being much more subject and obnoxious to all those blows, and all those absurdities, which flow from fatal destiny, than the necessity of doing; thirdly, as contrary to the sense and meaning of the whole world; fourthly, as contrary to the Scriptures; lastly, I have demonstrated the unreasonableness of his comparison between the intellectual and sensitive appetite, both as it is a comparison,Theologia Symbolica non est argumentativa,-as also as it is an inference from the lesser to the greater negatively. Numb. Xxx. 14 [13.] Now I add, that "that gloss is accursed, which doth corrupt the text;" as this gloss of his doth,-that a man is free to do if he will, but not free to will. Election is that very thing which he saith is not free, that is, the appetite and it is thus defined, "Electio est appetitus rei præconsiderate""Election is an appetite of something that hath been predeliberated off." But the texts alleged do demonstrate, that to choose or elect is free, and undetermined to one. Therefore they do demonstrate, that it is not free only to do, but much more to will or to choose. It is in the husband's choice, either to "establish the vow of his wife," or to "make it void." Here is a liberty of contradiction or of exercise. a [Above in the Defence, Numb. vi. pp. 37, 38; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] [Ibid., T. H. Numb. vi. above p. 38.] [Ibid., Defence, Numb. vi. above pp. 38-41.] d [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. vi. p. 54.] e Answer to the Stating of the Quest., [above p. 221; and to the] Fount. of Arg., [above p. 234;] and Castig., Numbers i. iii. [above pp. 257, 274; and] Defence, Numb. iii. [above pp. 30-32, Disc. i. Pt. iii.] f [See Thom. Aquin., Summ., Prim. Secund., Qu. xiii. art. 2.] II. xxiv. 12. Again, "Choose ye this day whom ye will serve, whether the DISCOURSE Gods of your fathers, or the Gods of the Amorites;" and, "I Josh. xxiv. offer thee three things, choose the which of them I shall do." 15.-2 Sam. Here is a liberty of contrariety or specification. And in all these places here is a liberty of election,—to will, to desire, to choose their own appetite. Secondly, the same is demonstrated from the definition of free will,-to be "a free power of choosing one thing before another, or accepting or rejecting the same thing indifferently, given to the intellectual nature for the glory of God, in order to some end." But all these texts by me alleged, and many more, do attribute unto the will a "power of choosing one thing before another," or of "accepting or rejecting the same thing indifferently." Therefore all these texts do demonstrate, that the will of man is free, not only to do if he will, but to will, that is, to choose or to elect. Wheresoever, whensoever, and howsoever the will acteth, it is volition; but election is the proper formal act of the will, as it is free. And it is altogether impossible there should be any election, without a freedom to will. The will employeth the understanding to consider of the most convenient means to attain some desired end. The understanding doth return its judgment, which is like a bill presented to the king by the two houses. The will is free, either to suspend its act or deny its approbation, with "La volonté s'avisera"-" The will will advise better," or else to consent, with "La volonté le veut"-" The will approveth it;" which consent to the judgment of the understanding is properly election, as it were the conclusion of a practical syllogism, "an intellective appetite or an appetitive intellecth." If a great prince should offer to his poor subject three distinct gifts and bid him take his choice of them, having underhand given away two of them before to another from him, were it not an abuse, and a mere mockery? God ["Liberum arbitrium est libera potestas, ex his quæ ad finem aliquem conducunt, unum præ aliis eligendi, aut unum et idem acceptandi vel pro arbitrio respuendi, intelligenti naturæ ad magnam Dei gloriam attributa." Bellarm., De Gratiâ et Lib. Arb., lib. iii. c. 2; Op. tom. iii. p. 650. D.] * [“ Διὸ ἢ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ προαίρε σις ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική.” Aristot., 19. PART 31, 32.] offered David in like manner his choice of three things ; 66 III. "I offer thee three things, choose which of them I shall do." [2 Sam. xxiv. 12.] Did God openly offer to David the free choice of three things, and had secretly determined that two of them should never be? Far be this from God. Especially to do it so seriously, 767 Deut. xxx. and with such solemn protestations; as, "I call heaven and earth this day to record against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing, therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live." Can any man who [Matt. xiii. hath but so much reverential fear of God, as a grain of mustard seed, which is the least of seeds," harbour such an unworthy thought in his breast ?-that Truth itself should be guilty of such gross dissimulation. It is a decided cause in law, that he who hath granted to another liberty of election, cannot before his election dispose of that which he hath granted away to another. He who hath a right to elect, if he choose an unworthy person, by the sentence of the law forfeits his right to elect for that turn. Why so, if he was necessitated without his will to choose as he did? We say truly, consent taketh away error. That man is not wronged, who consents to his own wrong. How so, if his consent be against or without his own will? If the will be not free but necessitated, then nothing is unlawful. "That which is not lawful by the law, necessity maketh lawful." In case not only of absolute, but even of extreme necessity, meum and tuum ceaseth, and that which otherwise had been plain theft, becometh just. He who necessitateth all events, taketh sin out of the world. One of my instances was in the election of the king of the Romans; to which he answereth as formerly, that "the electors are free to name whom they will, but not free to will." If they be "not free to will," then they are not free to elect; for election is the proper formal act of the will: and then the electors are no electors. There is one contradiction. Neither are they free to name whom they will indifferently, if they be determined necessarily and antecedently to name one. Possibility of more than one, and a precise determination to one (that is, may name, and must name), are likewise con i k [Defence, Numb. vi. above pp. 39, [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. vi. 40; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] p. 54.] II. tradictories in adjecto. This is not all. We see by the Golden DISCOURSE Bull', what care there is to bring the electors together to Frankfort, and to secure them there. Every one of them must take a solemn oath upon the Gospel of St. John, that "according to his faith which he oweth to God and the Roman empire, to the best of his discretion and understanding, he will choose"-" volo eligere"-" with the help of God, a king of the Romans, that is fit for it, and give his voice and vote without all pact, stipend, price, or promisem." And if they do not accord actually within thirty days, they are thenceforth to have nothing but bread and water until they have made their election m. If it was antecedently determined by extrinsecal causes who should be chosen and no other, what needed all this trouble and charge to so many great princes, when they might as well have stayed at home, and have set seven ordinary burghers to have drawn lots for it? Do men use to swear to choose that, which (it may be) is not in their power to choose, and to refuse that, which (it may be) is not in their power to refuse? The belly is a vehement orator; but if it be absolutely determined whom they must choose, and when, they might as well give them Moselle wine, and the best meat the country affords, as bread and water. Here we have expressly "volo eligere”—“ I will choose;" which is as much as to say, "volo velle”—“ I will will;" which phrase T. H." esteemeth an absurd speech, but Julius Scaliger thought otherwise,-" Dicimus et verè et ex omnium gentium consensu, volo velle." The very words, "cum adjutorio Dei"-" with the help of God," might teach them, that God is neither the total cause, nor the determining cause, of man's election. Lastly, this distinction And maketh T. H. worse than the Stoics themselves; for the Stoics, together with their fate, did also maintain the free- degree dom of the will; and as we find in many authors, both the Stoics. theirs and ours, did not subject the soul of man nor the will of man to the rigid dominion of destiny. The Stoics "substracted some causes, and subjected others to necessity and among those which they would not have to be 1 Bulla Caroli IV. [A.D. 1356. See Goldast., Constit. Imp., tom. i. p. 355.] m [Ibid.] n [Qu., State of the Quest., p. 4.] maketh T. H. a worse than III. PART under necessity, they placed the will of man; lest it should seem not to be free, if it were subjected to necessity"." Chrysippus made two sorts of causes; principal causes, which did necessitate and compel all things, except the will of man; and adjuvant causes, as objects, which did only excite and allure. These (said he) do awaken the mind of man, but being awakened it can move of itself; which he setteth forth by the comparison of a whirligig, and a roller cast down a steep place, which have the beginning of their motion from without themselves, but their progress from their own form 768 and volubility¶. So T. H. is worse than a Stoic in this respect, and extendeth fatal necessity further than they did. I have done with this distinction for this time. I say nothing of the bird, but the egg is bad. [How the will follow eth the of reason.] CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS;-NUMBER VII. In these Animadversions there is nothing contained which is material, either for necessity or against liberty; but passion judgment and animosity. Where it is said, that "the will doth perpetually follow the last dictate of the understanding, or the last judgment of right reason;" he excepteth, that I am "mistaken,. . for the will followeth as well the judgment of an erroneous as of a true reasoning." First, his exception is improper. It is the judgment of reason, not of reasoning. Secondly, it is impertinent. The only question here is, whether the will do follow the last judgment of reason, not whether the reason be right or not. Thirdly, it is false. Whilst the will doth follow the erroneous judgment of reason, yet it followeth it as the judgment of right reason. When the judgment of reason is erroneous, the will followeth it only de facto; but when it is right, it followeth it both de facto and de jure. [The will and the under His second exception is, that I" make the understanding to be an effect of the wills." Good words. I said not the understanding standing, but "the act of the understanding," that is, the deexplained.] liberation or judgment of the understanding; which is so far P Aug., De Civit. Dei, lib. v. c. 10. [§ 1; Op. tom. vii. p. 124. F.] Apud Gellium, [vi. 2.] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. vii. p. 58.] 8 [Ibid.] t [Defence, Numb. vii. above p. 42; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] |