I.

The scope of his discourse is, that "things necessary" may DISCOURSE be "praiseworthy." There is no doubt of it. But withal their praise reflects upon the free agent, as the statue reflects upon the workman who made it. a thing" (saith he) is "to say, it is good." True: but this liberty.] goodness is not a metaphysical goodness; so the worst of things, and whatsoever hath a being, is good:-nor a natural goodness; the praise of it passeth wholly to the Author of nature; "God saw all that He had made, and it was very [Gen. i. good:"—but a moral goodness, or a goodness of actions rather 31.] than of things. The moral goodness of an action is the conformity of it with right reason. The moral evil of an action is the deformity of it, and the alienation of it from right reason. It is moral praise and dispraise which we speak of here. To praise anything morally, is to say, it is morally good, that is, conformable to right reason. The moral dispraise of a thing is to say, it is morally bad, or disagreeing from the rule of right reason. So moral praise is from the good use of liberty, moral dispraise from the bad use of liberty; but if all things be necessary, then moral liberty is quite taken away, and with it all true praise and dispraise. Whereas T. H. adds, that "to say a thing is good, is to say, 685 it is as I would wish, or as another would" wish, or as "the state" would have it, or "according to the law" of the land, he mistakes infinitely. He, and another, and the state, may all wish that which is not really good but only in appearance. We do often wish what is profitable or delightful, without regarding so much as we ought what is honest. And though "the will of the state" where we live, or the law of the land, do deserve great consideration, yet it is no infallible rule of moral goodness. And therefore to his question,—whether nothing "that proceeds from necessity can please” me,—I answer, yes. The burning of the fire pleaseth me when I am cold; and I say, it is good fire, or a creature created by God for my use and for my good: yet I do not mean to attribute any moral goodness to the fire, nor give any moral praise to it; as if it were in the power of the fire itself either to communicate its heat or to suspend it: but I praise first the Creator of the fire, and then him who provided it. As for the praise "which Velleius Paterculus gives Cato,"-that

III.

PART "he was good by nature, et quia aliter esse non potuit,”—it hath more of the orator than either of the theologian or philosopher in it. Man in the state of innocency did fall and become evil; what privilege hath Cato more than he? No, by his leave,

[Of rewards and punishments;

of brute

beasts not

relevant.]

"Narratur et dii Catonis

Sæpè mero caluisse virtus."

But the true meaning,-that he was naturally of a good temper, not so prone to some kinds of vices as others were,— this is to praise a thing, not an action, naturally, not morally. Socrates was not of so good a natural temper, yet proved as good a man'. The more his praise; by how much the difficulty was the more to conform his disorderly appetite to right

reason.

Concerning reward and punishment, he saith not a word, but only that they frame "and conform the will to good;" the parallel which hath been sufficiently answered. They do so indeed; but if his opinion were true, they could not do so. But (because my aim is not only to answer T. H., but also to satisfy myself) though it be not urged by him, yet I do acknowledge, that I find some improper and analogical rewards and punishments used to brute beasts; as the hunter rewards his dog, the master of the coy-duck whips her, when she returns without company. And if it be true, which he affirmeth a little before, that I have confessed, that "the actions of brute beasts are all necessitated and determined to that one thing which they shall do"," the difficulty is increased. But, first, my saying is misalleged. I said, that some kinds of actions, which are most excellent in brute beasts and make the greatest show of reason, as the bees working their honey and the spiders weaving their webs, are yet done without any consultation or deliberation, by a mere instinct of nature, and by a determination of their fancies to these only kinds of works. But I did never say, I could not say, that all their individual actions are necessary, and antecedently determined in their causes; as what days the bees shall fly abroad, and what days and hours each bee shall keep

1. [All the

actions of

brute beasts

not necessary.]

I.

in the hive, how often they shall fetch in thyme on a day, and DISCOURSE from whence. These actions and the like, though they be not free, because brute beasts want reason to deliberate, yet they are contingent, and therefore not necessary.

III.

necessity inconsistent with piety.]

[2 Cor. vii. 11.]

PART things come to pass inevitably, and it will utterly destroy the study of piety. Who will bewail his sins with tears? what will become of that "grief," that "zeal," that "indignation," that holy "revenge," which the Apostle speaks of? if men be once throughly persuaded that they could not shun what they did. A man may grieve for that which he could not help; but he will never be brought to bewail that as his own fault, which flowed not from his own error, but from an antecedent necessity. Who will be careful or solicitous to perform obedience, that believeth there are inevitable bounds and limits set to all his devotions, which he can neither go beyond nor come short of? To what end shall he pray God to avert those evils which are inevitable? or to confer those favours which are impossible? We indeed know not what good or evil shall happen to us; but this we know, that if all things be necessary, our devotions and endeavours cannot alter that which must be. In a word, the only reason, why those persons who tread in this path of fatal destiny do sometimes pray, or repent, or serve God, is because the light of nature and the strength of reason and the evidence of Scripture do for that present transport them from their ill-chosen grounds, and expel those Stoical fancies out of their heads. A complete Stoic can neither pray nor repent nor serve God to any purpose. Either allow liberty, or destroy Church as well as commonwealth, religion as well as policy.

[Answer.]

T. H.-His third argument consisteth in other inconveniences, which he saith will follow; namely, impiety, and negligence of religious duties, repentance and zeal to God's service. To which I answer, as to the rest, that they follow not. I must confess, if we consider far the greatest part of mankind, not as they should be, but as they are; that is, as men, whom either the study of acquiring wealth, or preferments, or whom the appetite of sensual delights, or the impatience of meditating, or the rash embracing of wrong principles, have made unapt to discuss the truth of things; that the dispute of this question will rather hurt than help their piety. And therefore, if he had not desired this answer, I would not have written it. Nor do I write it, but in hope your Lordship and he will keep it in private. Neverthe

I.

less, in very truth, the necessity of events does not of itself DISCOURSE draw with it any impiety at all. For piety consisteth only in two things: one, that we honour God in our hearts; which ion of neis, that we think of His power as highly as we can; for to honour anything is nothing else but to think it to be of great impiety in power: the other, that we signify that honour and esteem by minded our words and actions; which is called "cultus," or worship of God. He therefore that thinketh, that all things proceed from God's eternal will, and consequently are necessary, does he not think God omnipotent? does he not esteem of His power as highly as possible? which is to honour God as much as can be in his heart. Again, he that thinketh so, is he not more apt by external acts and words to acknowledge it, than he that thinketh otherwise? Yet is this external acknowledgment the same thing which we call worship. So this opinion fortifieth piety in both kinds, externally, internally; and therefore is far from destroying it. And for repentance, [Nor exwhich is nothing but a glad returning into the right way pentance.] after the grief of being out of the way, though the cause that made him go astray were necessary, yet there is no reason why he should not grieve; and again, though the cause why he returned into the way were necessary, there remains still the causes of joy. So that the necessity of the actions taketh away neither of those parts of repentance, grief for the error, nor joy for the returning. And for [Nor prayer.] prayer, whereas he saith, that the necessity of things destroys prayer, I deny it. For though prayer be none of the causes that move God's will, His will being unchangeable, yet, since we find in God's word, He will not give His blessings but to [Matt. vii. 7. &c.] those that ask them, the motive to prayer is the same. Prayer is the gift of God, no less than the blessings. And the prayer is decreed together in the same decree wherein the blessing is decreed. "Tis manifest, that thanksgiving 687 is no cause of the blessing past; and that which is past is sure, and necessary. Yet even amongst men, thanks is in use as an acknowledgment of the benefit past, though we should expect no new benefit for our gratitude. And prayer to God Almighty is but thanksgiving for His blessings in general. And though it precede the particular thing we ask, yet it is not a cause or means of it, but a signification that we expect